PSCI 3500 Final Exam

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43 Terms

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Monarchies rely on

  • Kin and family network

  • Royal family, succession

  • Ex) Qatar and Kuwait

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Military dictatorships are ruled by

  • Committee, or junta

  • “Guardians of the national interest”

  • The biggest threat to stability is more military coups

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Civilian dictatorships rely on

  • Regime parties or personality cults

  • Ex) China and North Korea

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Electoral authoritarianism

leaders hold elections and tolerate some pluralism, yet democratic norms are violated

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Selectorate Theory

  • To stay in power, leaders must keep members of their winning coalition happy

  • Government performance should be better in large W/S systems than small W/S systems.

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Condorcet’s Paradox

  • A set of rational individuals may not act rationally when they act as a group

  • There is either no stable outcome or the outcome is determined by the rules of the game

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Median Voter Theorem

the proposal matching the ideal point of the median voter will defeat all other alternatives

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<p>Final outcome?</p>

Final outcome?

B is final outcome

C determines final outcome

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Sincere Vote

Vote for their “Most-Preferred Alternative”

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Strategic Vote

“Think Ahead, and Reason Backwards”

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Arrow’s Theorem

The pathologies of majority rule apply to “any” group decision procedure that meets some minimal standards of fairness

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Presidential democracy

  • government does not depend on a legislative majority to exist.

  • Minority government is more frequent.

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Parliamentary democracy

  • government depends only on a legislative majority to exist

  • Power to remove a government (no Confidence)

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Semi-presidential democracy

  • government depends on a legislative majority and the head of state is popularly elected

    • fixed term of the Head of State

  • Prime minister, Cohabitation

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Political surfing

The government does not actively manipulate the economy, but waits until the economy is at a highpoint before announcing the election

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Political business cycle

  • The government actively manipulates the economy to engineer a short-term economic high and then calls an election

  • Followed by an economic decline

  • Result: cycles of booms and busts

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Electoral Integrity

The extent to which the conduct of elections meets international standards and global norms concerning “good” elections

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Three major electoral systems

  • Majoritarian

  • Proportional Representation (PR)

  • Mixed

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A single-member district plurality (SMDP) system

  • The candidate with the most votes wins

  • unrepresentative outcomes

    • Ex) United States (for the House of Representatives)

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Proportional Electoral Systems

  • a quota- or divisor-based electoral system employed in multimember districts

  • produce a proportional translation of votes into seats.

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Electoral Thresholds

  • Minimum percentage of votes that a party must win to gain representation

  • Formal thresholds are often introduced in an attempt to reduce legislative fragmentation

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Main Purposes of Political Parties

  • Structure the political world

  • Recruit and socialize the political elite

  • Mobilize the masses

  • Provide a link between the rulers and the ruled

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Social Cleavages

  • individuals have different political identifications

  • Divisions/structure of party systems in society based on race/ethnicity, socioeconomic class, religion, territory/location 

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Types of social cleavages

  • Urban-rural cleavage

  • Confessional cleavage

  • Secular-clerical cleavage

  • Class cleavage

  • Post-materialist cleavage

  • Ethnic and linguistic cleavages

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Urban-rural cleavage

  • One of oldest political conflicts in world 

  • Conflict between rural and urban interests 

  • Ex. 

    • Early modern europe - feudal lords vs town dwellers (freemen, burghers, bourgeoise) 

      • Economic and cultural dimension

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Confessional cleavage

  • Different denominations in religion 

  • Conflict over religious differences

  • Ex. 

    • Europe during Protestant Reformation 

      • Roman Catholic Church vs rising Protestantism 

    • India 

      • Hindus and Muslims -> creation of Pakistan 

    • Middle Eastern countries 

      • Sunni vs Shia muslims

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Secular-clerical cleavage

  • Religious voters vs non religious voters 

  • Political competition around religious issues 

  • Conflict between growing state, that wants to dominate, and church that wants to maintain historic power

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Class cleavage

  • Actors have have conflicting economic interests 

  • Industrial sectors: Conflict b/w workers and capitalists

    • Capitalists: favor free market, small state, restricted franchise 

    • Workers: greater state intervention in economy and franchise expansion 

  • Agricultural sector: peasants/agricultural workers and large landowners 

  • Involves attempts to use state to redistribute wealth from rich to poor

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Post-materialistic cleavage

  • Different views regarding human freedom

  • Ex. equality, reproductive choice, and sexual freedom

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Ethnic and linguistic cleavages

  • Differences in ethnicity and language 

  • can be source of conflict

  • Ex. Canada, belgium, spain

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Nonpartisan democracy

  • no official political parties

  • ex. George Washington’s Era, Small Pacific Islands

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One-party dominant system

  • Only one particular party has a realistic chance of gaining power

  • Ex) Japan

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Two-party system

  • Two major parties

  • Ex) US

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Multiparty system

  • more than two parties

  • Ex) Germany and France

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Duverger’s Theory

  • Electoral institutions influence how social divisions are translated into political parties.

  • SMDP => Two party system

  • PR => Multiparty system

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<p>Social Heterogeneity and Electoral System Permissiveness</p>

Social Heterogeneity and Electoral System Permissiveness

  • high social heterogeneity & permissive electoral system → many parties

    • more diversity leads to more demand for political parties

  • high social heterogeneity & nonpermissive electoral system → few parties

    • have many social divisions and social demands aren’t translated into political parties

  • low social heterogeneity & nonpermissive/permissive electoral system→ few parties

    • less diversity → less demand for political parties

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Federalism

  • Sovereignty is constitutionally split between at least two territorial levels

  • Federal (10 % of the World) vs. Unitary States

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Devolution

A unitary state grants powers to subnational governments but retains the right to unilaterally recall or reshape those powers

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Why Federalism?

  • bargaining process to achieve security and economic goals

  • Diffuse secessionist pressures

  • U.S.

    • Big vs small states

      • Large state: want strong central gov

      • Small state: don’t want strong central gov 

      • Why? Bigger states have more power

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Bicameralism

  • Two distinct assemblies (41% of the world)

  • ex. U.S. Legislative (Congress composed of Senate and House of Representatives)

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Unicameralism

  • Single assembly

  • ex. Denmark

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Veto Player Theory

A veto player is an actor whose agreement is necessary for a change in the political status quo

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An increase in the number of veto players produces

  • Greater policy stability

  • Smaller policy shifts

  • Less variation in the size of policy shifts

  • Weaker agenda-setter powers