psy3`12 term test 1

associationist perspective

• kids learn about the world through experience

• minimal initial endowment

• likely only born with simple abilities to make connections between experiences

constructivist perspective

• started with piaget

• associative capabilities are not enough alone

• kids also have some motor and perceptual capabilities

  • become more elaborated to systematic thought

competent-infant perspective

• children might be born with more sophisticated perceptual skills

  • i.e. visual perception

• wide range of perceptual skills and conceptual understanding

bronfenbrenner’s ecological model

• microsystem: child

• mesosystem: school, family, daycare 

• exosystem: extended family, neighbours, community

• macrosystem: broad ideology, laws, customs

• chronosystem: changes in person or environment over time

stage theory

• conceptual change: developmental discontinuity

• qualitative change: knowledge in each stage is fundamentally different

• concurrence assumption

  • change in many concepts simultaneously 

  • can also reverse operations

• abruptness assumption

  • sudden change, not gradual

• coherent organization of knowledge

continuity theory

• conceptual enrichment: developmental continuity 

• quantitative change: kids know more, but their knowledge isn’t different

• independence assumption

  • change in concepts independently

• smoothness assumption

  • gradual change

  • amount of change is usually the same

DCCS task

• executive function task with 3-5-year olds

• shown target cards: red smiley face, blue heart

• shown similar cards that must be sorted by rule

  • i.e. shape

• given cards with blue smileys and red hearts

• change rules of the game

  • switch from shape to colour

• younger children (3 and young 4 year olds) have difficulty in post-switch

  • can say the new rule, but behaviour reverts to original

theory grid

• nature or nurture

• role of social world

• representational change or enrichment

• domain general or domain specific 

assimilation

• using or transforming the environment so it can be placed in a pre-existing cognitive structure

• i.e. baby sucks on rattle since the baby sucks on a pacifier

accommodation

• changing cognitive structures to accept something from the environment

• i.e. baby learns that zebras are not a type of dog

stage theory grid

• nature

• no role of social world

• representational change

• domain general

decalage

• a certain stage form of thinking applies to only certain cases and not others

sensorimotor period (piaget)

• age 0-2

• coordinate input with motor responses

• schemes become more specialized

• development of object permanence

• learn how to represent things they cannot see

preoperational period (piaget)

• 2-7 years old

• development of symbolic thought

• irreversibility: can’t run steps in reverse

• centration: focused on only one dimension such as appearances

  • i.e. failing conservation task

• egocentrism: focus on own perspective as opposed to another

concrete operational period (piaget)

• age 7-11

• mental operations applied to events

• can reverse operations

• can take others’ perspectives (ToM)

• hierarchical classification

  • i.e. a chair is also a piece of furniture

• mastery of conservation 

• class inclusion

  • i.e. are there more roses than flowers (in a row of 5 roses and 2 tulips)

  • understanding that roses are a flower and there are more flowers

formal operational period (piaget)

• ages 11+

• thinking becomes fully abstract and separated from reality

• mental operations applied to abstract ideas

• logical and systematic thinking

strength’s of piaget’s theory

• recognizes central role of cognition in development

• parsimonious: accounts for different cases

• child is an active, self-motivated agent

• robust developmental observations

weaknesses of piaget’s theory

• mechanisms of change are underspecified 

• children’s performance is not always consistent and stage-like

• children’s knowledge is often underestimated

• insufficient focus on social context

socio-cultural perspective (vygotsky)

• child in social context

  • not just child themselves

• culture contributes psychological tools that transform thinking

• development proceeds via internalization of verbal thoughts

  • first on social plane, then on psychological plane

distal and molar context

• social cultural historical moments

  • i.e. technology

• abstract things that affect development

• cultures differ in terms of which cognitive skills are adaptive and values

proximal context

• social and physical setting

  • i.e. interaction with people and activities

• adults as mediators of knowledge

  • guided participation through formal and informal interactions

zone of proximal development (vygotsky)

• difference between child’s actual developmental level and potential developmental level

• actual level determined by independent problem solving

• potential level determined by problem solving with adult guidance or with other more capable peers

  • function at a higher level

• adults do the most effective teaching

  • scaffolding through support and tailored interaction

• predicts future knowledge

socio-cultural theory grid

• nurture

• social world plays a big role

• enrichment change

• domain general (?)

information processing theories

• framework rather than theory

• focuses on cognitive change, not stages

• moment-by-moment cognitive activities

• what the child’s cognitive system does on-line

information processing tools

• task analysis: breaking a task down into component parts

  • i.e. ability to read, understand numbers, etc

• computer simulations: testing and revising models of thinking and cognitive change

  • computer program that mimics a child’s performance on a given task

information processing grid

• nature and nurture?

