Soviet Union Essay Plans

To what extent did the Soviet State maintain Bolshevik ideology in practice?

While the foundations and guiding principles of Bolshevik ideology were not always implemented from 1917-1941, short term deviations in practice predominantly furthered the long term drive towards communism under changing circumstances, meaning Bolshevik ideology was maintained to practice a fair extent

Lenin “eschewed” a definition of Bolshevism, declaring Marxism necessitated “perpetual adjustment to changing circumstances”. (Service)

1. Immense governmental power, and shifting leadership structures under Stalin meant that while gneral political ideology was implemented, the regimes very existence was paradoxical

   1. ● April Theses 17 “no support… to the Provisional Government” overthrow kerensky

      ○ But “place power into the hands of the proletariat and… peasantry” w democracy

      ● Soviet-based structure gave theoretical power, but plagued with corruption

      ○ First ‘democratic’ election Dec 17 (SRs) elected by proletariat 39%; Bols 24%

      ○ Lenin“tendency… to consolidate power as much as possible”(Ryan) - take power

      ● Stalin led by “dictating minority… to which a dictator dictates”(Scheffer) opposing “all power to the soviets” (Lenin) → both abrogated ideology for personal gain

      ● Cult of personality → posters depicting him as “captain” of ussr → not align with Marx

      ○ “hardly maintain that the Soviet state had ‘withered away’”(Fitzpatrick) by the end

2. Lenin and Stalin’s economic policies were founded on Communist ideals on nationalisation and collectivisation, and while numerous short term ideological concessions were intended to further long-term Communist economic reform, they ultimately compromised ideological implementation

   1. ● “As good Marxists”(Fitzpatrick) Bols nationalised banking 1919 80% large-scale industry nationalised

      ● “capitalism will be our salvation”(Lenin), response to destr from war comm → NEP prag(critiqued as un commie

      ● FYP, “consistent with earlier Bolshevik practice” (Morris)ideological + practical plasticity

      ● centralised + control econ of first FYP was “milestone on the road to socialism” (Fitz).

      ● collectivisation of agriculture, redistributing 98.3 million hectares between communities from 1922-27, → Bolsheviks’ intent for a vanguard party radically driving change.

      ● But, control ‘revolution from above’ Stalin believed → advancing socialist cause, Lenin → see regime as socialist “very doubtful”(Smith)short-term econ→shift Bol ideo in prac

3. Bolshevik ideology of equality in the social and cultural landscape of the USSR was implemented to mixed degrees, with increased diversions to Marx’s disavowal of identity politics, distractions from a revolutionary vision, under Stalin’s regime

   1. ● Avg salaries officials must, “not… exceed the average... of a competent… worker”(Lenin)

      ○ Honoured with 1920 intro posing a 500 ruble monthly salary for senior officials

      ● After Len death “worked towards securing… privileges”(Lenin) → Ducha hol home +over “500 flats for elite Party workers” (Rogovin) in House of Embankment

      ● “still a society of classes”(Serv) in 30s - working, peasant intelligentsia removed from Marx’s classless hypothesis, despite dekulakisation● Korenizatsiia nativisation policy(align with ideo) → 87% of Ukrainian schools teaching in Ukrainian by 1927“Marxist theory… of the multinational Russian Empire”. (Conquest)

      ● programs were “great success” (Smith) → prevent insurrection + ensure homogeneity → praxis changed for long-term survival of socialist state

      ● Marx’s religion is the ‘opiate of the masses’ w Russian orthodox church being “institutionally undermined”(Smith) → fracture intent vs achievement of Bol regime

4. Foreign policy implementation was arguably the least aligned with Marxist-Leninist writings and ideology, contradicting the worldwide communist movement.

   1. ● “we are opposed… to national exclusiveness. We are internationalists”(Lenin 19)

      ● “our commune is the start of a worldwide commune”(17 chairman of Saratov Soviet)

      ● Comintern 19 “promote Bolshevik-style revolution on a global scale”

      ○ “failed to understand” (Smith) workers in capitalist countries unlikely to revolution

      ● Treaty of Rapallo 22 → ideo compromise worked w Ger to “facilitate economic relations”

      ● Lenin death Bol leaders “did not [have]... unified views on foreign policy”,(Hoffmann)

      ● ‘Soc in one count’ respected Lenin’s ideals as a “misinterpretation of Lenin”(Service)

      ● Comintern from glob rev tool to assisting dictator → departure from early Bol policy

To what extent did Stalinism transform Soviet Society, culture and the economy?

Stalinism’s impact on Soviet society, culture and economy between 1928-41 profoundly transformed Russia from a backwards country to a global superpower, regimenting Stalin’s Communist odeology, eliminating non-conforming practices and strengthening his role as USSR’s supreme leader

● “extraordinarily grim” (Service) living standards

1. Stalin’s economic policies, primarily realised through Five Year Plans, dictated pace and output of Soviet industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation, transforming economy in some areas to a great extent, despite limitations achieving many fundamental goals

   1. ● Uplift in industrial production from FYP necessitated collectivisation to support urban workers+ intl needs → implemented with “characteristic ruthlessness”(Service??)

      ● Comm stop countryside free market operations, ↑ control, ↓ NEP-era class+ priv farms

      ● 2mil households collectivised by Oct 29 → ↑ to 15mil in Mar 30

      ● 41, 99% agri collective → stalin’s transformation of agri ownership + operations

      ○ While envisage dramatic ↑, actually ↓ from 85 - 70 mil tons only recover in 35

      ○ Mid 50s agri “regain level-of-output achieved…before WW1”.(Serv??)

      ● although grain-requisitioning ↑10x from 1924-35 + Soviet grain 15% global grain by 31, net-income didn’t ↑ as global-values for certain agril goods dropped.

