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This set of flashcards covers key milestones and treaties related to space policy, including their definitions and significance to the development of space governance.
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National Aeronautics and Space Act (1958)
Establishes NASA, tasks it with engaging the scientific community and sharing knowledge with the public.
The 'A' in NASA stands for Aeronautics, originating from NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics).
NACA was created in 1915 due to the U.S. lagging in aviation during World War I.
NACA’s 1945 rocket lab expanded into early space research.
After Sputnik I and II (1957), President Eisenhower advocated for a civil space agency.
NASA was established on October 1, 1958, by this Act, dissolving NACA.
The Act:
Created the Administrator and Deputy Administrator roles.
Defined NASA as a civilian agency, separate from military space programs.
Tasked NASA with engaging the scientific community and sharing knowledge with the public.
NASA's formation led to key U.S. space mission milestones in the 1960s, including the first meteorological satellite (1960) and the Moon landing (1969).
President John F. Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs (1961)
Delivered on May 25, 1961, by President John F. Kennedy.
Declared the United States would put a man on the Moon and return him safely before the end of the decade.
This challenge was motivated by the Soviet Union's consistent space mission successes.
Transformed NASA: its budget increased by more than an order of magnitude (1959-1965, adjusted for inflation).
Led to key human spaceflight advancements:
Project Mercury: Proved human spaceflight was possible for the U.S.
Project Gemini: Advanced docking, rendezvous, and extra-vehicular activities.
Project Apollo: Extended human presence to deep space, including the Moon landing.
John F. Kennedy's Moon Speech at Rice University (1962)
President John F. Kennedy reiterated his plans of sending men to the Moon by 1970 in his address at Rice University on September 12, 1962.
He first announced his Moon plans to Congress in 1961.
The speech at Rice is recognized as a space policy milestone for garnering public support needed to convince Congress to increase NASA’s budget.
It set a hard deadline for the U.S. to land an astronaut on the Moon and defined a clear finish line for the ongoing Space Race.
Kennedy pursued Moon plans after a series of Space Race losses to the Soviets and the Bay of Pigs invasion failure.
With the support of Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and NASA Administrator James E. Webb, Kennedy was convinced he could achieve a win on the Moon.
Limited Test Ban Treaty (United Nations, 1963)
Opened for signing in 1963.
Prohibits nuclear tests or explosions in:
The atmosphere
Outer space
Under water
Resulted from eight years of negotiations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.
Emerged due to:
Escalating nuclear arms race of the 1950s
Concerns over radioactive fallout and environmental contamination
Destabilizing potential of nuclear detonations in outer space
Significance for space policy:- Bans nuclear testing in outer space
Represents the first international agreement to regulate space uses and limit its weaponization
Paved the way for subsequent treaties like the Outer Space Treaty
Rescue and Return Agreement (United Nations, 1968)
Opened for signing in 1968.
Mandates for Astronauts:
If astronauts suffer an accident or make an emergency landing in a state’s territory or international waters, that state must notify:
The astronauts’ launching authority
The United Nations
Mandates for Space Objects:
If a space object lands in a state’s territory, that state must:
Notify the launching authority and the United Nations.
Recover the object.
Return it to the launching authority, if requested.
Harmful Space Objects:
If a state believes a space object could be harmful, the launching authority is responsible for mitigating the danger.
Costs:
The launch authority must pay for signatories’ obligations under the treaty.
Context/Significance:
Expands on the Outer Space Treaty (OST)’s principles.
Came into effect during the Cold War.
Examples of use: deorbiting of Skylab over Australia and Cosmos 954 over Canada.
Liability Convention (United Nations, 1972)
Opened for signing in 1972, this convention is the global rulebook for determining who pays when space objects cause damage.
Mandates the "launching state" to pay for damages.
Types of Liability:
If damage occurs on Earth or to aircraft: liability is absolute.
If damage occurs in outer space: liability depends on fault.
Claims Process:
Claims are typically handled through diplomacy (within one year).
