Supreme Court Case Laws w/ Reasoning

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that Black people, enslaved or free, were not citizens under the Constitution. In doing so, the Court argued that the liberties contained in the Constitution did not extend to Black people.

Core issue: Whether enslaved Africans and their descendants could be citizens, and entitled to all the rights privileges of the US Constitution.

Holding: People of African descent brought to the United States and held as slaves, as well as their descendants (either slave or free), are not considered citizens of the United States and are not entitled to the protections and rights of the Constitution.

Justification: Citizenship under Article III depends on being part of the political community that form the Constitution. At the time of the Founding, Black people were: Regarded as an inferior class, Treated as property, Excluded from political rights. Because the Founders did not regard Black people as members of the sovereign people, they could not be citizens under the Constitution.

Logic chain: (1) Founders' practices show Black people were excluded. (2) Exclusion means they were not part of the poltiical community. (3) Citizenship depends on that community. (4) Therefore, Black people cannot be citizens. (5) Equality must be read in light of that exclusion, not against it.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a law that did not explicitly discriminate on the basis of national origin still violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was discriminatorily applied.

Core issue: Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment applies only to citizens and facially discriminatory laws, or also to all persons and to discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral laws.

Holding: The Equal Protection Clause applies to all persons within a state's jurisdiction, not just citizens. It protects against discrimination in both the text of laws and their administration. A law that is neutral on its face but discriminatorily enforced violates equal protection.

Court's interpretation of Equal Protection: The 14th Amendment's use of the word "person" is deliberate and inclusive. Equal proteection extends to non-citizens, including Chinese immigrants. Equal protection is violated not only by discriminatory statues, but also when: (i) officials exercise unfettered discretion, and (ii) that discretion is applied systematically and arbitrarily against a particular group.

Logic chain: (1) The ordinance regulating laundries was facially neutral. (2) In practice, it was enforced almost exclusively against Chinese operators. (3) The Discretion given to officials lacked clear standards (4) Such arbitrary enforcement amounts to intentional discrimination. (5) Therefore, equal protection is violated even without discriminatory text.

Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889)

This landmark immigration case upheld the constitutionality of part of the Chinese Exclusion Act. The case established a key tenet of the plenary power doctrine, which gives the two political branches of government wide latitude in creating immigration and national security policies. At the same time, it vastly limited the rights of noncitizen residents once they left the country.

Core issue: On what constitutional basis does Congress have the power to exclude immigrants, even when doing so contradicts prior treaties or previously granted reentry permissions?

Holding: Congress has plenary authority to exclude immigrants because the Constitution creates a national government vested with external sovereign powers, and those sovereign powers implicitly include control over immigration.

Source of Congressional Power: The Court did not rely on an enumerated power. Instead, it held that: The US is a sovereign nation. Sovereignty entails inherent powers necessary for self-preservation. One such inherent power is the exclusion of foreigners.

Logic chain: (1) The Constitution creates a national government, not merely a league of states. (2) National governments posesss external sovereign powers. (3) Immigration and exclusion implicate foreign relations and national security. (4) Such matters belong to the political branches, not the judiciary. (5) Therefore, Congress's power to exclude immigrants is plenary and non-reviewable.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

In one of its most misguided decisions, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation and established the “separate but equal” doctrine. It ruled that public facilities could be segregated on the basis of race provided that the facilities were equal in quality.

Core issue: Whether state laws requiring racial segregation violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when the facilities provided are claimed to be equal.

Holding: The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees legal (civil) equality, not social equality, and therefore permits racial segregation under the doctrine of "separate but equal," so long as segregation does not deny equal civil rights.

Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to ensure: Equality before the law, not the abolition of social distinctions based on race. Laws mandating separation of races do not, by themselves, imply the inferiority of either race. Any perception of inferiority arises from social interpretation, not from the law itself.

Logic chain: (1) The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal civil rights. (2) It does not require racial commingling or social integration. (3) Segregation is a reasonable exercise of police power. (4) Separation alone does not deny equality if facilities are equal. (5) Therefore, "separate but equal" does not violate equal protection.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898)

This case clarified the concept of birthright citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ruled that children born on American soil are automatically citizens of the United States, even if their parents are not.

