Property Dualism

define property

a quality of a substance dependent on that substance to exist

define property dualism

there exists only one kind of substance (physical) and the brain is made of this substance but has both physical and mental properties. these mental properties are emergent ( only appear once biological matter organises itself into a complex system) and irreducible to matter ( can’t be explained in terms of matter) but are not substantial ( can’t live without the brain)

what are the strengths of dualism?

LEIBNIZ: thinking and perceiving machine

CHALMERS: philosophical zombie

JACKSON: Mary/ Knowledge Argument

what is the thinking and perceiving machine?

imagine a thinking and perceiving machine

if you walked into the machine, you would only find cogs and parts pushing against one another which causes the machine to function

you could not find anything to explain the perception of the machine

similarly if you were to enter a human, you would see muscles and organs which cause it to function but nothing to explain perception

so physicalism is wrong since even if the only substance to exist is physical, it must still have some mental property to explain perception

define phenomena

the appearance of things as they appear in our experience

what is the philosophical zombie argument?

philosophical zombies are beings which are physically identical to a normal human but who don’t have qualia

physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature

so any world physically identical to this world must also contain consciousness

we can conceive of a physically identical world which has no consciousness ( full of philosophical zombies)

a zombie world is metaphysically possible so physicalism is wrong

what are the criticisms to the philosophical zombie argument?

DENNET: philosophical zombies are not conceivable

what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about the world

what is conceivable need not be metaphysically possible

what is the criticism that philosophical zombies are not conceivable?

I can not conceive of a being with all its bodily functions and powers intact without having health

similarly i can not conceive of a being with all its cognitive systems intact without consciousness

the reason i believe i am able to conceive of such a thing is because i do not yet possess the knowledge of the neuroscience that they are connected

just because i am lacking this knowledge does not mean that cognitive systems without consciousness are conceivable

what is the metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about the real world criticism?

physicalists would argue that they can accept a possible world where philosophical zombies do exist and physicalism is wrong but that this does not mean physicalism is wrong in our world

the same way ‘bruce wayne is not batman’ is metaphysically possible but not possible in our world and so tells us nothing new about the world, philosophical zombies being metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about this world so it doesn’t disprove physicalism

what is the being conceivable does not mean being metaphysical possible criticism?

water is H2O is not an analytical truth so it is conceivable to say water is H3O

but some philosophers would say water is H3O is in fact a logical impossibility as even though ‘water is H2O’ is not logically necessary, it is still a necessary truth only discoverable by a posteriori means

so H2O is an essential property of water meaning water is H3O is a logical and hence metaphysical impossibility

so it is possible to conceive the metaphysically impossible

so if qualia were to be an essential property of brains only known by a posteriori means, this would make philosophical zombies metaphysically impossible even though we can conceive of them

what is the Mary/ Knowledge argument?

Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who has only ever seen black and white but knows everything about the physical processes involved in colour vision

when she sees colour for the first time, she learns something new (what it feels like to experience colour)

so there was more to know about colour vision than the complete physical account of it

so physicalism is false

what are the criticisms to the mary/ knowledge argument?

mary gains new acquaintance knowledge, not propositional

mary gains new ability knowledge, not propositional

new knowledge/ old fact

what is the mary gains new acquaintance knowledge not propositional argument?

commits the fallacy of equivocation because initially uses the word know in terms of propositional knowledge but finishes by using the word know in terms of acquaintance knowledge

imagine being a fan of a celebrity and knowing everything about their life and then meeting them. you do not know anymore facts about the celebrity than you did before despite having the new experience of meeting them

what is the counter response to the mary gains new acquaintance knowledge criticism?

Jackson argues that mary gains both acquaintance and propositional knowledge

imagine mary had a companion called marvin who was in the same situation as her ( only seen black and white but knows everything about colour vision)

when mary experiences colour and returns to marvin, she would try to explain to him her experience but without success and marvin would remain lacking important factual knowledge showing mary did gain propositional knowledge

what is the mary gains new ability knowledge, not propositional criticism?

commits the fallacy of equivocation because initially uses the word know in terms of propositional knowledge and ends using the word know in terms of ability knowledge'

this is not the same as we could imagine mary knowing everything physical about how to ride a bike and once she rides a bike she gains new ability knowledge but not propositional

what is the counter argument to Mary gains new ability knowledge not propositional criticism?

jackson claims mary gains new propositional knowledge about the mental life of others

after experiencing colour, she can ask herself the question ‘do people see red tomatoes the same way i see them?’

this is a propositional question that mary asks which she could not have asked before seeing colour

so she gained propositional knowledge along with the ability knowledge

What is the new knowledge/ old fact criticism?

when mary sees colour for the first time, she gains no new knowledge but rather is presented with the same facts she already knew in a different way making it appear to be new knowledge

imagine mary goes to a party and meets batman who she finds out is a millionaire

later on in the party she meets bruce wayne who she discovers is also a millionaire

despite this being new knowledge to mary, she is not learning new facts about reality since she already knew batman (who is bruce wayne) was a millionaire

similarly before seeing colour mary could describe it in a physical sense and after seeing it she could describe it ina phenomenal sense but all this shows is mary can represent the same physical facts in two different ways