PHYSICALISM: Behaviourism

behaviourism

- all mental states are behavioural dispositions, physical orgins
- eg what it means to have the mental state of pain is to display behavioural dispositions associated with being in pain

circularity - response

- building from multiple realisability, process of analysing mental states in terms of behavioural dispostions become circular
- behaviourism must assume other mental states in order to give an analysis of mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions
- will mean that other mental states will be defined in terms of the original mental states one set out to define

physicalism

everything is either physical or supervenes on the physical
- there are only physical things, any properties or abstractions are linked
- impossible to have two physically identical things/ two things in the same physical state but with a different mental state

+ behaviourism

category mistake

- behaviourism

asymmetry between self knoweldge and other knowledge
- super spartants
- circularity

ryle critcism of dualism - mental concepts would be impossible to use

- mental states non physical and private, so how could anyone talk about them
- if dualism is true, then it would be impossible for anyone to know anything about others mental states
- as there would be no way of seeing/ experiencing others mental states

category mistake

- to think that mental properties are distinct from assoicated behaviours

- someone wants to know what Uni is, so someone shows them library, lecture halls, etc everything that makes up the uni
- but they ask at the end, to show them the uni
- category mistake, since uni is a composiiton of all those things, it is nothing beyond what has been shown


- can be applied to mental states
- they are a comp of behaviour, nothing more than behavioural dispositions
- showing various behavioural dispostions associated with pain, is to show what the mental disposition of pain is,
- so single thing that can be called pain, category mistake to assume otherwise

hard behaviorism

HEMPLE all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to the propostions about behaviours
- mind is nothing more than behaviours
- describing all behaviorual means to have described the mind
- mental states can all be reduced to behavioural dispositions

soft behaviourism

RYLE - allows possibility for a mind
- there can be propositions about mental states such as 'i am in pain' , but they can be understood in terms of behavioural disposotions
- so completely reducing pain and mental dispositions to behavioural dispositions, would not fully encompass what mental dispositions are🕔

- propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions

multiple realisability - response

- same mental state can be realised through multiple behaviour depending on other mental states, which will also need to be identified with behavioural dispositions

- behaviourism will never be able to give a proper explanation of mental states

- eg mental state of being thirsty can be explained htrough disposition of wanting to drink something in front of you, but this will not be the case, if one also had the mental state that the drink was poisoned

- means another mental state must be analysed in terms of behavoir



- each mental state can be realised by any behaviour,
- makes it impossible to understand mental states as behavioural dispostions, as any behavioural disp could lead to any mental state and any menatl state could be realsied by any behavioural dispositon

asymmetry of knowledge - response to behavioursm

- behaviourism should rule out asymmetry of knowledge between self knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental states
- but there is an asymmetry, since knowledge of own mental states, infallible, directly understood, cannot be wrong
- others, indirectly acquired through inference, must assume mental based on behaviour, could be wrong
- must mean behavioiuism is false

response to asymmetry of knowledge - ryle

- rejects SK and Kof other people mental states as different things
- gain them both in same way by paying attention
- under impression they are different since self k = more info
- thinking = internal speech and speech is a behaviour
- can know what someone is thinking by paying attention to what they say
- means there is no asymmetry of knowledge, behaviourism still stands

response to super spartans

- impossible , begs the questions
- concpet of pain is meaningless in a society where there was no existence of the concept of pain
- no evidence for pain then how would they know which bD they are to supress
- incoherent concep

Zombies + response

pZ do not have qualia, so do not experience mental state of pain, show bD of pain
- if possible, pain is a sepertae thing to mental
- bH must be false


response
- inconceivable
- mental state are BH

conceivability argument

- mental states without bh are conc
- so they are possible
- Bh is false

bh would reject this since they are inconc, as mental and bh are the same

disposition

how someone will or how likely someone is to behave in a certain way under certain circumstances

(soft, uses bd, aware that people may not always behave a certain way under certain circumstances)

how did ryle demonstrate that self knowledge and knowledge of other people mental states are actually the same thing (counter the asymmetry of knowledge)

- they are the same, both gained by paying attention
- thinking is a behaviour since it is a form of internal speech, hence one is able to gain knowledge of other people, as much knowledge as there can be self knowledge by paying attention

how is self knowkedge and knowledge of other people gained accoridng to ryle

by paying attention

thinking is a behavioural according to ryle

- internal speech
- speech is a behaviour, hence by listening and paying attention to another person speak one has the potential to gain as much knowledge of that person as one has self knowledge

why does self knowledge and knowledge of other people have the apperance of being different

- one has more self knowledge, in more detail than they have knowledge of other people

soft b aqa

propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions, propositions that use ordinary language

super spartands - hilary putnam

- community of people who do not display an exterior disposition towards pain
- do not show pain behavioral dispositions
- example of mental state without associated beahviorual dispositions
- if this is possible, then BH is false, pain and pain+ behavioural disp are two different things
- since according to bH, to be in pain is to behavie in a pain way

difference between hard and soft behavioursm

hard - all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusivley use the language of physics to talk about bodily movements. mental states analytically reduce to behavioural dispositions

soft - propositions about mental states = propositions about behavioural dispositions, using ordinary language. not the actual behaviours , acknowledges that one can have the mental state without the assocuated disposition, or the disposition without the assoicated mental state

multiple realisability simple

- any specific mental state can be realised through multiple different behaviours,

- any specific behaviour can be realised through multiple different mental states

why did ryle say that mental states are impossible to use if dualism was true

-they are non physical, private, no one would be able to know anything about them
- no way for anyone to experience anything about mental states
- yet one does know things about mental states so mental states must be physical

how does analysing mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions become circular

- one must assume other mental states to give analysis of them in terms of behaviourism
- other mentla states will evevntually become defined in terms of the original mental state they set out to define - means all mental states will eventually mean the same thing

pain - disposition to run away

hard b aqa

all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements

difference between hard and soft behaviourism

hard : mental states are only meaningful if they are applied to something external, mental states analytically reduce to behaviours

soft - does not reduce behaviours, merely analyses mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions , a tendancy to behave in a certain way that utilises ordinary language