Bio-ethics about Germline genetic editing

Buchanan 1996: What is the primary focus of Buchanan's paper?

The paper focuses on the ethical implications of genetic interventions, specifically how they relate to justice, the morality of inclusion, and the treatment of disabled individuals. Buchanan evaluates arguments against the "new genetics" from the perspective of disabilities rights advocates while arguing that justice sometimes requires genetic interventions.

Buchanan 1996: How does Buchanan describe the rhetoric of the "new genetics"?

Buchanan states that the rhetoric of the new genetics emphasizes universal progress and aims to reduce suffering and disabilities for all human beings. It contrasts itself against the discriminatory and exclusionary practices of "old eugenics."

Buchanan 1996: How do disabilities rights advocates critique the ideology of the new genetics?

They argue that the ideology discriminates against disabled people by devaluing their lives and undermining their right to exist. The criticism stems from the claim that reducing genetic disabilities expresses a flawed understanding of human value.

Buchanan 1996: What is the 'expressivist objection' raised by disabilities rights advocates?

The expressivist objection claims that decisions to prevent or remove genetic disabilities express negative judgments about the value of disabled persons, suggesting their lives are not worth living or that only "perfect" individuals should exist.

Buchanan 1996: How does Buchanan rebut the expressivist objection?

Buchanan argues that valuing the removal of disabilities does not devalue disabled individuals. Disabilities can be undesirable while still fully affirming the worth of people who have them. Reducing disabilities expresses a commitment to enhancing opportunities for all people, not rejecting the disabled.

Buchanan 1996: What distinction does Buchanan make between 'defects' and 'disabilities'?

A defect is a lack of a capacity required for normal species functioning, whereas a disability occurs when a defect results in an inability to perform socially significant tasks in a specific environment.

Buchanan 1996: What is Buchanan's argument for justice sometimes requiring genetic interventions?

Justice, as equal opportunity, may require preventing or correcting serious genetic disadvantages because they are unchosen, undeserved, and severely limit individuals' opportunities for a decent life.

Buchanan 1996: Why does Buchanan reject the disabilities rights slogan 'change society, not individuals'?

Buchanan argues that achieving justice involves balancing interests. While society should accommodate individuals, sometimes changing individuals—through genetic interventions or otherwise—may be necessary for fair inclusion in cooperative social schemes.

Buchanan 1996: How does Buchanan view the relationship between justice and genetic enhancement technologies?

Justice requires ensuring equal access to enhancement technologies to prevent creating a new class of disabled individuals excluded from dominant social frameworks.

Buchanan 1996: How does Buchanan respond to the 'loss of support' argument by disabilities rights advocates?

He critiques the argument by pointing out that reducing the incidence of disabilities does not necessarily decrease support for those who remain disabled. Furthermore, justice considers the interests of those who wish to avoid disabilities.

Buchanan 1996: What are the two legitimate interests Buchanan identifies in choosing cooperative schemes?

The interest in inclusion—ensuring everyone can participate effectively—and the maximizing interest—having access to the most productive and rewarding cooperative scheme possible.

Buchanan 1996: How does Buchanan’s concept of justice address conflicting interests in social cooperation?

Justice requires balancing the inclusion interest with the maximizing interest. This balance might involve modifying both society (physical and institutional infrastructure) and individuals (through genetic interventions or training).

Buchanan 1996: What are the four ways Buchanan outlines for removing or preventing disabilities?

1. Changing the physical infrastructure (e.g., ramps for wheelchairs). 2. Changing individuals through education or nongenetic means. 3. Genetic intervention (gene therapy, pharmacology). 4. Changing the institutional infrastructure (e.g., simpler rules of interaction).

Buchanan 1996: How does Buchanan respond to fears of a new form of exclusion through genetic enhancement?

He acknowledges the risk of exclusion if enhancements are accessible only to the wealthy. Justice requires either universal access to enhancements or restricting their availability to prevent creating a new class of "disabled" individuals.

Buchanan 1996: What is the significance of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in Buchanan's argument?

The ADA recognizes the need to balance inclusion (requiring reasonable accommodations) with efficiency, highlighting that justice involves weighing competing interests fairly.

Buchanan 1996: Provide a comprehensive schematization of the paper, including argument buildup, stance, counterarguments, and replies.

