Lecture 25 - The Rise of Populism

What is the outline for this lecture?

Why Are People Turning Toward Populism?

• People feel current systems aren’t working.

• Economic dissatisfaction → belief that democracy is not delivering.

• Growing sense of frustration + unhappiness with everyday conditions.

• Populism appeals because it promises fundamental change, not incremental fixes.

Some ways that people are unhappy:

• Pessimism about the future: People doubt that future generations will live better lives → lowers willingness to have children.

• Deep social divisions: U.S. polarization driven by negative partisanship (motivated by dislike of the other side).

• High distrust in institutions: Falling confidence in government, doctors, education, etc.

• Lower willingness to follow government direction.

What are current life measures, though?

• One explanation for growing populism support is simply “people are unhappy.”

• But objectively, conditions are historically better:

  • Lower violent crime

  • Higher life expectancy

  • Less disease + lower maternal mortality

  • Strong U.S. economy (despite public pessimism)

Bottom line: Public mood is negative even though living conditions have objectively improved.

What are the four possible explanations for the populist movement?

• No external threat: International politics lacks a unifying enemy → internal divisions grow.

• Economic inequality: Rising gaps in wealth create frustration and insecurity.

• Status threat: Concerns about racism, immigration, and rapid economic change fuel identity-based anxiety.

• Media transformation:

  • New media weakens community ties.

  • Fragmented (“balkanized”) media replaces the shared public square.

A good explanation should account for variation over time and across countries.

What is the explanation not?

• Not uniquely American: The U.S. is just one case; the trend isn’t caused by Trump alone.

• Not just Western democracies: Countries like Brazil and the Philippines show similar patterns.

• Not a recent phenomenon: Signs of this dynamic existed even in 2001 and earlier

• Bottom line: This is a longstanding, global trend — so deeper structural explanations are needed.

What is the external threat and internal unity explanation?

• Balance of power logic: Big external threats force cooperation; e.g., NATO functioned best vs. the USSR.

• Domestic parallel: External danger reduces partisan conflict — “Politics stops at the water’s edge.”

• When no clear external enemy:

  • Internal divisions increase

  • Negative partisanship grows

  • Leaders feel freer to demonize the other side

• Shift in perceived “enemy”:

  • 50 years ago: Americans answered USSR

  • Today: many answer Trump or Biden → internal enemies replace external ones

• Empirical pattern: Countries that spend more on their military (i.e., feel external threats) show lower levels of negative polarization.

Evaluating the external threat and internal unity argument strengths and weaknesses?

Strengths

• US timing fits well: Polarization rises sharply after the USSR disappears (1990s).

• Cross-national support: Countries without major external threats show higher internal division.

Limitations

• Trust trends don’t align: Declining trust in institutions begins earlier (1970s–80s), even during the Cold War → weakens the timing argument.

• Evidence is indirect: Hard to directly manipulate or measure “perceived external threat” in surveys or experiments.

• Doesn’t fully explain pessimism about the future: External-threat logic accounts for rising polarization, but it does not clearly explain why people have become more distrustful about the future itself (economic pessimism, fear for next generation, declining optimism).

Bottom line:
The external-threat theory explains polarization patterns well but is less convincing for declines in institutional trust and future-oriented pessimism, suggesting additional mechanisms are needed.

What is the economic explanation: rise of inequality?

• Globalization raises overall prosperity, but benefits are unevenly distributed.

• Trade shocks (e.g., competition with China) cause job losses → people harmed become politically unhappy.

• Manufacturing has hollowed out in the U.S. and UK, especially in working-class regions.

• Economic gains flow more to the rich, so average people feel the economy is “bad” even when growth is high.

• People hurt or left behind by globalization are more likely to support populist movements.

Evaluating the economic explanation strengths and weaknesses?

Strengths

• Identifies the right voters:

  • Trump and Brexit support strongest in regions harmed by globalization.

  • U.S. Rust Belt areas hit by Chinese import competition shifted toward Trump.

  • UK areas with major manufacturing loss voted more for Brexit.

• Timing fits:

  • Decline in trust + rise in austerity policies align with jumps in populist support.

