Philosophy Midterm

Argument

An argument is meant to convince one to believe or do something; it provides reasons in support of the belief or action.

Premise

A reason in support of the belief or action.

Conclusion

The argument the author wants the reader to believe or do, supported by reasons.

Reconstruction

Extracting arguments from texts or speech; representing an argument into standard form.

Standard Form

Structured form of an argument; includes numbered premises and a conclusion.

Justification

Reason to support the conclusion. Can be either assumptions or inferences.

Assumption

The premise is not supported within the argument itself.

Inference

The premise or conclusion is derived from other premises.

Principle of Charity

Interpret a text in the best way possible and make its argument as convincing as possible, even if you don't agree.

Argument Analysis

Figuring out how the argument is intended to work before determining whether it does work; determining whether an argument is TP or NTP.

Truth-Preserving (TP)

The conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true. Called "deductions" and exhibit rational necessity.

Non-Truth-Preserving (NTP)

A good NTP argument provides good reasons to accept the conclusion, but the conclusion could nevertheless be false. The best we can say is that NTP arguments exhibit rational probability—the premises make the conclusion probably true.

Chains vs Heaps

TP arguments form chains of reasons that lead inexorably to the truth of the conclusion; NTP arguments gather heaps of reasons that weigh in favor of the conclusion, but do not require its truth.

Validity

The argument has the right form: it's a chain of reasons leading inexorably to the conclusion.

Modus ponens

If A Then B.

A

\---

B

Modus tollens

If A Then B.

B is false.

\---

A is false.

Soundness

The argument is valid, and its premises are true.

Strength/Weakness

Strength comes in degrees. If an argument is strong ("statistically significant"), the heaps are weighty enough to make it irrational to reject the conclusion.

Cogency

An argument is cogent if the argument is strong and all of its premises are true.

Induction

A NTP argument with independent premises all supporting a single conclusion. Strength is the weight of reasons in favor of the conclusion.

Argument by Analogy

A comparison of two or more things; premises are shared characteristic(s). Strength is the degree of resemblance.

Abduction

Premises present the evidence; conclusion explains the evidence. Strength is how well the conclusion explains the evidence.

Fallacy

A fallacy is an argumentative misstep—a wrong move that renders the argument unconvincing.

Diagnosis

Three ways an argument can go wrong: 1. It is an attempted TP argument that is invalid. 2. It is an attempted NTP argument that is weak. 3. It depends on a false (or unacceptable) premise.

Begging the Question

Occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it.

Elenctic (Socratic) Method

1. Framing Question ("What is X?") 2. Interlocutor proposes answer 3. Socrates refutes the answer (elenchus) 4. Interlocuter proposes refinement 5. Repeat 3 & 4 6. State of irresolution/puzzlement (aporia)

The Euthyphro Problem

If 'pious' and 'god-loved' are different, then what is the relationship between them? Either (A) god-loved because pious, or (B) pious because god-loved. (A) is circular and (B) is arbitrary.

Differential Definition

Pious is what is: (Genus) Just, and (Differentia) Concerned with care of the gods. Another differential definition: (Genus) Knowledge, and (Differentia) How to pray and sacrifice.

Good Definition

Says what a thing is, if you have it (necessary conditions); tells you how to find a thing, if you do not have it (sufficient conditions).

Philosophical Analysis

Generating a good definition.

Necessary Condition

Says what a thing is, if you have it. "If X, then C."

Sufficient Condition

Tells you how to find a thing, if you do not have it. "If C, then X."

Theory

A proposed set of conditions.

Argument for a Condition

Theory T is sufficient for X. Theory T is necessary for X. A good definition of X is a necessary and sufficient theory for X.

Counterexamples

Can show either a condition is not necessary (X and not T) or not sufficient (T and not X).

Responses to Counterexamples

Make T less restrictive by deleting conditions or make T more restrictive by adding conditions.

Problem of Personal Identity

We need a set of conditions that must be met in order for something to count as one and the same person over time: a definition of "the same person." Moral responsibility makes this important.

Numerical Identity vs. Qualitative Identity

Numerical: X and Y are only one thing. Qualitative: X and Y have common properties.

Person vs. Human Being

Person: a self. Human being: an organism (with mind/soul and body).