If diplomatic talks fail, an ad hoc three-member Claims Commission can issue an award.
Builds upon the Outer Space Treaty (OST)'s principles of responsibility.
Includes practical procedures, such as joint and several liability for joint launches.
Real-world Test: In 1978, Canada recovered damages (via settlement) after the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 spread radioactive debris on its territory.
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (US and USSR, 1972)
Signed in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Limited missile defense systems on Earth and set boundaries for the military use of space.
Restricted each country to only one Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) site.
Banned space-based anti-missile weapons, helping to prevent an arms race.
Made satellites an official tool for verifying compliance, embedding space technology into international law.
Promoted the vision of space as a domain for stability and transparency, influencing later global agreements.
Ended in 2002, which resurfaced concerns about the risk of new weapons in orbit.
Highlighted the critical role of space governance for international security.
Registration Convention (United Nations, 1975)
A collection of 12 articles serving as a mechanism to help states register objects launched into outer space.
Aims to promote transparency and safety in outer space activities.
Is the fourth UN treaty wholly dedicated to outer space.
Ratified by 76 states to date.
Its main contribution is the UN Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, compiled from data submitted by each state.
Has received criticism due to challenges with upkeep, organization, and clarity of current practices.
Registration under this convention is an active topic in the space sector, with imminent adjustments/changes.
Environmental Modification Convention (United Nations, 1977)
Opened for signing in 1977.
Created to prohibit environmental modification that could cause widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects, including in outer space.
Primary states responsible: United States and USSR, who brought the first draft to negotiation at the United Nations.
Originally created in response to concerns following:
The use of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War.
The first cloud seeding experiments.
Greater global environmental consciousness.
Prohibits intentional hostile environmental modification by states.
Has significant limitations due to:
Only applying in specific state vs. state scenarios.
Lack of international enforcement (many relevant states have veto power on the UN Security Council).
Despite limitations, it creates an international norm.
Clearly establishes outer space as one of the protected areas, working with the OST to prevent new space debris and further contamination.
Bogota Declaration (First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, 1976)
Signed in 1976 by Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Congo, Uganda, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), Indonesia, and Kenya.
Sought to establish sovereignty in the geostationary belt.
Legal argument based on the Outer Space Treaty (OST), claiming the geostationary belt is a limited natural resource linked to states below them.
Challenged OST's ban on sovereignty claims by arguing the geostationary belt is not necessarily in outer space (due to lack of definition).
Aims included securing control over orbital slots, generating potential revenue, fostering regional telecommunications infrastructure, and gaining geopolitical leverage.
The global community eventually recognized the geostationary belt as a limited natural resource.
Claims of sovereignty failed to earn international support.
Moon Treaty (United Nations, 1979)
Opened for signing in 1979.
An ambitious attempt to establish a legal framework for activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies.
Aimed to prevent conflict and ensure resources benefited all humanity.
Core provision: declared celestial resources the “common heritage of mankind,” leading to ideological conflict.
Developing nations desired collaboration and to prevent space from becoming a new economic frontier.
Major spacefaring nations and private companies feared an international regime could seize investments and redistribute wealth.
Only 18 states ratified the treaty, none of which are major space powers.
Its failure demonstrated that a single, universal UN agreement was too slow and restrictive for the rapidly evolving space industry.
A new, fragmented system of national laws and agreements (e.g., Artemis Accords) is now emerging in its place.
Commercial Space Launch Act (U.S Congress, 1984)
Enabled private companies to conduct space launches in the United States.
Changed the paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s where NASA and DoD controlled all U.S. launch activity.
Responded to competition from the ESA-funded commercial rocket program (predecessor to Arianespace).
Aligned with President Reagan’s push for commercialization to simplify commercial launch approvals.
Empowered the Department of Transportation to license commercial launches.
Required companies to carry liability insurance.
Allowed private access to government launch facilities.
This regulatory framework paved the way for today’s commercial space industry.
Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of Earth from Outer Space (United Nations, 1986)
Adopted after 1970s-era controversies over states’ rights in remote sensing (UNGA Res. 41/65, 1986).
Sets international guidelines for Earth observation (EO) operations.
Cooperation and Capacity Principles: Affirm that EO must serve the interests of all states, especially developing countries.
Transparency and Legal-Baseline Principles: Call on states to notify the UN Secretary-General of activities, exchange fundamental information about EO programs, and comply with other applicable multilateral space treaties.
Environment and Disaster-Related Principles: Urge states to share information to prevent environmental harm and promptly release disaster-related data products.
Access, Sovereignty, and Responsibility Principles:
Encourage open use of outer space.
Ensure sensed states have non-discriminatory, reasonable-cost access to data and analyzed information.
Provide for consultation where needed.
Affirm states remain internationally responsible for both governmental and commercial operators.
Bottom Line: Earth observation is open, yet obligated, shaping today’s tasking, latency, portals, and licensing.
National Space Policy Directive 1 and 2 (White House, 1990)
President George H.W. Bush sought to favor investments in the commercial space industry, even if it challenged efficiency or cost savings.
This was driven by anti-communist sentiment and success pathways for U.S. space companies under the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA).
NSPD-1 recognized the lucrative opportunities within the commercial space sector.
NSPD-2 focused on establishing a free and fair market in space.
While prioritizing U.S. prosperity, Bush also invited international cooperation, building on the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.
NSPD-2 contributed to the commercial dominance of the United States in outer space today.
Its impacts include improved technology, lower launch costs, increased opportunities for space exploration, and an enhanced quality of life on Earth.
National Space Policy Directive 3( White house, 1991)
Published on February 11, 1991, signed by President George H.W. Bush.
Also known as “U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines.”
Intention: Encourage government agencies (DoD, NASA, NOAA) to invest in commercial space products and services.
Goal: Diversify and grow the U.S. commercial space sector.
Impact (in hindsight): Made U.S. commercial space more interconnected with national security, strengthening the military-industrial complex.
Guidelines: Promoted fair competition and reduced barriers for new entrants in the space economy.
National Space Policy Directive 4 ( White house, 1991)
NSPD-4 was issued by George H.W. Bush on July 10, 1991.
It was a key policy in shaping the future of American space launch after the Space Shuttle.
It had 4 major takeaways:
No new Space Shuttle orbiters should be built, and only spare parts should be made. If another orbiter is lost, there could be a case to build a new orbiter with the parts on hand.
DoD and NASA should jointly develop an uncrewed launcher for first flight in 1999, possibly by using space shuttle components and technology to reduce costs.
Research should be continued on launch technology and single-stage-to-orbit vehicles.
Government entities should improve collaboration with commercial partners for space launch and technology by allowing contractors to hold technical data rights and to source requirements from the commercial spacecraft industry.
ITU Constitution, Chapter VII (International Telecommunication Union, 1992)
The fourth chapter of the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) Constitution is a binding treaty setting global rules for managing:
Radio spectrum
Satellite orbits
All radio stations
It was largely influenced by the Cold War era in which it was written.
Article 44: Frames frequencies and orbits as limited natural resources to be used rationally and fairly, moving beyond “first-come, first-served” and giving access rights to all countries.
Article 45: Bans harmful interference between radio stations and assigns responsibility for its minimization to member states.
Articles 46 and 47: Give absolute priority to distress calls and prohibit false signals, shaping specific frequencies for emergencies.
Article 48: Grants militaries full freedom not to abide by ITU regulations, while urging them to help with distress calls, avoid harmful interference, and respect administrative regulations “so far as possible.”
Space Station Agreement (Multiple civil space agencies, 1998)
Signed on January 29, 1998, in Washington, DC, by 15 countries (U.S., Russia, Canada, Japan, and ESA member states).
Intended to supersede a previous 1988 agreement to explicitly allow Russia’s participation.
