political science midterm

direct conception of power

the authority to direct the behavior of others; used by both


1. the monotonist theory of elites (Marx) saying that elites directly control behavior of ordinary people through their roles as heads of big corporations
2. pluralist tradition (Dahl) saying that people compete for power, different actors/interest groups prevail in different policy sectorsr; whatever capital you have in this sector cannot easily be mobilized in another

gatekeeping conception of power

ability to define what sorts of problems / debates / agendas structure human activity, eg. the media, legislatures, lobbying groups

→ mobilizes bias: some issues organized into politics, others organized out

the second face of power

some actors can limit decision-making to less controversial matters

Lukes’ three faces of power (1974)

1. decision-making power: commanding change
2. control power: controlling agendas
3. empowerment power: establishing preferences

example of gatekeeping power

sequential veto bargaining: pres & congress disagree, congress anticipates vetoes so modifies content of legislation, Pres can use vetoes not only to block legislation but to modify it

conceptual power

ability to shape the content of human thought itself, such as defining concepts / categories / institutions (usually of the states)

→ eg. census, cadastral maps, tax systems, race relations & immigration = “classification struggles”

Weber on domination

power = domination, domination depends on legitimacy


1. traditional: established habits, customs & traditions, ruler themself is constrained by the tradition
2. charismatic: based on individual properties (and extraordinary) qualities of the leader = personality cults
3. legal-rational: domination by and through formal rules and norms, enforced by bureaucratic organizations bounded by similar rules

does power = domination?

except for Weber, no; domination exists only when power relations are perpetually asymmetrical, and their is an extremely limited margin of liberty

Foucault on power

power is a persuasive aspect of social life (beyond formal politics); every institution is constituted by different forms of knowledge; all forms of knowledge are also forms of power

overton windows

the range of ideas that are considered acceptable in a society at a time (what is unthinkable, radical, acceptable, popular, etc.)

→ there are windows in which an idea is popular; this moves from one time to another

→ eg. business text, during the Great Depression the welfare state became a popular idea

window of opportunity (Tilly)

some things are popular which were not before = makes revolutions successful


1. a crisis or breakdown (to challenge existing political order)
2. a willingness of political actors to take action
3. a lack of effective repression, or disincentives to act, by the state

→ eg. the Great Depression allowed the SSA to pass

→ some ideas are waiting for a crisis to be implemented

policy feedback

policy implementation can set social norms and modify preferences; Schattschneider (1935): “new policies create a new politics)

Marxists/post-marxists on ideology

don’t study ideas because they reflect something else, instead study ideology & its material roots (the structural conditions which generated them)

Social constructivists on ideas

"ideas" emphasize the ideational dimensions always present in human action (you always have preconceptions of the world)

ideology

systematic, comprehensive set of ideas about politics, both empirical & prescriptive 

→ eg. fascism, liberalism, communism

4 main features of an ideology

1. complexity & abstraction: related to central concepts of political life, systematic and well-articulated, connects human nature to politics 
2. empirical explanation: claim to explain the political world
3. normative prescription: how political life should be
4. plan for action

4 main ideologies (in advanced liberal democracies of the 20th ce)

1. conservatism
2. liberalism
3. christian democracy (subsidiarity & social institutions)
4. socialism & social democracy

ideas

claims about descriptions of the world

Fukuyama on the end of the ideological battle

since fall of Soviet Union, Western liberal democracy (welfare state, decentralized power, pluralism, mixed economy) has triumphed over communism

Materialism

the material roots of political ideas, mostly associated w/ Marxism & distinction between infrastructure and superstructure

Idealism

ideational roots of political interests, mostly associated w/ Weber& his work on Protestant Reformers (their ideas were necessary to start capitalism)

→ for Weber, ideational & material factors have a dynamic relationship, not in opposition

particular policy paradigm

the broad ideational structure in which actors find themselves (& conceptualize the environment) do matter for policy outcomes

Kingdom’s multiple streams framework

explains different elements that impact policymaking as an interaction between 3 interconnected streams


1. the problem stream
2. the policy stream (ideas/solutions)
3. the politics stream (actors)

