Issues facing dualism

What is the problem of other minds that dualism faces?

According to substance dualism, while we each individually have direct and privilege access to our own mind and its contents via introspection, we do not have direct access to inspect the content of anyone else’s mind as minds are private. This means that we can only infer the mental states of others via what we can observe (their bodies and behaviour), however these inferences is insufficient to establish the existence of other minds of their mental states.

How does the problem of other minds raise a unique concern for substance dualism?

Since minds are non-physical substances, they can exist separately from the body, therefore upon seeing a body we cannot infer that the person has a mind.

Explain the response to the problem of other minds through the argument from analogy?

The analogy is between the link between our minds and our behaviour (which we observe) and other peoples behaviour and so inferring that they have a mind, which is similarly connected to their mind, alike to ours. Mill argues that there are law like connections between occurrences in my mind and body. It draws a parallel between observable similarities between my case and others (behaviours) and it then infer that other are also similar to me in certain unobservable ways.

Given an example used to explain the argument from analogy.

When I step on a nail, I feel pain in my mind and when I feel pain in my mind my behaviour reflects this e.g screaming. Similarly, when we observe others stepping on a nail (or something else which causes pain), and they react in a similar way to ourselves, we can infer that they are experiencing similar mental states to us (pain) and so have a mind alike to mine.

Outline the response to the problem of other minds by analogy.

P1) I observe that I have a mind.

P2) I also observe that my mental states are systematically connected with my behaviour and the states of my body.

P3) And I observe that other people who have bodies like mine behave similarly to me.

C1) So it is likely that their bodies and behaviour are connected to mental states too.

C2) And so it is likely that they have other minds.

What is a criticism to the argument from analogy?

It is an inductive argument so the existence of other minds is not certain. The conclusion is based on a single case (mine) and even if the argument is extended to be based on many of our own individual cases, similar effects (behaviour) do not always have similar causes (mental states) (e.g different non-mental causes) and some of our behaviours have no mental cause. There is no justification of the assumption that other people are analogous to my own case.

What’s a response to the criticism of the argument from analogy being a weak inductive argument?

Other people are very alike to me, their bodies are composed similarly to mind and we share many of the same behaviours which is casually connected to though process. It is reasonable to suppose that our minds are an essential component of what it is to be typically human.

What is the problem of other minds that i have been referring to?

The epistemological problem of other minds.

What is the response to the problem of other minds through the existence of other minds being the best hypothesis?

It accepts that philosophical zombies are conceivable but argues that we have sufficient reason to think that it is not the case. Alike to how scientists believe in the existence of unobservable entities such as atoms despite not having directly observed them, they conclude that atomic theory is the best hypothesis as it correctly predicts occurrences. Similarly, folk psychology is the best explanation for human behaviour as it also can correctly predict behaviour in a range of circumstances by drawing on from the assumptions of minds.

Outline the existence of other minds being the best hypothesis.

P1) Humans have complex behaviour.

P2) If humans have minds then this would explain their behaviour.

P3) There is no available alternative theory which explains their behaviour so well.

C) Therefore it is likely that humans have minds.

What type of argument is the response to the problem of other mins that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis.

It is an abduct I’ve argument as it takes evidence of other human beings behaviour and it asks what the best explanation of it that we can give is.

What is a response to the existence of other minds as the best hypothesis?

No matter how plausible the theory is, it may not be correct. Theories are often replaced with other theories. Eliminativists argue that the neuroscience of the future will supersede folk psychology.

How does Descartes believe that the problem of other minds can be overcome?

Language and reason cannot be explained mechanically, our minds allows us to construct new sentences but also to understand them. Understanding is required for intelligent behaviour which can respond appropriately to new situations.

What is the issue of Dualism posed by Gilbert Ryle that it makes a category mistake?

What is a category mistake and what is an example?

A category mistake is a mistake of treating a concept as belonging to a different logical category from the one it actually belongs in. E.g someone who is unfamiliar with cricket is asked which player is responsible for team spirit. The category mistake occurs as the player thinks that ‘team spirit’ is an operation conduced by the players but rather it is a way of talking about how the team play.

How does dualism make a category mistake according to Ryle?

Substance dualism makes the category mistake of thinking that the mind is like the body- another ‘thing’, a distinct, complex, organised unit subject to distinct relations of cause and effect. The mistake is to think that physical and mental concepts operate in the same way, in the same logical frameworks of things and causes, substances and properties. The question of other minds only makes sense if we accept the Cartesian ‘dual-life theory’, the mind is not a kind of thing as it claims

What are examples of mental states and mental process and how are they different to physical states and process?

