lecture 6 nuclear weapons and deterrence

are nuclear weapons ethical

• giving some countries them will prevent war

A Revolutionary Weapon?

• nuclear weapons changes the nature of statecraft

Origins and Evolution 

• 1913 word set free book

  • bomb that is radioactive , not just abt the use but also abt issues abt nuclear disarmament

  public faces book harold nicolson

  • moves toward nuclear disarmament

The Nuclear Powers

• has to do w infrastructure

Deterrence: A short history

• From Adam and Eve to early Cold War

  • serpent tempted adam and eve to eat the apple or you will die

  • punishment is the essence of deterrence

  • its the act of discouraging an action

• Cold War ‘coming of age’, ‘key concept for the understanding of the strategy and diplomacy’ of the period

• Post-Cold War ‘semi-retirement’

• Post-Crimea: back in fashion

Deterrence def

• 1. “the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits”

  • Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 11

  2. “the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits” 

  • US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: CJCS, as of November 2021) 

  For full list of deterrence definitions and variations, see Deterrence Dictionary post at Deterrence Now Substack

• theres many types of deterrence

General vs Immediate Deterrence

• General: conveys a somewhat vague, broad, continuous threat of retaliation for any future attack (e.g. NATO Article 5)

  • prior to a international crisis or war

  • ‘peace time deterrence’

• Immediate: threatening retaliation when an attack looms, or as already occurred and the victim wants to deter its continuation

  • when you get into a int crisis

  • also post war- immediate crisis

    • after they invade you are still in this immediate deterrence

Denial vs Punishment

• Punishment: “threats to impose costs through retaliation that may be unrelated to the aggression itself. Rather than focusing on the denial of local objectives, it seeks to raise the cost of aggression—even if successful— by threatening other consequences”

• Denial: strategies that “seek to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives—deploying sufficient local military forces to defeat an invasion, for example”

Direct vs Extended

• direct deterrence

  • we dont want the us to attack the su

  • Type 1: Direct attack (US vs USSR)

• extended deterrence

  • you extended nuclear deterrence to allies

  • Type 2: Extended deterrence challenge (NATO vs Warsaw Pact)

• Peripheral conflict:

  • Type 3: Peripheral conflict (Korea, Vietnam)

ALL= the threat of using nuclear weapons to not take certain actions

Deterrence Success

• deterrence failure

  • threat and threat is ignored

  • ex: adam and eve

• What constitutes a successful case?

  • hard

• Problem of explaining a non-event

• How to measure whether a threat had an effect on an adversary’s behavior?

• To measure deterrence:

  • Evidence that illustrates challengers intent and defenders deterrent attempt

  • BUT challengers intent difficult to discern 

  • Are attacks that do not occur every day examples of deterrence success?

  • What about countless reasons other than threats (self-deterrence)?

Credibility

• Problem of incomplete information

  • how do you convince the country that you would actually go to nuclear war to defend your allies

• Interests at stake

  • at what level/interest would that have to be for you to go to war

• How to communicate commitment to fight?

• Reputation/‘cumulative deterrence’

Madman Theory

• associated w nixon

• if we can make a nuclear threat nixon is crazy then he might actuall use it

• if your mad maybe they’ll take you more seriously then if you were rational

Nuclear deterrence options

• Maximum / ‘overkill’ – Counterforce + Countervalue

• Minimum  - Countervalue only

• Triad?

• No first use

• Mini-nukes

Nuclear Triad

• •Nuclear submarines are the most likely to survive a strike by another country, guaranteeing the United States the ability to strike back.

• ICBMs can be launched quickly if necessary.

• •Strategic bombers armed with penetrating cruise missiles can be deployed and recalled more easily.

Single Integrated Operation Plan (1969)

OPLAN 8010-08

Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike

 • Directed against six adversaries. 

• Probably Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Syria and 9/11-type WMD scenario

• •  Half do not have nuclear weapons and four of them are NPT members 

• • Includes four types of nuclear attack options:

• o Basic Attack Options (BAOs)

• o Selective Attack Options (SAOs) 

• o Emergency Response Options (EROs)

• o Directed/Adaptive Planning Capability Options

• • There are no longer Major Attack Options (MAOs) in the strategic war plan 

NATO nuclear deterrence timeline

- 1949: First Strategic Concept: to use all weapons against

overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority

- 1952: Lisbon Force Goals: 96 NATO divisions ready in 90 days

by 1954 (actual peacetime total in 1954: 16)

• 1953: “New Look” 

• 1954: MC 48: tactical atomic use to “prevent rapid overrunning”

• - 1955: FRG joins NATO, US atomic weapons in FRG

• 1957: MC 14/2 massive retaliation w/ caveats

• 1962: Athens Guidelines, Cuban Missile Crisis

• 1968: MC 14/3 Flexible Response

• 1969 to end of Cold War: how to implement flexible response

• 1970s: NATO nuclear warheads in W. Europe reach maximum of 7k

• 1991 to present:

  • no clear articulation of NATO nuclear policy

    NATO nuclear policy in limbo despite 2014/2022

    reduction in warhead numbers (200? in 2010, 100? in 2025)

    focus on warhead and delivery capability modernization

2020: “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” 

“The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation are as follows:

• a) arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies;

• b) use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies;

• c) attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions;

• d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

III. Conditions for the Transition of the Russian Federation
to the Employment of Nuclear Weapons

19. The conditions that enable the possibility of nuclear weapons employment by the Russian Federation are as follows:

a) receipt of reliable data on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;

b) employment of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, against facilities and (or) military formations of the Russian Federation located outside its territory;

c) actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which would disrupt response actions by nuclear forces;

d) aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the employment of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity;

e) receipt of reliable data on the massive launch (take-off) of air and space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation.

20. The decision to employ nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.

2024: Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence

India-Pakistan Crises – Elements of restraint

• 1999

• 2001-2002

• 2008

• 2016

• 2019

reading

• Schelling – "Nuclear Deterrence for the Future" (pp. 50-52)

  • The most significant event in the past 60 years is the non-use of nuclear weapons in conflict

• Waltz – "Should Iran Go Nuclear?" (Nuclear Optimist)

  • Waltz argues that nuclear weapons do not spread easily or lead to instability

  • Nuclear weapons are only useful for deterrence, not coercion.

  • Iran getting nuclear weapons could stabilize the region through deterrence.

• Sagan – "Should Iran Go Nuclear?" (Nuclear Pessimist)

  • the world should promote nuclear power without weapons.

  • Iran’s instability, poor controls, and risk of proliferation make nuclear weapons dangerous.

• Nuclear Taboo (Tannenwald)

  • – Beyond deterrence, a moral and political norm against nuclear weapons has developed, influencing leaders’ decisions not to use them.