Faced challenges due to financial uncertainties, economic instability, public scrutiny, and distrust among signatories.
Followed the end of the Space Race, drawing inspiration from early U.S.-Soviet collaborative human spaceflight missions and space stations.
Facilitated international collaboration through a shared technological project, which culminated in:
Further advanced human spaceflight.
Ensured continuous human presence in space.
Provided a foundation for future missions.
Led to breakthroughs through shared scientific research and technological expertise.
Commercial Development Plan for the International Space Station (NASA, 1998)
Introduced in 1998 by NASA.
Purpose: To highlight and foster ISS program activities that contribute to commercial space sector growth.
Context: Emerged alongside the 1998 Space Station Agreement and concerns about rising Shuttle and Station costs.
Long-term Goal: Establish a marketplace in low-Earth orbit.
Short-term Aim: Offset government expenses through private investment.
Key Tactics:
Commissioning market studies.
Identifying pilot business areas.
Reducing barriers to entry.
Creating a non-government organization to manage station utilization.
Commissioning Entities: Leading business schools, venture capital, commercial space centers, and consulting firms.
Impact:
Redefined NASA’s role from sole operator to facilitator.
Laid groundwork for today’s commercial crew and cargo partnerships.
Continues to influence NASA's Commercial LEO Development Program (Phase 2), aiming to transition from ISS to privately operated stations for a sustainable space economy.
International Charter on Space and Major Disasters (Various Space Agencies, 2000)
A global agreement that provides free, near-real-time satellite imagery to support rapid disaster response.
Launched in 2000, following the 1999 UN Space Conference.
Inspired by the UN-centered Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction initiative, due to increasing natural disasters in the 1980s and 90s (e.g., Hurricane Mitch).
Founding agencies included ESA, CSA, and CNES, later joined by 14 other signatories.
In 2012, its Universal Access principle enabled any national disaster authority to request support, regardless of membership status.
Prioritizes humanitarian needs over commercial or military use, coordinating satellites globally for faster crisis response.
As of September 2025, it has been activated 991 times across 144 countries.
Remains a model of international cooperation amid advances in multi-application space technologies.
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines ((Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee, 2007)
Developed by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC).
Details best practices to reduce, prevent, and mitigate debris impacts on the operational space domain and, in some cases, the natural environment.
Not legally binding, but represents agreed-upon values for designing, operating, and disposing of space objects safely to avoid creating new debris.
Operates on four pillars:
Minimize the potential of on-orbit breakups.
Prevent on-orbit collisions.
Ensure sustainable post-mission disposal.
Limit debris generated during normal operations.
Helps protect key regions like LEO and GEO, where satellites are most active.
Endorsed by the UN General Assembly, indicating widespread support beyond IADC’s civil space agency membership.
Some individual states, like the United States, have encoded some IADC guidelines into their mission authorization regulatory framework, leading to a patchwork of enforcement status globally.
New START Treaty (US and Russia, 2010)
A bilateral nuclear and strategic arms reduction treaty signed by the United States and Russia in 2010, which went into force in February 2011.
Represents a successful further reduction in nuclear arms by both countries since the previous START I treaty expired in 2009.
Includes provisions for inspections and reports by both countries to ensure compliance.
These reports include information about:
Characteristics of their nuclear weapons systems.
Their locations.
Requires notification for status changes in their arsenal and advanced notice for major exercises.
Offers a template for a bilateral arms agreement for a potential space arms race.
Covers ICBMs, which inherently use the space domain, but does not cover space-based weapons.
A new treaty on space
National Space Transportation Policy (White House, 2013)
Issued in 2013 by the Obama Administration, updating a 2004 version.
Motivated by:
Retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2011.
Growth of commercial space launch providers.
Federal budget constraints.
Heavily pushed for "assured access to space" with reliable, resilient, and affordable launch systems.
NASA's role: Develop heavy-lift vehicles for LEO exploration.
DoD's role: Maintain multiple launch facilities and develop rapid launch capabilities.
