Pols 231 Exam 2 Review

The Rarity of War

[Ch3A]

Despite common perception, war is actually a rare event.

Why Wars are Puzzling (part 1)

[Ch3A-B]

War is Costly (very costly)

• Human casualties

• Economic costs

• Actual costs often underestimated (Saddat pursuit of war 1973).

Because war is costly, it creates a bargaining range where at least one solution exists that both sides prefer over war.

Why Wars are Puzzling (part 2)

[Ch3A]

States would rather get what they want without going to war.

“In war, the aggressor is always peace-loving; he would prefer to take over our country unopposed.” (Clausewitz).

Peaceful alternatives usually exists.

Defining war

[Ch3A]

Organized use of military force between at least two parties.

• Typically requires minimum threshold of 1,000 battle deaths.

Two Main Types of War

[Ch3A]

1. Interstate - Between States

2. Civil War - Between Internal Actors

What states fight over: Territory

[Ch3A]

Why Land?

• Natural resources (minerals, farmland)

• Strategic advantages

  • Historical / cultural / racial significance.

Ex: Iran & Iraq War

What states fight over: Other Major Causes

[Ch3A]

• To pursue national security policy

  • Human rights

  • WMD “Redlines”

• Regime Type or Leadership

  • Regime change (Internal and External)

• Ethnic or Religious divisions

  • E.g., Kosovo, Arab-Israeli conflict.

War according to Realism: Internal Anarchy

[Ch3A]

Naturally occurs in midst of Internal Anarchy.

• Where there is no world government to prevent wars/aggression.

War according to Realism: Two main Reasons

[Ch3A]

1. Prevention: Keeping a rising power down

2. “Security Dilemma”: Mutual fear of war escalating out of control.

War: Alternative Explanations - Misperceptions

[Ch3A]

Where Leaders / Governments misperceive the situation.

• Overestimate their capabilities.

• Underestimate opponent’s capabilities/resolve.

  • Incorrectly fear attack, so strike first.

War: Alternative Explanations - Domestic Politics

[Ch3A]

Various groups may benefit from war:

• Corporations

• Military-industrial complex

• Political leaders

• Political Groups

Ex: Israel-Hamas war (2023).

War within 3I’s Framework

[Ch3A]

Interests - Can be used to explain the causes of war.

Interactions in global politics:

• Two “stars”: War & Peace

• Actors have interests.

  • Exploring war as interactions between 2 or more actors trying to accomplish their interests.

War as Failed Bargaining: Crisis Bargaining

[Ch3A]

Bargaining when one actor threatens to violently enforce his preferred outcome.

War as Failed Bargaining: Coercive Diplomacy

[Ch3A]

The means by which threats are made known to another party.

Types of Coercive Diplomacy

[Ch3A]

• Ultimatums: “Do what i want or else!”

• Implicit threats: Not overly announced, but effectively communicated.

• Compellence: threat of using force to change SQ.

• Deterrence: Threat of using force to preserve SQ.

Bargaining Model & War: Assumptions

[Ch3A]

1. War is costly

2. A settlement exists that both sides would prefer to paying the costs of war.

3. Only two states directly involved.

4. Both states act rationally to get as much of the good that they can.

Bargaining Model & War: Central Puzzle

[Ch3A]

Why do wars occur even though one or more peaceful bargain possibilities exists?

Bargaining Range

[Ch3A-B]

Zone of possible peaceful agreements.

At least one solution preferred by both sides over war.

Models of War

[Ch3A]

Can involve various contested elements:

• Fertile Farmland

• Borders

• Nuclear Weapons

• Other Strategic assets

Negotiated settlements are possible when both sides prefer agreement to conflict.

The Bargaining Model of War

[Ch3B]

War is the outcome of a failed bargain between states.

War is costly, which creates a bargaining range where at least one solution exists that both sides prefer over war.

The bargaining Model of War: Example

[Ch3B]

The U.S. vs. North Korea: Can they avoid war?

U.S. Interests: Disarmed and democratic N.Korea

N.Korea Interests: acceptance as a member of the “nuke club”

Both can choose war, but a bargaining solution would be preferable.

Bargaining Mistakes

[Ch3B]

Incomplete information leads to bargaining errors:

• Yielding too little

• Demanding too much

Uncertainty about risk and the other’s resolve can prevent a bargain and lead to war.

Risk-return Trade Off

[Ch3B]

Trying to get a good deal under incomplete information can increase the risk of war.

The further you push for a better deal, the more you increase the risk of war.

