Criminal Procedure: Adjudication

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Last updated 4:58 PM on 3/27/26
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108 Terms

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Powell v. Alabama

  1. 9 young Black men were accused of raping 2 white women 

  2. All = all murder/capital prosecutions

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Betts v. Brady

  1. All ≠ any case in any court

  2. All = “special circumstances” (examples: illiteracy, low intelligence, complex cases)

  3. Case-by-case analysis

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Gideon v. Wainwright

  1. D charged with felony B&E

  2. Overruled Betts 

  3. All = all felonies 

  4. Felony is whatever the legislature says it is (usually crimes punishable by more than a year)

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Scott v. Illinois

All includes misdemeanors if jail time is at stake

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Alabama v. Shelton

All includes suspended sentences if they may result in a deprivation of liberty

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Some States interpretation of “all”

  1. Some States have statutes or rules that simply track the federal and state constitutional requirements 

    1. Some states add to the list of crimes for which the state must provide counsel for indigents 

    2. Some states also provide counsel for some cases involving large criminal fines

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Who are the players involved in determining the actual availability of appointed counsel?

Supreme Court

State legislatures/statutes

Judges in a particular case

County Commissioners*

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Proceedings that require defense counsel 2-part test

(1) formal judicial proceedings have begun; (2) critical stage of prosecution

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US v. Wade

post-indictment ID lineup of suspects is critical

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US v. Ash

Post-indictment ID photo lineup of suspects is NOT critical because any error can be cured at trial

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Coleman v. Alabama

  1. critical stage includes all preliminary hearings in which gov’t must demonstrate a prima facie case against the D 

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Factors to consider from Rothergy v. Gillespie County

  1. Accusation is “sufficiently formal”

  2. State commitment to prosecute is “sufficiently concrete”

  3. From that point, D is “immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law that confine his capacity and control his actual ability to defend himself”

  4. It is irrelevant whether a public prosecutor is involved or aware of proceedings 

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Judges duties when D is waiving counsel

  1. Make sure the person is competent (a little higher than competence to stand trial, but no need for legal training)

  2. Make sure the person makes a knowing and voluntary waiver 

  3. Explain the consequences and downfalls of waiving counsel (not knowing procedure, meaning of things, rules of evidence)

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Why would a D waive counsel?

  1. General distrust of the system 

  2. Some Ds are very confident in their ability to communicate about a complicated issue 

  3. In NC – if you lose with appointed counsel, there’s a set number of fees you have to pay 

  4. efficiency/avoiding delay 

  5. Sometimes waiver happens after there is an initial assignment of counsel

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Faretta v. California

Flipside of right to counsel – you also have the right to represent yourself

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Standby Counsel

  1.  a court-appointed attorney who assists a D who has chosen to represent themselves 

    1. Standby counsel does not get up and object – functions like a living law library if D wants advice

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State v. Joseph Spencer

  1. D’s private counsel withdrew so he chose to represent himself 

  2. Court appointed attorney b/c D did not know legal procedure 

  3. Court did not abuse discretion because appointed attorney was only standby counsel 

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Adequacy of defense counsel

  1. There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance

    1. Prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest 

    2. Also presumed when there literally was not a lawyer available

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US v. Cronic

  1. allows a presumption of prejudice when the circumstances were so egregious that the adversarial process itself breaks down 

    1. Cronic standard is a difficult standard to meet

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Strickland v. Washington

  1. (1) deficient performance; (2) prejudice 

    1. Prejudice “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the D of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”

    2. A “reasonable probability” the outcome would have been different 

    3. A probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome (11-49%)

    4. D has burden of proving unreasonable performance, by a preponderance of the evidence

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Laffler v. Cooper

  1. trickland applies to pretrial negotiation errors

    1. D rejected plea offer based on advice of attorney – ultimately convicted and sentenced more harshly than plea 

    2. “Here, but for counsel’s deficient performance there is reasonable probability that he and the trial court would have accepted the guilty plea.”

