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First Cause Argument (FCA)
(FC1) There is a series of efficient causes
(FC2) The series of efficient causes is not circular
(FC3) The series of efficient causes is not infinitely long
(FC4) Therefore, there is a first cause
Contingency Cosmological Argument (CCA)
(CC1) Either every being is dependent or there is a necessary being
(CC2) Not every being is dependent
(CC3) Therefore, there is a necessary being
Defense of CC1
(1.1) Either every being is contingent or there is a necessary being
(1.2) PSR: every contingent being is dependent
(1.3) Therefore, either every being is dependent or there is a necessary being
Defense of CC2
(2.1) Collection C is contingent
(2.2) PSR: Every contingent being is dependent
(2.3) Only contingent beings are dependent
(2.4) Therefore, Collection C is dependent (2.1, 2.2)
(2.5) Therefore, there is a being x outside of C (2.4)
(2.6) Therefore, there is a being x that is not contingent (2.5)
(2.7) Therefore, being x is not dependent (2.3, 2.6)
(2.8) Therefore, not every being is dependent (2.7)
Argument from Evil (AE)
(AE1) A perfectly good being eliminates every evil it can eliminate (B1)
(AE2) If God exists, then God is omnibenevolent (O1)
(AE3) Therefore, if God exists, God will eliminate all evil (AE1, AE2)
(AE4) An omnipotent being can eliminate every evil (B2)
(AE5) If God exists, then God is omnipotent (O2)
(AE6) Therefore, if God exists, God can eliminate all evil (AE4, AE5)
(AE7) Therefore, if God exists, God does eliminate every evil (AE3, AE6)
(AE8) Therefore, if God exists, then there is no evil (AE7)
(AE9) There is evil
(AE10) Therefore, God does not exist (AE8, AE9)
Revised Argument from Evil (RE)
(RE1) A perfectly good being eliminates every evil it can eliminate without doing further damage (Revised B1)
(RE2) If God exists, then God is perfectly good (O1)
(RE3) Therefore, if God exists, then God eliminates every evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage (1,2)
(RE4) An omnipotent being can eliminate every evil (B2)
(RE5) If God exists, then God is omnipotent (O2)
(RE6) Therefore, if God exists, then God can eliminate every evil (4,5)
(RE7) Therefore, if God exists, then God eliminates every evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage (3,6)
(RE8) Therefore, if God exists, then there is no evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage (7)
(RE9) There is evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage
(RE10) Therefore, God does not exist (8,9)
Mackie's Omnipotence Defense of RE9
(9.1) An omnipotent being can eliminate every evil without either causing more evil or eliminating an equal or greater good
(9.2) If God exists, then God is omnipotent
(9.3) Therefore, if God exists, then God can eliminate every evil without causing more evil or eliminating an equal or greater good
(9.4) There is evil
(9.5) Therefore, if God exists, then there is evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage
Argument
series of statements or claims, some of which are offered as logical support
Valid argument
(1) If the premises are true then the conclusion would also be true
or
(2) it is impossible for all the premises to be true and for the conclusion to be false
Sound argument
An argument that is both (1) logically valid and (2) has true premises
Efficient cause
A being that causes another being to exist
First cause
A being that is:
(1) the efficient cause of everything else
and
(2) itself has no efficient cause
Infinite causal series
A linear series of efficient causes in which every being is caused by some prior being in the series
Question-begging
An argument whose premise inappropriately assumes its conclusion
Contingent being
Exists but possibly does not exist
Necessary being
Exists and does not possibly not exist (has to exist)
Dependent being
Caused to exist by something outside of itself
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
Every contingent being has a cause outside of itself (Every contingent being is dependent))
Collection C
The complete collection of all contingent beings there are, ever were, or ever will be
Evil
Any pain or suffering
Classical theism
God exists, God has certain natures, God is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient
Omnibenevolence
All-good
Omnipotence
All-powerful
Omniscience
All-knowing
Evil that can be eliminated without doing further damage
An evil that can be eliminated without causing more evil or eliminating an equal or greater good
Omnipotence 2.0
The ability to do anything that is logically possible
Higher-Order Good
A good that cannot possibly exist without the existence of evil
Can a valid argument have false premises? Explain.