      ○ collectivisation financially ↓ than expect to industn, required international aid

2. Stalin’s legacy of three-piataletka (FYPs) for rapid industrialisation substantially transformed the USSR into a modern industralist nation through monumental increases in some production areas, however, inefficiency, low quality production asnd Party figure distortionlimited complete economic transformation

   1. ● USSR “50-or-100 years behind advanced countries” → industrialiation not collectivisation for econ agenda → ambitious goals to ↑ indus capacity

      ○ Didn’t meet many, ↑ by 41(1500 projects e.g. Turskib railway)

      ● GNP tripled in 9 years + by 37 “twice the productive power of major European powers”

      ● Output ↑ but low-quality stunt growth; inferior to intl “wastage occurred on huge-scale”

      ● Stalingrad tractor factory, aim: 2000 trucks from jul-sep, only 43 produced → inefficient

      ● coall-production success; coal ↑35mil(27) - 150mil(40) but consumer goods overlooked

      ● “textile-industry languished” w necessities “completely unobtainable”

      ● publications(e.g. Pravda) controlled by commies → distorted to fool ppl

      ● Deceit in indus management complicated extent Stalinism transformed Soviet econ

3. Stalinism dramatically transformed Soviet society, changing the USSR’s urban/rural worker ratios and living standards through urbanisation whilst mandating education

   1. ● Collec+indus → new agri tech + larger farms required ↓ workers → sought urban work

      ● Moscow ↑ from 2-4 mil(26-39) → new cities(Magnitogorsk, Stalinigorsk)

      ● Modernisation↑‘white-collar’ class;4.5-16%(24-39)→transform of living+working areas

      ● aim:↑urban living but superficial changes+fail to impact majority→ “extraordinarily grim”

      ● Residential build lagged → bad housing; live in ‘kommunalki’“average living-space of Muscovites in 1940 was slightly-over 4sqm”.

4. Stalinism instilled profound Soviet educational transformation in the 1930s, raising literacy rates to record levels. Wishing to expand social support for the Communist PARTY and create a marxist modern technical society, education was “treated as a battlefront”

   1. ● Want ↑ social support from comm party+ make Marxist technical society, edu “treated as a battlefront”

      ● 400% ↑ edu funding(32-37), Dec 39 199,000 schools + ↑ 19 mil students(28-40)

      ● Compulsory 7year min school, implemented w “revolutionary-gusto” → ↑ 40-94% age 9-49 literate by 39

      ● Infrastructure construction for fast growth but edu-system had organisational limits

      ○ Limited teacher training, material, stu-discipline→withheld rigid system desired

      ● Tsarist-teach emphasis(rote-learning+discipline) diff to radical 20s → blurred ‘transformative’ impact on edu; viewed as reversal to pre-Bol

5. Stalinism dramatically transformed Soviet culture by reducing the diversity of thought and expression, communicating Soviet ideals and embodying a more “conservative approach to culture” → nationalities problem within the USSR

   1. ● Key organisations managing govt censorship alr established in 20s - Stalin expanded

      ● State controlled all major newspapers and radio stations → no mass free media 28-40

      ● News reported in conformist manner, damaging developments not reported at all → 32-33 famine covered up, highly public show trials, worst aspects of 36-38 mass violence censored

      ● Arts and literature rejected 1920s abstract experiments to reflect only Soviet cultural canon’s rituals and symbols → “communicating standards of style from Moscow to the periphery”

      ● Stalin instructed writers to reflect socialist realism principles, including FYPs, industrialisation,

      ‘hard-working’ individual → national heroes, Stakhanovite movement → socialist realism promoted across all artistic media (film, literature, painting)

      ● Creative intelligentsia “engineers of human souls” → abolish cultural orgs in 32 → artists join

      party-governed unions for socialist construction

      ● Stalinism’s strong ideological goals profoundly transformed Soviet-culture, diverting the USSR towards socialist realism.

6. However, some aspects of culture failed to reach Stalinism’s intended outcomes

   1. ● CommParty’s attack on Orthodox Church + other faiths gained momentum after Stalin’s power struggle victory → viewed religion as “opium of the people”

      ● Stal tried to eradicate religion: attacks on priests (60k priests in 25 → 6k in 39), mass secular propaganda, church requisitioning (1% of churches open by 1940)

      ● Although Stalinism publicly suppressed faith, private belief persisted, rendering minimal religious transformation → 37 census 57% of citizens religious → regime to “retreat and compromise” in religious eradication

Assess the political, social and economic impacts of the Bolshevik consolidation of power on the USSR

The period of Bolshevik consolidation from 17-24 cemented Bolshevik domination of the state and moved it towards a ‘centralised, ideocratic dictatorship of a single party” (Service)

1. The brutality of the Civil War and Cheka reinforced the use of terror and coercion and assisted in the elimination of political opposition to Sovnarkom

   1. ● Suppression of rival political parties + dissent with the Bolsheviks

      ● Lenin + Bolsh knew rev=violence, but were convinced it would not be enduring feature of regime

      ● Factions banned completely, failure to comply would result in immediate expulsion from party

      ● 18 decree(political prisoners to be held in concentration camps) - set precedent which were carried forward by Stal in 30s to a high degree

      ● Cheka + Red Army established during civil war, Cheka attacked political parties, arrested members for ‘counter-revolutionary crimes’

      ● ‘centralised, one-ideology dictatorship of a single party which permitted no challenge to its monopoly of power’ (Service)

2. During this period, the Bolsheviks also expropriated and controlled great segments of the economy described as the ‘commanding heights’ by Lenin including banks, heavy industry and foreign trade.