Promoted commercial growth via government support, new entrant certification, and competition.
Cross-sector guidelines promoted:
Modernized launch ranges.
Advanced propulsion R&D.
Strict nonproliferation rules about ballistic missiles.
This directive continues to shape policy today alongside later directives and frameworks.
Space Policy Directive 1 (White House, 2017)
Signed in December 2017 by President Donald Trump.
Reinvigorated America’s Human Space Exploration Program, marking a shift from previous policies.
Supersedes Obama’s 2010-era National Space Policy.
Reestablished the Moon as a primary destination for human spaceflight.
Maintained Mars as a vague, long-term aspiration.
Emphasizes building a sustainable lunar surface presence as a stepping stone to Mars.
Places renewed emphasis on commercial and international cooperation, especially with U.S. allies.
Directly responds to Chinese and Russian advancements in space.
Laid the groundwork for NASA’s Artemis Program and Artemis Accords (now with >50 members).
Its legacy endures due to bipartisan support, moving the U.S. closer to returning humans to the Moon.
Space Policy Directive 2 (White House, 2018)
Released in May 2018 by the Trump Administration.
Details policy and regulation goals for the federal government’s interaction with the commercial space industry.
Driven by recommendations from the revived National Space Council in late 2017.
Addresses five areas:
Launch and re-entry
Commercial remote sensing
Department of Commerce reorganization
Radio frequency spectrum management
Export controls
Delegates reviews and recommendations to the Secretaries of Transportation and Commerce to streamline mission authorization for commercial space actors.
Results have varied and are ongoing:
Launch agencies are still occasionally bottlenecked.
Some commercial remote sensing regulations have been repealed.
Export control relief efforts are ongoing with the
Space Policy Directive 3 (White House, 2018)
Signed by President Trump in his first administration.
Was the first formalized policy for "Space Traffic Management" in the United States.
Marked a shift in U.S. space governance from defense- and security-centric policies to a more commercial perspective.
Moved responsibility for public-facing space situational awareness (SSA) data and conjunction warning engagement from the DoD to the Department of Commerce (DoC).
Instructed the DoC to:
Create a new public repository of publicly available SSA data.
Develop relationships with private companies to facilitate data sharing.
Directed NASA to update the U.S. guidelines on debris mitigation.
Was a significant step before an anticipated spike in the number of objects placed in space.
Demonstrated U.S. intentions to enable sustainable space development.
U.S. National Defense Strategy (Department of Defense, 2018)
The Trump administration’s first formal articulation of its plans for the U.S. military. (2018)
Key aspects included:
Creation of a new military branch for space forces.
Recognition of outer space as a warfighting domain.
Re-classification of the greatest threat to the United States from terrorism to great power competition with Russia and China.
Emphasized strengthening deterrence and resilience in space by protecting critical U.S. and allied assets from counterspace threats.
Called for:
Building a more distributed and defensible space architecture.
Integrating space capabilities across all domains.
Working closely with allies and industry to ensure freedom of operation in orbit.
Marked a turning point in viewing space as an operational theater rather than a support function.
Set the foundation for later initiatives such as the Defense Space Strategy (2020) and the creation of the U.S. Space Force.
Space Policy Directive 4 (White House, 2019)
President Trump signed Space Policy Directive 4 (SPD-4) in February 2019.
Directed the executive branch to ease the pathway towards the creation of a U.S. Space Force.
Tasked DoD with drafting legislation to establish the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force, with periodic evaluation.
Responded to growing challenges from adversaries like China and Russia.
Heralded the creation of a Space Force as a solution to alleviate inefficiencies in U.S. space operations:
Fragmentation
Duplication of efforts
Lack of prioritization
Confusion of authority
Its core contributions included defining the Space Force’s role to:
Organize, train, and equip forces for space operations.
Deter aggression.
Ensure the United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to space.
Officially granted DoD the authority to establish the US Space Command.
