what is knowledge?

ability knowledge

knowing ‘how’ to do something e.g. i know how to ride a bike

acquaintance knowledge

knowing ‘of’ something or someone e.g. i know my mother

propositional knowledge

factual knowledge - knowing ‘that’ something is the case e.g. i know that 1 + 1 = 2

nature of definition

• zagzebski - types of definition depend on the natures of the concepts/objects involved

• some objects such as natural substances have a real essence (locke) - e.g. water is h2o. if it were not h2o it would not be water. so water must necessarily h2o - if an object has a real essence, it can have a real definition

• some concepts can only have conceptual definitions - defined by necessary truths but are not objectively investigable

  • e.g. a bachelor is an unmarried man - necessarily true but a bachelor is just a social construct - no objective reality

• knowledge is obviously dissimilar to natural substances - but philosophers often aim for a real definition of knowledge (often only implicitly)

• highlights possibility that “perhaps knowledge is not an ontological category for which a real definition is possible”

zagzebski - A CON

any definition of knowledge should not be:

• ad hoc - coming up with a definition specifically to meet a particular problem e.g. knowledge is a justified true belief that is not a gettier counter-example

• circular - including the term being defined e.g. justice is what happens when just acts occur

• obscure - terms in the definition should not be more obscure than the term being defined

• negative - defining a term by what it is not e.g. a good act is one that is not wrong

tripartite view

s knows that p iff:

1. p is true

2. s believes that p

3. s is justified in believing that p

jtb conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient

is belief necessary?

• seems incoherent to say “i know that it is raining, but i do not believe it”

• stems from fact that belief is necessary to honestly assert anything - would not assert that it is raining without believing it

• however belief may not be required when you are NOT asserting a claim

• could argue that knowledge can be a successful action

• e.g. hesitantly but correctly answering a quiz question when you were taught the answer but could not remember being taught - you knew the answer even if you did not really believe it

• therefore belief is not necessary in some cases - when not asserting a claim

is truth necessary?

• imagine a person in 2000 bce who believes the earth is flat based on the evidence available to them

• correspondence theory of truth - claim must correspond with the relevant fact - the earth is NOT flat → NOT truth → NOT knowledge

• coherence theory of truth - true if part of web of beliefs held by society to be true - internally coherent - at the time it was believed the earth was flat - justified true belief so the person DOES know the earth is flat

• these theories differ in whether the person knows the earth is flat, but both require a form of truth

• coherence theory - more inclined to allow people to have ‘known’ things in the past - concept of truth is bound to the belief system of the time

• therefore truth is necessary no matter how you define it

is justification necessary?

• imagine that your friend throws a dice and correctly guesses that it will land on six - we would not say that she knew this unless she had some other justification e.g. she knew the dice was loaded

• suggests that justification is necessary for knowledge

• however reliabilism claims that knowledge is true belief generated through a reliable process

• e.g. john has a gift that allows him to tell you the day of the week of any date in the future - he cannot explain how he does this but he is incredibly accurate

• john’s claims do not have rational justification as he cannot explain how he got his answers - but we might still say that he knows the day of a certain date - therefore justification is not necessary in some cases

gettier’s first case

• smith and jones applying for the same job

• president of the company told smith that jones will get the job - smith counted 10 coins in jones’ pocket

• smith forms beliefs (i) “jones will get the job” and (ii) “jones has ten coins in his pocket”

• from (i) and (ii) smith forms (iii) “the man who will get the jobs has 10 coins in his pocket”

• however smith gets the job - coincidentally also has 10 coins in his pocket

• smiths belief (iii) is therefore true and justified - but we would not say that smith had knowledge that HE would get the job

• belief (i) was wrong - belief (iii) is only true because of luck/coincidence (also having 10 coins in his pocket)

• therefore smiths belief that “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket” is not knowledge - jtb conditions are not jointly sufficient

gettier’s second case

• smith sees his friend jones driving a ford - forms belief “jones owns a ford”

• smith has another friend brown - no knowledge of his location

• forms a new disjunctive belief “jones owns a ford OR brown is in barcelona” (barcelona chosen at random)