   1. ● Retreat from War Communism and an ideological compromise

      ● NEP introduced to aid recovery of ruined economy + quell uproar amongst population

      ● Civil war “devastated the economy, bringing industry to almost a standstill” (Fitz)

      ● Peasants allowed to retain surplus goods after tax + allowed to trade + sell surplus at markets

      ● Incentivised more crop production, saw increase of 20 million tons of grain in 3 years

      ● Allowed small priv businesses to operate, 80% were privately owned by 23

      ● Began to actively search for foreign loans + investments to boost economic production

      ● By mid-1920s Russia agricultural output restored to pre-WWI levels

      ● 22 creation of ussr gave local autonomy to states,but ‘union of ppl’ extended control of Sovnarkom

      ● Brest-Litovsk secured Bol domination by ending participation in disastrous WWI

3. The social and cultural revolution of the party also had a significant impact as Marxism served as an ‘ersazt religion for the communist party’

   1. ● Bitterness regarding the way Party rules – openly atheist + forced grain requisitioning = deeply sus

      ● Clear cultural divide between party and rural religious peasants

      ● Strict censorship laws - media, public discussion and art were tightly controlled - decree on press 17 made publication criticising Sovnarkom or Bolsheviks illegal

      ● GLAVLIT 22 censored books, mag, newspaper, radio

      ● Suppression of people - most were willing to accept Party to avoid further conflict (+10 years of conflict)

      ● Econ policiese.g. grain requisitioning permanently damaged Sovnarkom’s relationship w peasants

      ● Cultural divide between Party + rural pop, NEP eased tensions slightly but many recognised imposing new changes on peasantry would be extremely difficult

      ● Under 1% of pop were members of Party, only 2% involved in youth organisation Komsomol

      ● Brutalised population + coarsened public life, people ‘more inclined to bury heads in the sand’ (Brose)

Assess the significance of differing visions for the USSR in the leadership conflict

Different visions for the USSR were crucial to the leadership conflict from 1924-29 because Stalin exploited these differences to discredit and isolate Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev and emerge as the dominant member of the politburo, securing his victory in the leadership struggle

● Position Gen Sec to undermin opp ‘victory for Stalin and Bukharin was completed’ (Serv)

1. Trotsky’s Leftist vision on the direction of the party opposed Stalin’s orchestration of an increasingly bureacratic structure; these disputes between between two wings were weaponised by the triumvirate to significantly weaken Trotsky’s position in leadership conflict by 1924

   1. ● Trot view - dictatorship of proletariat but democracy within party →stal’s control made party ‘conservative, bureaucratic factionalism’ (Trot)(stal was exploiting to get support)

      ○ Worried Bol Party “behaving like a small ruling elite whose only concern was to stay in power” (Fitzpatrick) + Trotsky voiced criticisms on Stalin’s

      ● Stal’s view - party and govt should become ↑ bureaucratic

      ● Stal, Zin + Kam formed a ‘triumvirate’ to counter “odd man out in the leadership” (Fitzpatr) contender for top position+ eliminate threat Left Opp who ↑ influence→ might split party

      ● Trot labelled as opp (Left Opp presented as opp vs the Seven being majority)

      ○ Seven met before Politburo meetings( discuss key issue)→ Trot’s views outvoted

      ○ w/o len, Trot’s diverged from party discipline+ Stal framed him of “discrediting Leninism in order to drag in Trotskyism as the ‘sole proletarian’ ideology”

      ○ 13th Party Congress (24) - ‘On Party Unity’(21)eroded Trotsky’s position (accused of ‘factionalism’)→defeated + forced public apology +lost commissar of war title

2. The issue of socialist modernisation was pivotal in debate of Trotsky’s ‘Permanent Revolution’ in opposition to Stalin’s envisioned ‘Socialism in One Country’, resulting in the expulsion of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev from Politburo in 1926 and Stalin’s progressive position towards supreme authority

   1. ● Fix indus+agri system, trot ‘Permanent Revolution’(orthodox marx view of rev in west, for ussr rev) → Zin supported, Kam disillusioned w stal ↑ threat → formed United opp

      ● But, unexpected eco reocovery 24→ emergence of indust proposition(soc in 1 country)

      ● Threat of ‘capitalist encirclement’, stal endorsed ussr ability to “create the preconditions of socialism by its own unaided efforts”(Fitz) bc oeace rather than potential conflicts

      ● duumvirate w bukh → position “simultaneously patriotic and practical”(Fitz) → appeal to national chauvinism of rank-and-file members + accusing Trot of lacking faith in peasants

      ● United opp denied party outlets→↓support→secret meetings(factionalist accusations)

      ● 14th party congress(25), Kam challenge towards Stal showed Stal’s domination “helpless in the face of an adversary infinitely astuter and better prepared for the fray.”(Carr)

      ● United opp removed from politburo → stal +buk majority

3. Despite originally supporting Bukharin on the NEP against the United Opposition, the ambiguity of an economic policy in ‘Social in one Country’, allowed Stalin to switch towards rapid industrialisation at the end of the 20s and exploit the Right Oppositions economic position to secure his victory in the leadership struggle

   1. Socio-eco crisis(peasant hoarding grain) → end of NEP utopian prosperity+ politburo moved left for more radical intervention

      ● Stal changed support to molotov, Voroshilov +Kuybyshev → move towards rapid industrialisation for ussr survival “beaten…for her backwardness”.(fitzpatrick)● But, right opp led by bukh though aggressive approach would threaten the smychka, with Bukharin’s “Peasants enrich yourselves!”.

      ● Peasant oriented also adopted by stal through FYP “the average wages of the working class would rise by 70%”(service)→ hard for bukh to object

      ● econ falling again as stal relied on “strength of quotations from Lenin” to justify industrise

      ● Stal dismissed supporters from posts → 29 Politburo ‘majority’ initiate compulsory collectivisation agaist bukh(sacked in sam meeting) → stal had supreme authority

4. Although differing visions were exploited by Stalin to eliminate his opponents, this may account for an overstatement in ideological differences, as “the differences among them are not so significant as the similarities’ (Service)

   1. ● Despite criticisms on Stal’s “bureaucratic apparatus”(Piatakov), trot support centralise rule

      ● Stal eas expansionist but prioritised building econ +milit before world rev

      ● Stal FYP accused of copying ttot policies→similarities as both saw indistrialisation as key

      ● Stal use of cult of len used to “distinguish the official party line from the heresies of its critics” but ‘critics’ advocated for len’s core ideas

      ● Differing views depend of personalities which shape interpretations of ideology “it was his closeness to the unlettered masses which constituted Stalin's great, and often misunderstood, strength”(Pereira) bc stal related more to working class

Why was Stalin able to emerge as a leader of the USSR by the late 1920s?

