Unipolarity

Post-Cold War International Order

construction of a western international order: hegemonic socialization

bipolarity to unipolarity

materialist:

• multipolar distribution → 1950s, bipolar system

unipolarity + multilateralism (global governance, multi-lateral institutions (UN)) + sovereignty and human rights (override)

nuclear weapons override polarity

power (second-strike capabilities) differences become less relevant

• ex. doesn’t matter if usa is stronger than russia, since russia has nuclear power = worries usa

• nuclear weapons have never been used: conventional weapons matter more

• unipolarity is not undermined by nuclear weapons

how unipolar is current international system

is usa more powerful

• looking at military spending: us is more than others

  • china is second runner up

• us has special forces deployed to 70% of the world: no other state has this kind of reach

• dynamic elements of system: military expenditure increase

  • us has more (consistent increase), but china increased more (at a faster pace)

us in decline?

china on the rise: china increase, us is consistent

• % of GNP of china: not spending more of what china has on the military

  • chinese spend more on the military without sacrificing any other areas by increasing the economy (bigger pie)

china is revisionist rising power

is it a challenger? must be revisionist

• relationship between chinese and liberal international order (undermined, alternative order)

counter-hegemonic balancing (source of instability)

when a state is too powerful = dangerous for other states

internal balancing: armed up

external balancing: counter-hegemonic alliances

regional rivalries/balancing: unintended global balancing

• rivalries between states wanting regional hegemony

  • ex. middle east: saudi arabia and iran

  • internal balancing to beat the regional competitor

  • states arm up: result of competition with regional rival

  • unintended results: start reducing the power gap between them and the global hegemon

lazy hegemon (souce of instability)

explains why some state is going to emerge and grow in power as at faster pace than the hegemon

• gilpin

• that state and the hegemon face different security threats

• hegemon don’t feel threatened: security from power, we have lots of power

  • no incentives, unlike other states, to become better at fighting wars, military technologies, improving themselves

• other states face a huge security threat all the time: from the hegemon

  • grow at a faster pace than the hegemon will

overburdened hegemon (source of instability)

functions of the hegemon (punish people who hurt the norm, guard the international order)

• this has very high costs, other states are not facing

  • hegemon can extract costs from other states, but mainly itself who pays for it

  • other states can use this money for other things: improving themselves

• leads to hegemonic decline

• leads to hegemonic war: resolve the crisis of unipolarity, can be replaced by another hegemonic order or balance of power pov (multipolar, unipolar system with mechanisms to keep themselves in equilibrium)

  • balance of power theory sees unipolar as unstable, not in equilibrium (only when power is balanced between at least 2 great powers)

unipolar threshold (source of stability)

point after the hegemon is too powerful to be balanced against

• likelihood of counter-balancing increases the most powerful the state becomes

• dangerous to confront the hegemon: they are more powerful than you are

• internal balancing as self-defeating

• free-riding and defection on counter-hegemonic cooperation: more likely to have free-ridding because they don’t want to pay for it, just enjoy the benefits

• regional vs global imperatives

  • resources are scarce, have to choose which to fight

  • past unipolar threshold: threat coming from hegemon is too big that there’s nothing i can do about it

  • rather focus on regional threats, which i can do something effective (confront)

    • become a priority

• unipolar equilibrium

nuclear balancing (source of stability)

deactivation of balancing mechanisms

• why would states balance against hegemon: threatened

• if state has second strike capability: even if much weaker than hegemon, still feel secure enough

  • nuclear arsenal deters hegemon from trying to destroy them (still have leverage, different kinds of power resources)

• makes it much more stable than without nuclear weapons

engagement or isolationism (source of stability)

not every global system is stable vs unstable: depends on hegemon (bully or chill)

• bully: coercion, impose order on other states

• chill: strategies of legitimation, persuade other states the rules they want to impose are in other interests

balance of threat theory (source of stability)

benign hegemon

• successful at producing public goods in the international order, other states will see the one who runs that order as benigh (want to support)

  • more unsuccessful: chaos and wars

    • states are not going to the see the hegemon as benigh (don’t want to support)

• strategic restraint: used by hegemon

  • state should not exploit too much of the power it has over others, don’t want to harm legitimacy of the system

    • only good idea in the short run, not long run

stability of polarity vs order (source of stability)

constructivists: difference, hegemonic order may be stable and outlive unipolarity

• hegemon can decline, disappear = system will be multipolar, but order will remain hegemonic

  • more than one great power, all endorse the same kinds of rule

    • ex. cold war, two super powers have different visions of how the world should go (communist revolution vs capitalist liberal)