Core issue: Whether a person born in the United States to non-citizen parents is a US citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause, even when the parents are ineligible for naturalization.

Holding: a person born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction is a US citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of the citizenship or race of their parents.

Court interpreted Fourteenth Amendment: (i) Textual meaning - the Citizenship Clause states: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof..." The plan meaning of 'all persons' includes children born on US soil. Wong Kim Ark was born in the US and subject to US law. (ii) Original intent - the drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to codify the common-law rule of birthright citizenship, and repudiate Dred Scott's exclusion of US-born persons. Legislative history confirms the Amendment was meant to include all persons born in the US. “To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.

Logic chain: (1) The Fourteenth Amendment uses inclusive language ("all persons"). (2) "Subject to the jurisdiction" means subject to US law. (3) Common-law tradition recognizes birthright citizenship. (4) The Amendment was meant to constitutionalize that rule. (5) Therefore, Wong Kim Ark is a citizen by birth.

Korematsu v. United States (1944)

One of the the most infamous Supreme Court decisions, Korematsu upheld the constitutionality of Japanese internment camps during WWII.

Core issue: Whether the federal government's exclusion and interment of Japanese Americans during WWI violated the Constitution, and what justificatory basis the Court relied on to uphold it.

Holding: The Court upheld the exclusion and internment of Japanese Americans, justifying not by reference to a specific constitutional provision, but by wartime powers, military necessity, and judicial defence to the executive's military judgment.

What the Court appealed to: Broad wartime powers of the national government. Military necessity during a time of declared war. Deference to the Executive and military authorities. The claim that the coruts are ill-equipped to second-guess military judgments. It did not ground its decision in: the text of the Constitution, an explicit suspension of rights, and a clear doctrinal test under equal protection or due process.

Logic chain: (1) The nation is at war. (2) Wartime requires rapid and decisive military action. (3) Military authorities judged exclusion necessary to prevent sabotage. (4) Courts must defer to military judgments in such circumstances. (5) Therefore, exclusion and internment are constitutionally permissible.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)

This landmark case struck down the “separate but equal” doctrine established in Plessy. Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that racial segregation could not continue in public schools under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The impacts of this decision were also more far-reaching: segregation in other areas controlled by government, like public transportation, was barred.

Core issue: Whether racial segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when physical facilties and resources are formally equal.

Holding: Racial segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment because separating children solely on the basis of race denies minority children equal educational opportunities, even if the facilities are otherwise equal.

Court interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Equal Protection Clause requires substantive equality, not merely formal equality. Segregation in education is inherently unequal because it: stigmatizes minority children, generates feelings of inferiority, and undermiens their ability to learn and participate as equal citizens. Therefore, "separate but equal" has no place in public education.

Logic chain: (1) Education is a fundamental function of government. (2) Equal educational opportunity is essential to citizenship. (3) Segregation is based solely on race. (4) Racial separation generates stigma and ineqaulity regardless of facilities. (5) Therefore, segregation violates equal protection.

Cooper v. Aaron (1958)

Following its decision in Brown v. Baord of Education, the Supreme Court denied Arkansas’s school board the right to delay desegregating its schools for thirty months. The case is also notable as it contained language suggesting that the Supreme Court not only has the power of judicial review, but that it has the final say about the American Constitution, a comment that has received criticism given the Court’s deeply flawed Equal Protection rulings only a few years earlier.

Core issue: Whether state officials in Arkansas could refuse to comply with Brown v. Board of Education on the ground that they disagreed with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution.

Holding: State officials are constitutionally required to comply with Brown v. Board of Education because the Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution the supreme law of the land and Marbury v. Madison establishes that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution are binding on the states.

Court appealed to: (i) Supremacy Clause (Article VI) - The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. State officials are bound by it regardless of contrary state law or policy. (ii) Judicial review (Marbury v. Madison), it is the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution. Those interpretations are authoritative and binding on state officials.

Logic chain: (1) The Constitution is supreme over state law. (2) The Supreme Corut has final authority to interpret the Constitution. (3) Brown is a constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court. (4) State officials are bound by that interpretation. (5) Therefore, Arkansas officials must comply with Brown.

