physicalism

not all of it (add during night)

What is the definition of physicalism

physicalists believe that all things are physical substances, the mind is not distinct from the body nor it is non-physical. instead there is a relationship between mental and physical meaning mental properties depend on physical properties.

What is philosophical behaviourism

behaviourists argue that mental states such as beliefs and desires are behavioural dispositions. meaning that the mind can be reduced to behaviours for example, mental states of pain would display behavioural dispositions associated with being in pain such as saying ow or frowning.

What is Carl Hempel’s Hard Behaviourism

Carl Hempel’s hard behaviourism is motivated by the verification principle that all meaningful statements must be verifiable or falsifiable by observation. since other minds cannot be observed it can be reduced to what can be observed such as statements about the mind are statements about publicly observable behaviour, which we can observe and access to behaviour of others.

How is Carl Hempel’s hard behaviourism an analytic reduction

analytic behaviourism is reductive because it claims that mental concepts can translate mental concepts in terms of behavioural concepts which can also be explained through using science for example, i feel stressed and my body has increased heartbeats and signs of distress such as shaking.

What is Hempel’s ‘Jared’s toothache’ example to strengthen hard behaviourism

the example goes like this:


1. Jared weeps and makes gestures of such kinds
2. at the question ‘what is the matter?, Jared utters the words ‘I have a toothache’
3. closer examination reveals a decayed tooth with exposed pulp.
4. Jared’s blood pressure, digestive processes, the speed of his reaction, show such changes.
5. such processes occur in Jared’s central nervous system.

this shows that pain isn’t a private experience causing Jared’s behaviour but it’s just that and able to be empirically established through observation and science.

What is the issue ‘multiple realisability’ to criticise Hempel’s hard behaviourism

the issue multiple realisability argues that there are many ways that mental states can express behaviours, for example, if someone is sad by showing a frowned face and slumped body language, it doesn’t show what sadness is really to everyone because if someone else would be sad but shows no emotions then we can’t just claim that one behavioural disposition of sadness would mean that everyone would follow it.

What is Gilbert Ryle’s soft behaviourism

Ryle’s soft behaviourism accepts that there’s something more to mental states than behaviour, Ryle argued that mental states could potential be a behavioural disposition instead of an actual behaviour. Behavioural dispositions tell us what a person would likely do or not do in circumstances for example, I am in pain because of a toothache which could cause me to try even if i’m not. However, soft behaviourism isn’t a reductive theory since it’s not reducing mental states to behaviour dispositions such as if i was sad and i show the behaviour of frowning or slouching.

What are the strengths to behaviourism?

* it’s able to overcome the problem of other minds since people behave like they do have minds since when people do have a certain mental state they still do act upon different behaviours even if it the mental state doesn’t match a certain behavioural dispositions, we’re still able to observe that there are people with other minds.
* Soft behaviourism is able to account for multiple realisability in contrast to hard behaviourism because they argue that a certain mental state such as sadness would have the behavioural dispositions of frowning and slouching whereas to soft behaviourism the mental state sadness can have multiple different behavioural dispositions instead of one.

What is the issue ‘Circularity’ to criticise Gilbert Ryle’s soft behaviourism

the issue of circularity argues that it doesn’t look possible for behaviourism to say what mental states ultimately are without talking about other mental states. we’re not able to analyse what behaviour a mental state is a disposition of without referring to other mental states for example, we’re not able to specify the set of dispositions of my fear without mentioning my beliefs, my desires or knowledge etc.

what is the ‘bear example’ to back up the circularity issue

the example goes like this:

if we’re analysing the fear of a bear in behavioural terms its that.

* john is afraid of bears
* john has the disposition to run away
* john has the dispositions to make himself look big

but i wouldn’t understand that behaviour unless if i understand that he desires to stay alive, but i would need to analyse another mental statement but haven’t completely translated it but then would end up referring to another mental state and more making this circular.