Introduction: Buchanan examines the promises and criticisms of the "new genetics" and its goal of reducing disabilities. Criticisms from disabilities rights advocates: Expressivist objection: Genetic interventions devalue disabled lives. Loss of support argument: Reducing disabilities decreases societal support. Buchanan's replies: Valuing the removal of disabilities does not devalue disabled individuals

it reflects a commitment to equal opportunity.
The loss of support argument is empirically weak and overlooks the interests of individuals in avoiding disabilities.
Justice and genetic interventions: Justice, understood as equal opportunity, requires addressing unchosen, undeserved genetic disadvantages.
Justice requires balancing inclusion and the maximizing interest in cooperative social frameworks.
Social construction of disability: Buchanan differentiates between defects and disabilities, arguing that disabilities are relational and context-dependent.
Conclusion: Justice may require changing both individuals and society, ensuring fairness in access to opportunities while addressing risks of exclusion posed by genetic interventions.

buchanan overview

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the central ethical question addressed in the paper?

The central question is whether pursuing germline gene editing (GGE), which includes allowing and funding its research, is ethically permissible and desirable.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors define "pursuing GGE"?

Pursuing GGE involves allowing scientists significant freedom to conduct GGE research and investing significant public resources in its development.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the authors' conclusion about the ethics of GGE?

The authors conclude that the moral case in favor of pursuing GGE is stronger than the case against it, making GGE both morally permissible and desirable.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the main medical argument for pursuing GGE?

GGE can prevent single-gene and polygenic disorders, reduce disease burden in future generations, and potentially address genetic components of infectious diseases.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What argument do critics present regarding GGE and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)?

Critics argue GGE is unnecessary because genetic diseases can already be avoided using PGD.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors respond to the PGD objection?

They argue that GGE is necessary for cases where PGD is not possible, such as when only one viable embryo is produced, or for families to remove disease-causing genes permanently from their lineage.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the role of GGE in addressing polygenic disorders?

GGE could edit multiple genes simultaneously to target polygenic disorders like diabetes, heart disease, and cancers, which are not preventable through traditional genetic selection methods.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the speculative potential of GGE in combating infectious diseases?

GGE could spread genetic resistance to pathogens in populations, potentially immunizing future generations during disease outbreaks.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What research benefits of GGE do the authors discuss?

GGE can help researchers study human development, unlock the genesis of diseases, test treatments on stem cell models, and develop stem cell therapies.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What are the main objections to pursuing GGE that the authors address?

The main objections include safety concerns, unintended germline changes, the autonomy and consent of future generations, and fears of GGE being used for human enhancement.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors address safety concerns regarding off-target mutations?

They argue safety risks can be mitigated through research using non-viable embryos, strict regulations, and harm minimization protocols for early clinical trials.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors respond to the concern about germline changes affecting future generations?

They claim the risks of unintended mutations are minimal compared to natural mutations and that careful regulation can minimize harmful intended changes.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is Habermas's autonomy-based objection to GGE, and how do the authors respond?

Habermas argues that intentional genetic changes undermine autonomy by imposing social values. The authors counter that social forces already influence genetics and that eliminating disease enhances autonomy.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the authors' stance on the use of GGE for human enhancement?

While acknowledging concerns, they argue that therapeutic uses of GGE should not be prohibited simply because the technology could also be used for enhancement.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors schematize their argument in favor of pursuing GGE?

Medical case: GGE prevents single-gene disorders, addresses polygenic diseases, and combats infectious diseases. Research case: GGE unlocks knowledge about human development and genetic diseases. Objections addressed: Safety risks are manageable

germline changes are less risky than critics claim

consent and autonomy concerns are outweighed by the benefits

and fears of enhancement misuse are speculative and can be regulated. Conclusion: The moral case for GGE—based on reducing disease, increasing autonomy, and advancing science—outweighs objections, making GGE both morally permissible and desirable.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the authors' policy recommendation?

The authors recommend resisting calls for international bans on GGE and instead advocate for careful research and regulation to unlock its potential benefits.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors justify funding GGE research despite ethical concerns?

They argue the potential benefits of GGE for disease prevention and research outweigh its ethical risks, which can be mitigated through strict regulation.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the primary ethical stance taken by UNESCO and the NIH on GGE?

UNESCO and the NIH argue against GGE, citing safety concerns and the ethical issues of altering the germline, calling for a ban or moratorium.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors respond to concerns about embryo harm in GGE research?

They argue embryos lack morally significant wellbeing as they have no experiences or desires. Many jurisdictions permit embryo destruction in IVF or research, making this concern inconsistent.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What role do ‘triploid embryos’ play in addressing safety concerns in GGE research?

Triploid embryos, used in research, are non-viable and cannot survive pregnancy. Using such embryos avoids any risk of harm to future persons.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the argument for using GGE in cases of autosomal recessive disorders?