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Systems for Providing Defense Counsel

  1. Public defender office 

  2. Assigned counsel system (the Court schedules cases for participating private attorneys) 

  3. Contract system (where attorneys contractually agree to take on a specified number of indigent Ds or cases)

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State v. Leonard Pert

  1. D charged w/ armed robbery, rape and 1st degree murder 

  2. He was appointed counsel from the Indigent Defender Program, but the attorney was actively assigned 70 felony cases

  3. Court ordered a smaller case load and increased funding for the IDP 

  4. Remedy: all Defendants in section E are entitled to a hearing where there will be a rebuttable presumption that they are not receiving effective assistance of counsel – if assistance is below constitutional standard, prosecution cannot proceed until the D is given reasonably effective counsel

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Kimberly Hurrel-Harring v. State 

  1. Indigent defense in NY is funded at county level – a “costly, largely underfunded and politically unpopular mandate upon local governments” 

  2. Ds filed civil claims claiming the state law burdening local governments with funding deprives them of 6th amendment RTC 

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Career Choice Ethics

  1. “The Question” for defense attorneys – How can you represent those people?

  2. “The Question for prosecutors – How can you participate in this system that has produced so much overreaction and injustice?

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8th amendment

  1. 8th amendment: “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted” 

    1. There is a constitutional right to bail, but it is not disrupted by setting high bail or no bail at all in some circumstances”

    2. Excessive bail clause means bail must only be as high as reasonable necessary to secure D’s appearance

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How pretrial release is accomplished (non-financial)

  1. Conditional release – example conditions: counseling, employment, drug testing 

  2. ROR (released on own recognizance) – written promise to return to court for appearances

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How pretrial release is accomplished (financial)

  1. Surety bond – D puts up 10% and a bail bondsman is responsible for the rest/getting D to appear – does not get 10% back 

  2. Cash bond – D pays full amount and gets it back if they show up to all the appearances 

  3. Deposit bond – D pays a deposit (usually 10%); refundable upon D’s appearance 

  4. Property bond – pledge of real estate

  5. Unsecured bond – D only owes the bond amount if he fails to appear

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In re Kenneth Humphrey

  1. Humphrey was 66 and stole $7 and wanted to be released without bail – lower court set high bail 

  2. CA Supreme Court restricted use of cash bail for Ds who cannot afford it and focused more on danger/threat to community or flight

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regulatory v. puntiive detention

  1. Regulatory v. Punitive detention 

    1. Punitive if Congress says so 

    2. Regulatory (1) if Congress says nothing or claims regulatory purpose, AND (2) [ENDS] an "alternative" regulatory purpose is “rationally connected” and therefore “assignable to detention AND 

    3. [MEANS} the “incidents of pretrial detention” and not “excessive in relation to the regulatory goal”

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United States v. Salerno

  1. Pretrial detention is permitted if its regulation and not punishment 

  2. Preventative detention to avoid flight or commission of other crimes is okay under bail reform act of 1984 

  3. When the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat.

    1. Considering the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the evidence, the arrestee's background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect's release.

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Prosecutor’s 3 charging options

(1) decline (2) divert (3) charge

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3 main types of declination policies

  1. (1) general declination principles (e.g. the Wash. code); (2) offense and offender specific guidelines (e.g. Brooklyn marijuana declination policy); (3) procedural policies (e.g. ABA Standards 3-3.8 say that the prosecutor should “explore the possibility” of diversion and be “aware” of the resources of social agencies; Get supervisor approval; fill out a form explaining your choice) 

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2 stages of charging

legal sufficiency

proportionality

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declination factors

  1. Contrary to legislative intent 

  2. Antiquated statute 

  3. De minimis violation 

  4. Confinement on other charge or pending conviction on other charge 

  5. High cost of prosecution 

  6. Improper motives of complainant 

  7. Immunity

  8. Victim request

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diversion

Prosecutors can divert Ds to alternate programs for rehab or restitution; or agree to deferral of prosecution based on D’s fulfilment of certain conditions 

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choice of charges

  1. It is recommended that prosecutors charge the highest reasonable offense 

    1. Additional charges should only be filed when they are necessary to ensure that the indictment adequately reflects the nature and extent of the criminal conduct involved or will significantly enhance the strength of the government’s case against the D or co-D 

    2. Defense attorneys accuse prosecutors of overcharging for the sake of bargaining power in plea negotiations

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People v. Jaleh Wilkinson

  1. Woman pulled over for drunk driving and grabbed an officer while belligerent at the station 

  2. She was charged with battery against a custodial officer (almost identical to another crime)– D argues the charging scheme is dumb because she can be charged higher when she doesn’t inflict and injury than when she does 