What is mind-brain type identity theory?

the claim is that the mind is the brain and each mental state is the same as a brain state. facts about the mind are reducible to physical facts about the brain and when talking about the nature of existence we can say that water is the same as collection of molecules of oxygen and hydrogen meaning we can make ontological reductions.

how does mind-brain identity theory differ from behaviourism

behaviourism uses analytic reduction which is using language and comparing mental states and behaviours and assuming they’re the same. for example, bobby is in pain which is shown through him screaming and holding his leg. whereas mind-brain type identity is ontological reduction which is using neuroscientific and psychological research which mental states can be explained through understanding of brain process for example, wate is h20 or lightning is electrical discharge which are the same also concerned with what actually exists in reality.

what is type identity theory

mental properties are physical properties of the brain such as thinking a thought is the same as neurons firing.

what are the strengths within type identity

they defend their position by pointing to physical processes which is responsible for the developments of human beings as individuals and species. and neuroscience makes advances in our understanding of the mechanisms of human behaviour and our mental capacities which can explain our behaviour in term of brain’s physical properties.

what is the issue with mind-brain type identity ‘location problem’

brain states have definable physical locations such as if my c-fibres are firing you can see it through an MRI scanner to find out the exact location of the c-fibres firing. but the issue is that identity theorists out say that mental states have the same location as brain states. However since according to leibniz law of indiscredibility of identicals both have to be identical and share exact properties so it doesn’t seem that mental states have physical location as the same as brain states.

what is a response with mind-brain type identity ‘location problem’

Smart responded that our language might haven’t caught up with neuroscience and language has developed in dualistic framework meaning our language lags behind. So if we understand out brain sufficiently then we can use it’s terminology so we would complain that our c-fibres are firing instead of talking about pain in our leg.

mind-brain type identity applied to dualist arguments

if applied to the divisibility argument


1. my body/brain is divisible
2. my mind is indivisible
3. Leibniz law states that two things must be identical and share exact same properties
4. therefore mind and body are separate substances

mind-brain type identity would argue that MRI can show clear parts of the brain and how the corpus callosum can be a surgically cut for epilepsy for patients to go live perfect normal lives.

what is the issue with mind-brain type identity ‘multiple realisability’

Hilary putnam argued that mental states can’t be reduced to brain states since mental states are multiply realised such as same mental states can come from many different brain states. this would be an issue since each type of mental states must be same to a type of brain states so if i would cut my finger on a knife and feel a pain mental state then it should be identical pain in brain state which would be the same for everyone. However with different species for example, an octopus has different brain functions to humans. so if octopuses have o-fibres instead of c-fibres and if you stabbed an octopus and it disperses and would think its in pain but if type identity theory is true then it’s not possible since octopus cant feel pain since pain is c-fibres firing and octopuses dont have c-fibres.

define eliminative

to be an eliminativist about something is to simply get rid of it completely like denying existence such as atheists are eliminativist about god denying its existence.

what is eliminative materialism theory

the theory is about how our basic common sense and mental states are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned since they don’t refer to anything that exists. which rejects that folk psychology doesn’t reduce to anything and should be eliminated.

define animism

animism is a religion that explains that behaviour of the natural world in terms of the actions of spirits and according the this the wind can feel anger and the moon can feel jealousy. Also things in the natural world have mental states and their behaviour is to be explained in terms of those states which are explained by physics instead of spirits which is now rejected.

what is folk psychology

it’s the theory about the mind held by ordinary people (folk) regarding the predictions and explanations of people’s behaviour represent by statements about the mind ordinary people use for example, an explanation for someone buying a drink is that ‘they desired a drink’ or ‘they were hoping to quench their thirst’.

what is the issue with eliminative material ‘intuitive certainty of the existence of mental states’ and it’s response.

it goes against the certain intuition we have since introspection can provide us strong evidence for the existence of mental states since i’m directly aware of the existence of desires, thoughts and pain e.g the desire for food which causes me to go to the fridge. denying their existence is false.

