POLO1500: exam 1

What is the leading cause of war?

Territory disputes

Interests

the goals that actors have

Interactions

the ways in which two or more actors’ choices combine to produce outcomes

Institutions

a set of rules that structure political interactions

Bargaining

A type of interaction. two or more actors trying to divide something they want; it is redistributive. “zero-sum game“, Chicken.

Cooperation

coordination of actors to achieve common interests

Realism

State dominant actor. System characterized by anarchy. Interest in security + power. SECURITY DILEMMA. Mostly bargaining and coercion. Fear of relative gains. Weak institutions.

Liberalism

School of thought. Many actors. Interests driven by domestic policies. WEALTH. Cooperation in interactions possible. DEMOCRACY best way to ensure foreign policy reflect interest in harmony & peace. Institutions facilitate cooperation (guard from incomplete info / commitment problems)

Constructivism

School of thought. Interests not innate; constructed through social interaction. Interests in pursuing norms (beliefs in what is right given conception of state/others view state). Interactions dependent on anarchy and other states. Transnational Actors play socializing role.

Mercantilism

economic doctrine based on a belief that military power & economic influence are complements

Sovereignty

Recognition of other states’ right to exercise independent and legitimate authority within their respective territories; Principle of non-interference

State

central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within its territory

3 categories of Interests

Power/Security, Economic or material welfare, Ideological goals

National Interests

interests that belong to states itself

Pareto Frontier

one player cannot become better off without making the other worse off. BARGAINING. Cooperation consists of mutual policy adjustments that move actors toward or onto this.

Defecting

adopting an uncooperative strategy that undermines the collective goal

Collaboration Problem

Actors have a unilateral incentive to defect even though joint cooperation would make everyone better off.

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Collectively, best to cooperate. But both parties have incentive to defect.

Dominant Strategy

Prisoner’s dilemma.  Defection is the best response whether the accomplice stays quiet or defects

mutual defection

Prisoner’s Dilemma. Equilibrium outcome.

Coordination

actors would like to cooperate, but they need to select among possible equilibria outcomes (Stag Hunt)

Factors Facilitating Cooperation

Smaller Numbers, Repeated Interaction (Iteration), Linkage, strategies of reciprocal punishment, Information (uncertainty/monitoring methods), Institutions.

Power

the ability of Actor A to get Actor B do something that B would otherwise not do. More __ , the more state can expect to get from others from bargaining.

Reversion Outcome

the outcome that occurs when no bargain is reached.

Coercion

1/3 ways to exercise power; threat or imposition of costs on others.

Outside Options

1/3 ways to exercise power; alternatives to bargaining (ex. China buying soybeans from Brazil after US imposed tariffs)

Agenda Setting

1/3 ways to exercise power; first mover advantage that helps an actor secure a more favorable bargain.

War occurs

when bargaining parties fail to reach an agreement

Bargaining fails

Incomplete info on opposing capabilities/resolve, commitment to peace is questionable, disputed good difficult to divide.

War

event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that satisfies some minimum threshold of severity. 1000+ battle deaths.

Not war

rioting, massacre/genocide, minor skirmishes

Interstate War

the main parties to the conflict are states

Civil War

When the actors are within the state, such as the government fighting a rebel group.

Territory

“good” that may contribute to wealth of state (industrial, agricultural, oil resources), military or strategic value, be valuable for ethnic/religious reasons.

State policies, regime type, security dilemma.

What Do States Fight Over?

Coercive diplomacy/crisis bargaining

when a state tries to influence the outcome of bargaining through the use or threat of military force. “Satisfy my demands or else”.

Bargaining Model of War

focuses on 3 factors 1) incomplete information, 2) commitment problems, and 3) issue indivisability

Capabilities

the state’s physical ability to win

Resolve

state’s willingness to bear the costs of fighting to achieve its goals

status quo

pre-crisis distribution

Compellence

effort to CHANGE status quo through threat of force. Threat used to coerce the target into making a concession or changing policy. “Give me Y or else“ or “Stop doing X or else“. Deadline for action. Cannot wait forever to be effective.

Detterence

PRESERVE the status quo by threatening other side with unacceptable costs if it seeks to alter the current relationship. “Don’t do X, or else“ or “Don’t attack me or I will fight back“. indefinite in timing and tactically static.

General Deterrence

attempt to deter attack on one’s own country

Extended Deterrence

attempt to extend protection to another state

Risk-Return Tradeoff

tradeoff between trying to get a good deal and trying to minimize the possibility that war will break out

Credible Threat

a threat target state believes will be carried out. must be costly in a way that the sender would only make the threat if it really intended to carry it out.

