PHIL384 - Game Theory

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63 Terms

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A game contains PSGO

Players, Strategies, Games, Outcomes

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Strategy

A comprehensive plan of action

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Dominant strategy

A strategy that yields the best outcome, regardless of what the other player chooses

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The most dominant strategy in a Prisoner’s Dilemma one-shot

Defecting

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Zero-sum game

a situation in which one participant's gain is precisely matched by another participant's loss, resulting in a total net change of zero for the system; there is a winner and a loser

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Strictly dominant strategy

ALWAYS has a higher payoff than other strategies

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Weakly dominant strategy

At least sometimes has a higher payoff—and never lower—than other strategies

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Pure vs Mixed Strategies

Mixed strategies have some degree of randomness in them while pure strategies have no randomness

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Mixed strategy example

JOSS

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Pure Strategy Example

TIT FOR TAT

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Perfect vs Imperfect Information

A game has perfect information if a player can see the opponent’s previous moves, a game has imperfect information if a player cannot see all of the previous moves

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A Game of Complete Information

Chess or checkers

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Complete vs Incomplete Information

A game has complete information if the player knows the opponent’s strategies and payoffs, a game has imperfect information if a player does not know the opponent’s strategies or payoffs

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Nash Equilibrium

A strategy profile where each player is playing their best response to the others’ strategies and in turn getting the best payoff in that given scenario

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The Nash Equilibrium in the Prisoner’s DIlemma

1/1; both players are playing their best response, defection

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Pareto Improvement

An Outcome (O) is better for someone but worse for no one

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Pareto efficient

No pareto improvements are possible, no one else can benefit without someone else being worse off

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Strict pareto

Both improve

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Pareto inferior

An outcome worse for someone

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The top eight strategies in Axelrod’s tournament were…

Nice

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Discount parameter

A reflection of how much players care about the future in regard to the present

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WIth a higher discount parameter…

The future matters just as much as the present to the player

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Simultaneous vs Sequential Games

In simultanous games, the player does not have time to react, while in sequential games the players play one after the other

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Example of a Simultanous Game

Rock paper scissors

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Example of a Sequential Game

Chess or checkers

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Non-Zerosum Game

a situation where the total gains and losses among all participants do not necessarily add up to zero, meaning a player's win is not always another's loss; there is not always a winner and a loser

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One-Shot Game

an interaction that occurs only once, meaning players cannot learn from past interactions or influence future ones through repetition

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Repeated Game

a scenario where the same game is played multiple times; players remember past actions and outcomes, allowing them to develop more complex strategies, which in turn influence future decisions and can lead to different results than in a one-shot game

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Dominant Strategy vs Best Response

a dominant strategy is a best response to all possible opponent strategies, whereas a best response is a best response to a specific opponent strategy

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What does the Prisoner’s Dilemma have in common with other games?

The tension between self-interest and collective interest, making decisions to benefit oneself or everyone; a payoff system that outlines the rewards or punishments of particular choices

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The Prisoner’s Dilemma is so special because…

it illustrates the conflict between individual self-interest and the collective good, showing that a rational pursuit of self-interest can lead to a worse outcome for everyone involved than mutual cooperation would have produced

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Who won in Axelrod’s tournaments and in virtue of what?

TIT FOR TAT won due to its niceness, forgiveness, retaliation, and clarity in execution

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How did Axelrod’s Tournaments work?

Axelrod create a series of computer tournaments with repeated games where different strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma competed against each other

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TIT FOR TAT

Cooperates initially and then mirrors the other player’s previous move

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Why did Axelrod need to run a tournament?

to discover which strategies were most effective in a partially cooperative and competitive environment; traditional game theory had concluded that mutual defection was the only rational outcome in a one-off game, but this didn't reflect the emergence of cooperation in repeated, real-world interactions; to find the most robust strategy

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Collective Stability

A situation where no single player has an incentive to deviate from a given strategy if everyone else continues using it

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Invasion

the ability of a new strategy to spread within a population dominated by another strategy; a strategy invades when a small number of players using that strategy can achieve higher payoffs than the existing population, allowing them to increase in relative frequency over time

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Why the “evolution of cooperation?”

Axelrod is looking at how cooperative behavior can emerge and persist over time, even among self-interested individuals, through processes analogous to natural selection

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When a strategy is unclear…

It is untrustworthy and difficult to understand, making every turn like the last time they will see each other

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A strategy is the best strategy dependent on…

What other strategies are playing

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The top eight strategies in Axelrod Tournaments were….

Nice

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The evolution of cooperation is…

Like a ratchet, asymmetric in one direction

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A random strategy…

Cooperates 50% of the time, defects 50% of the time

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The best response against ALL C

ALL D

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Best Response

The strategy that gets you your best score relative to your opponent’s strategy

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In a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, you’re best off…

Defecting no matter what

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Unconditional Strategy

Does not change no matter what

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Conditional strategy

Changes dependent on characteristics of the game

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The best response to a random strategy

ALL D

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Axelrod’s Tournament was a…

Round Robin Tournament; there was no elimination and the best final combined score over all games won

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DOWNING

Starts with a double defect and defects forever on unresponsive players

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A nice strategy is…

Not the first to defect

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TIT FOR TAT

starts off cooperating, then copies opponent’s prior move, has a one-turn memory

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JOSS

A variation of TIT FOR TAT; a mixed strategy; defects more than TIT FOR TAT

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If JOSS and TIT FOR TAT play against each other…

they will go back and forth defecting and cooperating with each other

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TIT FOR TAT won because it…

was nice, retaliated when necessary, forgiving, and was clear

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To invade you have to…

Do better against the native strategy than the native strategy does against itself

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If there is a cluster of TIT FOR TATS…

they take over as their success with each other outweighs the initial loss against the mean strategies

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In order for a cluster of TIT FOR TATS to successfully invade, there needs to be a threshold of…

5%, meaning 5% needs to be TIT FOR TATS

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TIT FOR TAT is collectively stable, especially if there is a…

High discount parameter

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