Experiments-Cog Psych

 Smith, Rips, & Shoben — Evidence for Prototypes

• Purpose (from your notes):
  To test whether category members are all equal (as the classic view claims) or whether some are “better” examples than others.

  Procedure (your notes only):
  Subjects were asked:

  1. “Is an apple a fruit?”

  2. “Is a grape a fruit?”

  3. “Is an avocado a fruit?”

  Findings (exactly as your notes state):

  • People answered “apple” fastest, then grape, then avocados

  • If the classic view were correct, subjects should answer equally fast because all are fruits.

  • This shows not everything is equal—some category members fit the average prototype better (“goodness of fit”).
    

Malt & Smith — Typicality Ratings

Purpose:
To measure how typical different items are within a category.

Procedure:

• Subjects rated how typical items were on a 1–7 scale.

• Example:

  • Apple = typical fruit

  • Olive = not typical

• Same pattern with birds (robin typical, penguin not).

Findings:

• People judge some members as more typical even though all share category membership.

• Supports prototype theory.

Ahn et al. — Likelihood Estimates (Causal Categorization)

3. Ahn et al. — Likelihood Estimates (Causal Categorization)

Purpose:
To show that people care about causal relationships when deciding whether an item fits a category.

Procedure:
Subjects learned a causal chain:

• Rubens eat fruit → have sticky feet → climb trees.

They were then given two cases:

• Case 1: X eats fruit, Y doesn’t have sticky feet, Z nests in trees.

• Case 2: X eats fruit, Y has sticky feet, Z does NOT nest in trees.

Findings:

• People think the example missing Z is more likely to be a Ruben.

• Root causes (X) matter more than downstream features.

• People use causal structure when thinking about categories.

4. Kim & Ahn — Clinicians’ Diagnoses

• Purpose:
  To show that real clinicians use causal relationships (not just checklists) when diagnosing mental disorders.

  Procedure:

  • Subjects received symptoms of depression and were asked to draw causal relationships among them.

  • Researchers examined which features subjects treated as root causes.

  Findings:

  • Sadness and low energy were consistently treated as root causes.

  • Central symptoms dictated diagnosis.

  • Shows people (including clinicians) rely on causal theories, not just feature lists.

5. Medin & Ortony — Psychological Essentialism

• Purpose:
  To explain how people think categories have an underlying “essence.”

  Procedure (based on your notes):
  Not a lab task—your notes describe the theory:

  • People believe categories (animals, objects, social categories, mental health disorders) have an essence.

  • Removing the essence changes category membership.

  Findings:

  • Essence must be all-or-none.

  • People use essence in everyday reasoning about animals, gender, and disorders.

6. Ahn, Flanagan et al. — Essence & Health Disorders

• Purpose:
  To test whether people believe medical and mental categories have essences.

  Procedure:
  Subjects rated how much they believed essences existed for:

  • Natural categories (cows, eggplants…)

  • Nominal categories (documents, songs…)

  • Medical categories

  • Mental categories

  Findings:

  • Laypeople believe natural, medical, and mental categories have essences.

  • They treat medical/mental categories the same way as natural kinds.

  • Experts show much lower essentialism for mental conditions.

  • Laypeople believe mental disorders are permanent because the “essence” cannot be removed.

7. Prentice & Miller — Inferring Features as Essences

• Purpose:
  To show people infer essences even when categories are arbitrary.

  Procedure:

  • Subjects estimated number of dots on a screen.

  • Then told whether their style (overestimate vs. underestimate) matched their partner’s.

  • Then asked what % of women use the same style.

  Findings:

  • When told they matched their partner, both genders estimated ~50–55% similarity.

  • When told they differed, men believed women were far less similar to them.

  People believe gender differences are essential even when the task does not differ between men and women.

8. Caramazza & Shelton — Patient E.W. (Double Dissociation)

• Purpose:
  To show neurological separation between animal and object concepts.

  Procedure:
  Picture-naming tasks comparing animals vs. non-animals.

  Findings:

  • Patient E.W.:

    • Animals: 55

    • Non-animals: 82

  • Controls:

    • Animals: 100

    • Non-animals: 98

  Another task: Is this an animal or object?

  • E.W.: animals 60, objects 92

  • Controls: animals 90, objects 84

  Patient J.J. had the opposite deficit.

  Conclusion (your wording only):
  There is neurological separation in the brain for inanimate vs. animate objects.