National Space Policy of the United States of America (White House, 2020)
Outlines the visions for U.S. space policy in the next decade.
Aims to use commercial space technology whenever possible to:
Boost the economic impact of the commercial space sector.
Promote U.S. space products to the world.
Contributes to military space policy by advocating proactive measures against cyberattacks, considering risk throughout the design process.
Tasks the U.S. Space Force with:
Responding to threats to essential national and allied assets in space.
Identifying and classifying potentially threatening behaviors.
On the civil side, it focuses on:
Maintaining existing technology (e.g., International Space Station, robotic missions).
Renewing efforts for human missions back to the Moon.
Seeks to collaborate more with international partners to augment program capabilities, such as space debris removal and the Artemis lunar mission, enhancing global space capabilities.
Space Policy Directive 5 (White House, 2020)
Signed on September 4, 2020.
Outlines cybersecurity principles for space systems.
Focuses on protecting space assets from cyber threats, recognizing growing reliance on space infrastructure for national security, economic stability, and scientific advancement.
Emphasizes the need for U.S. government agencies and private sector actors to adopt best practices for space system cybersecurity, including:
Designing resilient space architectures.
Protecting sensitive data.
Ensuring secure communications for satellites and other space-based technologies.
Promotes the development of cybersecurity frameworks and information sharing to mitigate risks.
Encourages collaboration across industries and with international partners to enhance the overall cybersecurity posture of the space domain.
Aims to safeguard U.S. leadership in space
Space Policy Directive 6 (White House, 2020)
Signed in December 2020.
Provides the U.S. national strategy for developing and using Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion (SNPP) systems.
SNPP systems (e.g., nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP), nuclear electric propulsion (NEP)) enable next-generation long-duration missions to the Moon and Mars.
SNPP systems provide more efficient power and decrease travel time.
Particularizes the defense, security, and sustainable deployment of SNPP technology.
Involves partnerships with allies, international bodies, and private companies.
Aims to increase the speed of U.S. space exploration, especially in response to competing goals from actors like China and Russia.
Facilitates scientific activities and serves U.S. national security priorities.
Space Policy Directive 7 (White House, 2020)
The final space policy directive of the Trump administration (January 2021) and the most recent executive branch guidance on space-based Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT).
It superseded the 2004 National Security Presidential Directive-39 (NSPD-39).
Complements policies outlined in Executive Order 13905 (February 2020) and the 2020 National Space Policy.
Primary actors: The recently re-established National Space Council.
Outlines policy goals for:- The free and continued use of GPS services.
Improving vulnerabilities to security threats.
Establishing executive committees and groups focused on space-based PNT.
Regulating and reforming foreign access to PNT technology while maintaining ITAR and export controls.
Delegating responsibilities to various federal departments.
Response to this directive has
COSPAR Policy on Planetary Protection (COSPAR, 2020)
In 2020, the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) amended its non-legally binding, 2011-era COSPAR Policy on Planetary Protection.
NASA defines this as "the practice of protecting solar system bodies from contamination by Earth life and protecting Earth from possible life forms."
The policy's guidelines add more detail to Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty (OST).
It encourages states to:
Not interfere with each other.
Avoid forward and backward contamination.
Consult one another as best they can.
The Panel on Planetary Protection identifies bodies of concern like Mars and Europa.
New guidelines were set on contamination levels and report documentation.
Since its 1967 inception, JAXA, NASA, ESA, CNSA, and ISRO are the only civil space agencies to conform to this policy on planetary science expeditions.
Defense Space Strategy Summary (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020)
A DoD document outlining a 10-year plan for U.S. military use of the space domain.
Offers recommendations to streamline policy decision-making for space technology acquisitions (private sector, international partnerships, federal agencies).
Provides an overall framework for U.S. Space Force objectives.
Addresses the current threat landscape, identifying China and Russia as immediate threats.
Serves as a recommendation framework based on the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which first named outer space as a warfighting domain.