Loving v. Virginia (1967)

A landmark civil rights decision, this case culminated in the Supreme Court ruling that laws prohibiting interracial marriages violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Core issue: Whether state laws prohibiting interracial marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding: State bans on interracial marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they are racial classifications that lack a legitimate purpose and because the freedom to marry is a fundamental right protected by due process.

Court appealed to two constitutional grounds:

(i) Equal Protection Clause - Anti-miscegenetion laws classify individuals solely on the basis of race. Such racial classifications are inherently suspect. Virginia's claim that the law punished whites and Blacks equally was rejected. The law had no purpose other than invidious racial discrimination.

(ii) Due Process Clause - Marriage is a fundamental right. The freedom to marry may not be restricted on arbitrary grounds. Denying marriage based on race violates liberty protected by due process.

Logic chain: (1) The statute draws a racial classification. (2) Racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny. (3) Preserving racial purity is not a legitimate state interest. (4) Marriage is a basic civil right. (5) Therefore, interracial marriage bans are unconstiutional

Plyler v. Doe (1982)

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and other rights contained in the Constitution applied to undocumented children in the United States. In doing so, the Court allowed undocumented children to receive an education in public schools across the country and further expanded access to rights contained in the Constitution.

Core issue: Whether a state may deny free public education to undocumented children, and whether undocumented persons are included within the term "persons" under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding: The Equal Protection Clause applies to undocumented children, and a state may not deny them access to public education without sufficient justification.

Court interpretation of persons: The Fourteenth Amendment protects "any person within [a state's] jurisdiction." This language is not limited to citizens or lawful residents. Undocumented children are persons physically present and subject to state laws. Therefore, they are entitled to equal protection of the laws.

Logic chain: (1) The Equal Protection Clause applies to all persons, not just citizens. (2) Undocumented children are persons within Texas's jurisdiction. (3) Denying education imposes a severe and lasting harm. (4) Children are not responsible for their immigration status. (5) Texas failed to show that denying education susbtantially furthered a legitimate state interest. (6) Therefore, the law violates equal protection.

(They appeal to the meaning of the words when written, not the Founders intent)

Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

The Supreme Court ruled in this landmark case that the University of Michigan’s use race in a point system for undergraduate admissions violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

Core issue: Whether the University's of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy, which awarded automatic points to applicants from certain racial groups, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding: The University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly tailored and used race in a mechanical, automatic way, rather than through individualized consideration.

Logic chain: (1) Racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny. (2) Educational diversity may be a compelling interest. (3) But policies must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. (4) Automatically awarding points based solely on race: Treats race as decisive, Lacks individualized consideration. (5) Therefore, the policy violates equal protection.

Schenck v. United States (1919)

In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether a pamphlet urging draft resistance during World War I was protected free speech. The Court, in a famous opinion by Justice Holmes, ruled that it was not protected because the speech posed a “clear and present danger” to the security of the United States. For much of the twentieth century, the Court would use the rationale of “clear and present danger” to limit free speech, in particular when it came from those on the left of the political spectrum.

Core issue: Whether anti-draft advocacy during wartime is protected by the First Amendment.

Holding: Schenck's anti-draft advocacy was not protected by the First Amendment because it created a "clear and present danger" to the government's legitimate wartime interests.

The Court did not rely on the text of the First Amendment, The Framers' original intent, Or a categorical definition of protected speech. Instead, Justice Holmes introduced the "clear and present danger" test, which asks whether: The context of the speech creates an immediate and substantive threat to the interests the government has a right to protect.

Logic Chain: (1) The nation is at war. (2) The government has a compelling interest in maintaing the draft. (3) Schenck distributed leaflets urging resistance. (4) In wartime, such speech threatens immediate harm. (5) Therefore, the speech may be punished.

Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

In 1969 the Supreme Court reconsidered the “clear and present danger” doctrine, ushering in a more stringent standard that would only allow advocacy of “lawless action,” including revolution and political violence, to be limited if it posed an “imminent” threat and was intended to do so. This case shielded a speaker at a Ku Klux Klan rally from prosecution on the grounds that his speech was protected.

Core issue: When, consistent with the First Amendment, may the government punish advocacy of illegal action?

Holding: The government may punish advocacy of illegal action only if the speech is durected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.