  
  
  

Eimas et al. — Categorical Perception in Babies

Purpose (from your notes):
To test whether babies can detect phoneme changes.

Procedure (your notes only):

• Babies were given a pacifier connected to a pressure sensor.

• They heard phonemes (e.g., “buh” vs. “puh”).

• Pacifier speed increases when the baby detects something new.
  
  

Findings:

• When phonemes changed quickly, pacifier speed went up.

• When phonemes changed slowly (gradual shift), pacifier speed went down because babies lost interest.

• Babies can tell when phonemes change.

McGurk Effect

Purpose:
To show how visual information influences what phonemes we hear.

Procedure:
Your notes describe only the phenomenon:

• People combine what they hear with the mouth shape they see.

• Even if sound and visual information differ, the brain fuses them into a new phoneme.

Findings:

• Demonstrates categorical perception.

We “hear” a phoneme influenced by visual cues.

Goldstein & Schwade — Responding to Babies’ Babbles

Purpose:
To test whether parental feedback shapes babbling.

Procedure:

• Mothers produced vowel sounds or consonants.

• Timing varied:

  • Contingent: mothers copied the baby’s sounds

  • Non-contingent: mothers responded randomly

Findings:

• Contingent feedback → babies made more sounds and learned quicker.

• Non-contingent feedback → no babbling improvement.

• Babbling is socially shaped.
  

Petitto & Marentette — Babbling Without Auditory Input ***

Purpose:
To show babbling does not require hearing.

Procedure:
Compared hand movements of deaf infants with signing parents to hearing infants.

• Deaf children also babble.

Findings:

• Babbling occurs even without auditory input.

Goodwyn et al. — Understanding Before Speaking ***

Purpose:
To show babies can understand language even if not speaking.

Procedure:
Not described in detail; your notes state:

• Not speaking ≠ not understanding.

Findings:

• Babies understand more than they can produce.

Motherese — Kemler et al. ***

Purpose:
To show the role of infant-directed speech in language learning.

Procedure:
Your notes describe:

• Motherese uses short sentences and gestures.
  Infants listened to infant-directed vs adult-directed speech while researchers measured looking/sucking preferences.

• Simplified speech helps language learning.

Findings:

Motherese supports early language development.

Lenneberg — Critical Period

Purpose:
To examine whether there is a developmental window for language acquisition.

Procedure:
Your notes specify:

• Critical period = ages 2–12.

• Younger brain damage → better language recovery.

Findings:

• Language must be learned in the critical period for typical development.
  

 Isabelle Case

Purpose:
To demonstrate effects of missing early language exposure (but not past the critical period).

Procedure (your notes only):

• Isabelle was never spoken to until age 6.

Findings:

• Within 1 year, her language was good.

Genie Case

Purpose:
To show effects of missing language exposure beyond the critical period.

Procedure:

• Genie was punished for making sounds until age 13.

Findings:

She developed language of a 2-year-old.

Chelsea Case

Purpose:
To show late access to language leads to limited acquisition.

Procedure:

• Chelsea was misdiagnosed as disabled.

• Actually deaf; got hearing aids at age 31.

Findings:

Had language of a 2-year-old.

Johnson & Newport — Second Language Acquisition

Purpose:
To examine how age of immigration affects grammar learning.

Procedure:

• Compared English grammar scores of immigrants who arrived at different ages.

Findings:

• Ages 3–7 performed like U.S.-born speakers.

• Later arrivals showed increasingly poorer grammar.

Earlier learning → better outcomes.

 DeLoache et al. — Can You Speed Up Babies’ Learning?

Purpose:
To test whether baby videos accelerate vocabulary learning.

Procedure:
Babies ages 12–18 months assigned to four conditions:

1. Video only

2. Video + parent interaction

3. Parent teaching

4. Control (normal development)

Findings:

• Parent teaching worked best.

• Video with no interaction was worst (same as control).

Sapir & Whorf — Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

Purpose:
To propose that language influences thoughts
The language you speak determines your thoughts.

Findings:

• Language shapes conceptualization.

 Gopnik & Choi — Developmental Effects of Language

Purpose:
To test whether early vocabulary differences influence cognition.

Procedure:

• Korean children (verbs learned first) vs. English children (nouns learned first).
  Tasks:

1. Object permanence

2. Means-end task

Findings:

• English babies were better at object permanence.

• Korean babies were better at means-end tasks.

