The road to independence, 1942 - 1948

Atlantic Charter 1941

Context

• The Second World War

Key features

• Even before the USA had joined the war, Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed the basis of their co-operation in the Atlantic Charter which included support for 'sovereign rights and self-government' 

Significance

• Churchill interpreted sovereign rights as applying to countries which had been conquered, whereas the status quo would apply to Britain and its Empire 

• Roosevelt saw it as a fundamental principle applying to all. Accordingly, he pushed Churchill to concede to nationalist demands in India 

Links to events after

• In March 1942, Churchill agreed that the lord privy seal, Sir Stafford Cripps, would be sent to India to discuss the implications of the declaration on dominion status made in August 1940, in order to secure full Indian cooperation and support for the war effort 

Fall of Singapore February 1942

Context

• By the beginning of 1942, the Allies' position in all war zones was desperate 

  • Hitler's armies controlled the Balkans and had invaded Russia 

  • Rommel was within striking distance of the Suez Canal in Egypt 

  • France (and most of Western Europe) had fallen to Nazi onslaught 

• After launching a lightning strike on the US naval base of Pearl Harbour in December 1941 and propelling the USA into the war, Japan swept through South East Asia and took Shanghai, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Indochina and Thailand 

Key features

• On 15 February 1942, Singapore, previously believed to be unconquerable, fell, with the loss of a British battleship and battle cruiser two weeks after 

• Japan was able to push on into Burma, capturing Rangoon in March and Mandalay 6 weeks later 

  • With Japan's declared aim of freeing Asians from European rule, invading troops were welcomed as liberators 

• The Japanese ships cruised at will around the Indian Ocean and Calcutta, Madras and other ports along the Bay of Bengal came under attack from Japan's ships and aircraft 

Significance

• In early March, Viceroy Linlithgow confessed that he did not have sufficient armed forces in India to hold out against a Japanese landing on the Cuttack coast and could not prevent an advance in Orissa 

  • All he could suggest, in response to a possible land-borne invasion in Bengal, was a scorched-earth policy 

• The sea-borne threat to India was only removed when the US Navy defeated the Japanese at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 

• There remained a fear of land-borne invasion and of German and Japanese forces linking up in the Middle East 

Links to events after

• Against this background Winston Churchill appointed Sir Stafford Cripps to lead a delegation to India in order to secure full cooperation and support for the war effort 

Cripps Mission March - April 1942

Context

• At the start of 1942 the war was going badly for Britain, with a series of major losses in the East, in particular the surrender of the fortress city of Singapore. After this, Japanese armies swiftly occupied British territory in Malaya and Burma and began pressing at the north-eastern border of India itself 

• Churchill was acutely aware that Britain's survival rested on the strategic support of the USA; he had no choice but to do as he wished 

• He was also pressured by war cabinet colleagues such as Clement Attlee and Leo Amery, and by the Allies, mainly the USA, USSR and China 

Key features

• Cripps was a Labour party minister, a friend of Nehru and Gandhi and personally sympathetic to Indian aspirations; there was much optimism on the Indian side when he arrived in new Delhi on 23 March 1942 

• Cripps had two parts to his brief: 

  • To explain and win backing for the August 1940 declaration by discussing the processes necessary to bring about dominion status 

  • To discuss arrangements for the duration of war on the basis of the 1935 Government of India Act with some minimal scope for additional Indian representatives on the Executive Council 

• Cripps made this offer to the Nationalists: 

  • Immediately after the war, steps will be taken to set up an elected body to create a new Constitution for India, which Indian States will participate in 

  • Any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution can retain its original constitutional position. Such non-acceding provinces could be given a new constitution giving them full status as Indian Union 

  • The British would retain control of Indian defence until the end of the war and the framing of the new constitution. The Executive Council should include with immediate effect an Indian as defence minister 

  • All Indian parties were also invited to join an interim government of national unity under the viceroy and his Council, which would operate until the end of the war 

Links to events after

• Both sides hardened their approach to constitutional change: 

  • Linlithgow stepped up press censorship and used more centralised Special Branch to intercept Congress communications. He ordered a search for information to allow him to suggest that Congress was pro-Nazi 

  • Congress launched the 'Quit India' campaign 

Quit India August - November 1942

Context

• Linlithgow stepped up press censorship and used more centralised Special Branch to intercept Congress communications. He ordered a search for information to allow him to suggest that Congress was pro-Nazi 

• The British government became aware of a planned civil disobedience campaign by the summer of 1942. Linlithgow's plan to arrest all the Congress leaders and deport them to Uganda, with Gandhi being sent to Aden (a British base in Yemen) collapsed when the governor of Aden said he would strongly object to Gandhi's presence if implemented. Colleagues pointed out that arrest warrants would lapse on board ship 

• Gandhi pressured Congress to support a new satyagraha, arguing that since Japan's aggression was aimed at Britain, if India became free it could make peace with Japan. 

