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Restall 2003
Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest
Conquistadors were free agents and not an organised state army
Centralization of the Spanish state only began in 17th century
Racial identities and solidarities are a modern construct
Local rivalries took precedence over rivalries with Europe
Key example: Tlaxacalans allied with Spanish to destroy Mexica City; ratio of 200,000 Tlaxacalans to 6000 Spanish
Clulow 2014
Dutch and Tokugawa Japan
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) behaved like a supplicant towards the Tokugawa Shogunate
Had to adhere to local diplomatic customs
Genocides and violence on the “spice islands” of South East Asia
1627- Dutch embassy landed in Edo+ fled 1 month later- without seeing the shogun
Periods of violence+ European technological advancement- not the overall picture of these centuries
When Dutch’s “rights” to sovereignty and diplomacy were asserted, conflicts resulted, ended in VOC withdrawal
European status and legitimacy questioned
Lockhart 1999
Of the Indies
Impact of Spanish and Portugese colonisation in South America- how it was uneven
Sedentary, well resourced societies- attacked more and resisted less; non sedentary groups were less predictable
Mobile societies were more likely to be enslaved
Many people did not have direct contact with the Spanish- relatively small force
Indigenous factionalism+ conflicts continued under early Spanish rule
Zhang 2014
Europeans as Chinese supplicants- 1513- 1793
Often narrated deterministically- as backstory to Opium Wars
3 centuries before 1842- China was the dominant partner
Europe wanted to integrate China into the international order for their own benefit; China was less dependent- 16th century
1400-1700- China had more advanced military, invented, cannons and gunpowder
Europe had to adopt Chinese norms to trade with them
Key examples- the British Macartney Embassy 1793- rejected by Emperor Qianlong, 1540s-50s Jesuit missionaries- had to learn to speak+ write local languages to get access+ confront China’s “intellectually sophisticated” culture
Quirk and Richardson 2013
Europe and Africa- 1450-1850
4 centuries of trade, including slave trade
Traders and African rulers traded with Europeans, including in people, on relatively even terms
Europeans relied on local guides to navigate difficult terrains and unfamiliar diseases
French 2021
Covers 1471-WW2
Slavery existed pre the transatlantic slave trade, but the the chattel model based on the black/white binary race hierarchy was a newer construction
Black African was made into a prominent identity in IR
Portugal+ Spain’s 1600s “takeoff” was enabled by a precious metals mining boom in South America
This depended on African slave labour (e.g. Brazil)
Sugar plantations then replaced silver mining as the “boom” of 17-1800s
Africa was advantageously resourced and located for the “triangular boom” of sugar+ cotton production through chattel slavery
Benton 2014
Sovereignty, law and European Empires from 1400-1900
Sovereignty+ the enforcement of boundaries- more porous
Borders and laws were often created due to intraimperial competition
Empires functioned on the discrepancy of law between colonies and metropoles
People often look back to early stages of empire+ look for continuities/early signs of modern state sovereignty
Uneven delegation of authority + degree of law across colonial territories
Key example- 19th century India- princely states, never directly controlled, but swore alliegance; princes were key in helping the British to crush 1857 rebellions- unevenness of colonial law+ administration
What type of scholar is Kenneth Waltz?
He is a neorealist/ defensive realist
Waltz 1979
The international system is anarchic, Hobbesian, risk of large scale violence
How the system conditions states takes priority over individual behaviour
States are rational actors who seek to maximise their own security
Model based on the balance of power between states
Self help system- influenced by state competition in market- microeconomics
Interdependency creates vulnerability- often subordinate economic gain to political interest
What type of theorist is Mearsheimer?
Neorealist/offensive realist
Mearsheimer 2001
Great power always seek to maximise their power over other states
This leads to security dilemmas
Anarchic system promotes aggressive rather than cautious behaviour
Military strength are a dominant source of power
States are rational actors who are strategic about their survival
Balancing leads to collective action problems+ free riding- states rely on others states’ efforts over challenging a stronger power
Key example- Pearl Harbour 1941- US let Europe deal with the Nazis+ Imperial Japan until it couldn’t be avoided
Net zero/green energy transition- no state wants to be first to make radical changes+ lose fossil fuel revenue to states who move later
How does classical realism differ from neorealism?