  3. In US v. Batchelder – SC held D could properly be sentenced under a statute even though a nearly identical statute provided a lesser punishment 

  4. When an act violates more than one criminal statute, the government may prosecute under either 

  5. Court upheld statute under RB

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Selection of system

  1. Judicial waiver (judge-centered)

    1. Entails a hearing where the prosecutor requests waiver into adult court 

    2. Under Kent v. US, hearings must provide DP to juveniles 

      1. Seriousness of alleged offense 

      2. Manner in which the alleged offense took place (aggressive, violent, premeditated, willful)

      3. Prospective merit of charge

      4. Prospect for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of D

    3. Judges usually agree with prosecutors about waiver 

  2. Statutory exclusion (legislature-centered)

  3. Concurrent jurisdiction (prosecutor-centered) 

    1. Not subject to judicial review

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State v. Jonas Dixon

  1. 15 year old D shot a man who came and took advantage of his mother 

  2. Trial court denied his motion to transfer the case to juvenile court 

  3. The decision was reversed and remanded because the trial court improperly considered failures of CPS and probable cause 

    1. System is meant to protect juveniles

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victim input

State law normally requires consultation w/ victims about filings, hearings, plea entry

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selective prosecution

  1. selective prosecution is a defense alleging that a prosecutor targeted a D based on unconstitutional, discriminatory reasons (race, religion, etc.), rather than legitimate law enforcement factors 

    1. Selective prosecution claims are very hard to win 

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United States v. Armstrong

  1. Ds were charged w/ conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine – Ds argue they were charged b/c they are Black 

  2. D filed motion for discovery or dismissal, supported by affidavit from paralegal of federal PD office – all 24 crack cases from that office during 1991 involved Black defendants 

  3. Plus he files an affidavit from a drug counselor, saying Blacks and whites use crack equally

  4. And a 3rd affidavit from a private defense lawyer saying whites are prosecuted in state court rather than federal (where punishments are less)

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pretrial screening

at initial appearance, judges can screen out charges that lack sufficient factual support

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Commonwealth v. Wilcox

  1. GJ indicted D for armed robbery + home invasion 

  2. D wanted discovery about attendance of jurors to see if all concurring jurors heard all of the evidence

  3. Court rejected D’s claim because the GJ is about inculpatory, not exculpatory information

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Double Jeopardy

  1. 5th amendment – “no person shall… be subject for the same offense to be twice in jeopardy or life or limb” 

    1. Mistrial does not count as DJ

    2. Appeal based on legal error also doesn’t count as DJ

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dual sovereign exception

  1. allows separate governments – usually federal and state – to prosecute an individual for the same criminal act without violating double jeopardy 

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Puerto Rico v. Luis Sanchez Valle

  1. D was indicted under Puerto Rico Arms Act and federal gun trafficking statutes 

  2.  Dual sovereign doctrine applies if the prosecutorial powers of the two jurisdictions have independent origins – does not apply here because PR and US are the same sovereign 

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Vindictive Prosecution

  1. a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights occurring when a prosecutor files harsher charges or initiates a case solely to punish a defendant for exercising legal rights, such as filing an appeal or demanding a jury trial

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Blockburger v. US

“Whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not”

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Grady v. Corbin

PLUS a same conduct limitation for multiple trial cases

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United States v. Dixon

Return to Blockburger’s same elements test

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Taylor v. Commonwealth

  1. Taylor stole V’s truck – convicted of assault, robbery + possession of a handgun by a minor – claim the convictions violated DJ

  2. Conviction of either assault or robbery required proof of an element not required to prove the other 

  3. Dissent: it did violate DJ b/c the jury instruction blurred the line between robbery and assault

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People v. Nutt

  1. Nutt charged w/ 2nd degree home invasion, larceny, receiving a stolen firearm

  2. Pled guilty to home invasion, larceny dropped as part of plea, last charge held over for trial 

  3. D says holding over last charge violates DJ 

  4. Court says the last charge survives same-elements test

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multiplicity

  1. occurs when a single criminal act or transaction is improperly charged in multiple counts of indictment, violating DJ (comes up mostly in conspiracy cases) 

    1. Remedied by merging convictions or dismissing counts 

    2. Does not deal w/ separate code sections 

    3. Question is the “unit of prosecution” – reading the statute to determine when one violation of the statute becomes two violations of the same statute 

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collateral estoppel

Established by Ashe v. Swenson – Prevents a party who lost on a fact issue in the trial of one cause of actions from relitigating the same fact issue in another cause of action against the same party

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Ex Parte Taylor

  1. D lost control of his car and crashed causing the death of his 2 passengers

  2. He was acquitted of intoxication manslaughter re the first passenger – can the state now prosecute him re second victim? 