• Congress disagreed, Nehru in particular refusing to have anything to do with supporting fascism. Nevertheless, Gandhi persisted, drawn to an idyllic rural life isolated from the rest of the world. He maintained that India should be left to God and if that was not possible, to anarchy 

• To commit to a satyagraha at such a critical time in Britain's struggle against the Axis powers seemed an act of great folly, or even treachery. It would set the Raj against Congress and make any reconciliation after the war incredibly difficult 

• However, to remain quiescent now might give the upper hand to Jinnah or Bose. Congress had to make its position clear and had to rally its supporters to the cause of swaraj. On 8 August 1942, Congress officially sanctioned Gandhi's satyagraha and the Quit India campaign was launched 

Key features

• 'Quit India' was shouted at British men, women and children as they went about their daily lives in India, and troops who were desperately trying to defend India's frontiers against the Japanese. Correctly guessing that the response from the Raj would be repression, Congress leaders called on their supporters to make India ungovernable before they could be imprisoned and silenced 

• In the three months Congress had spent deliberating on whether to support 'Quit India', the Raj had plenty of time to prepare contingency plans. On 9 August, Linlithgow ordered provincial governors to put into action prearranged plans for supressing the civil disobedience campaign, overriding the opposition of the Executive Council. 

• Gandhi, Nehru and most of Congress' leaders were arrested and interned. The Congress Working Committee was imprisoned in Ahmednagar Fort, but its members were allowed to meet freely and so continued political discussions. Gandhi was detained in the Aga Khan's palace at Poona  

• Within the next fortnight, thousands of local activists were rounded up and imprisoned. Offices were raided, files taken and funds frozen 

• In anticipation, Gandhi urged every demonstrator to 'become his or her own leader'. So began a horrific round of riots, killings, attacks on Europeans and damage to/destruction of government property:  

  • Revenue offices and police stations were targeted as usual, but stations and signal boxes were wrecked, railways tracks were torn up and telegraph and telephone boxes were pulled down (which was particularly alarming as India was anticipating Japanese attack) 

  • The initial Delhi hartal resulted in arson and the killing of 14 people by police. The leader of the Congress Socialist Party planned to seize Delhi in a guerrilla war, calling on US soldiers to support them. Unrest, arson and sabotage grew in mostly Hindu areas like Bihar, United Provinces, Bombay and Rajputana 

  • In response, the police shot on sight those breaking curfew and conducted public whippings; women were beaten with lathis and there were allegations of rape in custody. As violence escalated, policemen were burned to death while the British torched whole villages and used aircraft to machine-gun crowds 

• Over 1000 deaths and 3000 injuries were directly attributed to the Quit India campaign, and 500 were arrested without trial and denied visits 

Significance

• In New Delhi, the Revolutionary Movements Ordinance, a law giving the viceroy emergency powers, was implemented, struck down by the courts and reissued with slight amendments by the government. Linlithgow was determined to crack down and was oblivious to the mounting evidence that maintaining British order was more important than the British rule of law  

• By November 1942, the worst of the attacks were over, with the British using 57 infantry battalions to restore order. Quit India had failed to paralyse the government, even in militant Hindu areas like Bihar. The military remained loyal to the Raj. Even among India regiments, only 216 soldiers had gone absent without leave. The campaign had not attracted support throughout India in terms of geography, religion or caste. Non-cooperation had brought detention, despair and death 

• In the process of suppression, the British had lost their moral authority within India and with US public opinion, which once again saw the British as more interested in preserving their empire than defeating the common enemies of democracy 

• The Indian members of the Executive Council all resigned, while Gandhi declared from his palace-prison that he would undertake a 3 week fast in February 1943. Churchill called him a 'humbug' and a 'rascal' and demanded that his water be checked for secret nutrition. Linlithgow announced that he would not submit to 'blackmail and terror' and made preparations for the eventuality of Gandhi's death 

Wavell as Viceroy June 1943

Context

• Churchill had twice extended Linlithgow's term of office, largely to maintain the suppression of the Quit India civil disobedience movement. Now that was under control, there was no need to postpone the choice of a new viceroy. Both Leo Amery (the secretary of state for India) and Clement Attlee (the Labour Party Leader) were considered 

Key features

• In October 1943, Field Marshal Archibald Wavell was appointed viceroy of India. Outstandingly successful in the Middle East in 1940 until he was forced to transfer to Greece, Wavell was appointed to India as commander-in-chief just as the Japanese struck in South East Asia 

• Churchill's choice suggests a continuation of a hard line driven by military considerations. Another view is that Wavell was considered stolid and safe, ideal for what Churchill wanted in a viceroy but not a top general. The 'promotion' to viceroy was a useful way of putting General Claude Auchinleck in his place as commander-in-chief 

Significance

• Wavell took over an India which was paying vast sums towards the war effort. Britain was promising to repay afterwards but the total in 1942 was already £800 million 

• Wavell started his time in office by touring the subcontinent on a fact-finding mission, travelling as far as 1500km a week by plane, train, jeep and car. He focused particularly on troubled areas, such as the Punjab, Bengal and the United Provinces, trying to allay fears, settle disputes and boost morale 

• One of his first moves was to reinstate regular meetings of the 11 governors of the provinces of British India; during his 7 years as viceroy, Linlithgow had not called a single such meeting. This enabled the Government of India to present the British government with coherent advice and a unified point of view. It also made it much more difficult for the British government to dismiss the views of provincial governors out of hand 

Links to events after

• Wavell took action to respond to the Bengal Famine 

• Wavell sets up the Simla Conference 

Bengal Famine 1943 - 1944

Context

• Caused by: 

  • Run of poor harvests and distribution failures – the crop yield in 1943 was the worst that century 