• social world helps change cognitive structures

• enrichment

• domain general due to changes applying to everything

theory theory

• children possess theories about the world

• functional: can make predictions, explain behaviours, etc.

• develop and test hypotheses

• revise knowledge considering counterevidence

• theory revision occurs within a domain

knowledge in theory theory

• qualitative changes

• representational innateness: built-in knowledge

• architectural innateness: built-in constraints that influence what and how information is processed 

theory theory grid

• some nature (innateness), more nurture (evidence)

• strong role of social world

• representational

• domain specific: theories about a particular domain

core knowledge theory

• infants are innately endowed with modular systems

  • concerned with some types of input but not others

  • operates independently of other processes

• if an entity within a domain violates one principle, infants suspend other principles as well 

• development consists of enrichment around knowledge

core knowledge domains (spelke)

• objects

• number

• space

• geometry

• agents and actions

core knowledge grid

• initially nature, but then becomes more nurture

• role of social world helps enrich initial domains

• enrichment

• domain specific

challenges in studying infants

• limited response modalities

• get bored easily

• not good at inhibiting wants and needs

• get fussy and cry if they don’t want to do something

preferential looking paradigm

• measures visual fixation to two adjacent stimuli 

• longer looking to one stimulus implies

  • discrimination: can tell the two things apart

  • attentional or perceptual preference

• drawback: infants can discriminate between two stimuli but show no preference

intermodal matching paradigm

• measures ability to match information across senses 

• present two stimuli in one modality (i.e. faces) and another stimulus in a second modality (i.e. voice)

• longer looking to stimulus that matches

  • i.e. angry voice to angry face, object shape to how it feels, etc. 

habituation-dishabituations technique

• induces preferences

  • making the infant bored so they can show what they find interesting

• show infant a stimulus repeatedly until looking declines to asymptotic level

• present new stimulus

• increased attention suggests discrimination

  • requires ability to recognize old stimulus

novelty preference paradigm

• two novel stimuli that differ from another and test event along a single dimesnion

  • habituation: red circle

  • test: orange circle vs red square

• compare looking at two test events

  • explains how infants weight different dimensions

  • i.e. looking longer to orange circle indicates that infants weight colour more strongly than shape in object representations

violation of expectation paradigms

• infants familiarized to an initial event

• test events feature novel perceptual events or perceptually similar events that involve conceptual violations 

• expect longer looking to conceptual violations, even though perceptually familiar

violation of expectation in object permanence (baillargeon, 1987)

• babies looked at a screen on a stage that rotated 180º

• placed a box behind the screen so it would stop rotating

• possible event: box stopped the screen from rotating

  • perceptually novel

• impossible event: screen continues rotating by appearing to pass through the box

  • perceptually similar, conceptual violation

• 3.5-4 month olds looked longer to impossible event

high amplitude sucking paradigm

• assesses auditory perception

• polygraph assesses baseline level of intensity and frequency 

• play a certain sound when they suck harder on pacifier

  • babies understand relation after a few minutes and increase rate

  • get bored after a while and rate decreases again

• introduction of a new sound increases rate again

• short period where baby watches colourful slides with no sounds

  • play sounds again after

  • if the baby remembers initial sounds, they suck harder to novel ones

head-turn paradigm

• assesses discrimination of sound categories

• experimenter shows baby toys while sounds play in background

• baby turns head when a new sound is played, and a reinforcer is shown

  • i.e. new toy activated

• in later phases the reinforcer is delayed, and babies turn their head in anticipation that it will turn on

  • eventually reinforcer is removed

• young babies can learn the difference between da sounds in different languages, but older babies and adults can’t

• hit: correct head turn to changed sound

• miss: no head turn to changed sound

• false alarm: head turn to unchanged sound

• correct rejection: no head turn when no changed sound

views on intermodal perception

• piaget: major perceptual modalities are largely uncoordinated at birth

  • infant gradually learns through sensorimotor experience

• gibson: born with some perception abilities, or predispositions that facilitate these abilities

sights and sounds study

• assessed intermodal perception

• shown two female faces making different mouth movements with sounds that only matched one mouth

  • singular sound

  • phrases (story)

• shown a male and female face making different mouth movements

  • phrases played in woman’s voice

  • phrases played in man’s voice

• sounds that were played came from in between the two people

infants and intermodal perception

• by 3-4 months infants can

  • match faces based on gender

  • link parent’s voice to parent’s face

  • link voices to faces based on age

  • match speech stream to face based on timing 

  • match voices to faces based on emotion

  • match faces to voices based on specific speech sounds

neonatal imitation (meltzoff & moore, 1977)