Rejects the rational actor assumption and realpolitik
Focusses on tragic qualities+ fallibility of people and power politics
Thucydides- tragedies of character e.g. hubris, overcommitment to values, tragic decision making (Covid lockdown- economy vs life), competition between value commitments
Tony Blair Iraq- clash of ideals, loyalties, hubris
Morgenthau 1948
Politics Among Nations
Predates Waltz and Mearsheimer
Rejects rationalism- inherent tragic forces of human nature
Combines 3 images- human nature, anarchic regime type+ structural constraints
States pursue power, even when it leads to tragedy
Ideological justifications are often made up to cloak power motives
Key example- Cold War (alliance in WW2- shift in power relations then ideologically justified), Vietnam War- tragic result of power politics
System must account for human nature- diplomacy+ balance of power
What type of scholar is Morgenthau?
Classical realist
What are the key tenets of liberal internationalism?
2nd and 3rd image explanation- how domestic regime interacts with international system
Commerce and international law as engines of peace
Free trade increases interdependency which reduces the likelihood of conflict
Emphasis on building international institutions and encouraging countries to take on liberal norms and values
Doyle 1986
Democratic peace theory
Argues it is empirically accurate that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other
The voter accountability of democracy and the trade impacts of war make war unappealing
Other theorists have questioned whether causality can be tied back to democracy- rather than power of the US as hegemon, geopolitical considerations
Keohane 1984
(Neo)liberal institutionalism
Liberal rational actor assumption+ emphasise of anarchic structure of IR
States want to maximise wealth and compete like firms in a market
Building institutions improves the flow of information, allows trade+ cooperation, increases predictability of partners
States are self interested, but institutions can create institutions that positively harness this motivation
What are key points of constructivism/ Ruggie 1998
Reject “neo-utilitarianism” of rational actor theories+ economic/power maximization logic
Draw on social norms, ideologies, psychology and identities
State identities are formed intersubjectively- a state is not recognised as a state/great power until other states recognise it as one
Sovereignty is especially intersubjective
IR system is “social space”
Relationship histories inform how states behave- e.g. why the USA might have a realist attitude toward North Korea, but not UK, which also has a sizeable nuclear arsenal
Wendt 1992
Constructivism
State friendships trump conditions of anarchy- states that trust each other will risk greater dependency
Intersubjective character of IR
Key example- NATO makes Europe hugely reliant on America, but European states took this risk based on their trust+ history with America as an ally
What is Mitzen’s (2006) theoretical position and key contribution?
Constructivist work
Ontological security- the idea that states will move to secure their identities
Keep a “stable cognitive environment” is what allows states to exercise agency
Habitual routinised interactions help states build relationship where they can rely on and trust each other
States will take risks for identities and ideological reasons
Key examples- Cold War, Russia Ukraine, Oslo Accords (both Israelis and Palestinians saw themselves as security seekers but couldn’t be sure of each other- prevented them from using their agency to rationally secure peace/ curb aggression
Led to Israeli settlers exploting loopholes+ Palestinian authority not cracking down on terror groups/militants
What are vertical and horizontal enforcement and which one is present in IR?
Vertical enforcement= enforcement from above, the state+ the police, army, prison system, impose authority over citizens
Horizontal enforcement= enforcement among citizens, or in this case states- includes diplomacy, international law, treaties and alliances
How do vertical and horizontal enforcement work in terms of human rights?
Human rights do not have a centralized enforcement mechanism
Vertical enforcement to some extent at the level of the state- international human rights are written into national law
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International- NGOS which use shame+ reputational incentives to try and get state to adhere
States who adopt HRs cynically will then face pressure from activists based on having signed it
What are the 3 key components of regulating the use of force?
Jus ad bellum (meeting the conditions necessary to use force)
Jus in bello (regulating the actions of conflicting parties/ proportionate use of force)
Decline of war thesis
Why does Fazal (2012) argue that states no longer declare war?
Norm of jus in bello has made declarations of war far more costly- framework for legal action, citizens’ protest
Challenge- anti-war movements still respond when war isn’t formally declared- see Iraq, Vietnam wars
Complicates prosecution- atrocities at Abu Ghraib
Public declarations in terms of declaring state’s law- declined as normal behaviour
What argument does Zacher (2001) make about the territorial integrity norm?
Liberal leaning argument
Written in the context of rising democracies, EU expansion
Traces the development of the territorial integrity norm
Emergence after WW1, development between 1945-1976, institutionalization post 1976
Conditions which allowed TIN to flourish:
Stability of Western democracies that pushed in in 20th century
Fear of major war in Cold War
Declining economic importance of land/territory
How does Altman 2020 argue that the decline in territorial conquest has been misinterpreted?