Limitations

• Policy fixes don’t work as expected:

  • Redistribution (taxing wealthy to compensate losers) shows little effect.

  • Retraining programs had low participation.

  • Regions receiving assistance often shifted more toward Trump—not less.

• Inequality doesn’t predict everything:

  • Even in countries without rising inequality, populism still surged.

Bottom line: Globalization explains who supports populism and where, but it fails to fully explain why policy solutions don’t reduce populism or why populism rises even without inequality growth.

What is the status threat explanation?

• Populist backlash comes from status loss, not just material loss.

• Economic changes (e.g., job loss) are interpreted as loss of respect, recognition, and social standing.

  • “Make America Great Again” implies a fall from a higher-status past.

• Status is tied to identity categories (race, gender, etc.).

  • Example: White men reacting negatively when told their success reflects historical privilege, not individual merit → helps explain the gap between young men (more Trump) and young women (more liberal).

• Populism often includes backlash against movements that highlight past privilege or challenge existing status hierarchies.

What is the status threat explanation strengths and weaknesses?

Strengths

• Fits populist rhetoric:
  Populism frames “the pure people” as held down by a corrupt elite → directly tied to perceived status decline.

• Explains scapegoating:
  Blaming immigrants or minority groups as “getting too much” reflects attempts to restore status hierarchy.

• Matches group differences:
  Status-threat logic aligns with political gaps between:

  • Young men vs. young women

  • White vs. Black voters
    Groups who feel status loss lean populist.

Limitations

• Unclear triggers:
  Society is always changing—why did status anxiety spike now, but not during earlier periods like the civil rights era?

• Elite rhetoric matters:
  Populist leaders help activate status concerns, meaning it’s not purely bottom-up.

• But why is rhetoric more effective today?
  The theory doesn’t fully explain why populist messaging resonates more now than in the past.

What is the media and the decline of community explanation?

• Society functions better when people have strong social connections (“social capital”).

• Participation in voluntary organizations (frats, PTAs, churches, school boards) historically built community and reduced polarization.

• These involvements have declined sharply → less cross-group interaction, more isolation.

• Isolation increases susceptibility to populist and authoritarian appeals (including Trumpism).

• Why did social capital decline?

  • Rise of TV and later the internet shifted free time toward solitary activities.

  • Without TV, joining clubs made sense; with TV, people stay home → weaker community ties.

What is the media and decline of truth argument?

• Democracy relies on reliable, shared information so citizens can hold elites accountable.

• Traditional broadcast news (TV networks, newspapers) once created a shared national reality across political lines.

• All media has bias, but when outlets aim for a broad audience, partisan bias is moderated.

• Reliance on these shared media sources is declining.

• Rise of social media → people curate their own news, selecting content that confirms their views.

  • They avoid information they disagree with → more polarization and openness to populist narratives.

What is the media and decline and truth strengths and weaknesses?

Strengths

• Explains gap between reality and perception:
  Since the Bush era, people’s views of the economy track party identity, not actual economic conditions — a result of partisan media environments.

• Accounts for rising negative partisanship:
  Selective exposure to favorable news + negative stories about the other side fuels hostility and pessimism.

• Matches major empirical trends:
  Decline of shared media, rise of curated social media feeds, and increasing political polarization all align with this explanation.

Limitations

• Doesn’t fully explain early declines in trust:
  The drop in institutional trust began before the social media era, making media changes an incomplete explanation for the initial trend.

So which explanation is it?

• There is no single cause of rising populism.

• Multiple explanations likely interact (globalization, status loss, media changes, external threat absence, declining social capital, etc.).

• More useful question:
  Which explanations matter less compared to others, rather than searching for one all-encompassing cause.

Why does it all matter?

• Populist policies haven’t delivered success:

  • Example: Brexit → Britain economically worse off.

• Mainstream politicians copying populist positions (e.g., on immigration)
  → has not reduced populist support.

• Excluding populist parties from coalitions
  → often increases their appeal by reinforcing outsider/anti-elite narratives.

Bottom line: Neither populist governance nor mainstream counter-strategies have effectively curtailed populist momentum.