• facial imitation in very young infants (12-21 days old)

• saw 4 gestures in random order over 15 seconds

  • lip protrusion, tongue protrusion, mouth opening, sequential finger movement 

• had a pacifier during demonstration

• recorded what the baby did in the following 20 second response period

  • experimenter held neutral face

• second experiment only used mouth opening and tongue protrusion 

• babies most frequently produced the response they had just seen the experimenter do

  • unlikely to be due to reinforcement: young babies, parents did not know purpose of study, neutral face in experimenter

  • unlikely to be a fixed action pattern: same 4 gestures, lack of stereotypy (reproductions of gestures were intentional and changed over time)

neonatal imitation replication (meltzoff & moore, 1983)

• studied tongue protrusion and mouth opening imitation in infants

  • oldest babies was 71 hours old, mean was 42 minutes old

• infants reliably imitated gestures 

• implications:

  • imitation is innate

  • newborns possess an abstract representational system (contra piaget)

  • newborns can engage in intermodal matching 

• also shown in newborn monkeys

why neuroimaging is different in kids

• have a hard time staying still

• can’t always tolerate discomfort

• brains signals change with age

spatial resolution

• where you can see things happening in the brain

• pinpointing activity to specific areas in the brain

• smaller units of the brain can be seen

temporal resolution

• when things are happening in the brain

• tracks unfolding of processing

electroencephalography (EEG)

• electrodes glued to scalp

• measures fluctuations in electric charge related to brain activity

• mainly measures activity from pyramidal neurons

• measures receiving of signals, not firing of neurons

• brain activity = electrical potentials

  • event-related potential (ERP)

• high temporal resolution

  • good for quick processes

  • does not tell much about where signals come from

structural MRI

• creates 3D images

• units are voxel (3D pixels)

• smaller voxel: more units of space in brain image

  • higher spatial resolution

functional MRI

• measures what parts of the brain are active

• proportions of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood in certain brain regions

  • BOLD signal

• blood has different magnetic properties if it is oxygenated

functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)

• oxygenated and deoxygenated blood absorb light differently within particular range of wavelengths

  • near-infrared

  • different absorption spectra

• changes in concentration affect light scattering

• optodes shine light into head

• detector measures how much light reaches through without scattering

• changes in light intensity indicate brain activity

• high temporal resolution

developmental considerations for EEG

• kids blink more than adults

  • produce electrical changes that distort wavelengths

  • must preprocess in data

• amplitude of ERP signals differs in kids

• frequency of particular rhythms change with age

MRI

• hydrogen ions spin on axis that gives them a charge

• machine pulls all ions to orient in the same direction

  • charges sum together to create a signal

• creating a gradient to change frequency of ions

• send pulses of energy at the head that make the ions reorient 

  • gradually revert to being aligned with magnetic field 

• regrowth of magnetization is measured

diffusion-based imaging

• type of structural MRI

• uses movement of water molecules as a proxy for white matter

• creates a map of direction water was moving during a brain scan

fMRI univariate analysis

• standard

• how activity in one region of the brain is different across conditions

fMRI multivoxel analysis

• compare pattern of activity in associated with something to a different pattern

• how the pattern for one thing compares to the pattern for something else

  • i.e. looking at shoes vs hearing the word shoe

fMRI functional connectivity analysis

• assess synchronization of activity across different parts of the brain

• if one region is coactivated with another in response to something

developmental considerations of fMRI

• more sensitive to motion

• can’t use task-based studies because they need to stay still 

• uncomfortable small space

• hemodynamic response changes with age

• structural brain development can affect signal and processing

strengths of fNIRS

• portable

• cheap

• less affected by motion

• hyperscanning

  • high temporal resolution

weaknesses of fNIRS

• limited depth

• low spatial resolution

• signal is affected by hair

developmental considerations of fNIRS

• some issues with movement

• hemodynamic differences

• structural differences in head and skull can affect signal

• better signal in kids because their brain is closer to the skull

• age-related change in heart and respiration rates

object permanence 

• recognizing an object still exists when not perceptually available

object permanence (piaget)

• developmentally acquired

• protracted (takes a long time to happen)

• emerges in stages

• arises from infants’ actions on the world

object concept stage 2 (piaget)

• 1-4 months of age

• can track objects until they are occluded

object concept stage 3 (piaget)

• 4-8 months

• can anticipate future positions of occluded objects

• can search for partially hidden objects

  • but not fully hidden objects

• objects are things linked to infant’s actions

object concept stage 4 (piaget)