  • Loss of imports 

  • Wartime price inflation 

  • Severe weather conditions - cyclone 

Key features

• The starving crowded into Calcutta in their thousands, in desperate hope of finding relief, begging and dying in the streets 

• Fear of a Japanese invasion encouraged hoarding on the part of those who could afford to buy and there was fear that the famine would work as a recruiting agent for the INA 

• It's estimated between 1 and 3 million died in the three years of the Bengal Famine and in some areas whole villages were wiped out 

• Ration cards limited to the wealthy/homeowners 

• Begging for phan (leftover rice water) 

• The annual death rate rose above the average of 1.2 million to 1.9 million 

  • People died from smallpox, malaria, cholera and pneumonia, and diseases associated with malnutrition 

Significance

• By May 1943, the price of rice had risen tenfold and Wavell took immediate action to coordinate rationing and try to stop profiteering, diverting troops from the war effort to do so 

  • Wavell tried to buy more grain for India, but unfortunately Churchill listened to the advice he wanted to hear – from Lord Cherwell (paymaster-general and one of the government's scientific advisors) in particular, who claimed that the Bengal Famine was a statistical invention 

  • Wavell's request for a guaranteed million tonnes of grain throughout 1944 was met with an offer of 250,000 tonnes and a request for Indian rice. Nevertheless, by June 1944, Wavell had extracted 450,000 tonnes of grain from a reluctant government 

• Churchill originally refused to divert British merchant shipping in order to take grain to starving Bengal and Roosevelt refused when asked to lend American ships to bring in wheat from Australia. Both leaders were afraid of damaging their own war effort 

• Jinnah accused the British government of incompetence and irresponsibility, pointing out that Churchill's government wouldn't have lasted 5 minutes if people had been dying on the streets of London as they were in Calcutta 

• Congress blamed the crisis on the diversion of foodstuffs to the British troops 

Simla Conference June - July 1945

Context

• In November 1944, Wavell requested consideration of a political initiative. For five months, the war cabinet put off responding and eventually left it to the India Committee to reject Wavell's request. Wavell protested and was invited to London in March 1945 to make his case 

• Britain was millions of pounds in debt to India for goods and services borrowed to help win the war 

• Terrorist activity and unrest in India 

• Economic advisor John Maynard Keynes presented the war cabinet with a financial analysis that showed that running the British Empire had cost £1000 million for each of the past two years, rising post-war to £1400 million per year. Without US financial aid, Britain would go bankrupt 

• In April 1945, Roosevelt died. He had been a loyal but critical friend of the British when defeat had seemed possible. A new president might not be so tolerant of British problems of their own making 

• Churchill's mind was on managing victory parades and the first general election since 1935. Almost as a way of getting Wavell out of his sight, Churchill agreed to a national conference of Indian political leaders 

Key features

• Congress leaders were released from prison so that they could attend and some 21 political leaders travelled to Simla, including Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru and Azad (the Muslim president of Congress) 

• The Executive Council was to be chosen in a way that would give a balanced representation of the main communities, including equal proportions of Muslims and Hindus. All members would be Indian, with the exception of the viceroy and the commander-in-chief, felt to be essential for as long as the defence of Indian remained a British responsibility 

Significance

• Parties were divided as to how Muslim members of the newly reconstituted Executive Council were to be chosen: 

  • Jinnah insisted they must all be nominated by the Muslim League 

  • Congress could not accept such a restriction, maintaining that, as Congress was an inclusive party, Muslims should be able to represent Congress as well. Parity with Muslims would inflate the importance of the Muslim constituency in India 

• The governors of the Punjab and Bengal advised Wavell to set out the consequences of creating a Pakistan in order to test the true strength of Jinnah's support in these two crucial provinces with their own Muslim leaders. Instead, Wavell proposed an Interim Council, with a membership list drawn up by himself. This was rejected by Jinnah, who sensed his growing popular strength with every refusal to compromise 

• On 14 July, Wavell adjourned the Conference, having been unable to break the deadlock between Congress and the Muslim League 

Links to events after

• Shortly after, the British electorate voted to throw out Churchill in favour of the socialist Attlee at the head of a Labour government committed to radical social reform 

 

Labour government in Britain June 1945

Context

• Labour politicians were generally more sympathetic towards Indian independence 

Key features

• On 26^th July, the Labour Party won the British general election 

  •  Nehru was jubilant; he had always felt ideologically closer to Clement Attlee than the Conservatives. As early as 1938, Labour politicians had held a private meeting with Nehru at Stafford Cripps' house about passing an independence bill when they came to power. Since then, demands for separate Muslim representation had grown stronger; the question was not whether power should be transferred, but to whom 

Significance

• Attlee lost no time in putting his India Committee together 

  • Lord Pethick-Lawrence, with an academic (and not necessarily pragmatic) approach to Indian politics, became secretary of state for India 

  • Arthur Henderson, a junior minister, spoke on his behalf in the Commons, enabling Attlee and Chancellor of the Exchequer Stafford Cripps to take parliamentary control of matters relating to India 

  • They were joined by the education minister (Ellen Wilkinson) the former India secretary (William Wedgwood Benn, now Viscount Stansgate) and the Earl of Listowel (who had been a junior minister at the India Office during the war)  

• Congress had forged links with the Labour Party and its MPs for decades, which they relied on it give voice to the opinions of Congress in the British press and the House of Commons. Stafford Cripps and Jawaharlal Nehru had a deep friendship; both men were highly educated, highly intellectual and dedicated to radical reform of their respective countries.  

