Meta-Ethics

What is Naturalism?

• Naturalism claims moral properties are natural properties.

• Natural properties are features of the physical world.

• Therefore, goodness and badness exist mind-independently.

• This makes naturalism a form of moral realism.

• Ethical language expresses beliefs → therefore cognitivist.

Bentham’s Utilitarian Naturalism

• Bentham claims goodness = pleasure.

• Pleasure is a natural property of organisms.

• Moral judgements describe whether pleasure was maximised.

• Example:

  • “Stealing was wrong” = belief that the act failed to maximise pleasure.

• Therefore, utilitarian naturalism is cognitivist (true or false).

Naturalism vs Hume’s Is/Ought Gap

• Bentham: humans naturally find pleasure good.

• Mill: happiness is our sole ultimate desire.

• Mill claims this is the only possible proof that happiness is good.

Hume’s critique

• Factual claims about what is do not entail moral claims about what ought to be.

• Example:

  • “Humans like pleasure” ≠ “humans ought to maximise pleasure”.

• Naturalists make an unjustified leap from is → ought.

• Therefore:

  • Moral realism looks false

  • Cognitivism looks false

• Hume concludes moral judgements come from feelings, not facts.

Evaluation – Virtue Ethics Response

• Naturalists can respond by claiming values are a type of fact.

• Modern virtue ethicists return to Aristotle.

• Goodness = flourishing (eudaimonia).

• Flourishing is a natural property of organisms.

• Anscombe: “ought” functions like “need”.

• Foot:

  • Plants need water → humans need virtues.

  • Children need adults, therefore adults ought to protect them.

• There is “no difficulty” deriving ought from is.

• Stronger than utilitarian naturalism.

MacIntyre’s Support

• MacIntyre: modern morality uprooted “ought” from social practices.

• Abstract law removed morality from human facts.

• This caused anti-realism and relativism.

• Returning to Aristotelian ethics:

  • Reabsorbs ought into is

  • Grounds morality in communal human life

• Solves modern nihilism and relativism.

Moore’s Rejection of Naturalism

• Moore rejects naturalism using:

  1. Naturalistic fallacy

  2. Open Question Argument

• Naturalistic fallacy:

  • It is a fallacy to assume something natural is therefore good.

• A development of Hume’s is/ought gap.

Open Question Argument

• If goodness = pleasure, then:

  • “Is pleasure good?” would be meaningless.

• But it is always an open question.

• Therefore:

  • Goodness cannot be defined in natural terms.

• Moore concludes goodness is indefinable.

Non-Natural Goodness

• Moore rejects Hume’s scepticism.

• Claims goodness is a non-natural property.

• Reality contains more than just the physical world.

• Analogies:

  • Numbers (not physical, but real)

  • Colour yellow — known directly, not defined

• Moral truths are known by intuition.

• Intuition allows us to grasp whether propositions are true or false.

• Therefore intuitionism is cognitivist.

Intuitionism & Moral Agreement

• Evidence:

  • Cross-cultural agreement on core moral rules.

  • Killing and stealing are wrong.

  • Education is good.

• Suggests shared moral intuition.

• Pritchard:

  • Intuition depends on understanding the situation.

  • Disagreement arises from misinterpretation, not false intuition.

Mackie’s Challenge

• Mackie points to descriptive moral relativism.

• Cultures disagree deeply on morality.

• This doesn’t prove relativism — but gives an abductive argument against realism.

• Simpler explanation:

  • Moral intuitions reflect social conditioning.

• We do not need mysterious non-natural properties.

• Therefore anti-realism is more plausible.

Evaluation – Evolutionary Explanation

• Moral agreement can be explained by:

  • Evolutionary drives

  • Social survival

• Societies allowing killing or stealing collapse.

• Moral rules are practical necessities, not objective truths.

• This strengthens Mackie’s argument.

• Intuitionism becomes unnecessary and unparsimonious.

Ayer’s Verification Principle

• A statement is meaningful only if:

  • Analytic, or

  • Empirically verifiable

• Ethical statements are:

  • Not analytic

  • Not empirically verifiable

• Therefore:

  • Ethical language is meaningless

  • Cannot be true or false

Ethical Language as Emotion

• “Stealing is wrong” = “boo to stealing”.

• Moral language expresses emotional approval/disapproval.

• Ethical statements are non-cognitive.

Motivation Argument

• P1: Only desires motivate action.

• P2: Ethical language motivates.

• C1: Ethical language expresses desires, not beliefs.

• Supports non-cognitivism.

• Stevenson supports emotivism without verificationism.

Nihilism Objection

• Nihilism: morality is pointless.

• Traditionally morality is binding because it’s objectively true.

• Anti-realism removes this foundation.

• Concern:

  • Society may collapse

  • Atrocities could be justified

Foot’s Holocaust Critique

• After WWII, Foot criticised Ayer.

• If no right/wrong exists:

  • Hitler cannot be objectively condemned.

• Suggests emotivism destroys morality.

• Could even enable atrocities.

Ayer’s Response

• Social collapse doesn’t make a theory false.

• “Wrong” simply expresses emotional reaction.

• Holocaust reaction supports emotivism.

• Nihilism objection begs the question.

Foot’s Stronger Argument

• Fundamental mistake: separating facts and values.

• Values are a type of fact.

• Moral judgements are a posteriori verifiable.

• We can verify:

  • The Holocaust disabled flourishing.

• Moral realism is true → anti-realism false.

• Nihilism illustrates why anti-realism fails.

Moore’s Objection

• Moral disagreement involves:

  • Reason

  • Evidence

  • Argument

• Emotions cannot disagree.

• “Boo to stealing” ≠ logical disagreement.

• Therefore emotivism is false.

Hare’s Prescriptivism

• Ethical language expresses universal prescriptions.

• “Stealing is wrong” = “don’t steal”.

• Prescriptions require:

  • Reasoning

  • Universal application

• Better explains moral debate than emotivism.

Mackie’s Error Theory (Strongest View)

• Moral language is cognitive (belief-expressing).

• But all moral beliefs are false.

• Social conditioning explains belief in morality.

• Example:

  • Bioweapons scientist wants to know if an act is really wrong.

• People talk as if morality is real.

• Therefore:

  • Ethical language is cognitive

  • Anti-realism is true