Linked to differences in first learned words.

Hespos & Piccin — Language Influencing Perception

Purpose:
To test whether infants categorize spatial concepts differently depending on language exposure.

Procedure:
Habituation method:

• Babies saw narrow or wide coverings.

Then saw tight vs. loose containment.
Adults also rated similarity of events.
Findings:

• Babies showed reactions corresponding to linguistic distinctions (tight vs. loose).

• Korean adults and English adults differed in judgment due to language differences.

• English speakers lack tight/loose labels → slower/different categorization.

 Winawer et al. — Russian Blue Study

Purpose:
To test whether color naming boundaries affect color perception.

Procedure:

• Subjects shown a blue shade and asked which of two shades matched it.

• Russian has two words for blue; English does not.

Findings:

• Russians matched faster when shades fell on different Russian color categories.

• English speakers lacked this linguistic advantage.

 Bilingualism — Picture Naming & Competition Arrow Task

Purpose:
To demonstrate cognitive competition in bilingual speakers.

Procedure:
Your notes describe:

• Picture naming slower because two language systems compete.

• Competition arrow task shows bilinguals handle competition easily.

Findings:

• Bilinguals experience constant competition between languages.

This makes them better at tasks involving conflict.

1. Wason’s 2-4-6 Rule — Inductive Reasoning Error

Purpose (your notes):
To show how people form incorrect inductive generalizations and display confirmation bias.

Procedure:

• People are asked to guess the rule behind a number sequence.

• They tend to generate a hypothesis and stick with it.

Findings:

• 79% incorrect on first guess

• 28% were never correct

• 50% got it right on the second guess

People cling to their initial rule and seek confirming evidence.

Wason Card Selection Task — Conditional Reasoning

Purpose:
To test how well people evaluate “if–then” logic.

Procedure:
The rule:
If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other.

Cards shown: A, D, 4, 7

Task: choose cards needed to test the rule.

Findings:

• Correct answer: A and 7

• Only 4/50 got it correct

• 46/50 chose A and 4

33/50 chose A only
Shows people fail to check disconfirming evidence.

Griggs & Cox — Real-Life Content Effects ***

Purpose:
To show reasoning improves when conditional tasks use real-world content.

Procedure:
Example used:
If a person is drinking beer, then they must be over 21.

Cards: beer, tea, 30-year-old, 16-year-old.

Findings:
People choose:

• the 16-year-old

• the beer drinker

Reasoning improves because content is familiar

Maier’s Two-String Problem — Insight

Purpose:
To show how insight (“Aha!” moment) solves problems and how subtle cues influence problem solving.

Procedure:

• Two strings hang from the ceiling; they are too far apart to reach simultaneously.

• Subjects must tie them together.

• If stuck, Maier subtly bumps a rope so it swings.

Findings:

• Subjects then realize they must swing the rope to reach it.

They deny noticing the hint.
Shows sudden restructuring, not step-by-step reasoning.

Lehman & Nisbett — Education Effects on Reasoning

Purpose:
To test how different college majors develop reasoning skills over four years.

Procedure:
Measured two types of reasoning:

• Statistical/methodological reasoning

• Conditional reasoning

Groups:

• Natural science students

• Humanities students

• Social science students

• Psychology students

Tested at entry and after four years.

Findings:

• Social science & psychology → improved more in statistical and methodological reasoning

• Natural science & humanities → improved more in conditional reasoning

Chase & Simon — Chess Experts (Chunking)

Purpose:
To show how expertise improves memory through chunking.

Procedure:

• Chess positions shown briefly.

• Participants: Master (M), Intermediate (A), Beginner (B).

• Must recreate the board.

Findings:

• Normal chess positions: M > A > B

• Random chess positions: M does worse because they rely on real-game chunking
  Chunking is based on meaningful configurations, not general memory ability.

DeGroot — Chess Reasoning ***

Purpose:
To study expert reasoning and chunking.

Procedure:
had chess masters vs weaker players think aloud in middlegame positions.

Findings:

• Masters use chunks of familiar patterns.

• Performance advantage disappears for random boards.

Chi, Glaser & Farr — Expertise Theory ***

Purpose:
To explain how long-term practice (≈10 years / 10,000 hours) creates expert reasoning.

Procedure:
They reviewed performance across domains (chess, physics problem solving, medical diagnosis) to identify common cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise.