Cartesian Theory

One person

Locke's Consciousness Theory

One person

Locke's Arguments against Descartes

One person and not one soul (Soul Flow). One soul and not one person (Castor and Pollux; Nestor).

Soul Flow

One person and not one soul.

Castor and Pollux

One soul and not one person (there's two).

Nestor

One soul and not one person (Nestor's spirit in Taylor's body).

The Prince and the Cobbler

Against body theory. Two persons, one body; one person, two bodies.

Continuous Consciousness

Chains of memory makes a consciousness continuous.

Memory

"It is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done."

Amnesia

In permanent amnesia, there will be two persons (but only one "man").

Drunkenness

The drunk man is not the same person as the sober man (but it is not a good excuse for humans).

Thomson's Bodily Theory

One person

Natural-ness of the Body Theory

The body is how we identify the self and others. We care where the body goes. Survival requires the body.

Response to Locke's Objection

The Cobbler is mistaken; the body determines personal identity.

The Cobbler Survives

1. The survivor is the Cobbler. 2. Post-switch person has the body of the Cobbler. Therefore, body determines identity.

Duplication

Copying and implanting consciousness between bodies (Charlie Brown cases).

No Competitors Theory

One person

Problems for No Competitors Theory

Potentially circular and makes survival depend on irrelevancies, which is implausible.

Potential Circularity

The definition of personal identity depends on a definition of identity.

Survival Depends on Irrelevancies

The personal identity of Brown can be destroyed by something irrelevant to him (like a competitor being created somewhere else).

Indeterminacy

Just as consciousness-duplication can create problems for psychological theories, body-duplication can create problems for Thomson's bodily theory.

Knowledge

S knows p.

True Opinion vs Knowledge

Someone can have a true opinion and not know; knowledge is not getting lucky.

The Road to Larissa

The person with true opinion is no worse guide, but only succeeds at times; the person with knowledge will always succeed.

Daedalus's Statues

The statues run away if not tied down but stay in place if tied down. Relates to true opinions, which need to be tied down by an account of the reason why.

"Tied Down by an Account"

True opinion must be "tied down" by "an account of the reason why."

Luck

Succeeding sometimes, but not based on knowledge.

Justified True Belief (JTB) Theory

S knows p \---\>

S believes p.

p is true.

S is justified in believing p.

Sources of Justification

Testimony, perception, memory, reason, introspection.

JTB Conditions are Not Sufficient

There are counterexample where JTB is not knowledge.

Case 1

p \= The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Case 2

p \= Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.

Fake Barns Case

A town has a line of fake barns and only one real barn. Someone points at the real barn and says, "That's a barn," but does not KNOW it.

Gettier Problems

JTB theory is not sufficient \--- needs a condition. Otherwise, it can rely on epistemic luck, which is not knowledge.

Casual Theory

S knows p \---\>

1. p is true.

2. S believes p.

3. p causes S to believe p.

Truth Tracking Theory

Belief has to track the truth. "If p were false, then S would not believe p. If p were true, then S would believe p."

Subjunctive/Counterfactual Conditional

What are the truth conditions for "If A were true, then B would be true"? Ex: If Smith had 7 coins, Smith would still believe p.

Third Condition

If p were false, S would not believe p.

Person in a Tank Case

p \= I'm a person in a tank. Counterexample to First Tracking Theory.

Fourth Condition

If p were true, S would believe p.

Red Barns Problem

S knows "That's a red barn" but doesn't know "That's a barn." Violates closure principle.

Closure Principle

f S knows p and S knows (p → q), then S knows (or can know) q.

Global Skepticism

For any p, S does not know p.

Firm Foundation

Build a system of knowledge on the foundation of what cannot be doubted.

Method of Doubt

Infallibilism: if you can find any reason to doubt p, reject it. If some p cannot be doubted, p is known.

Sense Doubt

If I don't know my senses are not deceiving me, I don't know p. 2. I don't know my senses are not deceiving me. \--- I don't know p.

Dream Doubt

1. If I don't know I'm not dreaming, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not dreaming. \--- I don't know p.

Deceiving Demon Doubt

1. If I don't know I'm not deceived by a demon, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not deceived by a demon. \--- I don't know p.

The Skeptical Argument

1. If I don't know I'm not in SK, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not in SK. \--- I don't know p.