Yielding too little? Example : Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Iraq and Kuwait (1990)

[Ch3B]

1990: Iraq engaged in coercive diplomacy with Kuwait.

• Accused Kuwait of stealing oil from shared fields.

• Demanded Kuwait cut-back production & forgive Iraq’s war debts.

• Iraq mobilized troops along border.

• Kuwait did not comply → thought Iraq was bluffing.

The prevalence of incomplete information in escalation of Summer 1990 crisis.

War from incomplete information: Incentives to Represent

[Ch3B]

• actors may seek to appear weaker or stronger.

• May want to keep adversary guessing.

War from incomplete information:

What are the several forms of Military coercion?

[Ch3B]

• Deploying ships

• Initiating drills

• Mobilizing reserve forces

• Moving forces closer to attack positions.

• Moving in fuel, blood supplies.

War from incomplete information:

The different forms of incomplete information take

[Ch3B]

• Credibility of threats

• Capabilities (moving fuel, blood supplies)

• Resolve (willingness to incur costs to obtain goal)

• Ex: China’s threat in Korean war (1950).

• Credible threat in nuclear world.

Communicating Resolve

[Ch3B]

For a threat to be credible, it MUST be clearly communicated.

Mechanisms to communicate resolve:

[Ch3B]

1. Brinkmanship

2. Tying hands

3. Paying for power

Brinkmanship

[Ch3B]

Each side bids up” the risk of war until somebody “blinks”.

Ex: Cuban Missile Crisis

Main Risk: human error and escalation to unwanted (perhaps nuclear) war.

Tying Hands

[Ch3B]

Actor intentionally limits choices in specific situations.

Attempts to predetermine the outcome.

Ranges from physical to verbal actions:

• Public Threats: Bush 1990, Obama 2012.

• Risk of audience costs.

Paying for Power

Complimenting tying hands strategy.

Committing resources in a costly way (e.g., mobilizing troops.

Ex: JFK & Berlin Crisis 1961.

Overcoming Incomplete Information and War

[Ch3B]

Lack of clarity regarding intentions/capabilities/resolve increases war chances.

Overcoming incomplete information requires clear & costly signals of intent → increases credibility, but HOW?

War from commitment Problems: Main Problems

[Ch3C]

Even with a settlement within the bargaining range trust issues can prevent peace:

• The international system is anarchic with little trust and incomplete information.

• Many incentives exist to defect rather than cooperate.

• The “Sucker’s Payoff” is a likely outcome for attempting to cooperate.

Ex: President Zelenskyy (Ukraine) on Russia and commitment to a war settlement.

This creates a prisoners dilemma where each actor benefits most from defecting when the other cooperates.

War from commitment problems: Bargaining over the future is risky.

[Ch3C]

There’s the challenge of bargaining over future goods that can shift the future power dynamic.

Strategic Dilemma: choose between no war with future weakness or war with future strength.

Particularly problematic when bargaining over:

• Strategic weapons (e.g., nuclear programs)

• Strategic territory

Case Study: Libya 2003-2011

[Ch3C]

2003: Qaddafi ends weapons programs

US/GRB normalize relations & without promises of no regime change.

2011: During rebellion, Qaddafi attacks civilians.

NATO responds militarily; Qaddafi ousted and killed.

Lesson: US commitment was not credible.

Case Study: Islands of East Asia

[Ch3C]

Disputed for economic importance

Mostly for strategic importance

• Occupation

• Power Projection

• Means to control vital marine shipping lanes

Power Shifts: What if power shifts?

[Ch3C]

Military strength can shift due to economic growth or technological innovation (e.g., nuclear weapons).

Actors may renege on commitments and initiate future preventive war.

Power Shifts: No Imminent Threat

[Ch3C]

No imminent threat exists, but war is chosen to prevent future threats (choose to attack to prevent future threat).

Ex: State B may prefer to fight today rather than tomorrow if power is shifting against them.

First-Strike Advantages

[Ch3C]

Significant military/strategic advantage creates “use it or lose it” scenarios.

• Outcome is better after war IF striking first.

• Creates incentives to break commitments and attack.

• Results in preemptive wars (e.g., Israel is Six-Day war, 1967)

Case Study: World War 1

• Germany faced alliance of Great Britain, France & Russia.

• Feared Russia’s growing power & planned pre-emptive attack.

• Russia mobilized to deter Germany.

• Germany still struck first, attacking France.

• Great Britain joined followed by other European nations.

Lessons & predictions from commitment problems

[Ch3C]

• War is more likely when the good in dispute is a source of power to those who possess it (WMDs, strategic territory).

• Preventive incentives emerge during rapid military power shifts.

