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Argument
An argument is meant to convince one to believe or do something; it provides reasons in support of the belief or action.
Premise
A reason in support of the belief or action.
Conclusion
The argument the author wants the reader to believe or do, supported by reasons.
Reconstruction
Extracting arguments from texts or speech; representing an argument into standard form.
Standard Form
Structured form of an argument; includes numbered premises and a conclusion.
Justification
Reason to support the conclusion. Can be either assumptions or inferences.
Assumption
The premise is not supported within the argument itself.
Inference
The premise or conclusion is derived from other premises.
Principle of Charity
Interpret a text in the best way possible and make its argument as convincing as possible, even if you don't agree.
Argument Analysis
Figuring out how the argument is intended to work before determining whether it does work; determining whether an argument is TP or NTP.
Truth-Preserving (TP)
The conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true. Called "deductions" and exhibit rational necessity.
Non-Truth-Preserving (NTP)
A good NTP argument provides good reasons to accept the conclusion, but the conclusion could nevertheless be false. The best we can say is that NTP arguments exhibit rational probability—the premises make the conclusion probably true.
Chains vs Heaps
TP arguments form chains of reasons that lead inexorably to the truth of the conclusion; NTP arguments gather heaps of reasons that weigh in favor of the conclusion, but do not require its truth.
Validity
The argument has the right form: it's a chain of reasons leading inexorably to the conclusion.
Modus ponens
If A Then B.
A
---
B
Modus tollens
If A Then B.
B is false.
---
A is false.
Soundness
The argument is valid, and its premises are true.
Strength/Weakness
Strength comes in degrees. If an argument is strong ("statistically significant"), the heaps are weighty enough to make it irrational to reject the conclusion.
Cogency
An argument is cogent if the argument is strong and all of its premises are true.
Induction
A NTP argument with independent premises all supporting a single conclusion. Strength is the weight of reasons in favor of the conclusion.
Argument by Analogy
A comparison of two or more things; premises are shared characteristic(s). Strength is the degree of resemblance.
Abduction
Premises present the evidence; conclusion explains the evidence. Strength is how well the conclusion explains the evidence.
Fallacy
A fallacy is an argumentative misstep—a wrong move that renders the argument unconvincing.
Diagnosis
Three ways an argument can go wrong: 1. It is an attempted TP argument that is invalid. 2. It is an attempted NTP argument that is weak. 3. It depends on a false (or unacceptable) premise.
Begging the Question
Occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it.
Elenctic (Socratic) Method
Framing Question ("What is X?") 2. Interlocutor proposes answer 3. Socrates refutes the answer (elenchus) 4. Interlocuter proposes refinement 5. Repeat 3 & 4 6. State of irresolution/puzzlement (aporia)
The Euthyphro Problem
If 'pious' and 'god-loved' are different, then what is the relationship between them? Either (A) god-loved because pious, or (B) pious because god-loved. (A) is circular and (B) is arbitrary.
Differential Definition
Pious is what is: (Genus) Just, and (Differentia) Concerned with care of the gods. Another differential definition: (Genus) Knowledge, and (Differentia) How to pray and sacrifice.
Good Definition
Says what a thing is, if you have it (necessary conditions); tells you how to find a thing, if you do not have it (sufficient conditions).
Philosophical Analysis
Generating a good definition.
Necessary Condition
Says what a thing is, if you have it. "If X, then C."
Sufficient Condition
Tells you how to find a thing, if you do not have it. "If C, then X."
Theory
A proposed set of conditions.
Argument for a Condition
Theory T is sufficient for X. Theory T is necessary for X. A good definition of X is a necessary and sufficient theory for X.
Counterexamples
Can show either a condition is not necessary (X and not T) or not sufficient (T and not X).
Responses to Counterexamples
Make T less restrictive by deleting conditions or make T more restrictive by adding conditions.
Problem of Personal Identity
We need a set of conditions that must be met in order for something to count as one and the same person over time: a definition of "the same person." Moral responsibility makes this important.
Numerical Identity vs. Qualitative Identity
Numerical: X and Y are only one thing. Qualitative: X and Y have common properties.
Person vs. Human Being
Person: a self. Human being: an organism (with mind/soul and body).