      • ideological competition for decades

polarity: one state above the rest

hegemonic order: international system as a whole

• must be regarded as legitimate by the states, especially new rising powers that emerge

• if they see international order as the best (public goods), still maintain hegemonic order even when hegemon is gone and no one replaces them

legitimacy of the liberal international order

summary

source of instability

• balancing

  • regional hegemon to global balancing

• lazy hegemon

• overburdening

  • hegemonic decline

  • hegemonic war

source of stability

• unipolar threshold

  • external balancing undermined by collective action problems

  • internal balancing undermined by:

    • high cost of catching up

    • regional security dilemmas

regional threats undermined intentional global balancing

soft balancing

soft/institutional balancing: could be a source of stability or instability

limited/indirect warfare

• soft balancing with hard power: don’t compete with hegemon face to face, makes it difficult for hegemon to exploit power it has

balancing soft power: counter-ideology, de-legitimize hegemon

• soft “culture wars” (ideology)

• competition over attention/credibility: over the hegemon and challenger

anti-hegemonic ideologies (soft balancing)

last 3 decades, since end of cold war: uni-ideological environment, not really seen an anti-hegemonic ideology

• competitor to liberal democratic model

world did not become democratic: unchallenged standard is liberal democracy

• non-liberal states incorporate democratic aspects into their government

china tries to create successful autocratic form of government: taking advantage of the fact liberal democracies have failed to deliver, not doing so well at providing public goods to citizens in the past

• is china a revisionist state: reflects endorsement that are against the liberal democratic order (partially, partially status quo state)

  • regional comprehensive economic partnership: RCEP, other nations around it

    • 100% liberal, anything but a challenge to order

  • member of world trade organization, participates in un → part of institutions, endorse them, develops new initiatives that build on liberal international order

  • disagrees with consistent things: sovereignty, human rights

    • limits to what sovereign states can do on their own territory (human rights): china does not like

    • if china becomes new hegemon: these rules would be changed, new kind of sovereignty practice

      • other parts will remain unchanged

institutional balancing (soft balancing)

balancing through existing institutions of current international order

• ex. UN, WTO, tribunals/courts

• balancing against the hegemon, but no the hegemonic order: only destabilizing as position of the hegemon as most powerful state

hegemonic war (was as systemic change)

why hegemonic war is not the most likely mechanism of system change

• states could solve things through war: now, they cannot afford to do it (too costly)

  • makes more sense to use alternatives

• economic interdependence: if i hurt your economy, i hurt my own economy

  • hard to go to war, economic costs that result from war

• spread of democracy: through international system

  • no other time in history has the world been so democratic

  • democratic peace theory: likelihood of wars are low

  • hegemonic war: unlikely to happen

revolutionary vs incremental change (war as systemic change)

revolutionary systemic change: gilpin model, change from war

• when war is over: one system is replaced by another

• can be negotiated between hegemon and challenger, if war is too costly: negotiate a solution

  • revolutionary: happen fast, new order from tomorrow on

incremental change: gradual change

• most likely: negotiating incremental changes, need to reach agreement over the entire order (is difficult)

  • little agreements happening over time: today we change this rule, next year another

Posen

Argues that the current unipolar system, dominated by the United States, is giving way to a multipolar system.

Posen begins by defining unipolarity, emphasizing the need for the unipole to possess overwhelming power in all aspects, such as military, economic, and diplomatic. He acknowledges the current unipolarity of the US, noting its superior military power and global reach. However, he argues that unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise due to its inherent tendencies toward overextension and self-abrasion.

• Unipolarity leads to overextension: The unipole, lacking immediate threats, pursues opportunities and intervenes in areas of weak governance, creating new enemies and exhausting its resources.

• Unipolarity leads to self-abrasion: The unipole's attempts to maintain its dominance through liberal international institutions create contradictions. The unipole is tempted to violate the rules it establishes, leading to hypocrisy, undermining the legitimacy of the institutions, and prompting pushback from other states.

Posen contends that the rise of other powers, primarily China and India, combined with the diffusion of power to smaller states and non-state actors, will further erode unipolarity. He predicts that a multipolar system will emerge, characterized by a more equitable distribution of capabilities and a greater reliance on diplomacy and coalition-building.

While multipolarity will likely persist, Posen notes that the emerging system will be shaped by “defense dominance”. Factors like geography, advanced military technology, and nuclear weapons will favor the strategic defender, potentially muting great power military competition. However, competition for power will persist, albeit in a more cautious and indirect manner.

Posen concludes that the transition to multipolarity will be incremental and less dramatic than the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity. The US will remain powerful but face increasing challenges to its dominance. As other powers grow and the costs of US activism mount, the multipolar order will gradually take shape.

