10/8 Rational choice institutionalism II

rational choice redux

• methodological individualism

• consistent preference

• instrumental rationality

instrumental rationality

• maximize expected utility

• strategic thinking

bounded rationality

• flaws in maximizing expected utility and thinking strategically

flaws in maximizing expected utility and thinking strategically

• short-term memory bottlenecks prevent the use of all known information

• inability to assign probabilities, Baynesian update cognitive baises in processing information

• unwillingness to perform complex analysis and plan for future

• satisficing

satisficing

settle for “good enough” rather than maximize utility

keohane on bounded rationality

• governments are composed of human beings with limited problem-solving capabilties

• actors laboring under bounded rationality..need to simplify their decision making processes

• the choice is not whether to adhere to regimes at the expense of maximizing utility through continuous calculation but rather what rule of thumb to rely

pathways attributes (abbott and snidal)

• substantive content

• participation

• legalization

• types of uncertainty

substantive content

shallow ←→ ddep

participation

limited ←→broad

legalization

anarachy ←→ hard law hierarchy

legal obligations

nonlegal norms ←→ jus cogens norms

precision of commitments

vagueness ←→ clarity

delegation of authority

ad hoc diplomacy ←→ autonomous agents

framework convention

• promote dialogue, persuasion, and learning

• creates legitimacy via broad participation

• starts shallow but deepens over time

• ex: Montreal, Kyoto Protocol

plurilateralism

• starts with states with shared, intense preferences

• creates highly legalized organization with strong enforcement

• expands participation over time

• ex: EU, NAFTA

soft law

• expects compliance failures early on

• uses incentives to encourage increasing compliance

• increase legalization over time

• ex: regulatory agencies, human rights regimes

hawkins - principal agent theory

relationship between a principal and an agent, and the potential issues that can arise when one party delegates tasks to another

principal-agent theory; delegation

conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent

principal-agent theory; principal

an actor who is able both to grant authority and rescind it

principal-agent theory; agency slack

independent action by an agent that is undesired by the principal

principal-agent theory; agent autonomy

the range of potential independent action available to an agent within established mechanisms of control

how do you monitor the people working for you (in principal-agent theory)?

• police patrols: direct monitoring of agents

• fire alarms: affected parties bring evidence of agency slack to the attention of principals

principal-agent theory; forum shopping

states delegate authority to the most favorable IO

the central insight of neo-functionalism

IO agents using their autonomy to influence principals

benefits of delegation

• specialization

• policy externalities

• collective decision-making

• dispute resolution

• credibility

• lock-in

delegation hypotheses

• greater preference heterogeneity of members

• greater number of states required to approve an action

• more powerful state

• greater specialization of agent

• greater difficulty of controlling agents

• greater uncertainty of technical complexity

greater preference heterogeneity of members

reduced likelihood of delegation to IO

greater number of states required to approve an action

greater autonomy of IO

more powerful state

less likely to delegate to IO

greater specialization of agent

increased opportunity for agency slack

greater difficulty of controlling agents

increased use of rule-based delegation

greater uncertainty or technical complexity

increase use of agent discretion