• Expertise improves chunking, abstraction, and efficiency.

Findings:

• Experts process information differently than novices.

• They rely on deeper conceptual understanding.

Chi, Feltovich & Glaser — Abstract Knowledge Use ***

Purpose:
To show experts categorize based on abstract principles rather than surface features.

Procedure:
Participants were shown physics or math problems and asked to group them by similarity.

• Novices grouped by appearance (e.g., “ramp problems”).

• Experts grouped by underlying laws (e.g., “conservation of energy”).

Findings:

• Experts ignore superficial details.

• They group problems based on underlying structure.

Schmidt & Boshuizen — Chunking in Medical Experts ***

Purpose:
To examine how experts store information efficiently.

Procedure:
Medical students vs. experienced physicians were observed while interpreting patient cases.

Findings:

• Experts store meaningful chunks.

Reduces cognitive load.

Ericsson & Lehmann — Efficient Storage & Processing ***

Purpose:
To explain expert memory advantages.

Procedure:
They reviewed elite performers across multiple fields.

• Experts store and process information more efficiently.

Findings:

• Experts develop specialized encoding mechanisms tied to domain structure.

• Long-term practice reorganizes memory networks so experts can store complex information with minimal effort.

• Expert performance is not general — it is highly domain-specific.

Fry & Hale — Processing Speed Evidence ***

Purpose:
To show processing speed correlates with intelligence.

Procedure:
Measured processing speed tasks (like reaction time, mental rotation, matching) and correlated them with fluid intelligence scores.

Findings:

Higher fluid intelligence → faster processing.

Duncan, Burgess & Emslie — Prefrontal Activation Evidence ***

Purpose:
To link intelligence to prefrontal cortex activity.

Procedure:
Used neuropsychological and neuroimaging tasks requiring planning, problem solving, inhibition, and fluid reasoning.

Findings:

• Tasks that load heavily on g activate the lateral prefrontal cortex.

• Damage to this region → reduced performance on g-loaded tasks.

• Suggests intelligence is supported by a flexible, domain-general control network.

• Intelligence correlates with prefrontal activation

Terman’s “Termites” — Gifted Children Longitudinal Study

Purpose:
To track outcomes of gifted children over time.

Procedure:
Your notes:

• Identified high-IQ children and followed them.

Findings:

• Gifted children showed particular long-term developmental patterns.

Rosenthal & Jacobson — Pygmalion in the Classroom

Purpose:
To test whether teacher expectations influence student performance.

Procedure:

• Teachers told one class was gifted and another was not.

• Classes were actually the same.

Findings:

Teachers perceived gifted group as doing better at year’s end.
Demonstrates expectation effects.

Steele & Aronson — Stereotype Threat

Purpose:
To examine how stereotypes affect test performance.

Procedure:
Black and white students took:

• “diagnostic of intelligence” test

• OR non-intelligence-label version (same test)

Findings:

• Black students performed worse when test was labeled intelligence.

• Performed the same as white students when label was removed.

Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling & Darley — Golf Study

Purpose:
To show stereotype threat applies beyond academics.

Procedure:
Participants told test was either:

• sports strategic intelligence

• natural athletic ability
  (Test was identical.)

Findings:

• Black students performed better when framed as athletic ability.

• White students performed better when framed as strategy.

Flynn Effect — Rising IQ Over Generations

Purpose:
To illustrate historical/environmental influence on intelligence.

your notes state IQ is increasing generationally.

Findings:

• Something in biological/environmental change contributes to intelligence

1. Lee et al. — Example of Irrationality (Beer Experiment)

Purpose (your notes):
To show that people behave irrationally and that their preferences can be predicted.

Procedure:
Participants sampled two beers:

• One labeled “beer”

• One labeled “MIT Brew” (Budweiser + sweet vinegar)

Three groups:

1. Blind — not told the difference

2. Before — told about the vinegar before tasting

3. After — told after tasting

Findings:

• Most blind participants chose MIT Brew.

• Before group chose it the least (vinegar sounded unpleasant).

• After group fell in between.
  Labeling influenced preference even though the beverages were the same.
  

Kahneman & Tversky — Availability Heuristic

Purpose:
To show people rely on easily recalled information when making judgments.

Procedure (your notes describe examples):

• More words begin with R vs. have R in the third position

• Car accidents seem more common than strokes because of news coverage

• People judge country populations based on familiarity

Findings:

• People overestimate what is easily brought to mind.