The Brandenburg Test: (1) Imminence - the lawless action must be imminent, not abstract, speculative, or remote. (2) Likelihood - the speech must be likely to produce the unlawful action.

What the Court rejected: Mere abstract advocacy of violence is protected. Advocacy of illegal action at indefinite future time is protected. Punishment cannot rest on: Bad ideas, Offensive speech, General endorsement of unlawful conduct.

(1) The First Amendment protects advocacy. (2) Punishing abstract advocacy chills political speech. (3) Only speech posing an immediate, real danger may be restricted. (4) Brandenburg's speech lacked imminence and likelihood. (5) Therefore, his conviction violated the First Amendment.

Which of the following best captures Justice Douglas's distinction between protected and unprotected speech? That the First Amendment protects the advocacy of ideas—even ideas that may inspire others to act—but does not protect speech that itself functions as an overt act, such as falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969)

After a public school suspended students who wore black armbands to protest the country’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court ruled that this decision violated the students’ First Amendment right to the freedom of speech.

Core issue: Whether public school students retain First Amendment rights at school, and under what conditions schools may restrict student political expression.

Holding: Public school students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate, and schools may restrict student speech only if it causes a material and substantial disruption of school activities or infringes the rights of others.

The Tinker Test: Schools may regulate student speech only when: (1) The speech causes a material and substantial disruption, or (2) the speech invades the rights of others. Mere: Discomfort, Offense, Fear of controversy, is not sufficient.

Logic chain: (1) Students are persons with First Amendment rights. (2) Schools have an itnerest in maintaing order. (3) Political expression (black armbands) is pure speech. (4) There was no evidence of disruption. (5) Therefore, punishment violated the First Amendment.

Reasoning relies on contemporary meaning.

New York Times Company v. United States (1971)

The Supreme Court ruled in this case that the Nixon administration's efforts to block the publication of classified information violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of press. The case is notable for its refusal to place national security over the guarantees of the First Amendment.

Core issue: Whether the federal government may enjoin newspapers from publishing classified information relating to national security.

Holding: The government may not prevent publication of the Pentagon Papers because it failed to meet the "heavy burden" required to justify a prior restraint, having not shown immediate, direct, and irreparable harm sufficient to overcome the strong presumption against censorship.

Prior restraint interpretation: Prior restraints on speech and publication are presumptively unconstitutional. The government bears a heavy burden to jsutify them. Mere claims of: National security, Embarrassment, Potential harm are insufficient.

Logic chain: (1) The First Amendment strongly disfavors prior restraints. (2) The government sought an injunction before publication. (3) Such injunctions require proof of immediate, direct, and irreparable harm. (4) The government offered only speculative or generalized claims. (5) Therefore, the injunction violated the First Amendment.

Interpretive method: Relies on framers intent + meaning of the words when written.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

The Supreme Court ruled here that married couples could purchase contraceptives without government intervention or restriction. That right of “privacy” was extended in later rulings.

Core issue: Whether Connecticut's law banning the use of contraceptives by married couples violates the Constitution, even though the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to privacy.

Holding: Connecticut's ban on contraceptive use by married couples is unconstitutional because it violates a right to marital privacy that, although not explicitly stated, is protected by several provisions of the Bill of Rights.

Logic chain: (1) The Bill of Rights protects certain intimate spheres of government intrusion. (2) Marriage is a private, intimate assocation. (3) The contraception ban intrudes directly into the marital relationship. (4) Although privacy is not explicitly named, it is implicitly protected. (5) Therefore, the law violates the Constitution.

The Court used contemporary meaning of the words of the Constitution. Justice Douglas reasoned that: Several amendments presuppose zones of privacy, and These create "penumbras" and "emanations" that protect intimate decisions.

Roe v. Wade (1973)

In this case, the Supreme Court notably ruled that the Constitution protected the right of a pregnant woman to seek an abortion until the third trimester without excessive government interfere or restriction until the third trimester.

Core issue: Whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy, and how that right is balanced against the state's interests.

Holding: The Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty includes a constitutional right to privacy encompassing a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy, and before fetal viability this right is fundamental, so any restriction must satisfy strict scrutiny.

Trimester Framework: Pre-viability - right is fundamental. Post-viability - must allow exceptions for life and health of hte mother.

