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Gulf Security Key Factors
regional subsystem within the international state system
subsystems have their own greater and lesser powers and alliance patterns
Contemporary intl poiltics of Gulf shaped by which 2 events in the 1970s?
British withdrawal
rise in oil prices
before 70’s, these states had limited power and influence beyond their borders
after Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia vastly increased their military and economic power, their foreign policy became much more ambitious
British protectorates in Persin Gulf
Oman
Kuwait
Trucial States
balance of power
theory: states will seek to match perceived threats from rival states by increasing their military and economic strength and by forming alliances
Balancing power requires states to match an opponent’s strength
try to block any state that pursues an aggressive foreign policy/seeks to disrupt the existing equilibrium
regime security and traditional security concerns both continue to determine foreign policy choices
in Gulf region, realist and balance of power approaches provide a necessary but NOT sufficient framework → domestic issues must also be considered
international powers and domestic security
Iraq launched wars in 1980 and 1990: to solidify claim as a major regional power, but also in fear of regime security
1979: post Saddam’s rise to power, Iraqi Shi’a groups call for government's overthrow; Iran calls for exporting Islamic Revolution
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88): Saddam Hussein chose war: domestic unrest in Iraq seen as orchestrated in Tehran in wake of Iranian revolution (1979)
Gulf War (1990-91): Hussein’s regime saw an international conspiracy against it: rising Kuwait and Emirati oil exports and US-Israeli plans to strike Iraqi WMD targets
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) (Takeyh)
post 1979, Iran lacked a backing from a superpower, reliable source of arms, and dependable allies
Iran new regime still managed to consolidate democratic political power and mobilize society
Takeyh comments how Iranian elites didn’t see it as an interstate conflict fought for territorial adjustment or limited political objectives, but a contest of ideologies
The war became an extension of the 1979 Islamic revolution: ideological fervour against Iraq’s tecchnological superiority
Lead up to war
1975 Algiers Agreement: Iraq agrees to the Iranian definition of borders, Iran agrees to stop supporting Kurdish insurgency in Iraq
before war, multiple border skirmishes sustained Iranian propaganda against Saddam
in addition to his fears, Saddam coveted Iran’s oil-rich, ethically Arab Khuzestan province
misperception and war
misperception by key decision makers often explain failed offences
Saddam in 1980 made some key miscalculations
expected Iranians in border ares to rise up against Islamic Republic (they didn’t)
expected his military to smash through Iranian defences and quickly win (they didn’t)
he thought new Iranian government would lack resolve when faced with iraqi army’s might (they didn’t)
Iran’s ideological resolve
Khomeini: You are fighting to protect Islam and [Suddam Hussein] fighting to destroy it
Saddam’s secular regime was portrayed as an infidel invader
Iranian leadership had “maximalist aim” of defeating Iraq and overthrowing Ba’athist government
Martyrdom and collective sacrifice portrayed as a means towards spiritual elevation of Iranian body-politic
this culminated in use of human-wave tactics for attacking Iraqi positions, clearing minefields
goals and international dimentions
speaker of parliment Hashemi Rafanjani in 1980: see as an American war, thus why natural for Saudi Arabia, Jordan and others to support Iraq
iran demonized Gulf Sheikhdoms, why Western European states supported Iraq
Saddam Hussein saw war as chance to establish Iraq as leader of the Arab world
both sides rejected efforts of mediation, cease-fire, compromise, by UN, PLO, and others
ideology, misperception, and prolonging war
Mar1982: losing, Saddam suggests both sides withdraw to pre-war borders
June 1982: Iran expelled Iraqi forces from its territory
Rafsanjani: Imam commanded that no one should speak of a cease-fire and war must achieve its goals
Takeyh: goal of exporting the revolutions of the war became a consensus position within the Islamic Republic
Iran leadership thought could win swift victory, wanted to overthrow Saddam, saw war as a unifying principle for new regime
escalation and endgame
1984: first recorded use of chemical weapons in Iraq
1985: “War of the Cities”: both target each others population centres with surface to surface missiles
Feb 1986: Iraq bombs Iranian oil-loading ports
Aug 1986: Iran seizes ultra-strategic al-Faw peninsuala and western bank of Shatt al-Arab river
April 1988: Iraq launches massive attack to retake al-Faw
Aug 1988: both agree to implement a cease-fire
final death toll estimated to exceed 1 million