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Utility Theory
assumes you make decisions to maximise gains/minimise loss.
expected utility = value of outcome × probability of outcome
does not account for psychology - a definite is worth more than a probable.
Tversky & Shafir (1992) - Loss Aversion
expect losses to reduce happiness more than equal gains will increase happiness.
coin toss - get £200 heads, give £100 tails.
utility theory predicts you should take the bet (£50 gain), but 66% participants refused bet.
Dawes et al. (1988) - Sunk-Cost Effect
e.g. buy £100 ticket - lose the ticket, have money to buy a new one. most buy another - continue endeavor once investment has been made in money, effort time.
outside of predictions of utility theory.
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) - Asian Disease Problem
demonstrates framing effect. same decision framed differently results in either risk seeking or risk adverse decisions.
when scenario described more clearly, effect disappears (Mandel & Vartanian, 2001).
cancer treatments - patients list pros/cons and justify decision = framing effect disappeared (Almashat et al., 2008).
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
attempt to explain loss aversion - two key assertions:
people identify reference point (losses/gains intersect value) that represents current state
people more sensitive to potential losses than gains
Kermer et al. (2006)
Ps given $5 - coin toss, heads = win $5, tails = lose $3.
Ps estimate feelings if win or lose, rate afterwards actual feelings.
good at estimating feelings after win, overestimated x4 bad feelings after loss.
Prospect Theory - Cons
doesn’t explain why we are loss averse
ignores emotional factors in decision making
ignores individual differences in willingness to make risky decisions
Current Motivational State
Affective forecasting - bad at predicting future state and needs e.g. more likely to buy junk food when hungry (Read & van Leeuwen, 1998).
think of future self more as another person - seen in anterior cingulate cortex during fMRI (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009).
feelings alter gambling behaviour - optimistic gambles when happy; systematic bias in line with current feelings (Bower, 1981).
Anticipatory Arousal
use gut feelings as objective info - it isn’t = affect-as-information theory.
uncertainty/novelty increases arousal = can have great influence on decisions (Srull, 1983).
(Goldberg et al., 1999) - watch film - criminal either did or didn’t get punished. Ps asked to give judgement on diff. case. Group 2 increased punishment.
Omission Bias
preference for inaction when engaged in a risky decision due to overestimating future regret.
Wroe et al. (2005) - parents anticipate greater responsibility/regret if child experiences adverse reaction to vaccine
Shiv et al. (2005)
15 emotion region damage patients, 7 non-emotion region damage patients. investment coin toss - lose $1 or win $2.50
emotion damage invest over 20% more than neurotypical and non-emotion damage.
lesions to emotion areas removes loss aversion = better decisions.
Damasio et al. (1999)
7 patients with damage to ventromedial PFC (emotional regulation, decision-making).
cognitively normal, but impulsive, rude and violent.
make risky and emotion-based decisions.
Somatic Marker Hypothesis
make decisions based on past experiences’ related emotional experiences.
retrieved emotion includes peripheral arousal (somatic marker) - somatic markers biases decision-making. fast, adaptive, limited resources needed.
Individual Differences - Gambling in Parkinson’s Patients
~14% patients develop gambling problems/impulsive behaviours due to medications.
Ray et al. (2012) - gambling problems due to disruptions of dopamine function in PFC and other areas involved in impulsivity.
Reciprocity - Strohmetz et al. (2002)
adding sweets with bill increases tip%.
people feel need to justify costs (reduce dissonance). more sweets → more tip → more positive evaluation to reduce dissonance.
Justification (Tversky & Shafir, 1992)
took tough exam, burnt out - passed, failed, or unknown
chance to buy package holiday to Hawaii:
passed = 54% buy as reward
failed = 57% buy as consolidation
unknown = 32% buy - reluctant as could not justify purchase easily.