• Bargaining failures are more common with big strike-first advantages.

Duration of interstate wars

[Ch3C]

• Wars tends to be short.

• Longest wars occur between declining and rising states.

• Shorter wars are rooted in information problems.

• Longer wars stem from commitment problems.

War from indivisibility: Indivisible Goods can prevent successful bargaining, why?

[Ch3C]

• Indivisibility can be socially constructed

• Claims of indivisibility may be strategic refusals to compromise.

• Allegedly “indivisible” goods may well be divisible after all.

War from Indivisible Goods: Holy Site Example

[Ch3C]

• Holy sites for multiple religions in the same location.

• Source of dispute between Israel and Palestinians.

• Religious motivations make compromise difficult (almost impossible).

• Legal constraints (“tying hands”) further complicate resolution

Have wars become obsolete? Changing Interests:

[Ch3C]

• Decline in wars over territory.

• Technology & trade may be more valuable.

• US as global leader less interested in territorial expansion.

Have wars become obsolete? Changing Interactions:

[Ch3C]

• Economic interdependence.

• Exponentially increases the costs of war.

• Nuclear weapons and Mutually Assured Destruction (WMDs).

Have wars become obsolete? Changing Institutions:

[Ch3C]

• Spread of democracy (Democratic Peace).

• Leaders more sensitive to costs of war.

• States more transparent to outsiders, reducing uncertainty & clarifying resolve.

• Expansion of international organizations, with a rapid increase over the last 65 years.

Summary of War Causes: War occurs when bargaining fails due to?

[Ch3C]

1. Incomplete information: uncertainty about resolve and/or capabilities.

2. Commitment Problems: Inability to trust rivals to keep their end of bargains.

3. Indivisible goods: “non-negotiable” issues where compromise seems impossible.

Summary of War Causes: How to promote peaceful resolution?

[Ch3C]

• Increase the costs of conflict.

• Promote transparency and communication.

• Bring in third parties to enforce deals.

• Find creative ways to share seemingly indivisible goods

Ex: The Israel-Egypt Peace of 1979 is noted as an example of successful conflict resolution.

Domestic Politics & War - Interests, Leaders, & Groups

[Ch4A]

Internal characteristics & dynamics of a country impact the likelihood of going to war.

• Interests → Key question: National or sub-national?

• Leaders → Can be categorized as hawks or doves.

• Groups → may be security-focused, business-focused, or both.

Domestic Politics & War - The Price of Oil, 1960-2018

[Ch4A]

Interests for war:

• Civilian

• Military

• National

• Corporate

Can internal characteristics of states explain going to war?

[Ch4A]

• Type of government & power distribution affect war decisions.

• Gov’t leadership (autocrats vs. elected reps) influence foreign policy.

• Decision making processes (e.g., transparency, methodology) play a role.

• Checks & Balances within government systems impact war decisions.

** Internal characteristics shape both incentives and constraints for conflict.

Key Domestic Factors in Foreign Policy:

[Ch4A]

Various officials drive foreign policy decisions.

Ex: CIA Director John Ratcliff.

Leaders & Fighting for (political) survival: What do leaders want?

Leaders primarily seek to:

• Obtain political power.

• Survive in Office (maintain political power).

• Pursue ideology and/or enact policy.

What is a “Rally Effect”?

[Ch4A]

A short-term boost in public approval originating from a foreign policy crisis targeting that country.

“Rally Around The Flag” (“We’re under attack”).

Why do people Rally?

[Ch4A]

When there is:

• External threats to their social/nation group.

• Domestic opposition decreases due to threats.

Why do Democratic & Non-democratic leaders “seek” the rally effect?

[Ch4A]

• To aid re-election

• To strengthen legitimacy

• As a diversion for domestic problems

Leaders & War: Do leaders ever spark war to get the public on their side?

[Ch4A]

Yes, there have been instances where leaders have used war to rally public support.

There is the concept of “gambling for resurrection”, where leaders take risks for political survival.

Leaders & War: The Falkland Islands War (1982)

[Ch4A]

Argentine (March 1982)

• Domestic Riots → led to foreign invasion.

UK, early 1982

• Domestic Recessions → preceded foreign wars.

Evidence on Leaders & War

(Valid logic, Not many historical examples…)

[Ch4A]

Despite the Falklands example, there is little evidence that leaders regularly start wars for diversionary effects.

Evidence on Leaders & War - Research suggests:

[Ch4A]

Evidence does suggest that:

• Leaders are more likely to start wars soon after an election, not before it.

• Secure leaders might be more likely to initiate a crisis.