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churchland argues that our belief in folk psychology shapes our introspective experience so the introspective evidence for the existence of mental states is our interpretation of this evidence shaped by folk psychology. but eliminative can respond that when we believe or desire there is nothing going on in our mind.

what is the issue with eliminativism ‘folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power’

we can respond how folk psychology does explain and make accurate predictions about people’s behaviour. since we use folk psychology all of the time to explain why others act as they do such as a person running because they are scared. when predicting a persons behaviour likea child who suffers abuse can be reliably said that they would be likely to misbehave because of differences in beliefs or feelings but cannot be easily said with neurophysiological. folk psychology is a universal theory and likely continue to use its vocabulary.

what is the issue with eliminativism ‘eliminative materialism is self-defeating’

eliminativism claim that beliefs don’t exist which is mistaken since a eliminative materialist expresses their beliefs in the theory because why would anybody argue that something is true if they didn’t believe it was true showing how self-contradicting it is.

what is functionalism

functionalism is how all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised and mental states can be reduced to functional states. Which believe that mental states are best understood as being functional entities like hearts which mental states are functional states, best understood by what they do.

what are functional states

some everyday objects are defined not by what they are made of but how they are designed such as what task they perform. for example, can-openers might be made from different materials but doesn’t prevent them from all being can-openers since their function is to open cans which they’re defined to their function.

with functionalism what is input and output

since mental states can be reduced to functional states, so describing what mental a state will output a set from a set of inputs that describe its function. for example, an input would be c-fibres firing within the function of the mental state of pain with the output of the behaviour of crying or mental state of frustration.

how can functionalism be multiple realisability

mental states represent by their functions which means relations with other mental states, sensory input and behavioural outputs. functionalists maintain that if something functions like it has a mind then it has a mind.

for functionalism what is the computer analogy

this analogy was created to shown how functionalists compare computer system and operations of the mind. which computer hardware compare to the brain whereas computer software compare to mental functioning of the mind. this is apparently useful since they’re not different entities or substances or identical to each other. but it shows that its the way the brain is organised and its operations to be minded.

what are the advantages of functionalism over behaviourism

Behaviourism try to define each type of mental state through environment input and behavioural outputs which functionalists deny that its possible. Functionalist would argue that to characterise a mental state it should be looked at what is observable on the outside but it must involve reference to all other mental states which is causally connected.

the problem with functionalism and qualia

Since qualia is defined as intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible to you its subjective to you. this is a problem because qualia can be explained in terms of what caused them such as experience of redness and can only be understood by yourself, it cannot be explained by talking about the experience do or what caused them in the brain. Moreover, functions aren’t intrinsic properties.

what is the issue with functionalism ‘the possibility of a functional duplicate with inverted qualia’

Ned Block argued that functionalism cannot account for qualia. this argument experiments with the use of inverted spectrum, the spectrum of private colour qualia that I experience would be inverted to others. for example, if i see yellow as yellow but yellow is blue to someone else they would still call it yellow. Someone might see a blue banana and a yellow sky but since language is the same we wouldn’t notice. but since functionalism say mental state are functional states if true then two functionally identical mental states are the same mental state so if my mental state when i look at green grass is functionally identical to yours but phenomenally different. shows that they’re not the same meaning its false.

what is the response with functionalism ‘the possibility of a functional duplicate with inverted qualia’

a response would be that there can be functional differences in the scenario so meaning that inverted qualia examples wouldn’t have functional duplicates but certain functional difference for example if i asking a child ‘is the banana a bright happy colour or mournful and sad’ the child would reply that it’s a miserable colour then there would be functional difference showing that functional duplicates with inverted qualia isn’t possible.

what is the issue with functionalism ‘the possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia’

this is an argument that argues if there would be a possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia and what would happen. using the homunculi-head example. with the china brain example, if china would to simulate the working of a single brain, each person act as a neuron and connect to the body that provides sensory input and behavioural outputs of the brain. so if the body is damaged then messages is sent to the china mind and perform actions like moving the foot. Block wants to show how unintuitive that arrangement could be capable of thoughts and feelings if the mind has no qualia. so the people would have a busy time reacting to the input singals and making an effort to hope on one leg but would anyone feel any pain? since the china brain is functionally identical to human pain it isn’t in any pain so there are more to mental states than their functional roles.