  3. D says state can’t b/c of collateral estoppel – trial 1 based on alcohol; trial 2 based on marijuana 

  4. Court agrees – issue of whether he was intoxicated was already “necessarily decided”

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mandatory joinder

all offenses based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan shall be charged in the same indictment

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permissive joinder

codified in Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 8(a) – two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are (1) of the same or similar character (2) are based on the same act or transaction or (3) on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan

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severance

  1. codified in Federal Rule 14 – if it appears that a D or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of Ds or provide whatever other relief justice requires 

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joint trial of defendants

Defendant should obtain severance from a co-defendant when (1) evidence admitted against one defendant is facially incriminating to the other defendant, such as a prior statement of one co-defendant that incriminates the other co-defendant; (2) evidence admitted against one defendant influences the jury so strongly that it has a harmful “rub-off effect” on the other defendant; (3) there is a significant disparity in the amount of evidence introduced against each of the two defendants; or (4) co-defendants present defenses that are so antagonistic that they are mutually exclusive.

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misjoinder

  1. When a defendant believes that a prosecutor has grouped together more charges than the permissible joinder rules will allow, she can request the trial court to declare a misjoinder. 

    1. Remedy is separate trials not dismissal.

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Damian Long v. United States

  1. D found guilty of assaults with intent to rob – 2 robberies were several minutes apart and a block away from one another) 

  2. D says trial court erred in joining charges 

  3. Joinder is ok if (1) can be kept separate and distinct at trial and (2) is mutually admissible at separate trials

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Sources of Discovery Law

  1. Federal constitution: prosecutor obligation to disclose exculpatory information (particularly deals with witnesses) 

  2. State constitution: the same 

  3. State statutes or rules of criminal procedure also reach prosecutor disclosure of inculpatory information, some defense disclosures of alibis or other evidence 

  4. Local court rules can broaden the state coverage or set timing  

  5. Local office policies do the same 

  6. Ethics rules address discovery obligations of both prosecutors and defense attorneys

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Brady v. Maryland

  1. Prosecution must turn over evidence “favorable to the accused” 

    1. Favorable evidence includes impeachment material re government witnesses

  2. If it is material either to guilt or to punishment 

    1. The evidence need not be admissible 

  3. Within control of the government 

Over 40 states have passed rules or statutes codifying the Brady disclosure requirement, although many of these rules and statutes (unlike the Constitutional requirement) only take effect after a request from the defense.

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Kyles v. Whitley

Evidence in the hands of government agents (such as criminal investigators) who regularly report to the prosecutor form the basis for a Brady violation because the prosecutor has a duty to inquire about such information

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Giglio v. US

  1. Court overturned a conviction based on the prosecutor’s failure to disclose a promise made to its key witness that he would not be prosecuted if he testified for the government.

  2. Have to tell jury about risk of bias from grant of leniency

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Precedent re Materiality

  1. Strickler v. Greene (1999): measure materiality not just by determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. Rather, the question is whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict 

Holmes v. South Carolina (2006): state cannot bar third-party suspect evidence even if it has forensic evidence. Strength of one party’s evidence has no logical bearing on the strength of the other side's evidence

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People v. Alan Beaman

  1. D convicted of first-degree murder – claims prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose info about viable alternate suspect 

  2. Court says this was a violation b/c the evidence against D was not that strong (D was far away from crime – would have had to drive 10mph above speed limit)

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defense disclosures

  1. Defense disclosures are required for topics requiring specialized rebuttal (alibi, insanity) 

    1. Alibi: A defendant who intends to offer the defense of alibi at trial shall [file a notice before trial containing] specific information as to the place or places where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of witnesses whom the defendant intends to call in support of such claim.