Cartesian Theory
Locke's Consciousness Theory
Locke's Arguments against Descartes
One person and not one soul (Soul Flow). One soul and not one person (Castor and Pollux; Nestor).
Soul Flow
One person and not one soul.
Castor and Pollux
One soul and not one person (there's two).
Nestor
One soul and not one person (Nestor's spirit in Taylor's body).
The Prince and the Cobbler
Against body theory. Two persons, one body; one person, two bodies.
Continuous Consciousness
Chains of memory makes a consciousness continuous.
Memory
"It is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done."
Amnesia
In permanent amnesia, there will be two persons (but only one "man").
Drunkenness
The drunk man is not the same person as the sober man (but it is not a good excuse for humans).
Thomson's Bodily Theory
Natural-ness of the Body Theory
The body is how we identify the self and others. We care where the body goes. Survival requires the body.
Response to Locke's Objection
The Cobbler is mistaken; the body determines personal identity.
The Cobbler Survives
The survivor is the Cobbler. 2. Post-switch person has the body of the Cobbler. Therefore, body determines identity.
Duplication
Copying and implanting consciousness between bodies (Charlie Brown cases).
No Competitors Theory
Problems for No Competitors Theory
Potentially circular and makes survival depend on irrelevancies, which is implausible.
Potential Circularity
The definition of personal identity depends on a definition of identity.
Survival Depends on Irrelevancies
The personal identity of Brown can be destroyed by something irrelevant to him (like a competitor being created somewhere else).
Indeterminacy
Just as consciousness-duplication can create problems for psychological theories, body-duplication can create problems for Thomson's bodily theory.
Knowledge
S knows p.
True Opinion vs Knowledge
Someone can have a true opinion and not know; knowledge is not getting lucky.
The Road to Larissa
The person with true opinion is no worse guide, but only succeeds at times; the person with knowledge will always succeed.
Daedalus's Statues
The statues run away if not tied down but stay in place if tied down. Relates to true opinions, which need to be tied down by an account of the reason why.
"Tied Down by an Account"
True opinion must be "tied down" by "an account of the reason why."
Luck
Succeeding sometimes, but not based on knowledge.
Justified True Belief (JTB) Theory
S knows p --->
S believes p.
p is true.
S is justified in believing p.
Sources of Justification
Testimony, perception, memory, reason, introspection.
JTB Conditions are Not Sufficient
There are counterexample where JTB is not knowledge.
Case 1
p = The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Case 2
p = Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
Fake Barns Case
A town has a line of fake barns and only one real barn. Someone points at the real barn and says, "That's a barn," but does not KNOW it.
Gettier Problems
JTB theory is not sufficient --- needs a condition. Otherwise, it can rely on epistemic luck, which is not knowledge.
Casual Theory
S knows p --->
p is true.
S believes p.
p causes S to believe p.
Truth Tracking Theory
Belief has to track the truth. "If p were false, then S would not believe p. If p were true, then S would believe p."
Subjunctive/Counterfactual Conditional
What are the truth conditions for "If A were true, then B would be true"? Ex: If Smith had 7 coins, Smith would still believe p.
Third Condition
If p were false, S would not believe p.
Person in a Tank Case
p = I'm a person in a tank. Counterexample to First Tracking Theory.
Fourth Condition
If p were true, S would believe p.
Red Barns Problem
S knows "That's a red barn" but doesn't know "That's a barn." Violates closure principle.
Closure Principle
f S knows p and S knows (p → q), then S knows (or can know) q.
Global Skepticism
For any p, S does not know p.
Firm Foundation
Build a system of knowledge on the foundation of what cannot be doubted.
Method of Doubt
Infallibilism: if you can find any reason to doubt p, reject it. If some p cannot be doubted, p is known.
Sense Doubt
If I don't know my senses are not deceiving me, I don't know p. 2. I don't know my senses are not deceiving me. --- I don't know p.
Dream Doubt
If I don't know I'm not dreaming, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not dreaming. --- I don't know p.
Deceiving Demon Doubt
If I don't know I'm not deceived by a demon, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not deceived by a demon. --- I don't know p.
The Skeptical Argument
If I don't know I'm not in SK, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not in SK. --- I don't know p.
Note 
Flashcard (44)