  • One like-minded politician was Krishna Menon, a London-based Indian socialist who was the driving force behind the India League (an organisation dedicated to campaigning throughout the UK for Indian independence). He did much to create and maintain Labour-Congress links and was a strong advocate for Nehru as India's future leader 

• The Muslim League had no such connection with any British political party and, within the ranks of leadership, there grew the strong suspicion that Labour was anti-Muslim 

Links to events after

• Cabinet Mission 

• Second Simla Conference 

• Interim government 

• Plan Balkan  

• Partition 

Elections Winter 1946

Context

• The Labour government's India Committee (dominated by Cripps) recommended that elections should be held throughout India to allow people to choose their own representatives to a constituent assembly. They suggested elections be held to the assemblies of the 11 provinces of British India and to the central assemblies in New Delhi 

  • This would give a clear indication as to Indian opinion and pave the way for negotiations about a final political settlement 

  • Meanwhile, they has little to suggest beyond setting up a constitution-making body of unelected Indians serving as the viceroy's council and to resurrect the Cripps offer of 1942 

• The British in India were concerned because: 

  • The India Committee had not fully understood the strength of the movement for a separate Pakistan 

  • They hadn't factored in to their deliberations the animosity between Nehru and Jinnah 

• A small fact-finding group of MPs had made an unannounced visit to India with the aim of trying to gauge the strength of support for a separate Pakistan 

  • In private, some of the group conceded that this would be necessary to avoid Muslim unrest. Work began in secret to determine how such a partition would be achieved, with Wavell in particular being anxious that as much groundwork as possible was done in preparation for the unpleasantness of announcing the actual boundary lines (should an official declaration be made) 

  • It was immediately clear that the Punjab, with a Muslim-dominated west, a Hindu-dominated east and 5 million Sikhs spread throughout the province, would become a focus of discontent. The Sikh holy city of Amritsar was surrounded by a Muslim-majority area, potentially cut off in a future Pakistan 

Key features

• Congress won 90% of all available seats 

• The Muslim League won 75% of all Muslim votes, 90% of all seats reserved for Muslims in the provinces and all 30 seats reserved for Muslims in the central assembly 

• Congress formed governments in eight provinces and the Muslim League in 2 (Bengal and Sind). The only province where the Congress-Muslim League polarisation was not clear was in the Punjab, where a non-Muslim coalition took control even though the Muslim League polled the largest number of votes and took 75 of the 88 Muslim seats 

Significance

• Congress was shocked to realise that it would have to face up to the Muslim League and their Pakistan campaign 

• In provinces where Muslims were in a minority, there was very strong Muslim vote for Muslim League candidates as opposed to provinces standing independently of the League. These were provinces that could never realistically expect to be part of a geographical Pakistan so implied support for a separate Muslim state to which they might travel 

• In the areas which were already Muslim-majority there appeared to be more interest and confidence in maintaining local power. In Bengal, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, the local Muslim League leader, tried to form a regional coalition with Congress in order to campaign for a united, and possibly independent, Bengal. In Sind, the local Muslim League broke away from the national organisation with the aim of autonomy – an independent mini Pakistan 

• In the North West Frontier Province, the Pathan tribes, although Muslim, were loyal to their leader, who was against the Muslim League and the idea of Pakistan. Accordingly, Congress held power in this far-flung area 

Links to events after

• Following the election results, Jinnah felt he had enough supporters to call for Direct Action 

 

Cabinet Mission March - June 1946

Context

• The Labour government was pledged to implement Indian independence 

 

Key features

• The formal brief was to consult about setting up a process whereby Indian independence could be 'determined by Indians with the minimum of disturbance and the maximum of speed'. Attlee insisted that the Mission did everything possible to maintain a united India; this would seem to rule out a separate Pakistan, but did not preclude the existence of separate Muslim-dominated states within a Hindu-dominated India 

• The confidential brief was not just to listen but to create positive desire for a speedy transferral of power 

 

Significance

• The three men remained in India for three months, determined to break the deadlock between Congress and the Muslim League: 

  • Gandhi argued forcefully that power should be handed to Congress, as it was the election winner 

  • Jinnah, realising that a separate Pakistan could only come from a British position, waited. They need cooperation in order to avoid disorder and present an agreed peaceful transfer to the world 

• The Sikhs, a vulnerable minority, were ignored 

• The princes had separate treaties with the British and could not be forced to amalgamate with an independent India 

• The British delegation undermined themselves as: 

  • Pethick-Lawrence wanted Indian independence so much that he left the British no bargaining power. He tended to agree with every demand, earning him the secret nickname 'Pathetic Lawrence' 

  • Cripps enjoyed holding secret meetings but then made no secret of his closeness with Gandhi 

Links to events after

• Indian leaders were invited to Simla to discuss the two constitutional options proposed by the Cabinet Mission and approved by the British Cabinet 

Second Simla Conference May 1946

Context

• The Cabinet Mission consulted Congress and the Muslim League about how they wanted independence to look 

Key features

• Indian leaders were invited to Simla to discuss the two constitutional options proposed by the Cabinet Mission and approved by the British Cabinet. Congress and the Muslim League were each invited to send 4 representatives 