Stalin’s emergence as the leader of the USSR by the late 1920s was a deliberately orchestrated process of establishing credibility, clientele and a cult of personality in order to be accepted by the general public while controlling the intricacies of the public

Attributes established image as “the manager, the administrator the bureaucrat”(Carr

1. Establishing and reiterating a strong association between Lenin, Leninism and himself as the “inheritor of Lenin’s mantle” (Duranty), Stalin was strategically positioned to be an acceptible and credible successor whilst facilitating the downfall of his opponents

   1. ● Associate w lenin was respected → saved from Romanov+Provisional govt failures

      ● Lenin's funeral orator→lenin myth(deifying)+present stal as guardian of len’s principle

      ● Verbal association asserted role in USSR →“‘the best disciple’...’the best co-fighter’... then (reaching) equality between Marx, Lenin and Stalin”(Daniels)

      ● Propagation of relationship → ↑credibility as leader(prev not seen suitable outside admin)

      ● Leninism was “the ideal, and revision or deviation were held in increasing horror”(Daniels)

      ● Trotsky(men) portrayed as distorting len legacy+industrialiser(exploit peasants for capital)

      ● Stal’s pragmatism → hypocritical expelling of trot, zino, kamen for a plan to rid NEP

2. Stalin’s tactical manipulation of his power over appointment within the party apparatus was a “major factor in his rise to dominance” (Rigby) as it enabled his to gain a political clientele and dilute the support of his opponents

   1. ● Soc structured around connections+protection →used to elevate position+ gain loyalty

      ● Replaced dom cliques with his own from21-23 by provincial officials → maintain power

      ● Patient in gaining followers(didn’t come from influential background

      ● Rely on benefactor relationships to be “dynamic leader who had a hand in … discussions on politics, military strategy, economics , securuty and international relations.”(Service)

      ● Practical use of power w control speech agenda at meetings → put opposition lower

      ● “conventional wisdom” (Service) by exchanging advancement with compliance +support

      ● Building extensive network ↑threat to others → total control+effective removing opposition

3. In the context of class warfare, Stalin’s peasant background, and skilful utilisation of it, was a significant asset in gaining the popular support of Soviet Society

   1. ● Emergence of cult of personality → worker for ppl to be idolised + worshipped

      ● Lenin + other senior members “too cosmopolitan and intellectual, or simply alien”(Pereira)

      ● Stal ‘humble upbringing’ + role People’s Commissar for Nationalities → centralised figure

      ● upbringing exacerbated as Under romanovs+prov govt ppl felt inadequately represented

      ● Appealed to ‘workers from the bench’ → ↑ 50% party membership after 1924 speech

      ● Speech effective as used exegesis’s of lenin’s texts → fuel nation pride + image of power

      ● Viewed as “father of the people, (whose) word is law”(Macridis)→humble+eager to serve

      ● Exacerbated by strategic funding of rural schools and hospitals

4. However, whilst Stalin’s deliberate tactics were very successful, the mistakes of his opponents and their downplaying Stalin’s ability also contributed to his rise to power by the 1920s

   1. ● Politburo downplayed stal “dull…and illiterate”(Carr)→believed Stal served officials

      ● Trotsky arrogant+overbearing → offputting ↑ fears he would create personal dictatorship

      ● Zin+Kam tried moves on Stal but thought Trot was greater threat → Stal use tactics freely

To what extent can Stalinism be considered totalitarianism to the period 1941?

Although the concept of ‘totalitarianism’ has been challenged by historians in recent years, the model developed by Friedrich and Brzezinski in the 1950s still has value and Stalinism can certainly be considered as fulfilling this criteria to a significant degree

● six traits: “an ideology, a single party typically led by one man, a terroristic policy, a communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally directed economy”.

1. The USSR was driven by a clear official ideology with the creation of a communist state as the “final state of mandkind”

   1. Stal’s Marx-Lenism interpretations basis of ideology → forced to adhere+pivotal in for DM

      ● Stal saw himself as replacement leader for “soc in 1 count” officially accepted April 25

      ○ pervaded all areas of life, excusing/legitimising actions for utopian Comm vision

      ○ “Any influence which conflicted with communist ideals” (Gibson) e.g. religion condemned

      +secularism encouraged → anti religion in schools

      ● ideology “manipulated as required” (Lewin) in Stal’s pragmatic policies but end goal same

2. Stalinism enforced a single mass party led by a dictator, the Vozhd

   1. opposition banned →exploited one party state +dictatorial leadership established by Len

      ● Stal held many positions e.g.Gen Sec +only party member in: Polit/Orgburo + Secretariat

      ● 28 Stalin completed his rev by eliminating opposition through control of the party machine

      ● comm party was exclusive, less than 10% of adult pop →careful selection+ expulsions

      ○ party hierarchically organised/bureaucratised, stressing “complete and absolute unity” (Stalin) → create submissive +efficient “instrument” (Lewin)

3. Stalinism also fulfils the aspect of a centrally directed economy as private property was abolished and the entire economy was state-owned, controlled by Stalin’s policies of industrialisation and collectivisation

   1. forced transition semi-private to centralised econ→ achieve indus growth ideology wanted

      ● ↑ bureaucratisation in Vesenkha +Gosplan= ↑ control +centralised power →directives from central committee would be obeyed in countryside

      ● Rapid modernisation was way of “extending the direct control of the totalitarian state” (Erlich) → enforcement of Stalin’s FYPs in 28-32, 33-37 and 38-42

      ● Priv farms under govt control, high production rates + coercion employed for failure to obey

      orders/achieve goals, Article 107 of the criminal code for arrests

      ● “Ural-Siberian” method, reminiscent of War Comm, legal status in June 29 +applied to countryside → by 1930, 15mil households collectivised

4. The state had full control of all means communication and power was maintained through the party’s jurisdiction of public opinion and indoctrination of the masses

   1. The Stalinist state employed a syst● All areas life monitored→ensure message citizens outside ussr received were regulated

   ● All media +forms of culture had political purpose→censorship+propagandistic message