• 8-12 months

• successfully search for hidden objects

• commit A not B error

A not B error

• failure to search in correct place even after witnessing moving object to a new location

• repeated hidings in one location lead them to continue to search there

• objects are created through the search process

object concept stage 5 (piaget)

• 12-18 months

• pass A not B task

• fail invisible displacement task

  • do not believe objects continue to exist if they can’t find them

object concept stage 6 (piaget)

• 18-24 months 

• fully represent hidden objects

• achieved object permanence

• pass invisible displacement tasks 

why infants fail to search for hidden objects

• streams for visual processing

• graded representations

• ancillary deficits

dorsal stream of visual processing

• how we should act on objects

• perception for action system

• action tasks

  • i.e. putting a letter into horizontally or vertically oriented mailbox slit

• develops later

ventral stream of visual processing

• visual judgement system

• what we see

• looking time tasks

  • i.e. judge orientation of mailbox slit

• develops early

  • why infant succeed in looking based tasks

graded representations

• not all representations are created equal

  • vary in strength

  • on average get stronger with age

• looking time tasks require weaker representations than reaching tasks

• support from computational models that mimic infants’ performance on looking time and search tasks

ancillary deficit

• infants lack the ability to organize and coordinate means-end sequences

  • i.e. separating way of getting an object from the object itself

  • required to search for a hidden object

• infants fail to search for hidden objects since they can’t effectively plan their actions

  • not their ability to mentally represent hidden objects

• removing planning component leads to success

reaching in the dark (hood & willatts, 1986)

• 5-month-old presented with an object on a rod while their arms are restrained

• object presented at mid-line, then moved either left or right, remained present or was removed

• room turned completely dark and hands are released

• look at presence and location of reaching

  • more reaching on object present than object absent trials

  • more reaching to target area than non-target area

• infants can successfully reach for an object that isn’t perceptually available (object permanence(

• replication study showed that infants use two hands to reach for large objects and one hand for small objects in the dark

  • can represent characteristics like size

ancillary deficit in A not B task

• requires ability to represent hidden objects

• appropriately update working memory

  • remember current location

• inhibit prepotent response

  • avoid reaching to location they last saw it

• abilities rely on frontal lobe

  • slow to develop

• increasing delay between hiding object and search impairs performance

core knowledge principles in objects

• innately endowed principles

• cohesion: objects move as connected and bounded wholes

• continuity: objects move on unobstructed paths

• contact: objects do not interact at a distance

• solidity: objects do not pass through one another

• support: objects do not hang in midair

quantitative learning and core knowledge

• initial knowledge is qualitative, all or none

• over time, develop an understanding of particular physical properties that affect object and event outcomes

• by 3 months: recognize that an object without any support can’t hang in midair

  • don’t realize the amount of contact needed for support

• by 6 months: recognize that a particular degree of contact is needed for support

core knowledge violation experiments 1-3 (stahl & feigenson)

• 11 month olds

• shown outcome which either violated or was consistent with expectations

  • solidity: ball going through a block 

  • continuity: ball placed in a box

  • support: car moving off platform

• taught something new about an object: hidden audio property

  • shaking the ball makes a noise

• looking to target object versus new distractor object when sound was playing

  • indicates that they learned that it makes sound

• more likely to associate target object and sound following a knowledge violation event

  • solidity and continuity events

core knowledge violation experiment 4 (stahl & feigenson)

• 11 month olds

• shown outcome which either violated or was consistent with expectations

  • solidity: ball going through a block 

  • continuity: ball placed in a box

  • support: car moving off platform

• spend more time with target object than a distractor object when following violated expectations

  • might prefer a novel distractor object when expectations were met

• exploratory behaviour varied depending on the type of violation

  • solidity violation: bang object more than drop, testing solidity 

  • support violation: drop object more than bang, testing gravity

infants’ understanding of number (wynn, 1992)

• 5 month olds in violation of expectation paradigm

• addition: starts with 1 object, screen comes up, 1 object added, hand leaves empty

  • possible: screen drops and shows 2 objects

  • impossible: screen drops and shows 1 object

• subtraction:  starts with 2 objects, screen comes up, empty hand enters, 1 object taken away

  • possible: screen drops and shows 1 object

  • impossible: screen drops and shows 2 objects

• no baseline preference for 1 or 2 objects

• looked longer at impossible condition for both

• replicated to test if infants expected a specific number of objects or just an increase/decrease