Ikenberry

Argues that the United States' unipolarity is not just a product of its overwhelming material power but also a consequence of the liberal international order it has fostered. This order, characterized by openness, rules-based institutions, and strategic partnerships, has created a "one-hub" system with the US at the center.

Ikenberry introduces the concept of a "hub" to describe a state's ability to organize and manage international relations, going beyond the traditional realist notion of a "pole" defined solely by material capabilities. He argues that the US has become the world's most powerful and enduring hub due to its:

• Provision of public goods: This includes security commitments through alliances and the promotion of an open global economy.

• Establishment of multilateral institutions: The US has championed a dense web of institutions like the UN, IMF, and WTO that provide a framework for cooperation and reduce the role of brute power.

• Open and consensual mode of organization: The US-led order allows for "voice opportunities" and facilitates bargaining, making it more attractive and durable than previous hierarchical orders.

The source traces the evolution of this American-led order, highlighting its expansion and integration through the postwar decades, incorporating former adversaries like Japan and Germany and, later, states from the former Soviet bloc. It challenges the realist expectation of a return to multipolarity and great power competition, arguing that the liberal character of the American hub has created a system that is "easy to join and hard to overturn."

Ikenberry examines the rise of China, acknowledging its growing power and potential to become a regional hub. However, he contends that China faces significant incentives to work within the existing order rather than challenge it. China's economic growth is deeply intertwined with the global capitalist system, and it benefits from the rules and institutions of the US-led order.

The excerpt concludes by suggesting that the "return to multipolarity" may be a slower and less complete process than anticipated. While a diffusion of power is underway, the American hub's unique features and the advantages of the "one-hub" system are likely to persist, potentially shaping the character of the international system for decades to come.

Legro

Argues that the concept of polarity, particularly unipolarity, has been overemphasized in international relations theory. While acknowledging that the distribution of power matters, Legro contends that polarity's influence is often ambiguous, endogenous to state choices, and incomplete as an explanation for international outcomes.

Legro raises three key problems with unipolarity as a dominant causal factor:

• Ambiguity: Unipolarity's impact on international politics is often overstated when compared to other factors, such as norms, institutions, and domestic politics. The excerpt cites several chapters from the same volume that, despite finding some influence of unipolarity, ultimately reveal that other variables are more significant in shaping various outcomes. For instance, Stephen Walt's analysis of alliance formation reveals that intentions, rather than the unipole's capabilities, are the primary driver of alliance decisions. Similarly, Michael Mastanduno's examination of the international economy reveals that US dominance in security does not translate into leverage in the economic realm, and that economic interdependence outweighs unipolarity in shaping economic outcomes.

• Endogeneity: Rather than being an objective structure that shapes states, polarity is often a product of state choices. Legro argues that states can choose to pursue policies that either reinforce or undermine the existing power structure. He cites historical examples of the US choosing not to fully embrace its potential unipolarity after World War I and exercising restraint in its use of power after World War II. This suggests that focusing solely on polarity as an independent variable risks overlooking the crucial role of state preferences and strategic decisions in shaping the international system.

• Incompleteness: The current conception of unipolarity focuses narrowly on material capabilities and ignores the role of ideas and norms in shaping international structure. Legro advocates for a more nuanced understanding of structure that incorporates ideational factors alongside material power. He argues that dominant powers often seek to shape the norms and principles of the international system, and that the contest over those ideas can significantly impact the durability and nature of international order. The excerpt highlights Martha Finnemore's emphasis on "social structure" and Robert Jervis's observation that the "coincidence or discrepancy between the worlds" preferred by states and the unipole impacts compliance with the unipolar order.

Legro concludes by advocating for a "conjunctural" approach that analyzes the interaction of polarity with other factors like ideas, norms, and domestic politics to provide a more comprehensive understanding of international politics. He maintains that unipolarity, while likely to persist for some time, should be analyzed not as a dominant force but as one variable among many in shaping the future of international relations.

It is worth noting that this source and the previously summarized sources by Posen and Ikenberry offer contrasting perspectives on unipolarity and its implications for the future of the international system.

• Posen argues that unipolarity is inherently unstable and will inevitably give way to multipolarity, driven by the unipole's overextension and self-abrasion, as well as the rise of other powers.

• Ikenberry, conversely, suggests that the US's unipolarity is reinforced by the liberal international order it has created, making it more durable and resistant to change.

Legro, while acknowledging the importance of both material power and the ideational foundations of the US-led order, cautions against overemphasizing the role of polarity and calls for a more nuanced, conjunctural approach to understanding international dynamics.

These contrasting viewpoints highlight the ongoing debate within international relations theory about the nature of the current system, its potential trajectory, and the factors shaping the future global order.