→ not necessarily in this order, eg. some pre existing policies looking for a problem

political institutions

not just formal structures (legislatures/courts) but also the structural arrangements maintaining them (rules/norms); both a constraint and something that enables society

“old” institutionalism (1900-1950)

focus on central formal institutions like the executive, the parliament, with a highly legal focus

→ limited as you can’t predict policy outcomes based solely on legal texts

behavioralism (1950-60s)

stop looking at formal institutions, instead study psychology, human actors & their behavior = less legal and more sociological

“new” institutionalism

must consider both previous focuses: concrete law/parliament BUT ALSO informal norms/conventions; must include behaviors to see how individual behaviors are mediated by the formal structure, eg. what is influencing actors?

why is it important to study institutions not just formally but also informally?

behind the formal election, there are the norms of the electoral college & caucus. behind the formal parliament, there are the rules of debates and votes.

Schlepsle’s structure-induced equilibrium

preference-induced equilibrium (expression of individual preferences) is mediated by structure-induced equilibrium (rules & formal institutions)

rational choice institutionalism

* focuses on behavior of rational actors
* sees institutions as structures of **voluntary cooperation** that resolve collective action problems
* change occurs through **changing preferences or exogenous shocks**
* eg. stability of congress outcomes

historical institutionalism

* focus on structures and practices
* sees institutions as structures inherited from the past that generate asymmetric power relations
* change occurs through **critical junctures which interrupt path dependency** = have to overturn existing balances
* eg. the US pension system is very difficult to change (due to timing of past reforms, mixtures of public/private provisions)

sociological institutionalism (aka constructivist)

* focuses on norms and ideas (= the broad ideological consensus, eg. if the consensus sustains property rights, then free markets are likely to be supported)
* sees institutions as ideational structures that diffuse cultural norms and frames
* change occurs through ideational & discursive interactions = fast, important change is possible
* eg. the **culturally constructed conceptions** of state & market conditioned 19 ce railroad policy in France & the US

can actors trigger institutional change?

yes, depending on **capacity of incumbent institutions** (path dependency) and the **level of discretion of actors on the ground** (how they manipulate the rules/institutions to their objectives, eg. how judges interpret the law, how police apply the law)

competition in economics vs. politics

economics: the ability of a firm to influence a price

politics: the ability to exert power and influence policies

→ (generally) more rivals = more competition, generally comp. is greater over longer periods of time than in the short term

challenges of applying economic competition to political (Stigler)

* political policies are mutually exclusive, economic products are not
* in economics, all patrons receive a product, however voters may receive nothing (no representative)
* more rival parties = lower chance of any party platform being successful, instead must develop coalitions

Downsian (demand-side) model aka Downs’ theorem

based on a rational-choice model of oligopolistic behavior; 2 competitors have sole motivation to enjoy the power, don’t care about policies (like voters do)

→ assumes a normal distribution, the median voter position leads parties to position themselves around the center

Limits/implications of Downs’ theorem

limits: does not take into account institutions, nor Schlepsle’s structure-induced equilibrium

→ eg US has large party polarization, but normally distributed electorate = swing states/voters

implications: nonexploitation (harder competition for votes, party leaders don’t pursue own interests as much) & party convergence implies party continuity (next leader wouldn’t undo what the other did, US case doesn’t hold up here)

Schumpeter’s supply-side model

minimal conception of democracy, competitive-elitist conception, “machine politicians” are necessary due to lack of active normal electorate, not informed nor competent enough

→ argues that there is no mechanism that can aggregate individual preferences ( = Arrow’s impossibility theorem: individuals rank preferences, can’t aggregate them w/o losing some)

does political competition exist under authoritarian rule?

yes, but organized around different principles; eg. China has competition based on price; one party dominant regimes can have competition among sectors & levels of govt

regime

the formal/informal structure & nature of political power in a country (eg. method of determining office holders, their relationship w/ society)

regimes & policies adopted?

may or may not be affected… eg. civil liberties can be restricted w/o total regime change = Hungary & Poland today