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Commonwealth v. Patrick Durham

  1. Reciprocal discovery order required defense turn over statements of defense witnesses (not limited to impeachment 

  2. The 5th amendment protects the D from turning over his own statement, but not statements of other witnesses   – order did not require disclosure of anything the defense did not intend to use at trial

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Speedy trial

  1. 6th Amendment: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial”

    1. Right to a speedy trial does not extend to sentencing

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Sources of Speedy Trial rules

  1. Constitutional requirements 

    1. Pre-charge delay through DP

    2. Post-charge delay through 6th amendment 

    3. Speedy trial statutes (post-charge delay)

    4. Statutes of limitations (pre-charge delay)

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Commonwealth v. Stephen Scher

  1. V died of gunshot in 1976 – D was tried and convicted for it in 1997 

  2. Delay can violate DP if the delay is intentionally undertaken to gain a tactical advantage 

  3. In other situations, D must prove delay was prejudicial 

  4. D did not show either CW intent or prejudice

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Post-accusation delays

  1. Factors to Consider:

    1. Length of Delay

      1. Necessary threshold. Only when the delay becomes long enough will the court analyze the other factors. 

      2. A delay of just under one year is usually sufficient to obtain a full review of the four factors. 

    2. Reason for the Delay

      1. Who can the delay be attributed to? 

    3. Defendant’s Assertion of his Right

      1. How early and how consistently is the defendant raising the speedy trial claim? (least important probably). 

    4. Prejudice to the Defendant

      1. Once the full inquiry takes place, this is often the most important factor. 

      2. Three Types of Prejudice

        1. Oppressive pretrial incarceration

        2. Anxiety and concern of the accused; and

        3. Possibility that the defense will be impaired

          1. Courts often say that this type, which can include a disappearance of witnesses or loss of memory, is the most serious.

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Vermont v. Michael Brillon

  1. D had 6 different appointed attorneys pre-trial 

  2. D was at fault for some of the delay/ withdrawals of counsel 

  3. Assigned counsel are not state actors for the sake of a speedy trial claim – there was also no determination that institutional problems caused any part of the delay 

  4. Court considers: length of delay; reason for delay; whether the accused asserted his right to a speedy trial; whether D was prejudiced by the delay

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People v. Michael Sutton

  1. CA penal code says D must be brought to trial within 60 days unless there is “good cause” for delay 

  2. Trial was ~6 days late because of lawyer’s other trial 

Examples of “good cause:” (1) unavailability of W (2) unavailability of judge (3) unavailability of courtroom (4) counsel’s need for additional time to prepare (5) unavailability of counsel (6) interested in trying Ds jointly

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Why do Defendants plead guilty

  1. Reduced risk of severe punishment 

  2. Plea discounts, aka avoiding the trial tax 

  3. Reduced financial costs of trial 

  4. To move on, psychologically 

  5. Remorse

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Why do prosecutors bargain?

  1. Costs of trial

    1. Opportunity costs 

    2. Financial costs 

  2. Risk of acquittal 

  3. Risk of lesser punishment 

  4. Mercy or other qualities of justice

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State v. Bey

Package deals as potentially coercive – especially in cases involving related third parties

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components of a valid guilty plea

  1. Knowing (constitution + rule)

    1. Defendant only has to know about the direct consequences of waiver, not the collateral consequences 

      1. Direct

        1. Max sentence authorized, expected here

        2. Substantial fines or restitution 

        3. Effect on sentence for later conviction 

        4. Immigration 

      2. Collateral 

        1. Right to operate licensed business 

        2. Loss of voting rights 

        3. Ineligible for parole or probation 

        4. Sex offender registration?

    2. Voluntary (constitution + rule)

      1. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(b)(2) – Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).

    3. Adequate factual basis

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Padilla v. Kentucky

  1. Counsel must give accurate advice about immigration 

  2. Counsel must advise noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may have adverse immigration consequences 

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Brady v. US

  1. Defendant was charged with kidnapping – took a plea after he found out the co-defendant was going to testify 

  2. Threat of the death penalty alone is not enough to make a plea involuntary 

  3. Defendant had competent counsel and was given a full opportunity to assess advantages and disadvantages

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State v. Landour Bouie

  1. 2nd Degree murder – defendant wanted to go to trial 

  2. Defendant expressed doubt about the evidence during the plea colloquy 

  3. Judge said he would be convicted – this was beyond the scope of the judge’s role 

  4. Plea was not knowing and voluntary

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Missouri v. Frye

  1. Two plea offers weren’t communicated to the Defendant 

  2. He entered a naked plea, prosecutor stayed with option 1, judge went above that 

  3. Defendant says he would have taken option 2 

  4. Deficiency prong of Strickland satisfied – attorney should have told him about the pleas

  5. Prejudice prong is not – Defendant cannot prove the prosecution or court would have abided by the unaccepted plea offer