  • showed 3 or 2 objects in addition situation

  • looked longer at 3 (impossible)

interpretation of wynn’s numerical study

• methodological critiques: maybe representing amount of stuff instead of specific numbers

  • controlled with different object sizes

  • effects maintained even when amount is controlled for

• object tracking system 

object tracking system

• ability to form mental representations of small sets of objects

• can keep track of actions performed on sets and anticipate outcome

• not a numerical system exactly

• combines with approximate number system to help children understand exact integers

causal perception (leslie, 1984)

• 6.5 month olds in habituation paradigm

• direct launching event: red square hits green square, green square moves

• delayed launching event: red square hits green square, stays for a few seconds, green square moves

• showed both conditions then ran films in reverse

• more dishabituation to direct launching events in reverse

  • new agent and new recipient 

  • event is special and causal

spatial cognition in infancy (piaget)

• infants code space with respect to their own bodies (egocentrically)

  • don’t understand spatial relations until at least stage 4 but still egocentrically

• space is externalized by end of sensorimotor period (allocentric)

• understanding of space emerges via actions on the world

• evidence instead shows that knowledge of physical world principles is present early in infancy

allocentric spatial encoding (acredelo, 1978)

• light is flashed in one of two windows (left or right)

  • buzzer used to predict interesting sight at window

• baby is moved from one side of the room to the opposite

  • seeing if they look towards the same side again

• marked: the windows look different, the one with the light is marked

• unmarked: the windows look the same

• 6 month olds: turned to wrong location (egocentric)

• 11 month olds: succeeded but only on marked condition 

• 16 month olds: succeeded in both conditions (allocentric)

infants’ understanding of spatial relations (casasola et al., 2003)

• 6 month olds habituated to different pairs of objects with the same spatial relationship

  • one object inside another

• shown either old objects with a new relation, or new objects with the same old relation

• longer looking at new spatial relationships 

  • i.e. one object on top of another 

  • novelty of objects did not matter

symbols

• the signifier does not resemble what is being signified

• relation is arbitrary and conventional

• i.e. language, number

icons

• signifier resembles what is being signified

  • or possesses some of the same properties

• i.e. portraits 

indexes

• the signifier is directly related to what is being signified

  • either physically or causally

• i.e. paint swatch, smoke

pretense

• representational intent: using a symbol to stand for something else

• counterfactual reasoning: if this, then this

• social activity

pretense (piaget)

• assimilation of reality to the needs of the self

• stages leading towards true symbolic play

  • object substitution marks onset

  • symbolic actions applied to inadequate objects

• more complex pretense develops later

  • pretending to be someone else, pretending inanimate objects are alive, etc. 

• underestimated social factors

pretense (vygotsky)

• social communicative behaviour: social cues and supports are important determiners

• occurs only in context of joint activity with others

  • usually with adults who model actions

• nonliteral use of language by adults provides scaffolding

  • i.e. saying a block is an apple and making chewing noises 

nativist view of pretense (leslie)

• infants are born with ToM module for representing pretense and other mental states

• allows for mentalistic understanding of pretense

• also possess decoupling mechanism that separates reality from pretense

• pretense is present early

  • unrelated to other tasks that tap mental state understanding

constructivist view of pretense (lillard)

• representational understanding of pretense emerges late in preschool

• distinction between pretense and “behaving as if”

• pretense requires 

  • knowledge of symbol: to pretend to be a rabbit one must know what they are

  • intention to act as the symbol: can’t act like a rabbit by accident 

• age 6: understand only those that fulfill those requirements are pretending

  • younger children use surface features to judge pretense

• when procedures are simplified, even young children understand pretense

  • i.e. forced choice

intermediate view of pretense (rakoczy)

• children understand basic intentional structure of pretense early

  • do not understand full implications until 4 or 5 years old

• initially possess implicit, action-based understanding

  • later becomes explicit conceptual understanding

• both 3 and 6 year olds reproduced pretense and truing actions accurately 

  • only 6 year olds could accurately report whether an individual was pretending or trying

understanding scale models (deloache, 1987)

• 2.5 and 3 year olds

• children shown a room and a small exact replica of the room

  • along with big and small snoopy doll

• watched experimenter hide small snoopy in small room

• told experimenter would hide big snoopy in the same location in the big room

• searched for big snoopy in big room

• then asked to show where small snoopy had been hidden initially

  • making sure they didn’t forget the location

• 3 year olds looked in the right spot

• 2.5 year olds failed but remembered where small snoopy was hidden

dual representations in young children

• 3D objects distract from a model’s symbolic role

• decreasing salience of model as a thing unto itself should improve performance

• increasing model’s “objectless” should decrease performance