  • The Mission's hope was that Congress would hate the fall-back proposition of two states and would opt for the main proposition  

  • Muslim League (though obviously preferring the second option) would accept the first, because the opt-out clause would allow for a separate Pakistan, reached by a democratic process 

  • The British cabinet was concerned about the viability of a Pakistani state in itself as well as the effect of splitting the Indian armed forces 

  • There is some evidence that the British regarded a future Pakistan as more loyal to British strategic interests in central Asia than a future India 

• The first option provided a three-tier federal structure within a united India: 

  • An All-India Union, responsible for defence, foreign policy and international communication, together with powers to raise finances to fund these three elements, and governed by an executive legislature 

  • There would be three clusters of provincial governments 

    • Congress' Hindu heartland of Madras, Bombay, Orissa and the United and Central Provinces 

    • Muslim and predominantly Muslim areas of Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Punjab 

    • Bengal and Assam, where the balance of religions was slightly in favour of Muslims 

  • Each provincial group would run its own government to be responsible for day-to-day running of provincial affairs 

  • The All-India Union would comprise elected representatives from each provincial group 

  • The regional groups could, after a period of time and a plebiscite, secede and become independent states 

• The Mission suggested a second, fall-back proposition would he the creation of two separate independent states of Hindustan and Pakistan. The two states would conclude formal treaties with each other but would have no common government 

 

Significance

• Gandhi, although not formally involved, turned up on a special train to announce that he would block any moves towards partition 

• Congress would not agree to either option, as they could both lead to a future Partition 

• Jinnah refused to speak to Maulana Azad, one of the two Muslim Congress representatives 

  • With hindsight, historians have speculated about the failing health of Jinnah. His public stance of waiting until people came round to the idea of Pakistan was at odds with his personal fear that he didn't have long to live. He wanted to see the birth of Pakistan and be its first leader; he couldn't afford to wait another ten years or more for plebiscites to take place 

  • If Congress and the British had known how seriously ill Jinnah was, they might have been tempted to slow down and wait for him to die in the hope that the momentum might go out of the Pakistan movement 

• After two full sessions of the conference, with no prospect of agreement, Pethick-Lawrence wound up proceedings 

Links to events after

• The failure of the Simla Conference prompted the Cabinet Mission to make the May statement 

  • The Cabinet Mission announced that they would create a Constituent Assembly, comprising representatives from the 11 British provinces, who would draft a constitution for a single Indian state with regional groupings 

• Congress refused to accept the May statement 

• Jinnah, emphasising the compromise he had made in agreeing that he creation of Pakistan could be left to the decision of the Constituent Assembly, accepted it on 6 June 

Direct Action Day July 1946

Context

• Wavell announced the imminent formation of an interim government on the basis of six Congress nominees, five from the Muslim League and three chosen by Wavell to represent minorities. When the Muslim League declined to nominate anyone, Wavell agreed that Congress should choose additional Muslim representatives.  

• The Muslim League responded by withdrawing its previous agreement to the May statement and instructed all Muslim officials to resign 

• Outraged at what he saw as the duplicity of both Congress and the Raj, convened his council of the League in Bombay on 27 July 1946 and repudiated all agreements made with the Cabinet Mission 

Key features

• On 29 July, Jinnah called for a universal Muslim hartal and urged Muslims to prepare for a day of Direct Action on 16 August 1946 

  • He felt that, despite all efforts from the Muslim League to find a peaceful solution through compromise and constitutional means, Congress and the British failed to respond to their concerns. He wanted the immediate establishment of Pakistan, which he believed could only be achieved through direct action 

  • He was confident of a show of strength because of the election results 

• The Raj were concerned about containing it: 

  • Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck, having made discreet enquiries among his India officers, found them to be loyal to their own concept of India, but privately warned Viceroy Wavell that he could not envisage Hindu firing at Hindu and Muslim shooting Muslim in any ensuing conflict 

  • Wavell and his governors were worried, as Congress effectively controlled ¾ of India. With the days of the Raj numbered, police loyalty would be swayed towards those who could inherit power and control; Wavell couldn't be sure he could contain the gathering storm 

• The symbolic purpose of the strike was a huge Muslim League procession through Calcutta. Jinnah's intention was entirely peaceful, and League leaders had persuaded the relatively new British governor of Bengal, Sir Frederick Burrows, to declare a public holiday, with the result that the army were withdrawn to the barracks 

  • The streets were given over to the mob; the tens of thousands of marching Muslims had provided themselves with lathis and rocks, either for self-defence or aggression. At the final mass rally, the chief minister of Bengal, H.S. Suhrawardy, is thought to have incited violence against local Hindus. As darkness fell, the crowd moved off and attacks began in the docks and the slums 

  • Within 72 hours, more than 5000 were dead, at least 20,000 were seriously injured and 100,000 made homeless. Muslim and Hindu murdered each other in an orgy of killing rioting, lynching, looting and arson that spread all over India 

Significance

• Congress held the governor responsible for failing to prepare for the rioting 

• Growing increasingly irritated by Gandhi, whom he had come to regard as a malevolent manipulator, Wavell was genuinely appalled when Gandhi remarked that if India wanted a bloodbath, she could have it 

• In a similar tone, Jinnah assured Wavell that Pakistan was worth the sacrifice of ten million Muslims 

• Congress, despite their numerical strength, now felt the injured party and began working outside formal negotiations. Gandhi warned Wavell that Congress would not try to calm any future troubles if that actually meant using British troops as a back-up. Gandhi briefed Congress' representatives in London to have private and secret conversations with Attlee, where his suggestion that Wavell be replaced as viceroy was accepted 

• Wavell's appeals to Congress and the Muslim League to call a halt to the killings fell on deaf ears.  