GGE can ensure embryos are not carriers of the disease-causing gene, thereby preventing the disorder in future generations and reducing the overall disease frequency.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How is GGE presented as a ‘person-affecting benefit’?

Unlike Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), which replaces one embryo with another, GGE can directly cure an embryo of a genetic disorder, benefiting the individual who would otherwise be born with the disease.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What are the authors’ long-term arguments for GGE beyond single-gene disorders?

GGE could address polygenic disorders by editing multiple genes simultaneously, and spread genetic resistance to infectious diseases in populations.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the argument regarding environmental versus genetic interventions for polygenic disorders?

Environmental causes of polygenic disorders are harder to identify or alter. GGE may offer a more reliable, biological means of disease prevention alongside environmental interventions.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors address concerns about unintended germline changes?

They argue that mutation rates in GGE will likely become negligible, as off-target mutation rates have been improving and are undetectable in some applications.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do natural processes compare to GGE in terms of germline mutations?

Natural processes like older paternity increase germline mutations, yet these are not viewed as morally problematic. GGE, with safety measures, introduces fewer risks than these natural occurrences.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors address the risk of ‘harmful intended changes’ in GGE?

They acknowledge the risk of unintended consequences, such as introducing susceptibility to new diseases, but argue these risks can be minimized through careful research and consideration of future environments.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors rebut Habermas’s autonomy-based argument against GGE?

They argue social forces already shape genetics and parenting influences children intentionally. Preventing disease through GGE enhances autonomy more than it reduces it.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What are the ethical principles proposed for early clinical trials of GGE?

Initial trials should minimize harm by targeting lethal diseases in infants where no other options exist, ensuring expected harms are outweighed by potential benefits.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What measures do the authors propose for safety evaluations in clinical use of GGE?

Testing at multiple stages—PGD, chorionic villus sampling, and ultrasound—can identify off-target mutations. Pregnancy termination can be used as a harm-minimization measure if needed.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors respond to concerns about GGE and human enhancement?

They argue that fears about enhancement misuse are speculative and that therapeutic uses can be regulated, as with technologies like PGD and plastic surgery.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: Why do the authors believe consent objections fail for GGE?

Future individuals cannot consent to any decision made before their existence. What matters ethically is that the benefits of GGE outweigh the risks.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What role does existential benefit play in addressing consent objections?

Individuals born due to GGE would not exist otherwise, giving them an existential benefit that outweighs potential risks.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors address the fear that GGE will lead to societal inequality and conflict?

They argue these concerns are misplaced when GGE is used therapeutically to prevent disease, and proper regulation can prevent harmful enhancement applications.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: How do the authors justify continuing GGE research despite ethical objections?

They argue that bans on GGE would deprive humanity of valuable knowledge about development, disease prevention, and potential medical treatments.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: What is the authors' response to fears of regulatory failure in preventing enhancement?

They argue existing technologies (like PGD) are regulated effectively, and there is no reason GGE cannot be similarly controlled.

Glynell, Douglas, Savulescu 2017: Summarize the authors' final stance on GGE and policy recommendations.

GGE is morally permissible and desirable due to its medical and research benefits. Calls for international bans should be rejected in favor of carefully regulated research and clinical applications.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: What is the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB)?

The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) states that if couples (or single reproducers) decide to have a child and selection is possible, they have a significant moral reason to select the child who, based on available information, can be expected to have the best chance at the best life.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: How do the authors introduce and defend PB against common intuitions?

The authors acknowledge that PB conflicts with the view that children should be accepted as “gifts” of nature, as expressed by Michael Sandel. However, they argue PB aligns with common moral intuitions that parents already aim to create better conditions for their future children (e.g., waiting for better financial or health circumstances).

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: What is the relationship between PB and commonsense morality?

Commonsense morality implicitly recognizes PB: most people agree that it’s morally preferable to wait to have a child if waiting would result in better conditions or outcomes for that child. PB formalizes this intuition and applies it to genetic selection.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: How do the authors distinguish PB from absolute moral obligations?

PB is not an absolute obligation. It states that there is a significant moral reason to select the most advantaged child, but this reason can be outweighed by other moral considerations, such as harm to existing people or excessive burdens on parents.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: What are the authors’ responses to claims that PB is too demanding?

The authors argue that PB is no more demanding than existing parental duties, such as spacing children or improving their upbringing. In cases where selection has no additional cost (e.g., in IVF), selecting the best child imposes no further burden.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: What competing procreative principles do the authors discuss?