Yes, if the premises are true then the conclusion would also be true (deductively valid) or it is impossible for all the premises to be true and for the conclusion to be false.
Can a valid argument have true premises and a false conclusion? Explain.
No, it would be invalid based on the definition of a valid argument.
Can a sound argument have false premises? Explain.
No, a sound argument must be logically valid and have true premises.
It is impossible for Argument X's premises to be true and its conclusion false. Moreover, Argument X's premises are actually true. What else, if anything, can you conclude about Argument X?
Its conclusion must be true; sound
Argument Y's premises are all false. What else, if anything, can you conclude about Argument Y?
Its conclusion must be false; not sound
Argument Z's premises are actually true. And so is Argument Z's conclusion. However, there is a possible scenario in which Argument Z's premises are all true and yet its conclusion is false. What else, if anything, can you conclude about Argument Z?
Its conclusion is not always true; not sound
What is efficient causation? Give a few concrete examples.
The act of causing a being.
Ex. table made from carpenter
One of FCA's key premises is that the series of efficient causes cannot be circular. How does Aquinas defend that premise?
Nothing can be an efficient cause of itself; it is impossible.
Consider the following passage:
Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause [....] Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false (Aquinas, "Second Way")
Which premise of FCA is Aquinas defending here? Please state that premise in its entirety. In class we identified a potential fallacy (or flaw) in the above defense. Be prepared to name and define that fallacy. Also make sure you understand why that fallacy is arguably present in the above passage.
(FC1) There is a series of efficient causes
(FC2) The series is not circular
(FC3) The series is not infinite
(FC4) Therefore, there is a first cause (undefended by FC3)
Question-begging, premise three relies on the conclusion to be true. Infinite series objection.
What is a question-begging argument?
An argument that does not explain or support the conclusion, instead it assumes without proof.
Give a few concrete examples of contingent beings.
Me, you, your mom, Truong, tables, chairs. These things do not need to exist.
Give a few concrete examples of dependent beings.
Me and Truong are dependent beings because of parents. We exist because we were caused by something else.
Make sure you know the difference between a contingent being and a dependent being. Specifically, make sure you know that these concepts are not defined the same way.
Contingent is when it exists, but does not need to exist. Dependent is when it is caused to exist by something other than itself.
Consider the following flawed speech: "No one should deny that every contingent being is dependent. After all, being dependent is part of the very definition of being contingent. As a result, the claim that not all contingent beings are dependent is absurd—it is akin to the claim that not all bachelors are unmarried." Please explain the main flaw in this speech.
In the beginning, they claim that every contingent being is dependent. In the second sentence, they then claim that being dependent is within the definition of contingence, creating a circular reasoning. Hence, the main flaw is that both terms rely on the definition of each other.
There is a single principle that appears twice in the Contingency Cosmological Argument—once in the theist's defense of CC1, and again in her defense of CC2. What is the name of that principle? Please state it briefly explain its appeal.
PSR states every contingent being is dependent; it can not be denied (although controversial).
What is Collection C? What role does that concept play in CCA?
Collection C is a collection of every contingent being to have existed. It serves to illustrate that there is a being outside of Collection C that is not dependent
The first step of the theist's defense of CC2, 2.1, says that Collection C is contingent. Why does the theist think that Collection C is contingent? (Hint: your answer should invoke and explain the idea that wholes sometimes "inherit" properties of their parts).
Collection C is composed of every contingent being. Without these beings, Collection C would not exist. Therefore, Collection C is contingent.
There are cases in which a whole "inherits" a property from its parts. There are also cases in which the whole lacks a property that is exemplified by all of its parts. You should know at least one example of each sort of case. You should also know why this is relevant to CCA (specifically, you should know why it is relevant to the defense of CC2).
A whole does not necessarily "inherit" every property of its. Ex. parts singular lego pieces vs a lego statue. A lego statue is not small even though it is made up of small lego pieces.