• In a secret conversation, Congress pressed for the removal of Wavell as viceroy, to which Attlee agreed. Wavell, hearing of this, felt undermined by Congress and the Labour government 

• Jinnah, having urged Direct Action, had shown himself to be a leader who either could not control the Muslim League or had been naïve in unleashing disorder, ruining his reputation for wise leadership 

• Any optimism that communities and their leaders might reach a compromise was destroyed. The slope towards partition on communal lines had tilted steeply 

Links to events after

• Mountbatten took over as viceroy 

Interim government September 1946

Context

• The Cabinet Mission, acting unilaterally, announced in the May Statement that they would set up an interim government to run India before the proposals of the Constituent Assembly could be put into effect. This would be composed solely of Indians, with the exception of Wavell as governor-general/viceroy 

  • Congress insisted that they chose all members (including Muslims for their section). A Sikh and a Christian representative were added, followed by a Dalit and then a Parsi 

  • Jinnah insisted that the Muslim League had to select Muslim members 

• In the June Statement, the Cabinet Mission announced that the viceroy would select members of the interim government for any group that did not immediately accept the May statement 

  • Not wishing to be excluded, Congress announced that they would agree to the original plan on 24 June, provided it was understood that individual states, and not groups of states, could opt out. In this way, they hoped to fragment any cohesive Pakistan that might emerge 

  • Cripps declined to rule out Congress' counter-interpretation, to the anger of Wavell and Jinnah 

  • On 27 June, feeling betrayed (by the lack of British response to Congress' counter-interpretation) Jinnah announced that constitutional methods had failed. He repudiated all agreements made with the Cabinet Mission and launched Direct Action 

Key features

• The interim government was sworn in on 2 September, with Nehru as prime minister 

  • The viceroy was still nominally responsible for the governance of India and in charge of relations with princely states but in reality had to carry out the decisions of Indian ministers and the Executive Council. This effectively meant carrying out the wishes of Congress 

  • Nehru took on responsibility for foreign affairs and Sardar Patel, Congress' general secretary, took on home affairs. Here, Patel insisted that intelligence reports were sent to the Congress administration, thus effectively sidelining to the viceroy 

  • Relations between Nehru and Patel had broken down since the elections for Congress president in April 1946. Patel had secured the votes of twelve of the fifteen provincial committees, but Gandhi had made it clear he wanted Nehru, and therefore it was decided 

  • Wavell finally managed to persuade a reluctant Jinnah to join the government in October. The Muslim did not have a veto over legislation concerning Muslims as it had previously demanded. Refusing to join the Executive Council because of Nehru's presence, Jinnah sent Liaquat Ali Khan instead 

  • Hoping to give the Muslim League more power within the government, Wavell proposed that the League should become responsible for home affairs instead of Patel. When Congress threatened to bring down the whole interim government if this happened, Jinnah contented himself with the post of finance minister 

Significance

• There was almost continuous rioting in Bengal, Bombay, Bihar and the United Provinces. The terror included forced conversions to Islam and forced marriages to Muslims 

  • 20,000 Muslims in Bihar were killed in retaliation for the killing of Hindus in East Bengal, who had themselves been killed in reprisal for the Calcutta violence 

  • Growing increasingly concerned that India was on the brink of a civil war, Wavell again warned the secretary of state, Pethick-Lawrence, that he could not contain the situation by force and requested support for his secret evacuation 

  • In the event of the collapse of the interim government and law and order, all British civilians and their families would be moved to heavily protected safe  zones near the coast and would be evacuated in an orderly way from Calcutta and Karachi. Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck would withdraw all British troops in a similarly orderly manner, leaving only Indian forces to maintain order 

  • Attlee refused to contemplate such a plan 

• Attlee summoned Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and the Sikh representative, Balder Singh, to London, engaging in 4 days of talks 

  • The Muslim League continued to insist on the basic interpretation of the May statement, namely that groupings of provinces could secede from an independent India. On this basis, they saw no need for further constituent assembly 

  • Attlee had taken against the Muslim League, describing Jinnah as 'an Indian fascist'. He reassured Wavell of his support for Congress. They would press ahead with the constituent assembly and Nehru flew back for its opening 

  • Jinnah remained at his residence in London, laid low by illness and disappointment. The 79 Muslims seats in the constituent assembly would be boycotted so there was no need to return 

  • Wavell stayed on to press the case for a retreat plan. He also wanted decisions about the employment or pensions of the tens of thousands of British officials about to become unemployed upon independence, but made no progress. His position was further weakened by the British appointment of a high commissioner to handle relations between the Indian interim government and the British government, leaving the viceroy as figurehead 

Mountbatten arrives as Viceroy March 1947

Context

• Wavell was worn out; he himself had severe doubts about his ability to cope with the increasing strains that 1947 would bring as India moved closer to independence 