The authors compare PB to four alternative principles:

• Procreative Autonomy – any procreative choice is permissible if autonomous;

• Minimal Threshold View – parents only need to select a child with a “life worth living”;

• Satisficing View – parents should aim for a “good enough” life but not necessarily the best;

• Prevention of Harm View – focus on avoiding suffering rather than maximizing well-being. ;
  
  minimal treshhold, satisficing and prevention of harm: Both views fail to account for strong moral reasons to aim for better outcomes. The Minimal Threshold View ignores significant improvements in well-being, while the Satisficing View allows irrational choices when better options are available without cost.
  
  
  
  

Minimal Threshold View – parents only need to select a child with a “life worth living”

Satisficing View – parents should aim for a “good enough” life but not necessarily the best

Prevention of Harm View – focus on avoiding suffering rather than maximizing well-being.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: Why do the authors reject the Minimal Threshold View and the Satisficing View?

Both views fail to account for strong moral reasons to aim for better outcomes. The Minimal Threshold View ignores significant improvements in well-being, while the Satisficing View allows irrational choices when better options are available without cost.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: What role does decision theory play in PB?

PB applies principles of decision theory: parents should aim to maximize expected value, where the outcome of interest is the future child’s expected well-being. Parents must select the embryo likely to have the best life, based on available information.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: How do the authors respond to the objection that PB relies on a controversial view of well-being?

PB is neutral on theories of well-being (e.g., hedonistic, desire-fulfillment, or objective goods). It only requires parents to use widely accepted judgments about traits that make life better, such as health, intelligence, and happiness.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: What is the Welfarist View of disability proposed in the paper?

The Welfarist View defines disability as a stable physical or psychological property that significantly reduces a person’s well-being in a given context, compared to realistic alternatives. It excludes the effects of social prejudice.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: Why do the authors reject the Species Norm View of disability?

The Species Norm View defines disability as deviation from biological norms. The authors argue this is flawed because deviation itself is not inherently bad—what matters is how a condition impacts well-being in a given context.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: How do the authors address the claim that disability is socially constructed?

They acknowledge that disabilities can result from social prejudice or contextual mismatches. However, some conditions reduce well-being regardless of social attitudes, making disability more than just a social construct.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: How does PB apply to cases like selecting a deaf child?

PB gives moral reasons to select against disability (e.g., deafness) if it reduces well-being. It does not stigmatize disabilities but prioritizes expected well-being when selecting embryos. Parents’ choice must be based on reasonable predictions, not social bias.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: How do the authors respond to concerns that PB promotes discrimination against disabled people?

PB does not value normality but well-being. It acknowledges that people with disabilities can live good lives. Selecting against a condition (e.g., deafness) is about preventing harm, not discriminating against existing people with that condition.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009: What is the authors' schematization of the argument for PB?

Stance: Parents have significant moral reasons to aim for the child with the best chance of the best life. Grounds: Commonsense morality already supports the idea that parents should optimize conditions for their children (e.g., timing conception, IVF). Counterarguments: PB is too demanding → Rejected

PB aligns with existing duties to care for children. PB relies on controversial views of well-being → Rejected

PB uses widely accepted judgments about traits that promote a good life. PB promotes discrimination → Rejected

PB prioritizes well-being, not normality, and does not diminish the value of existing people with disabilities. Conclusion: PB is superior to competing principles (Procreative Autonomy, Satisficing View, etc.) as it provides a clear, rational guide for morally preferable procreative choices.

Sparrow 2019: What is the core argument of the paper?

Sparrow argues that rapid progress in genetic enhancement will render human enhancements obsolete, leading individuals to become “yesterday’s child.” This introduces unique psychological, social, and ontological concerns. Sparrow builds on Jürgen Habermas’ idea that genetic enhancement blurs the line between the “born” and the “made,” treating humans as products subject to technological progress. Counterarguments, like comparing genetic obsolescence to aging or skill obsolescence, are rejected because genes are integral and unchangeable. The paper concludes that enhancement imposes a teleological framework on human life, creating generational hierarchies based on advancements in enhancement. ]

Sparrow 2019: What is genetic obsolescence?

Genetic obsolescence refers to the condition where genetic enhancements become outdated as technological progress introduces better traits, rendering earlier enhancements inferior. ]

Sparrow 2019: How does genetic enhancement differ from therapy?

Therapy restores normal functioning, while enhancement aims to push traits beyond species-typical norms. Unlike therapy, enhancements create a cycle of obsolescence as they are overtaken by superior versions. ]

Sparrow 2019: What psychological impacts could genetic obsolescence have?

Individuals may experience feelings of inferiority when their obsolete enhancements are compared to younger generations with superior traits. This could make the experience of aging more distressing. ]

Sparrow 2019: How does technological progress underpin Sparrow's argument?