Altman looks at data from 151 conquest attempts from 1918 to 2018
He argues that attempts to conquer small territories such as provinces persisted
One state has attempted to absorb another 4 times since 1945
Brute force replaced by “fait accompli”- imposing limited gains without permissions in the hope adversaries will relent
22 non violent conquest attempts over last century
Significant interventions/use of force by international community to back up TIN have been uncommon
Key example- Russia Crimea- territory was taken without a full scale conquest
Contrasts- Zacher’s rise of TIN reading
How does Kinsella (2024) expose the coloniality of the 1863 General Orders 100?
1863 General Orders 100, based on the laws of war as formulated by Francis Lieber
Lieber believed in American settler colonialism
Distinction between revenge and retaliation, encoded “savage”- influenced later laws that governed war
Uneven application- American government was not held to its own humanitarian conventions during the dispossession of the Native Americans
Uneven enforcement of sovereignty- Native American sovereignty was not respected
Continuity- Israeli settlers, US government supporting Israel- uneven enforcement of humanitarian principles, humanitarian rights violations by settler colonialism in West Bank
What are St Thomas Aquinas’ 3 principles of a just war? (Medieval history of use of force)
It should be waged by a sovereign authority
It must have just cause (punishing wrongdoing/wrongdoers)
A just cause must be accompanied by the right intention
History of regulating the use of force
Post WW1, League of Nations- 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact- article committing to “condemn recourse to war” and to “renounce it as an instrument of national policy”
End of WW2- UN Charter- enshrined the territorial integrity norm, sovereignty, banning the use of force
Force allowed- when authorised by the UN Security Council, self defence, this self defence must be proportional
What are areas of complexity regarding the UN Security Council’s rules on the just use of force?
When can states lawfully use force against nonstate actors
Key example- post 9/11 UN Security Council issued a resolution suggesting a strong mandate to allow the use of force against terrorist groups
The Bush administration security strategy was based around the right to pre-emptive self defence
This contradicts the rule of force as a last resort
Can states engage in preemptive self defence
What are 2 examples of the Bush administration and the American army suspending the humanitarian laws of war?
Abu Ghraib Prison Iraq
2003- early stages of the invasion of Iraq
Department of Justice authorised “enhanced interrogation techniques”- torture, rape, sexual humiliation, sleep deprivation, use of hoods, playing loud music, dogs
Bagram Prison Afghanistan 2002
Civilian prisoners put in chains and beaten, leading to several deaths
Culture of impunity among the United States forces- part of War on Terror
What is the case of the Srebrenica massacre and what principles of international humanitarian law is it connected to?
1995 genocide of 8000 Bosnian men and boys of Muslim origin
Serbia claimed it was retaliation for violence by the Bosnian army against Bosnian Serb civilians
ICJ found it to be genocide
1995- NATO intervened militarily, which brought the conflict to a quicker end
60,000 US and NATO troops stayed to enforce peace
Successful intervention for US led LIO in 1990s
How does Mearsheimer (2019) diagnose the fall of the LIO?
Trump is a symptom of the LIO crumbling, not the cause
Inherent tension of sovereignty vs delegating decision-making to international institutions (e.g. EU migration)
Globalisation+ free markets have led to labour leaving the West- backlash from lower and middle classes
The rise of China- undermines the unipolarity of the LIO, which is the only way it can survive
What does European support for Ukraine in the war show about the LIO?
Several large European states still support the territorial integrity norm (France, United Kingdom, Poland etc)
LIO under pressure- Germany with AfD, illiberal leaders like Fico, Orban
Support not backed by military means, or America
Given Putin more bargaining power, as he has more military power, younger average age of conscripts
What do Alder Nissen and Zarakol argue with regards to the LIO?
Paper from 2021
Merging of different discontents with the system
Hollowing out from within- Western voters, illiberal actors within like Orban
Accelerated by digital social media+ decline of global ideologies since Cold War
LIO seen as a bureaucracy that “did not exist” in better economic times for majoritarian ethnic groups, working classes
Resentment among Global South states of LIO “status community” and hypocrisy, which has prevented true equality between members
Russia can play the middle man effectively- destabilises international institutions from within+ runs interference in Western liberal democracies, Kremlin finances far right in Hungary and Turkey
Lawson and Zarakol 2023- what do they say about hypocrisy and the LIO?
The hypocrisy charge is a common one
As a unipolar order, with the USA as hegemon, it has broken norms and international law and not lost its standing in the inner circle
Taiwan’s democracy has strengthened, whilst the USA’s has weakened, but Taiwan has not been let into the core of the LIO
CEE countries seen as “queue jumping” when the Cold War ended AND have not been punished for democratic backsliding
LIO challenged from left wing, postcolonial critiques+ illiberal actors simultaneously