Names four lines of effort to sustain and fortify U.S. space superiority, space support, and space stability for warfighters, allies, and partners.
In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy (White House, 2020)
The National In-Space Assembly and Manufacturing (ISAM) Implementation Plan, released in December 2022, translates the ISAM National Strategy into concrete government actions.
It organized 28 implementation activities across six strategic goals:
Advancing research and development
Expanding infrastructure
Accelerating commercial industry
Promoting international collaboration
Prioritizing environmental sustainability
Inspiring a diverse workforce
Eighteen federal agencies, primarily NASA and DoD, were assigned specific responsibilities for each activity.
Key provisions included:
Developing standards for spacecraft interfaces.
Establishing test facilities.
Revising regulations for on-orbit imaging devices.
This plan represents the first comprehensive U.S. government approach to coordinate capabilities for servicing, assembling, and manufacturing objects in space.
It builds on traditional precedents like ISS construction and Hubble servicing missions, connecting directly to prescriptive measures for future robotic servicers.
Artemis Accords (2020)
A set of principles shared on October 13, 2020, by NASA and the U.S. Department of State to guide next-generation space exploration.
Unlike treaties, the Artemis Accords are not legally binding.
Reaffirms norms of previous space documents (e.g., OST) and builds a new legal framework for future instruments beyond the OST’s terms.
Significant for:
Affirming the utilization of space resources as lawful (Section 10).
Establishing safety zones to reduce conflict in lunar operations (Section 11).
Part of the larger Artemis Program, which originally aimed to put the first woman and the next man on the Moon by 2027.
Stands in contrast to Russia and China’s International Lunar Research Station, which seeks to have an operating Moon base at the lunar south pole starting in the 2030s.
Chief of Space Operations' Planning Guidance (U.S. Space Force, 2020)
A non-legally binding document written by the first CSO General John W. Raymond, released in 2020.
Issued shortly after the founding of the U.S. Space Force (USSF).
Served as a public explanation of USSF expectations and initial personnel structure.
Highlighted five priorities:
Empower a lean and agile service.
Develop joint warfighters in world-class teams.
Deliver new capabilities at operationally relevant speeds.
Expand cooperation to enhance prosperity and security.
Create a digital service to accelerate innovation.
Themes included personnel development and recruitment, taking risks, developing capabilities, revolutionizing processes, and working with
Gen. Saltzman's White Paper on Competitive Endurance (U.S. Space Force, 2024)
written by General Saltzman 2024
Redefines "winning" in the modern contested space domain.
In the face of gray-zone warfare, the Space Force must achieve space superiority by:
Ensuring friendly access to space capabilities.
Denying adversaries’ access to theirs.
Preserving the safety and stability of the space domain.
The theory of competitive endurance shifts "winning" away from sharp, decisive battles toward continuous protracted competition.
This continuous competition aims to:
Degrade adversaries’ capabilities.
Deter escalation.
Composed of three main tenets:
Avoiding operational surprise.
Denying first mover advantage.
Undertaking responsible counter space campaigning.
Challenges traditional thoughts on space superiority.
Helps guide Space Force doctrine and decision making.
The Iron Dome for America (White House, 2025)
A proposal for a layered, next-generation national missile-defense architecture, initially called “Iron Dome for America” but later renamed “Golden Dome for America.”
Initiated by a presidential executive order.
Aims to defend the U.S. and allied homelands against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks.
Core components include:
A Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor layer.
Proliferate LEO space-based interceptors for boost-phase interception.
Terminal-phase interceptors to prevent countervalue attacks.
Also includes development of secure, resilient supply chains.
Focuses on non-kinetic options, such as directed energy weapons (DEW), to augment kinetic defeat.
Budget estimates vary significantly (e.g., 175~billion to over 3~trillion).
Politically sensitive and expected to face congressional scrutiny and partisan debate.
Would weaponize space by a reasonable definition, despite not violating the Outer Space Treaty (OST).
Likely to prompt adversaries to expand offensive arsenals rather than match defenses.