Logic chain: (1) The Court found an implied right of privacy, protected by the Due Process Clause. (2) Prior cases recognize privacy in intimate decisions. (3) Abortion falls within that protected privacy. (4) Before viability, the state's interest is insufficiently. (5) Therefore, pre-viability abortion bans are unconstitutional.

Interpretive method: Implied right from the contemporary meaning of substantive Due Process. It interprets liberty as an evolving concept encompassing modern understandings of personal autonomy and privacy.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

This case changed the standard courts used for reviewing abortion restrictions passed by states. Whereas Roe v. Wade required courts to review abortion restrictions under a standard of strict scrutiny, this case changed the standard to one that assessed whether such restrictions placed an “undue burden” on affected individuals. Although the case was a compromise to allow more abortion restrictions, it was overturned along with Roe in the Dobbs decision.

Core issue: Whether the Constitution continues to protect a woman's right to choose abortion, and what standard courts should use to evaluate state regulations of abortion.

Holding: The Court reaffirmed Roe's core holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to choose abortion before fetal viability, but abandoned Roe's trimester framework and strict-scrutiny standard, repalcing them with an "undue burden" test that permits greater state regulation rpior to viability.

What the Court reaffirmed: (1) A woman has a constitutional right to choose abortion before viability. (2) The state has legitimate interests in maternal health and potential life. (3) After viability, the state may prohibit abortion, with exceptions for life and health.

What the Court abandoned: The trimester framework. Strict scrutiny for pre-viability regulations.

What the Court Adopted: The undue burden test.

Undue Burden Test: A state regulation is unconstitutional if it has: "The purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before viability. Regulations before viability are allowed unless they impose an undue burden. Regulations after viability may be more restrictive.

Logic chain: (1) Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment protects intimate decisions. (2) Abortion remains within that protected liberty. (3) Roe's rigid framework is unworkable. (4) States may regulate to promote interests in life and health. (5) But regulations may not impose a substantial obstacle before viability. (6) Therefore, the undue burden test governs.

Interpretive method: Contemporary meaning / evolving understanding of liberty. The Corut explicitly rejects Original intent, and the original public meaning of "liberty" in 1868. Instead, it appeals to evolving conceptions of autonomy, reliance itnerests, and the Court's institutional legitimacy.

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022)

In Dobbs, Justice Alito abruptly ended the decades-long protection of abortion rights. His argument that Roe was “egregiously wrong” relied on two main points. The first was that there was no basis in the Constitution’s text for abortion rights. The second was that rights protected under a broad umbrella of liberty had to be “traditional” in the sense that there was a long-standing history of guaranteeing them. This part of the decision includes Alito’s history of the abortion debate in the United States. The opinion is anemic in its conception of constitutional civil liberties, stripping out those that cannot be established through explicit protections.

Core issue: Whether the Constitution protects a right to abortion, and whether Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey should be overruled.

Holding: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion, because the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of lbierty protects only those unenumerated rights that are deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Accordingly, Roe and Casey are overruled.

What the Court appealed to: The Court rejected - an implied right to privacy protecting abortion, and a living or evolving interpretation of liberty. The Court adopted a historical test for substantive due process: unenumerated rights must be deeply rooted in history and tradition.

Logic chain: (1) The Constitution does not mention abortion. (2) Substantive due process protects only certain unenumerated rights. (3) Those rights must be deeply rooted in history and tradition. (4) Abortion was widely restricted or prohibited at the Founding and in 1868. (5) Therefore, abortion is not a constitutionally protected liberty. (6) Regulation of abortion is returned to the states.

The Court acknowledged stare decisis, but held it did not justifying retaining Roe and Casey because: they were egregiously wrong, poorly reasoned, unworkable, and has distorted other areas of the law.

Interpretive method: Originalist / historical-tradition test. The Court relies on: historical practice, and legal tradition at the Founding and Reconstruction. It explicitly rejects: contemporary moral reasoning, living constitutionalism, implied privacy reasoning of Griswold / Roe / Casey.

Dissent from Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022)

(1) Liberty includes reproductive choice. The Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty includes: Privacy, bodily autonomy, and control over intimate life choices. Abortion fits squarely within the line of cases protecting: Marriage (Loving), Contraception (Griswold), and Family relationships (Casey).