Since rationality is assumed in political models, benefits of war to a leader must outweigh benefits of peace.

Domestic Groups & War: Why do these groups pursue war?

[Ch4B]

Domestic groups may pursue war to serve their own interests, even when these interests conflict with national interests.

Domestic Groups & War: Which domestic groups pursue war?

Types of groups:

• Political parties

• Economic interests groups

• Ideological or ethnic interest groups

• Bureaucratic actors

Domestic Leaders & War: Collective Action

• Smaller groups → more organized.

• Larger groups → suffer from “free rider problem”.

• Effective groups often shape policy to support narrow interests (and away from unified, national interests.

Leaders make choices / policies → groups implement them.

Domestic Groups & War: Military as Bureaucratic Actor

[Ch4B]

Military (DoD) → most important bureaucratic actor.

• Main purpose: to wage war.

• Has best info about capabilities and resolve.

Military may favor war → Japan in 1930s.

• Benefits from increased budgets.

• leads to promotion benefits.

Military may NOT favor war → US & Iraq war 2003.

• Very cautious when facing significant risks.

• Has combat experience & understands the “fog of war”.

Domestic Groups & War : Coup D’etat in Zimbabwe

[Ch4B]

Where military can overthrow the government.

• Gives military direct influence over foreign and domestic policies.

• Less likely to occur in democracies.

Domestic Groups & War: United Fruit Company

[Ch4B]

• Guatemala as a “banana republic” (1950s).

• Guatemala government nationalized the U.S. private company.

• CIA overthrew that government after United Fruit Company asked for intervention.

This highlights the lack of public scrutiny during the CIA’s overthrow of the nationalized government, as this action raised questions about the influence of corporate interests over democratic processes.

Impact of Domestic Groups

[Ch4B]

Small groups have significant potential to shape foreign policy.

Is it really a cause of war?

• Cold war intervention → “national interests”.

• Their interests may not align with national interests.

• Ex: Do corporations like Exxon Mobile share interests with the US public?

• Contrasting interests groups and US foreign policy.

Hawks

[Ch4B]

Favor war, perceive war as less costly and more beneficial.

Doves

[Ch4B]

Oppose war, perceive war as more costly and less beneficial.

Institutions & War: Why are Democracies less prone to go to war?

[Ch4B]

• They require rough consensus between elites & masses.

• Leaders are accountable to citizens who bear costs.

• Promotes norms of negotiation.

Institutions & War: Drawbacks of democracies

[Ch4B]

Slow decision-making processes.

Institutions & War: Democratic Peace Theory

[Ch4B]

Where a shared democracy changes the nature of bargaining interaction and reduces the risk of war.

Ex: Bush 2003; Obama 2009.

How democratic peace works - Canada & UK

[Ch4B]

• Promotes transparency in policy making

Features that reduce incomplete information problems:

• Open debate

• Apparent Capabilities

• Transparent resolve

Institutions & War - Accountability in Democracies: Protesting the Iraq War

[Ch4B]

• Voters can remove leaders who make unpopular foreign policy decisions.

• Public opinion can influence decisions to enter or avoid war.

• Can affect negotiation or ending conflicts (e.g., Biden in Afghanistan, Trump in Ukraine).

Institutions & War - “Democratic Peace”

[Ch4B]

• Based on strong correlations (two things happening at the same time).

• Correlation is not the same as causation.

Institutions & War - The Research challenge in Democracies

To identify the mechanism that explains lack of war between democracies.

Other Factors:

• Economic incentives/developments

• Reverse causality: Peace → leads to democracy.

• Shared strategic NOT regime types (May be more important than regime types).

Key Take aways: Domestic actors in foreign policy

[Ch4B]

• Different Domestic actors may see benefits from war and expect to bear few costs.

• Military & other organizations have institutional advantages that allow them to exert influence.

• Economic & political interests groups also shape policy and provide benefits for small groups.

• Democratic peace → role of institutions? - Complex relationship.

• The spread of democracies doesn’t necessarily guarantee peace.

International Institutions & Security Cooperation:

The Puzzle

[Ch5A]

When are the international versions of the national institutions that prevent, stop, and punish acts of aggression?

The international system operates in a state of Anarchy, with no central authority that can prevent or stop actors from engaging in conflict.

International Institutions & Security Cooperation:

Despite anarchy, cooperation is plentiful.

Despite this anarchy, cooperation exists through international institutions.

Examples include:

• Korean War (1950): US intervention authorized by the UN.

• Gulf War (1991): UN authorize western alliance.