• this belief is justified - smith has no reason to doubt the first part of his belief

• it turns out jones does not own a car and has been driving a hire car - however by coincidence brown (unbeknown to smith) IS in barcelona

• belief “jones owns a ford OR brown is in barcelona” is true and justified - but we would not say that smith knew it - it is still a lucky coincidence - jtb conditions not jointly sufficient

no false lemmas definition

lemma = premise accepted as true

s knows that p iff:

1. p is true

2. s believes that p

3. s is justified in believing that p

4. s did not infer p from anything false (false lemma)

how does no false lemmas solve gettier cases?

lemma = premise accepted as true

• case 1 - cannot be considered knowledge because the ‘justification’ includes a false belief/lemma

• P1 jones has 10 coins in his pocket (smith has seen them)

• P2 jones will get the job (smith was told this)

• C the person who gets the job will have 10 coins in his pocket

• however P2 is a false belief/lemma - the conclusion cannot be knowledge even though it is jtb

criticism of no false lemmas - fake barn county

• in fake barn county the locals create fake barns that look identical to real barns

• henry is driving through fake barn county but doesnt know the locals do this

• henry thinks “theres a barn” when he looks at the fake barns - these beliefs are not knowledge because they are not true

• however henry later looks at the ONLY real barn and thinks “theres a barn” - this belief is true, justified by his visual perception, and not inferred from anything false

• according to the nfl definition henry’s belief is knowledge

• however henry has no idea that the other barns are fake - he is simply lucky in looking at the only real barn - so jtbn are not jointly sufficient for knowledge

criticism of no false lemmas - zagzebski

• dr jones has strong inductive evidence (symptoms and lab test) that patient smith has virus X - uses this justification to form the belief “smith has virus X”

• however smith’s symptoms and lab results are due to an unknown virus Y

• coincidentally, after the tests were performed but before dr jones saw the results, smith caught virus X

• dr jones’ belief is true, justified, and not inferred from a false lemma - but only due to epistemic luck

• so jtbn cannot be jointly sufficient for knowledge

infallibilism definition

• we should only count as knowledge those things which we cannot rationally doubt e.g. that you exist, that 2+2=4

s knows that p iff:

1. p is true

2. s believes that p

3. s has a justification which guarantees the truth of p

how does infallibilism solve gettier cases?

• case 1 - cannot be considered knowledge as smith’s justification is not infallible (impossible to be wrong)

• he is told by the president of the company that jones will get the job - the president could have been wrong, lying, or even a hallucination

• we can rationally doubt that e.g. jones will get the job - therefore smith’s belief cannot constitute knowledge

infallibilism - knowledge vs belief

• some infallibilists distinguish between knowledge and belief - knowledge is not a type of belief but entirely separate

• beliefs = doubt is possible, knowledge = doubt is not possible

• price - you know you are in pain and you cannot be wrong about this - it makes no sense to also say you believe you are in pain, because you know you are and knowledge cannot be doubted

  • someone else may observe you and infer that you are in pain - they hold a belief about your pain but cannot know it - there is an alternative possibility where e.g. you are faking it

  • however you yourself cannot doubt you are in pain - so you know you are

criticism of infallibilism

• goes against our intuition that we can know lots of things - implies that we have very little knowledge about the world - we need to maintain some connection with common usage of the term ‘knowledge’ to really be analysing the concept at all

reliabilism definition

s knows that p iff:

1. p is true

2. s believes that p

3. s’s belief that p was formed through a reliable cognitive process e.g. senses, memory, trustworthy sources

• replaces ‘justified’ with ‘reliably formed’

advantages of reliabilism

• accounts for how animals and children can have knowledge

• e.g. jtb would not allow this as they cant justify their beliefs

• reliabilist can claim that animals have evolved to have reliable processes of vision, cognition, memory etc. - allowing them to interact successfully with the world - so we can say they have knowledge about it

how does reliabilism solve gettier-style cases?