(2) Stare decisis and reliance interests: Roe and Casey have structured: Women's lives, Medical practice, and Social and economic expectations for decades. Overruling them ignores massive reliance interests. The dissent argues this violates basic principles of stare decisis.

(3) Equality and institutional legitimacy: The dissent emphasizes - women's equal citizenship, and the disproportionate burden abortion bans palce on women. It argues that the Court damages its own legitimacy by: reversing a settled constitutional right, based on a contested historical methodology.

Interpretive method: Contemporary meaning / evolving concept of liberty. Precedent and reliance (stare decisis).

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

This case upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia law that prohibited what it called “sodomy,” or oral and anal sex between consenting individuals. The case was centered on the constitutionality of prohibiting homosexual activity, though the law itself did not differentiate between homosexual and heterosexual sex acts. The case stands as an example of a precedent that once set the law of the land in the arena of the LGBTQ+ rights before it was reverse and a new era of gay rights was ushered in by the Supreme Court.

Core issue: Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, such that Georgia’s sodomy law is unconstitutional.

Holding: Georgia's sodomy law is constitutional because the claim right to engage in homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right historically protected by the Due Process Clause.

Logic chain: (1) Substantive due process protects only fundamental rights. (2) Fundamental rights must be deeply rooted in history and tradition. (3) Homosexual sodomy has long been criminalized. (4) Therefore, no fundamental right exists. (5) Georgia's law is constitutional.

The Court relied on the meaning of the laws when written and employed originalism.

Dissent from Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

What Blackmun's dissent argued:

(1) The majority framed the right too narrowly. The majority asked, is there a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy? Blackmun says this framing rigs the analysis

(2) The proper question is broader. Blackmun argues the Court should instead ask: Does the constitution protect a right to privacy and intimate association that includes consensual adult sexual choices? Under that broader framing: The case fits squarely within: Griswold (marital privacy), Eisenstadt (individual autonomy), and Roe (intimate decision-making).

(3) History should not control liberty. Blackmune xplicitly rejects the majority's reliance on: historical condemnation. He argues: Fundamental rights not about whether a practice was approved in the past.

Interpretive method: contemporary meaning / evolving standard of liberty

Romer v. Evans (1996)

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a state constitutional amendment from Colorado that prohibited extending protections to gay or bisexual people violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

Core issue: Whether Colorado's Amendment 2, which prohibited any state or local law protecting gay and lesbian people from discrimination, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding: Colorado's Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause because it imposed a broad and undifferentiated disability ong ay and lesbian people without any rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.

Logic chain: (1) Equal Protection requires at least a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose. (2) Amendment 2 imposes sweeping disabilities on single group. (3) The law cannot be justified by neutrality or administrative convenience. (4) Its breadth reveals animus, not policy. (5) Therefore, it fails even rational basis review.

Interpretive method: Contemporary doctrinal interpretation of Equal Protection

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court ruled that laws restricting private gay sex were unconstitutional. This case extended findings from Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut about the right to privacy. It also reversed Bowers.

Core issue: Whether a state may criminalize consensual same-sex intimate conduct between adults.

Holding: Texas's ban on same-sex intimacy is unconstitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty includes the right of consenting adults to engage in private intimate conduct without state intrusion, and Bowers v. Hardwick was wrongly decided.

Logic chain: (1) There is a right to privacy, protected by the Due Process Clause. (2) Liberty includes privacy. (3) The Texas law criminalizes private, consensual conduct. (4) The law serves no legitimate interest beyond moral disapproval. (5) Therefore, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment. (6) Bowers is overruled.

Interpretive method: contemporary meaning / evolving understanding of liberty

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

This landmark case legalized same-sex marriage in the United States and asserted that such unions received protection directly from the Constitution.

Core issue: Whether states may deny same-sex couples the right to marry or refuse to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed elsewhere, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding: States must license and recognize same-sex marriages because the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause and prohibits excluding same-sex couples from that right under the Equal Protection Clause.

The Court appealed to: (1) Due Process Clause - Marriage is a fundamental right. The right to marry includes, individual autonomy, intimate association, family formation, and social dignity. (2) Equal Protection Clause - denying marriage to same-sex couples imposes a stigma, denies equal legal status, and treats similarly situated couples differently.