• It gradually became clear to Cripps and Attlee, partly because of Congress' wire-pulling behind the scenes and partly through their own dealings with Wavell, that a man with fresh ideas was needed to complete India's independence. On 31 January 1947, Attlee wrote to Wavell, removing him from his post and offering him an earldom in recognition of his services to the Raj 

Key features

• His flamboyance, left-wing tendencies and determination to be seen as a man of action brought a refreshing change to Indian politics and hope that the Congress-League deadlock could be broken 

• Mountbatten spent his first four weeks in India consulting with Indian ministers, politicians and his own staff  

Significance

• With some his charm and flattery worked, as did his clear determination to cultivate the friendship of men with whom he had to bargain. Cordial relations were quickly achieved between Mountbatten and Gandhi, Nehru and other Congress leaders. Mountbatten admired Patel's bluntness but Dr Ambedkar insisted to him that Congress did not represent the 60 million Dalits (nor the 3 million Christians) 

• Mountbatten's first meeting with Jinnah was decidedly frosty; he was not in the least bit charmed by the viceroy or his wife, the vicereine, and felt that he had strong pro-Congress sympathies, a view strengthened by Lady Mountbatten's very clear infatuation with Nehru. Mountbatten referred to Jinnah as an 'evil genius' 

 

Plan Balkan May 1947

Context

• In the middle of February 1947, Attlee announced to the House of Commons that His Majesty's government had resolved to transfer power to responsible Indian hands, no later than 30 June 1948 

Key features

• Plan Balkan, the first draft for the reallocation of power, would allow Indian states to decide their own future, with the princely states able to remain autonomous or join with others 

Significance

• Nehru pointed out that the plan was a recipe for anarchy when it was unofficially revealed to him in a private meeting with Mountbatten; Jinnah was given no such preview 

• Nehru assured Mountbatten that Congress would be sure to reject such a plan as it would both weaken India and the Congress Party itself. He called the plan 'a picture of fragmentation, conflict and disorder' which could create a multitude of Ulsters all over the Indian subcontinent 

• If Pakistan was to be a viable state, it needed to contain, in Jinnah's oft-stated opinion, an undivided Punjab and Bengal. To allow these states to decide their own futures would undoubtedly lead to their partition 

• Plan Balkan was ultimately abandoned 

Links to events after

• Plan Balkan was succeeded by the Mountbatten/Menon plan 

Menon/Mountbatten Plan June 1947

Context

• Plan Balkan was discarded 

Key features

• At great speed, Mountbatten and his team cobbled together a new plan, desperate to placate Congress and get Jinnah's agreement. They were also keen to get out of India before the subcontinent went up in flames; the remnants of the Raj were quickly losing control of the domestic situation and Mountbatten was afraid the British would be swamped by events they could no longer control. The plan contained the following: 

  • Two states, India and Pakistan, would be created. The states would use the existing structure of the 1935 Government of India Act until they wished to alter them 

  • Provincial assemblies would decide which state to join, with the Bengal and Punjab assemblies also voting on the question of provincial partitions 

  • The princes would decide whether to join either India or Pakistan or, as before, remain autonomous  

• Mountbatten knew that Congress would approve as they could easily gain control of a single Indian state and if dominion status was less than they hoped for, they could drop it once the handover ceremonies had been forgotten (India became a republic in 1950; Pakistan in 1956) 

• Just to be sure, Mountbatten went to see Gandhi, who was not concerned enough to break his latest vow of silence, preferring to write comments on the backs of envelopes 

• For the Sikhs, Balder Singh, now defence minister, had no choice but to agree 

• Jinnah was in a corner; there would be a single, but two-part, state of Pakistan. However, the almost inevitable partitions of Bengal and Punjab would mean it was no more than the area he had previously described as 'moth-eaten'. Moreover, the regional Muslim leaders were more than ready to do their own independence deals to secure their local power. This was, however, the best deal Jinnah was going to get and with 24 hours he agreed 

Significance

• On 3 June Mountbatten and the leaders went on the All-India Radio to announce that a plan for the future of India and Pakistan had been agreed. The tone was hardly celebratory the underlying message was that it could all be rescued from the situation. Jinnah attempted to end on a positive note with the phrase 'Pakistan Zindabad' (long live Pakistan) but with poor radio reception, it was heard as 'Pakistan's in the bag', which sounded falsely triumphal and further antagonised Hindus 

• Vast area of north west India were in a state of riot and rebellion 

• The ICS, which had held India together in the heyday of the Raj, was now reduced to a mere skeleton of mainly Indians to whom their friends and relatives looked to for patronage 

• Attlee's declaration that the British would be out of India by July 1948 had led to bloody contests for supremacy in mixed Hindu and Muslim areas like the Punjab 

• The authorities capacity for controlling the situation was severely compromised and collapsed completely in Bihar. Almost the only form of authority that could go any way toward holding the situation together was the army and Partition would man that the army would no longer be a national body. Auchinleck guessed it would take 2, maybe 5, year to split the army between Pakistan and India; in the event, he was given 4 weeks to complete the separation 

• Jinnah's persistent cough and debilitating physical weakness had been diagnosed as symptoms of tuberculosis, a terminal disease. If he wanted to see the birth of Pakistan, events had to move fast 