Brinkmanship

Mechanism for making threats credible. “Slippery Slope”. State could signal their resolve in a crisis by approaching the “brink” of war through provocative actions.

Tying hands

Mechanism for making threats credible. States can send credible signs of their willingness to fight by making threats in a way that would make backing down difficult.

Audience Cost

negative repercussions that arise if a leader does not follow through on a threat.

Commitment Problem

States may have difficultly in making credible promises not to revise the terms of the deal/treaty later. Ex. prisoner’s dilemma. Common in absence of enforcement mechanisms

Preventative War

War in response to changing power. intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the future

First-Strike Advantage

when there is a benefit to being the first to launch an attack; when tech enables a state to launch a blow that disarms the other state’s military or renders it incapable of responding effectively

Preemptive War

fought with the anticipation an attack by the other side is imminent; Creates a commitment problem unless each state can credibly promise to not act first.

Indivisible Good

a good that cannot be divided without destroying its value

War becomes obsolete

Changing interests, interactions, institutions

Diversionary War

use force for political gain

Unitary state assumption

treatment of states as coherent actors with a set of interests that belong to state

3 kinds of actors

Leader, Organized groups, General Public

Diversionary Incentive

Politician/Leader temptation to spark an international crisis to rally public support at home

Scapegoating

blame the country’s problems on foreigners

Military-industrial complex

alliance between military leaders and the industries that benefit from international conflict. ex. arms manufacturers

Democratic Peace

Democratic states do not go to war against each other. (DYADIC)

Democracy

political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent, fair elections (contestation) in which a sizeable portion of the adult population can vote (participation).

Liberal

Accompanies democracy. philosophy that emphasizes the value of individual liberty

Autocracies

political systems where individuals or small groups exercise power with few constraints

Accountability

Theory of Democratic Peace. the ability to punish or reward leaders for their decisions. Implications: democratic leaders should be more selective about starting wars.

Information Explanation

Theory of Democratic Peace. Democratic institutions make it easier to overcome informational problems. Implications: transparency can reduce the risk of preemptive war between democracies.

Normative Explanation

When democracies face each other, they expect the other side to resolve disputes through compromise and nonviolence. Implications: Peace is more likely between countries who have been democracies for a long time.

Monadic

Weak evidence. unit of analysis examines every country’s conflict behavior in every year since its independence.

Dyadic

Strong evidence. unit of analysis pairs every country against every other country globally every year since 1816. No two mature democracies have fought a war against each other. Confirms __ democratic peace.

Systematic

Moderate Evidence. Increasing % of democratic states decreases the % of states fighting wars. % of democracies declining could increase # of wars

Capitalist Peace

Criticism of democratic peace. democracy and peace are more likely to thrive in free-market economiesR

Alliances

institutions that help their members cooperate militarily in the event of a war.

Offensive Alliance

states pledge to join one another in attacking another state. Ex. Prussia-Italy Alliance

Defensive Alliance

requires states to come to one another’s aid militarily. ex. NATO: Article V

Neutrality/Non-Aggression Alliances

States pledge to remain neutral in a conflict and not attack each other.

Consultation Alliance

states agree to consult with each other before using military force or seizing territory.

Bandwagoning

when states team up with the more powerful side in a dispute to share the spoils of conquest. Often offensive. Not accounted for in the Balance of Power Theory

collective security organizations

Institutions that facilitate cooperation among their members; all states have common interest in preventing war/aggression.

Collective Security System

Renounce the use of force to settle disputes (reduced uncertainty). Promise to use force or impose other punishments collectively on any member who uses force. DOES NOT form security alliance.

Responsibility to Protect

state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities. international community has a responsibility to assist the state if it is unable to protect its population on its own. If state fails to protect population and peace attempts fail,  international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. MILITARY INTERVENTION LAST RESORT.

collective action problem

International peace and security is a public good. Member states are tempted to free ride and shift the costs of cooperation to others.

join decision-making

Determining which acts are considered threats to the community. Deciding which states are aggressors. Selecting response to aggression.

UN p5

US, Britain, France, Russia, China

Peace enforcement

Military operation to establish peace among warring parties.

Peacekeeping

maintains peace after an interstate or civil war.

Stag Hunt

models situations where mutual cooperation leads to the best outcome, but trust is essential.

Positive-Sum Game

All parties can benefit; the "pie" grows through cooperation. Implications: Encourages diplomacy, alliances, and mutual gains.

Reversion Outcome

result that occurs if no agreement or bargain is reached between actors—essentially, the status quo or fallback position in a negotiation

Warsaw Pact

collective defense treaty led by the Soviet Union and included Eastern Bloc countries like Poland, East Germany, Hungary, etc. Served as a military counterbalance to NATO, reinforcing the division between Western and Eastern Europe.