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Alford Plea

A defendant may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter a guilty plea, even while he maintains his innocence, as long as the record establishes a strong factual basis for the guilty plea

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Alford v. North Carolina

  1. What level of proof is necessary?

    1. Alford Court says “strong” and "overwhelming" evidence were present 

    2. Courts have said they need enough evidence for a court to say it is “not unreasonable” to conclude guilty 

    3. Enough evidence to convince the judge that Defendant “might have been convicted” at trial

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State v. Edwin Urbina

  1. Defendant said he didn’t mean to kill the victim, was responding to victim's drawing of a pistol (self-defense)  didn’t know his own weapon was automatic 

  2. NJ had a heightened standard for factual basis – includes waiver of all affirmative defenses

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Victim consultation

  1. Most states require prosecutors inform/consult with victims about plea negotiations 

    1. Example from Maine: requires notification to victim about results of plea negotiations before they are submitted to the court

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State v. Patrick William Casey

  1. Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child

  2. Victim and mother wanted to speak at court and told prosecutor – prosecutor neglected to inform the court 

  3. Victims and mother filed misplea – Court reopened plea hearing to allow them to be heard – guilty plea was then reaffirmed  

  4. Utah Victim’s Rights Act 

    1. Victim had the right to appeal 

    2. Victim has the right to be heard at the plea hearing 

    3. Prosecutor had a duty to inform the court that the victim wished to be heard 

    4. But, the error was remedied

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Jury trial availability

  1. There are constitutional and statutory rules that designate when a criminal case becomes too small to require a jury (petty v. serious offense based on jailtime of 6 months or more – established by Duncan v. Louisiana)

  2. Presumption of pettiness attaches to any crime punishable by six months or less. Presumption might be overcome by considering the other consequences - besides incarceration - that flow from criminal conviction. 

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Bado v.. United States

  1. D was charged w/ 3 counts misdemeanor sexual assault of a minor 

  2. Demanded a jury trial and was denied 

  3. At bench trial – convicted of one charges → deportation proceedings commenced 

  4. Serious offenses includes anything with a sentence of 6 months or more 

  5. Court begins with presumption that this offense is petty – does the possibility of deportation refute that presumption? 

  6. Holding – 180 days + possible deportation defeated presumption of petty offense 

  7. Dissent – a citizen would not have a right to a jury trial under these facts, but here, a noncitizen does

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Singer v. United States

Defendant can waive a jury trial – but they do not have an absolute right to a bench trial if prosecution objects

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selection of jurors

Summon to courtroom → voir dire → judge removes for cause → parties remove

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Strauder v. West

EP challenge; cannot ban Blacks from jury venire

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Norris v. Alabama

cannot exclude Blacks from GJ

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Turner v. Fouche

does not have to be a total racial ban, even  if jury does not represent the racial makeup of the community

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Ristaino v. Ross

  1. Black defendant requested a question about juror prejudice in voir dire 

  2. Judge refused and only asked general bias question 

  3. Court is not constitutionally required to ask a race-specific question

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Filmore v. State

  1. Defendant was convicted of assault 

  2. Trial court refused to allow voir dire question about D being black and victims being white 

  3. This was wrong – the question should have been asked

100
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State v. Reche Smith

  1. D convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death 

  2. D made challenge for cause against juror who was really against drugs 

  3. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the juror unbiased 

  4. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: “Your position is such concerning drug use and abuse that in the event evidence came out in this trial that drug use was involved, it would affect or impair—substantially impair your ability to be fair and impartial; is that correct?” 

  5. JUROR HASSELL: “Yes”

JUDGE: “I’m not trying to put words in your mouth … I’m asking you as to whether or not your personal feelings about particular crimes or particular types of conduct are such that it would overwhelm your reason and common sense and your ability to follow the law as I would instruct you on should we reach some aspect of the case that may relate to the consumption or use or possession of drugs?

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