Consider Collection C. Suppose there is a being, x, which exists outside of Collection C. Is being x contingent or non-contingent? Explain. Your explanation should make reference to the definition of Collection C.
It is not contingent because it is outside of Collection C, and Collection C contains every contingent being.
In the defense of CC2, 2.2 and 2.3 are superficially similar but logically distinct premises. What do 2.2 and 2.3 say, respectively? Explain why, despite their superficial similarity, they are in fact logically distinct.
2.2: every contingent being is dependent 2.3: only contingent beings are dependent. 2.3 focuses on a category of beings so that there are no other beings, besides contingent beings, to be misclassified as dependent.
In class we divided objections to the CCA into two categories—two "weaker" objections, on the one hand, and two "stronger" objections, on the other. You should know all four objections. You should also know which objections fit into which category, and why. In other words, you should know why the weaker objections are weaker and the stronger objections are stronger.
Weak: the infinite series objection and "what caused God?"
Strong: the gap problem and counter-examples to the PSR
What is the infinite series objection?
The infinite series of efficient causes is still flawed.
The infinite series objection plagued early cosmological arguments. However, the CCA is not vulnerable to the infinite series objection. In addition to understanding the infinite series objection itself, you should be able to articulate why CCA is not vulnerable to it.
The CCA does not mention anything about an infinite series.
What is the "What Caused God?" objection?
God is not contingent, so God is necessary.
The "What Caused God?" objection is a common objection to Cosmological Arguments. While this objection may stick to other versions of the Cosmological Argument, CCA is invulnerable to it. You should know how the defender of CCA replies to this objection. (Either the easy version of the theist's reply, the harder version, or both)
Every contingent being has a cause, but God isn't contingent. God is a necessary being, meaning they're self-existent
What is the gap problem for Cosmological Arguments? Specifically, what is the gap problem for CCA? How might a theist try to "close" the gap between CCA's conclusion and the existence of the God of classical theism?
Even if there is a necessary being, how can you tell if that is God of classical theism? A theist might have to look outside the cosmological and pull in other arguments.
What are some potential counterexamples to the PSR? Don't worry too much about the details. Just know the general idea.
The human free will. Are our actions predetermined?
What is evil, in the context of the Argument from Evil? Give a few concrete examples.
Any kind of pain or suffering
What are the central commitments of classical theism? Be prepared to state and explain the four propositions—(G), (O1), (O2), and (O3)—that jointly characterize classical theism.
G: classical theism
O1: If god exists, then God is omnibenevolent
O2: If god exists, then God is omnipotent
O3: If god exists, then God is omniscient
What is omnibenevolence?
All-good
What is omnipotence?
All-powerful
What is omniscience?
All-knowing
J.L. Mackie argues that classical theism, when conjoined with his three "bridge principles", logically implies that there is no evil. What are Mackie's bridge principles? Memorize all three and understand their logical role in the original Argument from Evil.
B1: An omnibenevolent being eliminates every evil it can eliminate
B2: An omnipotent being can eliminate every evil
B3: An omniscient being knows about every evil
You should know all ten premises of the Argument from Evil (AE). In addition, you should know which steps in the argument validly follow from earlier steps and why (ex. You should know that AE3 validly follows from AE1 and AE2, and understand why AE3 validly follows from AE1 and AE2).
(AE1) A perfectly good being eliminates every evil it can eliminate
(AE2) If God exists, then God is omnibenevolent
(AE3) Therefore, if God exists, God will eliminate all evil
(AE4) An omnipotent being can eliminate every evil
(AE5) If God exists, then God is omnipotent
(AE6) Therefore, if God exists, God can eliminate all evil
(AE7) Therefore, if God exists, God does eliminate every evil
(AE8) Therefore, if God exists, then there is no evil
(AE9) There is evil
(AE10) Therefore, God does not exist
Here is the first premise of the original Argument from Evil:
(AE1) A wholly good being eliminates every evil it can eliminate.
We discussed a counterexampleto AE1, the perfectly good doctor case. What are the details of this case? Why is it a counterexample to AE1? And what lesson did we draw from the case? How did that lesson lead us to revise AE1?