• the basic definition of reliabilism does not seem to solve most gettier-style cases - they are based on fairly reliable processes e.g. henry in fake barn county, his belief is caused by visual perception

• could redefine processes in a way that affects how reliable it is - close up visual perception of an object is generally reliable for forming true beliefs

  • we could instead call it a case of ‘visual identification in highly deceptive circumstances’ (the other fake barns placed around) - which is therefore not reliable

• goldman - should count a process as reliable if it can distinguish between truth and other relevant possibilities

  • e.g. imagine you know two identical twins - you bump into one and believe it is A - you are right - if you would not be able to tell if it was B, your process of identification is not reliable enough - you could not distinguish between truth and relevant alternatives - if you can tell them apart, however, you would know that it was A

  • fake barn county - henry cannot distinguish between seeing a real barn and a fake one as he previously believed “theres a barn” when looking at the fake barns - so his belief when looking at the real barn was not formed through a reliable process - so does not constitute knowledge

virtue epistemology definition

zagzebski - s knows that p iff:

1. s believes that p

2. s’s belief that p arises from an act of intellectual virtue

• replaces ‘justified’ with ‘virtuously formed’

• intellectual virtues = being rational, caring about the truth etc.

(ve) zagzebski - argument against truth condition + definition of knowledge

• definitions following ‘true belief + third condition’ will always fall victim to gettier-style cases

1. start with a situation where a belief fits the definition but is false due to bad luck e.g. henry thinking “there’s a barn” when looking at the fake barns

2. change the situation to one where a belief fits the definition and is true due to good luck e.g. henry looking at the one real barn

3. in case 2 the belief still fits the definition because it is basically the same as the first case - but case 2 will not be knowledge because it is only true due to luck

• this formula will always defeat a ‘true belief + third condition’ definition - the truth and third condition are added together but NOT linked - the belief is not apt - leaving a gap where lucky cases can incorrectly fit the definition

• so we should remove the truth condition altogether leaving:

1. s believes that p

2. s’s belief that p arises from an act of intellectual virtue

• truth of the belief is implied by the idea of an act of intellectual virtue - it requires having the correct motivation (you want to find the truth) and succeeding as a result of that virtue (your belief turns out to be true because you acted virtuously)

sosa’s AAA model

• archer analogy:

1. accuracy - an arrow hitting a target - an accurate belief is true

2. adroitness - a shot being skilful - an adroit belief is formed by intellectual virtue (even if not true)

3. aptness - a shot that is accurate BECAUSE it was adroit - an apt belief is true as a direct consequence of the believer exercising their intellectual virtues

• knowledge is apt belief

how does virtue epistemology solve gettier-style cases?

• sosa - knowledge is apt belief - accurate because it is adroit - belief must be true as direct consequence of the believer exercising intellectual virtues

• zagzebski - gettier-style cases are a problem for ‘true belief + third condition’ definitions because the truth and third condition (e.g. justified, reliably formed) are not linked - leaves a gap where beliefs can be true due to luck

• gettier case 1 - smith’s belief “the person who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket” is accurate and somewhat adroit (counting the coins, being told by the manager) - however it is not apt, just coincidentally true

sosa’s ve - response to fake barn county

• henry’s belief seems to fit the AAA model - his belief is accurate (there is a barn), adroit (formed by visual perception) and apt (accurate because it is adroit) - should be a case knowledge but many would not agree - suggests sosa’s account is flawed

• sosa counters that henry does have a form of knowledge he termed ‘animal knowledge’ - which other animals can have too

• human knowledge requires ability to be aware of how apt a belief is - to reflect on your belief

  • a skilful archer shoots on a windy day and hits the bullseye - the archer knows that some element of luck is involved due to the wind - the shot is still apt but the archer can reflect and form a belief about how lucky (or not) the shot was

• henry is unaware he is in fake barn county and does not know that all the other barns he sees are fake - he cannot reflect on his belief to determine whether it is apt, or how lucky it is - therefore he has animal knowledge NOT human knowledge

• if henry was aware of his unusual context, he would then be able to reflect on his belief to have human knowledge