Aristotle’s “good” vs “deviant” constitutions

Good: monarchy/aristocracy/republic

Deviant: tyranny/oligarchy/democracy

\*he thought the aristocracy was the best

Montesquieu’s regime distinction

limited vs despotic regimes based on degree of sep of power (limited regimes should have checks and balances)

Kelsen’s regime distinction

autonomies: norms are made by those to whom they apply

heteronomies: legislators are distinct from those subject to laws

Schumpeter’s regime distinction

emphasis on contestation (competition) as the essential feature of democracy

liberal vs electoral democracies

liberal: broad civil rights, rule of law, lines of accountability between elected official s& other independent bodies (eg. Canada, Spain)

electoral: minimal, procedural features (eg. Turkey, Columbia)

totalitarian regimes

ruling ideology, mass mobilization, total state control

→ eg Nazi Germany, Soviet Union under Stalin

post-totalitarian regimes

ideology, mobilization, more (but still limited) freedoms

→ eg Soviet Union in 1970s

sultayistic regimes

personal rule of an individual or family, constitutional hypocrisy, blurred lines between regime & state

→ Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Haiti under Duvalier

traditional authoritarian regimes

apply to traditional legitimacy (close to feudal/monarchical), patron-client ties

→ eg. Imperial Russia

Diamond’s typology of regimes

liberal democracy → electoral democracy → ambiguous regimes → competitive-authoritarian → electoral, uncompetitive authoritarian → politically closed authoritarian

Moller’s typology of regimes

liberal democracy: rights to freedoms & free elections

electoral democracy: no rights to freedoms but free elections

liberal autocracy: rights to freedoms but no free elections

illiberal autocracy: neither rights to freedoms nor fair elections

freedom house rating

a measure of democracy using a large # of variables (eg. electoral process, political pluralism, participation, civil rights)

V-dem polyarchy index

measures freedom of association, expression, etc. mo

most important measure to classify regime types?

extent of free and fair elections

Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State (Hacker and Pierson)

was business the central actor in the early development of the US welfare state? yes, due to the vast market economy in the US (& private actors), however complicated interplay (**instrumental vs structural power shifted before, during and after new deal**)

→ also idea of **Overton windows**, during/after the Great Depression the idea of the welfare state was more popular

→ and **Tilly’s Window of Opportunity**: the GD allowed the SSA to pass

Eugenic Ideas, Political Interests, and Policy Variance: Immigration and Sterilization Policy in Britain and the US (Hansen and King)

how did eugenic ideas come to exercise a cause influence on US/UK policy and politics? **ideas’ impacts are maximized when they serve individual interests**, when actors possess the requisite institutional position, and when timing (**Overton windows**) reinforces these ideas

→ **policy variance:** the same idea translates into different policy outcomes depending on the context (US had more racist nationalist culture)

Institutional change in varieties of capitalism (Hall and Thelen)

how does capitalism exist in different countries? do they have strong or weak labor unions? how much power do different actors have to influence decisions? a spectrum between **LMEs** (liberal market economies, in which labor unions/businesses have more power) and **CMEs** (coordinated market economies, in which govt coordinates decision-making)

→ nuancing Fukuyama’s “end of history”; capitalism is not the same everywhere

→ every change is embedded in a net of different institutions which need to be individually changed in order to trigger change in the long term = historical institutionalism

The Political Determinants of Economic Performance (Pinto and Timmons)

how does political competition impact the key sources of economic growth? has systematic, cross cutting effects: decreases physical capital accumulation & labor mobilization, but increases human capital accumulation & productivity (more intensive than extensive growth)

→ can be tied to **path dependency**, has led to some of the discrepancies noted in the literature

Path-dependent explanations of regime change: Central America in Comparative Perspective (Mahoney)

how did the 19 ce liberal reform period impact different Central American countries, and lead to their varying political institutions? this period was a **critical juncture**, which locked CA countries onto diverging paths of long-term dip, culminating in contrasting regime outcomes

→ eg. Guatemala had radical liberalism = military authoritarianism, and more polarized class structure, while Costa Rica had reformist liberalism = liberal democracy

→ **path dependence** focusing on the **choices of key actors at critical junctures**