W7- Taking Stock | Quizlet

W7

• Taking stock

DMA provisions capable of being further specified (W7)

Provisions allow the commission to further specify because assumptions are problematic

- the DMA eschews effects analysis, we need a correction (the error-costs could be very significant)

- Rebuttal for gatekeeper status

- Further specification for rules (art. 5, 6, 7) that could well lead to regulatory enshittification (making our internet services worse

justifications under DMA (W7)

No efficiency defence (recital 10, 23) --> impossible for gatekeeper to justify enhanced efficiency

Security/safety concerns are all relevant in Art. 6, but very openly worded --> gatekeeper can use this, ensure integrity or security of OS. But how do you define this exactly? How to know if vulnerability is presented? (Teams decision)

e.g. Legitimate interest of wanting to protect product. But issue of info asymmetries – google will have an incentive to overstate is requirements for safety. Counterbalance is provided in the compliance workshops (discussion).

network-effects as justifications? “Extra data is needed to allow me to develop better product that better meet the requests of consumers” - not specified by DMA yet

DMA killer acquisitions (W7)

addressed through: Duty to notify concentrations (Art. 14)

- Turnover is irrelevant, will not fly under the radar

- Plus possibility to make Art. 22-reference (Art. 14(5)): Possibility for MS to request to investigate an even smaller takeover

DMA enforcement activity (W7)

1. specification procedures --> art. 8, ex ante

- Specification ex officio (Art. 8(2)) (commission takes initiative to further specify)

- or at request of gatekeeper (Art. 8(3))

2. non-compliance procedures --> art. 29, ex post

specification procedures (W7)

2 ex officio procedures to date

e.g. apple interoperability: proximity pairing of apple products in the ecosystem

- Should apple not offer the same for third party hardware? - Would be required under the DMA but have to decide what the protocol would be for these two devices to seamlessly interoperate.

- Access to the OS is needed. But this comes with vulnerabilities....

non-compliance procedures (W7)

2 non-compliance procedures to date

e.g. Apple anti-steering provisions

The non-compliance procedures are most abstract whilst specification procedures are clearer. This is counter-intuitive, esp. for non-compliance when the commission is about to slap a fine on undertaking... Want the non-compliance decision to survive judicial scrutiny , can bet the company will appeal.

heuristics (W7)

Changing consumer decision involves _______

- Consumers can easily be nudged to suit the interests of gatekeepers. Example of this is sherlocking

- Choice architecture exploiting heuristics. ‘compliance on paper’? forcing lock-in effects.

art. 6(3) DMA

example of heuristics (W7)

e.g. ‘info’ actually means personal data (euphemism)

e.g. a blue vs transparent button, the minute you press ‘manage accounts’ pops up more choices to make

based on:

•       Loss aversion bias : people afraid of loosing out (not having personalised social media)

•       Saliency bias: making something more salient, people are more likely to choose it

•       Underestimation

sherlocking (heuristics) (W7)

origin: Sherlock app: enabled users to find files on iphone very quickly. Within a few months Apple copied the function of that app and integrated it into iOS.

Sherlocking = taking something from the market and integrating into own product, forcing others off the market.

- Happens a lot in vertically integrated companies (active on upstream and downstream market).

E.g. Amazon; operates the paltforms and sells its own products. May find a very attractive product, has the ability and incentive to use its superior data position to increase visibility and sales of its own products.

ban on sherlocking (W7)

art. 6(2) DMA

- from comp POV makes good sense. The info advatage of operating the market place itself is blatantly unfair. Do not want vertical integration (company controlling access to market AND being active)

- but is this bad for consumers? – not necessarily, would have gotten better deal. Because to get consumers to switch to another product will have to offer better terms; better price. Is this not increasing competition on the downstream level? New entrant undercutting prices?

self-preferencing for eco-system building (W7)

Most digital market operators involve a degree of vertical integration and (horizontal) ‘sprawl’

- done by: Leveraging from a position of strength in one service and monetising that with another = that is self-preferencing

•       This could be the other side of the platform (advertising)

•       This could be another service at the same side of the platform

- self-preferencing/sprawl makes good business sense! More data and more money

- s that a reason to say it is pro-competitive? – no. impact on market structure (s) impact on performance (p)

Verizon v Trinko (W7)

neo-liberal/Chicago perspective: anti-trust law should be less invasive

Slovak Telecom I (W7)

The function of the right to property and the freedom of contract (Bronner)

Caution when applying ex post art. 102 law

the function of competition law?

Android auto (W7)

Caution when applying ex post art. 102 law

role of the EU legislature (W7)

democratic legitimacy

Telenor (W7)

What does discrimination mean? Context on which it takes place is important

The QoS-rules (= quality of service rules) provide an indication (reasonable traffic management), what should get priority traffic? ISP has to differentiate