• On 18 May, Mountbatten carried his plan for Partition to London for government and then parliamentary approval. On 15 July, it was announced in the House of Commons that, in precisely one month's time, two separate dominions of India and Pakistan would be created on the Indian subcontinent 

• Mountbatten claimed to be unprepared for the question of the precise date of transfer at a press conference but improvised in order to maintain his image of confidence, choosing 15 August as it was the anniversary of the Japanese surrender which ended WW2. With hindsight, the anniversary of a surrender was probably not the best date to associate with British retreat 

• According to Hindu astronomers, 15 August 1947 was so horrendously inauspicious that a compromise had to be found. The transfer would take place at the stroke of midnight, which might be regarded as the moment between the two days 

Links to events later

• The work of the Boundary Commission was to draw a boundary between India and Pakistan that would, as far as possible, accommodate Hindus and Muslims in separate states 

Boundary Commission June - July 1947

Context

• Both Congress and the Muslim League agreed to the Mountbatten/Menon Plan 

Key features

• The work of the Boundary Commission was to draw a boundary between India and Pakistan that would, as far as possible, accommodate Hindus and Muslims in separate states 

• The Commission comprised equal numbers of Hindu and Muslim judges (chosen by Congress and the Muslim League) and a chairman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who was a legal expert. His impartiality was guaranteed as he had no previous experience whatsoever of India, nor did he ever return once his work was done. Using out-of-date maps, anecdotal stories of land ownership and dusty boundary charts, the Commission was given just 5 weeks to complete its work 

Significance

• Inevitably, some decisions were leaked to interested parties; when leaks reached Nehru, he would then apply pressure on Mountbatten, who would in turn attempt to influence the Boundary Commission 

  • Firozpur was a town that controlled the only bridge over the River Sutlej as well as playing a strategic part in the irrigation system of the area. Radcliffe's first draft of the boundary, flown to Lahore on 10 August, placed it inside Pakistan, which resulted in intensive lobbying by Nehru and Congress to have the boundary moved. On the evening of 11 August, Radcliffe had dinner with Mountbatten and Ismay, and the following day Firozpur appeared on the Indian side of the boundary 

• Mountbatten's partiality, may have been due to his personal dislike of Jinnah and the warm relationship he and his wife had with Nehru, as well as due to the fact that he simply didn’t believe Pakistan would last. Mountbatten likened it to a temporary hut that would soon collapse and be reabsorbed into India 

• The princes, despite their support of the Raj in WW2, felt ignored and threatened by Congress, a party dedicated to removing their sovereign powers 

  • Mountbatten took no notice of complaints from the princes nor of Conrad Corfield, head of India's Political Department. Corfield sympathised with the princes' desire to remain autonomous and persuaded the new secretary of state, Lord Listowel, to agree that the princes would become, in effect, independent rulers once the Raj ended. Having won this concession, Corfield authorised the burning of four tons of documents listing the princes' misdemeanours over the years, wanting to prevent them from falling into the hands of Congress, which he suspected would use them for political blackmail  

  • Nehru was furious when he heard of Corfield's manoeuvrings. If carried through, independence for the princes would mean the disintegration of India and a complete reverse for Congress, who intended quietly to take over the princely states. Mountbatten, who deeply resented being outwitted by an official, dismissed Corfield 

  • Mountbatten called a conference of Indian princes, held on 25 July, where he explained that when British rule ended on 25 August, they would have to accede to either India or Pakistan, depending on which state they were nearer. By shamelessly exploiting his royal connections and playing on the princes' loyalty, fear and superstition, cajoling and flattering, browbeating and threatening, Mountbatten had them all signed up by the time of the transfer of power from the Raj to either India or Pakistan 

• The assets of British India had to be divided between India and Pakistan on the basis of 82.5% for India and 17.5% for Pakistan. The army and police, civil service and revenue service, railways and schools, had to be dismantled and reassembled 

Links to events after

• India was partitioned on 14 August 1947 

Independence for India and Pakistan 14 August 1947

• Millions of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were terrified that, after independence, they would wake up on the wrong side of the India-Pakistan border, abandoning their homes, fields and livelihoods and leaving. They walked, crammed into bullock carts and tried to make it through to the railway system 

• Muslims moving west were butchered by Hindus and Sikhs in India and Hindus and Sikhs moving east were murdered by Muslims in Pakistan. 10 million tried to change lands and around 1 million were massacred 

• The border changes weren't fully complete until 48 hours after independence 

• The British military withdrawal began in August 1947 and continued until mid-1948; at the very time when violence in the Punjab was at its height, the majority of British troops were kept in their barracks and then evacuated from the country. A totally inadequate force of 50,000 troops was dispatched to bring order to the new frontiers, although mostly kept their heads down in their barracks, totally unable to control the situation 

• Mountbatten himself believed that the British were powerless to prevent the violence of 1946-48 and government instructions were that British troops should only be used to protect European lives. Indeed, no Indian leader would have agreed to the use of British troops 

• Jawaharlal Nehru spoke in Delhi's Constituent Assembly as midnight on 14 August 1947 approached 

• Mountbatten, hoping to be governor-general of both India and Pakistan, had to be content with just India 

• Jinnah flew from Delhi to Karachi on 7 August to become Pakistan's first governor-general 

• Gandhi did not want to stay in Delhi for independence celebrations, but left for Bengal, bitterly regretting that the errors of the past had not been rectified