   ● Praises of Stal “invariably sung in every speech” (Gibson) and “intrusive political campaigns” (Service)pervaded all aspects of society

   ● Ideology used in communication to describe rev as “necessary and proper development of Marxist Leninism” (Daniels)

   ● propaganda enforced as“legitimate means of projecting worldview of the regime” (Laver)

   ● Cultural freedom disappeared+censorship→misinformation(idealised)→minimal rebellionem of terror, featuring terroristic police to ensure cooperation and eliminate opposition

5. There was also a monopolgy on all means of armed combat, including a red army and the navy

   1. secret police thought rev was “supreme law” (Ascher) → justification to use extreme coercion →Great Terror 35-39,

      ○ Kirov’s assassination→pretext to legalise terror Dec 34→govt eliminate enemies

      ● Len also used terror but Stal did it fully for“power in all spheres of life” (Laver)to fulfil goals

      ● Terror dominant presence in “security state”(Lewin), (kulaks then party) no one “escaped the vigilance of the secret police”(Ascher) 680K political executions in 37-38

      ● Massive purges +show trials of party members devastated party with 110/139 members of Central Committee arrested before 19th Congress March 39

      ● NKVD was “elevated…above all other institutions” to become arguably one of the most “complicated and extensive terrorist organisations” (Lewin)

6. Though Stalinism fitted the criteria of totalitarian model, it wasn’t completely totalitarian as the overall aim of the total control of the individual was not fully achieved.

   1. “Soviet leadership never totally controlled its own state – and the state never totally controlled society”(Service)

      ● Argued Stal not all-powerful dictator, admin curbed by bureaucratic chaos +rivalries amongst elites

      ● Subtle resistance strategies developed by public → used in informal illegal practices

      ● scepticism was widespread → disobedience despite terror

      ● peasant opposition to collectiv threatened regime →pressured govt to give back priv plots

Assess the impact of collectivisation and industralisation on the Soviet society and economy to 1941

The implementation of the policies of industralisation and collectivisation from the period 1928-41 set in motion a series of events that would have substantial, yet deeply divisive impacts on society, while engendering a fundamental shift from base agrarian economics to large scale industrial modernisation

● Eco policies→industrial+collectiv“large gains and losses amongst the population”(Davies)

1. The implementation of expansionary industrialisation policies under Stalin’s Five Year Plans undoubtedly created a mostly positive outlook for the Soviet economy

   1. ● positive impacts productive capacity +real output → FYP1 (28-32) grain requisition→ famines → transfer of labour agri to indusl (peasants migrated urban to avoid famine)

      ● Labour supply ↑202%→rapid industrialisation, output 2x by 34 + productive capacity↑40%

      ● most substantial impact was real output, civilian industries 3x pre-policy output+munitions output ↑70-fold

      ● Export grain ↑heavy industry in GOSPLAN → make of industrial factories + infrastructure

      ● Production of capital goods, sharp ↑ in output by 28, total industrial production ↑ by 237%

      ● Rapid industrialisation furthered in FYP2 (33-37) → import machine+experts for efficiency

      ● Policy had “converted the USSR from an agrarian and weak country” into an industrial powerhouse “fully self-reliant and independent of the caprices of world capitalism” (Stalin)

2. While the impact of industrialisation on the Soviet economy was substantial in its outcomes for both industrial production and capacity in the urban sector, an equally devastating societal outcome in the form of famine faced its agricultural counterpart'

   1. ● basis of industrialisation was change of ussr into powerful indus econ by reallocation of produce+labour to urban industrial sector

      ● procurement+ repressive techniques of coercion used by govt → crisis of rural subsistence as rural areas stripped of basic food + agri commodities (e.g. animal feed)

      ● Killing livestock(protest)+supply disruptions→ damage food security in vulnerable areas

      ● conditions culminated(arguably greatest impact)→Soviet, Kazakh +Great Ukraine Famine

      ● Collectively, 7.5mil deaths thought direct result of famine caused by policies; 4mil in Ukraine +2mil Kazakhstan (40% of pop)

      ● the prosperity +rapid growth of the eco impossible without the “brutalisation and demoralisation of the rural population, decimated by famines” (Harrison)

3. The subsequent process of “collectivisation” engendered substantial widespread impacts on the Soviet Economy

   1. ● Collectivization brought a far more bleak outlook for the Russia economy

      ● Farm mechanisms advancement +electrification → basis of collectivisation targets in FYPs→collective farms cover 20% of all peasant households

      ○ serious miscalculation as ↑ demand in urban sect→ ↑ pressure from local officials + State → ↑ quota targets + level of collectivisation

      ● close of the FYP1(final push for complete collectivisation) w 90% of households in collective farm sector in 38 → period described as “the Great Leap into the Unknown”○ Complete collectivis disastrous → ↓animal tractive power(killed in FYP1), grain cultivation, arable sector 15% while centralised collection of 23M tonnes of grain saw peasant harvest collapse → ↑ unregulated market transactions→grain surplus sold inflated “scarcity prices” (Robert)

      ○ Peasants resisted collectivization by killing animals than turning them to State

      ● Measures represent eco failure with productivity, + erosion of eco +productive capacity → confiscation destroyed incentives to work/innovate

4. The substantial impacts of collectivisation on Soviet Society can be categorised into both individual and wider collective impacts

   1. Collective:

      ● dekulakization→confiscation +redistribution of Kulak property+ grain expropriation

      ● Kulaks subjected to social isolation + confinement in “gulags”

      ● period of terror would see the dismantling of 1.5K kulak households(7M in labour camps)

      Individual:

      ● Liquidation of Kulaks represented destruction of Kulak as social/eco model of individual achievement + self-betterment that peasants aspired to follow

      ● Cemented mindset that success by hard work impossible, prosperity only possible in kolkhozy(collective)

      ● Attempted to “eradicate individualists striving altogether” (Massimo)

To what extent was Soviet political life transformed under Stalin in the period 1921-1941?

