social cleavages and party systems

PS 0300

nonpartisan system

no official political parties; maybe bc they are illegal or bc they just haven’t formed yet; very rare

single-party system

only one party is legally allowed to hold power; only found in dictatorships; minor parties might exist but they can’t hold power

one-party dominant system

only one party has a realistic chance of gaining power, despite the possible legal existence of other parties; common in dictatorships, rare in democracies; different from sgbnle-party system bc there is fairly open debate

two-party system

only two parties have a realistic chance of holding power; electoral success with a third party is very difficult (but not impossible)

multiparty system

more than two parties have a realistic chance of holding power

effective number of parties

counts each number of parties in a country after weighting them based on size

effective number of electoral parties

counting the effective number of parties based on “vote shares” (how are votes distributed across parties)

effective number of legislative parties

counting the effective number of parties based on “seat share” (how are seats in the legislature distributed across parties)

political parties

group of officials or would-be officials linked with a large group of citizens into an organization; main goal is to get and keep power; incudes ppl who hold office and ppl who help them get there

party identification

party that an individual associates themselves with and most commonly supports

whip

party official in charge of ensuring party members show up to legislative sessions and vote with the party

pre-industrial cleavages

“urban-rural” (traditionally rural=traditional and urban=change); “confessional” (religious differences); “secular-clerical” (church involvement vs. separation of church and state)

industrial/post-industrial cleavages

“class” (workers vs. property owners/capitalists); “post-material;” “ethnic” and “linguistic”

cross-cutting cleavages

societal division that are not correlated to each other

reinforcing cleavages

societal divisions that are correlated to each other

mechanical effect of electoral laws

translation of votes into seats; harms small parties, but the amount of harm depends on proportionality of the system and geographic dispersion of votes

strategic effect of electoral laws

how does translation of votes into seats (mechanical effect) influence voter and elite behavior; depends on proportionality (disproportional systems encourage strategic voting/entry)

strategic entry

when elites enter the political scene under the most preferred party with the most realistic chance of winning

Duverger’s law

SMDP systems encourage two-party systems

Duverger’s hypothesis

proportional systems favor multiparty systems

how do political parties provide structure for elites

order for policymaking process (coordinates actions of individual legislators, simplifies issue space → less chaos)

how do parties provide structure for voters

information shortcuts (voters are uninformed → they take the position of their party)

how do parties serve to mobilize the masses

voters might not turn out bc of personal costs (time, money, weather, chance of their candidate winning); parties have membership and organizational structures to extend to localities and mobilize voters (parties that don’t have a local presence fail)

how do parties affect politics in democracies

helps to mobilize the masses, provides structure for voters and elites