A patient wants the pain from a paper cut to be gone immediately. For it to be gone immediately means replacing the injured area with a new part. However, this requires causing pain to replace a body part. So, evil persists as it is removed.
We revised AE1 in order to avoid obvious counterexamples. You may be given AE1 and then asked to select its revision from a list of possibilities. Be ready to do that.
A perfectly good being eliminates every gratuitous evil
The Revised Argument from Evil employs the notion of an evil that can be eliminated "without doing further damage." However, as we noted in class, the idea of "further damage" is just shorthand. What is it shorthand for?
(i) causing more evil
or
(ii) eliminating an equal or greater good
In the original AE, the ninth premise is obviously true and the first premise is susceptible to counterexamples, In the RE, the first premise is invulnerable to counterexamples and the ninth premise is controversial. Explain.
AE1 and RE9 suggest that God is not omnipotent. RE1 is valid. AE9 is true.
You should know all ten premises of the Revised Argument from Evil (RE). In addition, you should know which steps in the argument validly follow from earlier steps and why (ex. You should know that RE3 validly follows from RE1 and RE2, and understand why RE3 validly follows from RE1 and RE2).
(RE1) A perfectly good being eliminates every evil it can eliminate without either (i) causing more evil, or (ii) eliminating an equal or greater good (without doing further damage) (revised B1)
(RE2) If God exists, then God is perfectly good (O1)
(RE3) Therefore, if God exists, then God eliminates every evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage (1,2)
(RE4) An omnipotent being can eliminate every evil (B2)
(RE5) If God exists, then God is omnipotent (O2)
(RE6) Therefore, if God exists, then God can eliminate every evil (4,5)
(RE7) Therefore, if God exists, then God eliminates every evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage (3,6)
(RE8) Therefore, if God exists, then there is no evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage (7)
(RE9) There is evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage
(RE10) Therefore, God does not exist (8,9)
RE9, the most controversial premise of RE, says that there is evil that can be eliminated without doing further damage. In class we discussed two defenses of RE9. You should be able to name both defenses and have a thorough understanding of Mackie's defense.
Mackie's Omnipotence Defense
What is Mackie's Omnipotence Defense of RE9? You should know and understand the premises of this defense.
(9.1) An omnipotent being can eliminate every evil without either causing more evil or eliminating an equal or greater good
(9.2) If God exists, then God is omnipotent
(9.3) Therefore, if God exists, then God can eliminate every evil without causing more evil or eliminating an equal or greater good
(9.4) There is evil
(9.5) Therefore, if God exists, then there is evil that God can eliminate without doing further damage
How do theists respond to Mackie's omnipotence defense of RE9? (Note: the reply has two distinct steps—a claim about the nature of omnipotence, and a claim about the nature and existence of higher-order goods)
1. clarify omnipotence (the ability to do anything that is not logically impossible)
2. claim that there are higher-order goods
3. deny 9.1 (without evil there would be no higher-order good, thus removing more good)
We began with a simple definition of omnipotence. However, in response to Mackie's omnipotence defense, the theist must clarify this definition. We called the clarified definition omnipotence 2.0. You should know the original definition and the clarified definition. You should also know what role this clarification plays in the dispute between Mackie and the theist.
1.0 (The ability to do anything.) 2.0 (The ability to do anything that is not logically impossible.)
Most theists believe that God is omnipotent. Yet virtually no theist believes that God can lampdogpony. Nor can God slithy toves gire and gimble in the wabe. Nor can God make square circles. How can this be? After all, isn't omnipotence the ability to do anything? And why is all of this relevant to the argument from evil?
God has the ability to do anything that is not logically impossible
What is a higher-order good? Give a couple of plausible examples of higher-order goods. How can the theist use the notion of a higher-order good—in conjunction with omnipotence 2.0—to block Mackie's omnipotence defense of RE9?
a good that cannot possibly exist without the existence of evil. Jealousy and charity.
Many theists believe that free will is a higher-order good. What does this mean? Why is this relevant to RE?
Free will is a higher order good because if there is freedom, then there is evil.