Whilst the Soviet political sphere underwent a moderate degree of reformation during the 1924-29 struggle over power, the increasingly drastic policy and social changes under Stalin from 1929 onward engendered greater change, accumilating in a comprehensive transformation of political life by 1941.

● Expansion of terror as tool of “prophylactic repression” (Service) threatened elite security

● ↑centralisation made “extreme destabilisation”(Serv) of state apparatus → transfom roles

1. Stalin’s escalation of Lenin’s mass operations signifcantly destabilised the security of the USSR’s political elite, drastically transforming Soviet political life

● Violence+mass operations “central to Russian and Soviet statecraft will before Stalin came to power” (Harris)

○ Stal’s use 37-38 expanded Len’s in scale+methodology → threaten elite security

● Politburo July 37 →quotas for # of arrests+executions from geographic regions 28% shot

● len(extrajudicial target opponents, limiting intra-party repression to anti-factionalism policy +expulsion of dissidents), stal indiscriminately targeted supporters to fulfil quotas

● Execution Nikolai Yezhov(orchestrator of victims+confidant with 3 writers)→ inconsistency

● Vast scope of terror marked significant transformation

● 5287 annual executions(20-23) → 1880 not indicating terroristic expansion(24-29) → 62542 not including deaths of prisoners(30-41)

● Policy changes 24-29 → foundation for terror article 58 of 1934 Penal Code (loosely defined counter rev acts, only 29-41 quantitative transform seen)

● “Lenin would’ve been horrifies by the scale and methods of the Great Terror”(Service)

1. Stalin’s pursuit of centralisation further transformed Soviet political life by maintaining Party membership and undermining the authority of his officials

Stal transformed Len’s “oligarchy” into a “personal dictatorship”(Getty)

● Len had power but surrounded by colleagues who “served to limit [his] power”(Getty)

● Stal’s rule after Great terror was “the limitless power” over any official(Getty)

● Authority as gen sec+ later purges→instate personal loyalty in new members by “manufacturing…situations which induced local officials to compete” (Service)

● Late 30s Central Committee “purely decorative appendage of teh dictatorship”(Service)

● reshuffling→destabilisation+inability officials to retain power→centralisation to have order

● 30s 0 evidence of ppl contradicting Stalin unlike early 30s(Kirov’s advocate reconciliation)

● 29, devout Stalinist loyalty rather than revolutionary aptitude +ideological deviation

● 36 “transformation… into a more powerful system of leadership of the state by society”(Stalin) → power increasingly held by one man

1. Stalin’s dictatorship demanded the increasing politicisation of the masses by augmenting existing ritualism and incorporating the social and economic practices of regular citizens into the political sphere, thus transforming their political lives

Unlike terror/central, politicisation arose from deification of lenin+ cult of personality

● Stalin’s “perennial anxiety about identifying Sovietness [necessitated] political rituals”(Yekelchyk) andallowed personal beliefs to be ascertained

● “Loyalty rituals”(van Ree)→ letters, public speech, marches,art+music→display of “civic emotions”(van ree) for successful internalisation of ideology

● Despite “politicised appearance of political life,[the population] was depoliticised” (kuromiya) but irrelevant →participation shows ability to politicise everyday practices

● Politicised priv ceremonies “red”(McDowell)weddings/funerals link indiv w political system

● Economic behaviours excluded from ritualism e.g. Stakhanovite enthusiasm + buying state bonds → absorb depoliticised behaviours

● Leninist state attempted to politicise social behaviours(red army day/ oct revolution day) yet not standardised nationally until stalin

To what extent did terror contribute to political transformation of the USSR under Stalin?

The use of terror significantly aided political transformation of the USSR into a one party, one ideology dictatorship under Stalin by cementing total, multifaceted ideological compliance

● Helped construct “an efficient Soviet state subservient to his personal dictatorship” (Serv)

1. Terror wielded against percieved ‘anti-Soviet’ enemies in the 1937-38 mass operations contributed to Stalin’s political transformation of the USSR to a great extent by facilitating the dissolution of “categories of people believed by Stalin.. to contain the regime’s enemies” (Service) to ensure they could not threaten Communist authority

   1. ‘hidden enemies could link w external enemies + pose mortal danger to power’(Kuromiya)

      ● (kulaks, military, ethnic minority, +‘ex-Mens, ex-SRs, priests’ (Service)) likely future opp

      ● Suspect various groups doing ‘fifth column’ activity (alliance to external govts) → undermine Comm regime in future conflicts.

      ● Stalin saw Soviet Poles as ‘a potential fifth column of the 'semi-fascist' Polish state, which … [could] unite with Nazi Germany to attack the Soviet Union.’ (Figes)

      ● mass extralegal e.g. ‘group arrests or exiles [conducted] without a differentiated approach to each person,’(NKVD deputy Beria) → ensure the elimination of all threats

      ● The NKVD (secret police) subsequently arrested 300K ppl of various ethnic groups(74% executed) + arrested 650K ‘anti-Soviet’(half executed)

      ● Majority allegedly disloyal High Command officers executed+15/16 Army Commanders

      ● success w eliminating political threats confirmed by Molotov, who stated after WWI that ‘we owe the fact that we did not have a fifth column … to '37.’

2. Terror’s facilitation of the elimination of potential enemies within the Communist Party also contributed to Stalin’s establishment of a personal dictatorship of the USSR to a great extent, by ensuring Stalin himself had complete control over Communist ideology and DM

   1. ‘broke the party as an independent, supreme political agency’ (serv)in 30s trials+ purges

      ● 34 murder of Kirov (head Leningrad Party), Stal thought oppositionist ‘Trotsky-Zinovievite Centre’ undermining his leadership.

      ● ‘show trials’ of ex-allies Z+K w other Left Opps accused of terror-adjacent behaviour, later bukh → executied 40% ‘Old Bols’ who had positions in Politburo, eliminating disloyal ppl

      ● trials+purging of broader Party institution→execution +imprison 100K members (37-8).

      ● prophylactic repression(Service) w focus on pre-emptive cleansing, purges facilitated creation of new Party elite (ex-peasants or labourers) promoted to Comm admin posts.

