PHYSICALISM: Functionalism

how does functionalism avoids multiple reliasbility , knife

- rather than analysing/reducing mental states in terms of their physical characteristics, analyse mental states in terms of their function, which acknowleges the fact that mental states are not specific to any physical instantation

- functionalism will see the workings of a knife as analogus to the workings of mental states - knife can be made from any physical material as long as it is able to perform its function, to cut things, then it is still called a knife

- this avoids the multiple realisability objection, acknolwedges that there are many ways mental states can be realised,

circularity, against behaviourism and for functionalism

- functinoalism sees the function of mental states as more than to cause behaviours
- acknoweldong that mental states have a function to ellict other mental states

behaviorusm - pain is merely the disposition to say ouch, though this does not hold if the person also does not want to look weak.

functionalism - pain, desire for pain to stop and the mental state will still serve this function even if mental state of pain has no influence on behaviour

- functionalism - does not tie mental states to other specific behaviours, therefore analysis does not become circular

inverted qualia/ possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia - response to functionalism

FL claims that mental states are functional within an organisms,
1) if this is true then two functionally identical mental states are the same mental states

2) looking at green grass, could lead to a functionally identical mental state, the belief that that is green grass, but phenomenally different, eg red qualia

3) therefore two functionally identical mental states are not the same mental state

4) therefore fl is false

inverted qualia sumary

two mental states can be functionally identical despite being different mental states
- two different mentla states producing a functionally identical purpose

zombie ei ei, functionalism

can concieve of a zombie, who does not have any qualia, who is able to form a belief that is functionally identical to human, yet with a different mental state (no mental state)

- for example, looking at blue sea, would form a state that is functionally identical to the belief that the sea is blue
- concievable therefore it is possible
- shows that two different mental states can be functionally identical, therefore functionalism is false

summary of zombie argument against functionalism

concieve of zombie with different mental state yet same an identical functional state

major problem

- does not offer a true explanation as to what mental states actually are
- disproves dualist and physicalist theories
fails to provide a satisfactory ontological explanation of mental states, it simply focuses on their function

functionalism

physicalist theory of mind which states that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.

- two things are functionally identical , then they are also mentally identical


- for example, functionalism claims that the mental state of pain has the functional role of triggering other mental states which will overall result in moving away from the source of pain

arguments against type identity theory - mental states can be multiply realised, putnam

sensation of pain can be experienced by organisms with different physical brain structures, c fibres in humans, octopus

- suggesting pain, and other mental states are more than just a single physical property

how does functionalism avoid Multiple reliasbaility objection

- not reducing mental states to any specific physical instantation
- analysing in terms of function
- acknowledging that mental states can be realsied in any way.

knowledge argument against functionalism

mary knows all the physical and functional facts about colour
- though mary will still learn something new upon seeing colour for the first time
- knowing all functional facts is still not enough to know what red is, to accomodate for the mental state
- shows that seeing colour, mental states are more than just functional states
- therefore functionalism is false

summary of knowledge argument against functionalism

knowing all functional facts about colour is not enough to compensate for the experience of seeing colour

china brain - functionally identical to the mind but not same thing

-how something functionally identical to a human mind wil lack qualia, meaning functionalism cannot explain qualia - phenomenal properties cannot be explained or reduced to functional properties

every person in china is linked to another person in china through a two way radio, mirroring the way neurone in the brain are connected - this is functionally identical to the brain


- if this was stabbed, fl suggest that they would all actually be in pain , shows that being functionally identical does not mean they are the same

- possible for the human mind to differ, since it contains qualia

china brain summary

- a construction of the brain which physically operates in an identical way to the human brain. the brain is functionally identical to the human brain

- yet still differs mentally, in that human contain qualia, and the china brain does not - ( if one person in the china brain was stabbed, its obvious that only that one person would feel pain, yet functionalism would suggest that everyone in the brain would feel the pain)


- shows that mental states are more than just their functional role, possible that functional duplicates to differ on a phenomenal level, and that qualia cannot be reduced to functional properties

what does china brain show

functional duplicate to human mind can lack qualia, so can still be different
- functionalism cannot explain qualia
- phenonomanl properties cannot be explained by or reduced to functional properties

machine functionaliism

mental states are machine states specified in terms of their inputs, outputs and relations to other internal states by a (deterministic or probabilistic) machine table.???

how should mental states be treated like

- functional concepts like a mouse trap or a clock rather than compositional concepts

how does causal functionalism define mental states

mental states are defined in terms of the causal role they play in a network of inputs, outputs and relations to other internal states.

how does analytic functionalism define mental states

all mental states can be analytically reduced without loss of meaning to statements about functional states