• Kosovo conflict (1998-99): NATO intervention against Serbs.

The two main types of International institutions/Security Cooperation

[Ch5A]

1. Alliances (focus on the first part)

2. Collective Security organizations (to be discussed later).

Alliances

[Ch5A]

States commit to security cooperation.

• They are international institutions that help actors cooperate in the face of conflict when they have shared security interests.

E.g., France & Britain → Defend Poland from Nazi invasion.

Types of Alliances

[Ch5A]

• Bilateral (two actors) or Multi-state (multiple actors like NATO).

• Asymmetric (strong actor w/ weaker actor) or Symmetric (actors w/ similar capabilities).

  • US - South Korea

• Offensive (agreement to attack a third state).

• Defensive (pledge to defend if attacked).

  • US - Japan

Asymmetrical Alliance: US-South Korea Example

[Ch5A]

• The US assists South Korea in case of attack.

• South Korea cannot provide equivalent military capabilities.

Benefits of Asymmetric Alliances for Stronger Actor

[Ch5A]

1. Strategic placement of troops & military hardware.

2. Ability to respond quickly if conflict emerges.

3. Joint military exercises to improve local military capabilities.

4. Power projection (demonstrating global interests and commitments).

Alliances: US Military Bases in Japan

[Ch5A]

The US-Japan Alliance has been central to US security interests in the Pacific since WW2.

• Regional power projection.

Alliances are costly

[Ch5A]

Because of:

• Commitment/Payment of Blood and treasure to defend another state.

• Limited freedom, where it’s required to consult allies before taking action.

• Actors can drag allies into unwanted conflicts.

Costs of Alliances: For Strong Actors

[Ch5A]

Costs:

• Economic/financial costs of maintaining troops abroad.

• Potential human casualties.

• Risk of being dragged into unwanted conflicts

Costs or Alliances: For Weak Actors

[Ch5A]

• Limited autonomy and freedom of action.

• Need to consult with stronger ally before taking action.

Why Form Alliances?

[Ch5A]

• Weak states can gain protection.

• Strong states show resolve & project power.

• Shared security interests.

• Combining resources improves likelihood of success.

• Tempers long-lived conflicts (E.g., Turkey & Greece)

• Formalizes a sphere of influence (E.g., Warsaw pact).

Commitment Problems in Alliances

[Ch5A]

The main challenge of alliances is commitment credibility: Can one actor trust the other to abide by the terms of agreement?

Commitment Problems in Alliances: How do they increase the likelihood of fighting for other(s)?

[Ch5A]

by…

• … decreasing COSTS of fighting.

• … increasing BENEFITS of fighting.

• … Increasing COSTS of NOT fighting.

Shaping expectations of rival state(s) by signaling resolve.

Signaling Credible Commitment:

[Ch5A]

1. Increasing Benefits of fighting (fostering economic, social, and political connections).

2. Placing military personnel & hardware in allied countries.

3. Conducting joint military exercises.

4. Making alliances public to increase the cost of defection.

Alliances - Joint Military Exercises in South Korea

[Ch5A]

• Large, regular exercising between allies help establish credibility.

• Signal of credibility: permanent placement of US troops S.Korea.

Are Alliances Effective?

[Ch5A]

Research shows, that for some degree:

• Alliances are honored about 70% of the time (though, this has decreased over time).

• Defensive alliances reduce the risk of conflict by about 30% compared to having no alliance.

• 1945 as inflection point, commitment lower since.

• Alliance deterrent role: having defensive alliance reduces the likelihood of being attacks.

The Balance of Power

[Ch5A]

Alliances help ensure military balance of power between actors is roughly equal, which can reduce the likelihood of war.

E.g., NATO was formed to preserve the balance of power against Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.

Other Rationales for forming Alliances: Bandwagoning

[Ch5A]

Where states join alliances with the side likely to win a conflict:

• countries joining Germany during WW2.

• Former Soviet states joining NATO after the Cold War.

Other Rationales for forming Alliances: Affinity

[Ch5A]

Where shared Culture, Ideology, or religion can motivate alliance formation:

• US-Israel security agreements partly based on shared cultural views and ideologies.

History of European Alliances before WW2

[Ch5A]

• Germany emerged as single power in late 19th century.

• France and Russia allied against Germany (1894).

• Pattern of multiple alliances & counter-alliances formed across Europe.

• The large number of state alliances increased risk of miscalculation & contributed to WW1’s escalation.

It was the existence of the Triple Alliances and the Triple Entente that turned the resulting war into a world war.

Ex: The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand triggered a chain reaction through alliance commitments.