Sparrow assumes that genetic enhancement technology will improve rapidly, which will cause earlier enhancements to become obsolete, creating a continuous cycle of progress and inferiority. ]

Sparrow 2019: Why does Sparrow reference Habermas' critique of genetic enhancement?

Habermas argues that genetic enhancement turns individuals into products, blurring the distinction between “the born” and “the made.” Sparrow strengthens this concern by showing how obsolescence introduces a technological framework into human identity. ]

Sparrow 2019: How does genetic obsolescence compare to skill obsolescence?

While skill sets can be updated and are domain-specific, genes are permanent and integral to human identity. Genetic obsolescence cannot be “updated,” making it fundamentally different and more significant. ]

Sparrow 2019: How does obsolescence impact the parent-child relationship?

Parents who genetically enhance their children may experience regret as advancements render those enhancements obsolete, potentially leading to disappointment in their children. ]

Sparrow 2019: What are the social and economic implications of genetic obsolescence?

Employers may prefer younger generations with superior enhancements, creating new age-based inequalities. Genetic enhancements could stratify society based on the date of enhancement. ]

Sparrow 2019: Why does Sparrow argue genetic obsolescence imposes a teleology on human life?

Progress in enhancement technologies assumes a singular goal of human improvement, reducing the diversity and complexity of human ends to a ranking based on technological achievement. ]

Sparrow 2019: How does genetic obsolescence differ from natural aging?

Aging is a universal and natural process affecting all individuals in similar ways, whereas genetic obsolescence arises from technological progress and creates hierarchical differences between generations. ]

Sparrow 2019: Why does Sparrow claim genetic enhancement would undermine egalitarian ethics?

Genetic obsolescence introduces a hierarchy where each new generation is considered superior to the last, undermining moral equality and social respect between individuals. ]

Sparrow 2019: What is the ontological impact of genetic obsolescence?

Obsolescence turns human beings into products subject to technological progress, intensifying an instrumental view of human life and fundamentally altering our understanding of what it means to be human. ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: What is the core argument of the paper?

Douglas and Devolder propose supplementing existing individualistic selection principles (focused on the future child's well-being) with Procreative Altruism. Procreative Altruism holds that prospective parents have significant moral reason to select a child whose existence is expected to contribute more to (or detract less from) the well-being of others. They argue that combining Procreative Altruism with any major individualistic principle (e.g., Procreative Beneficence) creates a superior, more comprehensive basis for selection decisions. The authors defend this two-principle model against objections such as impracticality, excessive demands, and fears of eugenics. ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: What is Procreative Altruism?

Procreative Altruism is a principle stating that parents have significant moral reason to select a child whose existence will contribute more to (or detract less from) the well-being of others than any alternative child they could have. ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: How does Procreative Altruism relate to individualistic selection principles?

Procreative Altruism supplements individualistic principles, which focus solely on the well-being of the selected child. Together, they create a two-principle model that considers both the child’s well-being and the impact on others. ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: What is the Free-Rider example, and how does it support Procreative Altruism?

The Free-Rider example describes two embryos: Paul, with a predisposition to free-ride (violating norms for personal gain), and Liza, who does not. Paul’s life would contain more well-being, but Liza would contribute more to others’ well-being. Procreative Altruism supports selecting Liza, showing a moral reason to account for others’ well-being. ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: What is the primary advantage of the two-principle model?

It is more comprehensive than individualistic principles alone because it captures moral reasons to promote the well-being of others, which individualistic principles neglect. ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: How does the two-principle model address objections to Procreative Beneficence?

The two-principle model mitigates concerns of Procreative Beneficence being self-defeating. For example, it reduces risks of overbearing parenting by shifting focus from the child’s well-being alone to broader altruistic concerns. ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: What are practical challenges to applying the two-principle model?

Challenges include incomplete genetic knowledge, environmental influences on traits, and balancing the child’s well-being with that of others. However, the authors argue these challenges are similar for individualistic principles and can be addressed through heuristics and practical reasoning. ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: What role does virtue theory play in supporting the two-principle model?

Virtue theory evaluates traits as conducive to the well-being of their possessor and others. Douglas and Devolder argue that parents can draw on this reasoning to select for virtues (e.g., empathy) and against vices (e.g., deceit). ]

Douglas & Devolder 2013: How does Procreative Altruism challenge redundancy concerns?

Critics argue traits beneficial to the child’s well-being are usually also beneficial to others, making Procreative Altruism redundant. However, the model prioritizes traits that significantly impact others (e.g., avoiding free-riding), which individualistic principles overlook. ]