Having the mental state of a belief is not a state in the same way as the physical state of being solid and having the mental process of doing arithmetic is not a process in the same sense as the physical process of a log burning.

How does Ryles category mistake actually attack dualism?

Ryle argues that the mind is not a thing at all, the mind is a way of talking about patterns of behaviour, dispositions and capacities

Define interactionist dualism.

Interactionist dualism is the view that both mental and physical events can cause both mental and physical events, there is two way effect.

E.g your emotion for anger can cause a desire for revenge (a mental event causing a mental event), your wish to move your arms causes you to move your arm (a mental event causing a physical event) and your arm touching a cold surface can cause you to have the experience of cold (a physical event causing a mental event).

What did Descartes believe in regards to interactionist dualism?

The casual interactionist between mind and body takes place in the pineal gland (the soul sends messages to the brain which then moves it onto the physical body and the soul reacts to messages ‘displayed’ by the pineal gland which it receives through the sense).

Outline the conceptual interactionist problem as articulated by Princess Elisabeth.

P1) It is inconceivable for two things to casually interact, unless their surfaces come into contact with one another.

P2) The mind has no surface.

P3) So, it is inconceivable for the mind to interact with the body.

P4) If such interaction is inconceivable, it is impossible.

C) Therefore, mind-body interactionist is impossible.

Outline the conceptual interaction problem? (Don’t memories)

P1) It is inconceivable for two things to casually interact, unless their surfaces come into contact with each other.

P2) According to substance dualism the mind is unextended and so has no surface.

C1) Therefore, it is inconceivable for the mind to interact with the body.

P3) What is inconceivable in is impossible.

C) And so mind-body interaction is impossible.

What are strengths of interactionist dualism?

Common sense/ fits with lived experiences

What type of argument is Princess Elisabeths argument for interactionist dualism?

A priori/ conceptual.

Explain Princess Elisabeths conceptual interactionist problem argument.

The mind is unextended in space and it is immaterial and so has no physical properties unlike the body which is extended and so has no mental properties.

For two things to causally interact, they need to have properties in common in order for transactions/ communication to occur.

She also relies upon inconceivability entailing metaphysical impossibile.

What is Descartes response to Princess Elisabeths argument against interactionist dualism?

What is Descartes response to the conceptual interaction problem?

Descartes rejects P1 and argues that we sh

What does Cartesian dualism argue in regards to the interaction between mental and physical substances?

Descartes argued that mind and body casually interact with one another .

Outline the empirical interaction problem.

P1) The physical universe is a closed system.

P2) An in any closed system, energy must be conserved.

P3) Mind and body casually interact.

P4) But causation involves the transfer of energy.

C) Therefore, the mind must be physical.

Explain the empirical interaction problem.

Energy is required in order for their to be an interaction between mind and body (and anything). It then uses the conservation of energy and argues that the mind cannot interact with the body as because the mind is non physical, it cannot change or increase energy.

What type of argument is the empirical interaction problem?

A posterior/empirical.

What is a response to the empirical interaction problem?

Interaction doesn’t require a transfer of energy

What is epiphenomenalist dualism?

Epiphenomnelaist dualism is the view that physical events can cause both mental and physical events, but mental events can cause neither mental nor physical events. The physical has casual power but the mental has no casual power.

Explain epiphenomenalist dualism.

First define it. Phenomenal properties are incidental/ a by-product or ‘collateral property’ of the activity of the brain. the universal conviction that our actions/behaviours are determined by our mental states are wrong, instead they are completely causally determined by process in the brain and body (mental properties have no casual influence on the physical). Mental states do also not affect other mental states. E.g if your body requires liquid, your body will reach out to the drink, although there will be a sensation of thirst accompanying this, the sensation does not cause the action.

How do dualists theory use the category mistake?

What is the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge towards epiphenomenalist dualism?

What is the challenge towards epiphenomenalist dualism posed by the phenomenology of our mental life?

Epiphenomenalist doesn’t accord with our experiences. From experiences, we feels as though there is a causal connection between our mental states and between our mental states are behaviour. It is a part of my experience that whether I am experiencing an emotion (e.g pleasure) makes a difference to what I think (e.g the belief that I am experiencing please) and what I do (e.g smiling).

What is the challenge posed to epiphenomenalist dualism regarding introspective knowledge?

What is the challenge posed to epiphenomenalist dualism regarding natural selection/evolution.