Logic Chain: (1) The Constitution protects certain fundamental liberties. (2) Marriage is one of those fundamental rights. (3) Same-sex couples seek access to the same institution. (4) Exclusion denies liberty and equality simultaneously. (5) States therefore must license and recognize same-sex marriages.

Interpretive method: contemporary meaning / evolving understanding of liberty and equality

Baker v. Carr (1961)

Because legislative apportionment, or the process of allocating seats to determine political representation, deals with a political problem, the Supreme Court might have lacked jurisdiction to make decisions in disputes over it. But in this case, the Supreme Court explains why it does have the legal jurisdiction to weigh in.

Core issue: Whether claims of legislative malapportionment present a nonjusticiable political question, or whether federal courts may adjudicate them under the Equal Protection Clause.

Holding: Claims of legislative malapportionment are justiciable because the Equal Protection Clause provides judicially manageable standards for evaluating vote dilution.

Logic chain: (1) The political question doctrine bars cases lacking judicial standards. (2) Prior apportionment cases failed because they relied on the Guarantee Clause. (3) Equal Protection claims are different. (4) The Equal Protection Clause offers mangeable judicial standards. (5) Therefore, malapportionment claims are justiciable.

Interpretive method: meaning of the words when written

Reynolds v. Sims (1964)

This case furthered the principle of “one person, one vote.” The Supreme Court ruled that electoral districts represented by state legislative chambers must be roughly equal in population,

Core issue: Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislative districts to be apportioned based on population equality, rather than geography or political subdivisions.

Holding: The Equal Protection Clause requires state legislative districts to be apportion on a population basis so that each vote has substantially equal weight---the principle of "one person, one vote."

What the Court held substantively:

State legislatures must be apportioned so that: population differences between districts are minimized, and so that votes are weighted equally, regardless of where voters live.

Systems that give disproportionate power to voters in sparsely populated areas: Dilute the votes of urban residents, and violate equal protection.

Logic Chain: (1) The Equal Protection Clause protects equal participation in the political process. (2) Voting is a fundamental right. (3) Vote dilution denies equal protection just as surely as outright disenfranchisement. (4) Population-based apportionment is necessary to ensure equality. (5) Therefore, malapportioned legislatures are unconstitutional.

Interpretive method: contemporary meaning.

Shaw v. Reno (1993)

In this case, the Supreme Court found that North Carolina’s efforts to create a racially gerrymandered district violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

Core issue: Whether a racially drawn congressional district that is highly irregular in shape violates the Equal Protection Clause, even when it is intended to benefit minority voters.

Holding: North Carolina's congressional district triggered strict scrutiny because its bizarre shape indicated that race predominated over traditional districting principles, making racial gerrymandering constitutionally suspect under the Equal Protection Clause.

Logic chain: (1) The Equal Protection Clause forbids racial classifications. (2) Racial gerrymandering sorts voters by race. (3) A district's bizarre shape signals racial perdominance. (4) racial clasifications trigger strict scrutiny. (5) Therefore, the district is presumptively unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.

Interpretive: contemporary equal protection doctrine.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010)

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court protected corporate funding of advertisements that endorsed candidates during elections. The Court also held that corporations have free speech rights protected by the First Amendment, a decision that would have wide-reaching implications for money in politics

Core issue: Whether the First Amendment permits the government to limit independent political expenditures by corporations and unions based on the identity of the speaker.

Holding: The First Amendment prohibits limits on independent political expenditures based on the speaker's corporate identity, because political speech speech may not be restricted on the basis of who is speaking. What the Court appealed to:

The Court held that: Political speech is at the core of the First Amendment. The First Amendment protects speech regardless of the speaker's identity. Therefore corporations and unions have the right to engage in independent political expenditures.

Logic chain: (1) Political speech receives the highest First Amendment protection. (2) The government may not suppress speech based on speaker identity. (3) Corporate speakers are not exempt from First Amendment protection. (4) Independent expenditures do not pose a sufficient risk of corruption. (5) Therefore, limits on independent corporate spending are unconstitutional.

Interpretive method: Originalism + meaning of the words when written