      ● ‘loyal servitors from lower-class origins’ (Figes) owed positions to Stal → totally loyal + ideologically conformist, ensuring Stal’s political environment ‘emptied of content.’

3. Terror also made an extensive contribution to security of Stalin’s leadership by engendering pervasive fear amongst the Soviet population, ensuring dictatorship was socially unopposed

   1. executions during Great Terror (1-1.5 mil) + expansion of the gulag/NKVD systems(2.9 mil arrests) → citizens “acutely aware of their state’s immense and pervasive powers … [with] no one in doubt about the consequences of overt disobedience.’ (Service)

      ● new, ideological climate, (established initially by random arrests) enforced by denunciations from citizens+ paid informers (one for every 6-7 families in Moscow).

      ● Great Terror - ↑ denunciations(ppl avoid arrest by accusing others) → self-imposed political censorship‘people learned to remain silent, not to question the authorities’(Figes)● complete political control essential to success of Stal’s political transform - given large population, total ideological control over citizens vital to the survival of one-party state.

4. While terror clearly made an extensive contribution to the moulding of Soviet politics, ideological compliance was cultivated jointly through other methods such as propaganda and censorship

   1. Terrors inability to directly influence ideology/morals →propaganda/censorship forcibly establish trust in state ideals,+ outlawing dissemination of alternative views.

      ● domination of arts→,regime able to demand faith in state’s visions for unity, discipline, + patriotism,(elevate of paragons of labour productivity, Alexei Stakhanov, +key leaders)

      ● But, w/o terror, unlikely propaganda would succeed in stopping anti-communist sentiment

      ○ the 32 oppositionist Ryutin Platform + 34 poem ‘Ode to Stalin,’ w lines as ‘[Stalin] rolls the executions on his tongue like berries,’

How did Stalin’s policies transform social and cultural life in Russia?

The implementation of Stalin’s policies had a broad effect on all facets of Soviet life through its forceful transformation of social and cultural spheres to conform to ideological principles of the regime, however this approach whilst effective, faced considerable challenges

Great Retreat was defined by a “clear abandonment … of gender equality”(Fitzpatrick)

● Suppressed cultural expression “chilling effect on creativity and innovation”(service)

1. The transformation of the Soviet educational system into a centralised organisation rooted in Marxist principles and the elimination of “counter revolutionary” sentiment, as well as the founding of Komsomol youth groups targetted towards absolute indoctrination exposed adolescents to significant erosion of their livelihood

   1. New edu policies contrasted skills of independent inquiry/thought(keystones of pre-rev)

      ● Emphasisied “hard work, discipline, and obedience”rigid curriculum “standardised tests designed to weed out any deviation from the official line”(Figes)

      ○ Attempted to create gen of committed socialists to build new better society

      ● Overhauling of previous curricula emphasis on political loyalty+ physical skills rather than artistic+ intellectual inquiry

      ● Attempted to prepare youth for indust work + subdue development of future intelligentsia

      ● Komsomol→mass youth organisation of activities to promote comm values + instil loyalty

      ● Members encouraged to report anti-Soviet activities +maintain strict morality/behaviour, facilitating function “a mechanism of social control, monitoring and reporting” (Fitzpatrick)

2. Stalin’s policies during the Great retreat marked a clear abandonment of social ideals of gender equality and a turn in favour of a patriarchal and traditional society, resulting in a significant reversal of progress twoards women’s rights

   1. advances e.g. legalisation of abortions(outside Comm Party area of regulation) prohibited with Stalinist family policy ↑ population to support industrialization through FYPs

      ● Ppl who underwent subject to severe social reprimand, “significant setback for women’s rights in the Soviet Union” (Fitzpatrick)

      ● “strong Soviet family” counteract issues of delinquency + enforce parental responsibilities

      ● contrasted prev Bol ideology(family as economic institutions that collapse w/o capitalism)

      ● Household work, “the most unproductive, the most barbarous, and the most arduous work a woman can do” (Lenin) proclaimed socially useful by state → ideolody compromise

      ● Women’s in indus continued emphasis → “double shift,” (Scuster) one for the state+home

      ● ↑ stress on women→ often overexerted +received minimal compensation

      ● progress made on position of women deliberately reversed → result of Stalinist policy

3. The censorship implemented under Stalin stagnated cultural and artistic expression in the Soviet Union, imposing “strict guidelines” on what was permissible (service)

   1. ● intellectuals +artists constrained by government bodies e.g. GLAVLIT(all encompassing censorship body) which “sought to control every aspect of cultural production” (Kotkin)

      ● intimidated to conform to state-approved, narrow ideology of socialist realism, → cultural items glorify ussr+ achievements

      ● incorporating socialist realism key component of Party’s effort in shaping consciousness of ppl +rallying around goals of regime by promoting unified culture

      ● regime “sought to promote a more accessible and didactic art form” (Bown)● Stalin could not control the beliefs and thoughts of the people → can’t control information

      ● “The regime was unable to completely stamp out dissent and alternative voices” (Kotkin)

      ● Underground culture which challenged official narratives of the state flourished

4. Whilst Stalin’s policies were successful in transforming other facets of Soviet life, his underestimation of religion’s deep entrenchment in Russian society led to a failure to eradicate faith completely

   1. Militant atheism central pivot of the Comm policy→elimination enforced by removal of religion from curriculums + demolition of churches

      ● Efforts to eradicate faith based on assumption that religion was an instrument of ruling class to exert control over proletariat, rather than belief held deeply by ruling ppl

      ● Many ppl“continued to practise their faith despite the dangers of persecution” (Figes)

      ● Physical +mental pressures culminated by collectivisation +FYPs only ↑ appeal of religion, “had the power to provide comfort and solace to people in difficult times”(service)

How successful was the USSR in achieving its foreign policy aims by 1941?

Although it achieved some minor successes, Soviet foreign policy largely failed to achieve the dual aims to achieve security through diplomacy and expansion through socialist revolutionary agitation,

● revolutionary aims to ignite “socialist transformation… of the entire world”(Hoffmann)

● shift to“revolutionary patriotism” “strange compound of Marxism and nationalism” (vanRee)

1. The aim to export revolution on a global scale was a long term Bolshevik aim but was largely unfulfilled in the period 1928-41

   1. After WWI w no comm revs in eur, ussr made comintern as “messianic mission”(Figes)

      ● 28 comintern ‘third period’ w focus on class ideology+purer ideolo vision for global rev

      ● Comintern encouraged member orgs to cut ties w comm+ less radical socialist/dem parties → existing comm parties became highly radical under ussr command

      ● Initially led to ↑ party members(29-31) bc of great depression in capitalist nations, but radicalisation → extreme collapse in numbers once GD end(limit success of comintern)

      ● Germany dems(SPD) + comms(KPD) wiped out by Nazis in 33-34

      ● Comm parties pushed to margins + global rev more distant → limits of foreign policy

2. In response to the changing threats in Europe but still linked to its aim to support worldwide revolution, the Soviet regime turned focus on limiting the growing influence of far right political movements during the 30s

   1. Under new Gen Sec(Dimitrov), comintern launched ‘Popular Front’ in 35 + relaxed extreme policies seen in 3rd period to defeat fascism

      ● ↑ Comm party membership(numbers stayed high), but still failed aim of challenging ↑ influence of far right

      ● Apart from Germany, republican govt of Spanish Civil War(36-39) defeated by fascists

      ○ Ussr gave secret aid but loyalty to global collective prevented proper intervention

      ● Nazi-Sovi Non-Aggres 39 → gave nazis confidence to expand east (short ussr security)

      ● 1941 - ussr still sole comm power + europe still openly hostile to communist movements

3. Apart from global revolution, the primary concern of Soviet foreign policy was the USSR’s security but in this endeavour too, the Soviet regime largely failed

   1. War scare 27 - convinced soviet leaders major war was approaching → “prioritise the survival of their revolution over internationalist principles.” (Fitz)

      ● surrounded by capitalists, Foreign Affairs Commissar(Litvinov) protect ussr(build collective security)

      ● Litvinov aimed relations w UK+Fra→ Short term success (Kellog-Briand 28 + Franco-Soviet 35 + LoN 34)

      ● UK+ france remained suspicious of true intentions+ scared of war w ger

      ● Distrust bc of comintern activities→ agreements between ussr and others remained weak

4. Despite some isolated achievements, the Soviet foreign policy failed to prevent some other significant security threats from developing in the later 30s

   1. Sino-Sov Non-Agg 37 →prevent open conflict w nationalist china but relations w Japan more problematic

      ● Japan+ussr clashed several times before Japanese-Soveti Non-Aggression Pact 41

      ● Significant move towards ↑ security on eastern front → clearest evidence of achieving aims but still overshadowed by failures e.g. nazi non aggression 39

      ● nazi non aggression 39 -Gave ussr some time to prepare for war but gains destoryed by nazi invasion 41

      ○ Lasted only 2/10 agreed years → relativley small achievement(more of a failure)

To what extent was Soviet foreign policy influenced by Communist (BOLSHEVIK) ideology throughout the period 1917-41?

Soviet foreign policy was guided continually by Communist ideology to a significant extent throughout the period as both Lenin and Stalin had the ultimate goal of expanding the socialist revolution internationally.

● Conflict trad vs rev “socialist transformation of Europe and of the entire world”(Hoffmann)

● “revolutionary patriotism,” “strange compound of Marxism and nationalism” (van Ree)

1. From 1917, Lenin realised the vulnerability of the Bolsheviks as the only socialist power, inciting deviations from certain ideologies in foreign policy to sustain the revolution within Russia and not jeopardise the goal of global revolutions

   1. ● Brest Litovsk 1918 → not economically equipped + harsh conditions

      ○ “Ger is just pregnant … we have given birth to a completely healthy child.”(Lenin)

      ○ “prioritise the survival of their revolution over internationalist principles.” (Fitz)

      ● Treaty Rappallo 22→diplomatic+renunciation of financial claims/west eu connections

      ● treaty Berlin 26→“amplification of the Rapallo Treaty" (Litvinov), Ger neutral, protect ussr

      ● Famine → foreign aid(preserve rev) “willing to compromise his ideological principles in order to get it.” (Pipes)

      ● Comintern 19 - “Soviet Union had a duty to spread it throughout the world” (Service)

2. To preserve the revolution within the USSR in the 1920s, Stalin had to make pragmatic ideological compromises to the foreign policy by promoting ‘Socialism in One Country’ to rapidly industrialise the Soviet State while still providing aid for international communists

   1. We can build socialism … all that is needed … overcoming all internal difficulties,”(stalin)

      ○ Fix “internal difficulties,”by signing trade agreements to fund industrialisation

      ● Export grain(capital), import experts “as the country was desperately short of experienced engineers and managers." (Figes)

      ○ Contradicted but social in 1 country→shift to “revolutionary patriotism.” (van Ree)

      ● Comintern dominated by Bol ideology → assist international commies e.g. CCP

      ○ advisors China to help communists + cooperate with nationalists → og plan same

      ○ killed after nats, "Soviet support was vital in the survival of the CCP." (Spence)

      ● Stalin’s “mental world” remained “wholly Marxist” (van Ree) → influence of Bolshevik

3. Despite the rise of fascism in the 1930s, Stalin still pursued the goal of a global socialist revolution but deviated from the Bolshevik ideologies as the Soviet foreign policy started actively pursuing collective security by signing non-aggression pacts with capitalist countries

   1. Kellog Briand 28 → renounce war and settle peacefully

      ○ “Anything, which is a necessity from the standpoint of Soviet Russia... necessity from the standpoint of the world revolution”(Stalin) → security of ussr for glob rev

      ● LoN entry 34 “pragmatic move,” (Service) → improve trade, security, recog from others

      ● Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression 39 → though could manouvre fight within capitalists (undermining capitalist system)

      ● Despite devs “insisted Marxism-Leninism should remain the core of state ideology” (service)