Leads to real-world distortions (e.g., “summer of the sharks”).

Slovic & Lichtenstein — Anchoring and Adjustment

Purpose:
To show judgments are biased toward arbitrary anchor numbers.

Procedure:
Examples given:

• “Have the Eagles appeared in 100 playoff games?”
  vs.

• “Have the Eagles appeared in 10 playoff games?”

People then estimate the actual number.

Findings:

• Higher anchor → higher estimates

• Lower anchor → lower estimates
  People adjust insufficiently from the anchor.
  
  

Kahneman & Tversky — Base Rate Neglect (Engineers & Lawyers Study)

Purpose:
To show people ignore statistical base rates.

Procedure:
Two groups told different proportions of lawyers/engineers.
All participants receive the same personality description implying “engineer.”

Findings:

• People judge the target as an engineer regardless of actual base rates.

They ignore statistical information and rely on descriptive stereotypes.

Kahneman & Tversky — Conjunction Fallacy (“Bill” Example)

Purpose:
To show people incorrectly judge conjunctions as more probable.

Procedure:
Participants read a description of Bill:

• Intelligent, unimaginative, compulsive, lifeless

• Good in math, weak in humanities

Asked:
A) Bill plays jazz for a hobby
B) Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for a hobby

Findings:

• 80% chose B, even though it is logically less likely.

Kahneman & Tversky — Conjunction Fallacy (“Linda” Example)

 To demonstrate conjunction errors again.

Procedure:
Participants read a feminist-leaning description of Linda.
Asked which is more likely:
A) Bank teller
B) Bank teller AND feminist

Findings:

• People choose B even though A must be more likely.

Kahneman & Tversky — Representativeness Heuristic (Hospital Births Study)

Purpose:
To show people misunderstand randomness and sample size.

Procedure:
Two hospitals:

• Large hospital: 45 births/day

• Small hospital: 15 births/day

Question: which hospital has more days where 60% of babies are boys?

Findings:

• Correct: small hospital

• People incorrectly think they are equal.

 Attraction Effect

Purpose:
To show adding a clearly inferior option changes preference between two existing options.

Procedure:
Your notes explain that when A and B are the main options, adding a worse version of A shifts preference toward A.

Findings:

This violates rational choice theory.

Compromise Effect

Purpose:
To show people tend to choose the middle option.

Procedure:
Businesses add very expensive versions of products to make mid-tier products more appealing.

Findings:

• People avoid extremes and gravitate toward the compromise choice.

10. Redelmeier & Shafir — When We Choose Not to Choose

Purpose:
To show increased options lead to decision deferral.

Procedure:
Examples from notes:

• People stick with original plans when too many alternatives appear.

• Doctors avoid certain treatments when choices become complex.

Findings:

• More options → more deferral and avoidance.

Kahneman et al. — Endowment Effect

Purpose:
To show ownership increases perceived value.

Procedure:
Three groups:

• Sellers: hold the mug → state selling price

• Buyers: not given mug → state buying price

• Choosers: choose between mug or money

Prices from notes:

• Sellers: $7.12

• Buyers: $2.87

• Choosers: $3.12

Findings:

• People value items more when they own them.

Framing Effects

Purpose:
To show decision choices depend on wording even when outcomes are identical.

Procedure:
Disease outbreak scenario:

• A) 200 people will be saved

• B) 1/3 chance 600 saved, 2/3 chance none saved
  People choose A.

Negative frame:

• C) 400 people will die

• D) 1/3 chance none die, 2/3 chance 600 die
  People choose D.

Findings:

• Wording changes preference despite identical math.

Bechara et al. — Iowa Gambling Task

Purpose:
To show how emotions and the prefrontal cortex influence decision making.

Procedure:

• Four decks (A, B, C, D).

• Some decks yield net loss, others net gain.

• Participants draw 100 cards.

Observations in your notes:

• People without brain damage: start with bad decks, learn over time to choose good decks.

• People with prefrontal damage: start with bad decks, briefly switch, then return to bad decks.

Findings:

• Emotion (somatic markers) helps guide advantageous decisions.

Kudney et al. — Dogs’ Use of Solidity

Purpose (your notes):
To test whether dogs can use the concept of solidity (understanding that objects cannot pass through solid barriers), and compare their performance to toddlers and monkeys.

Procedure:

• Researchers built a contraption with a ramp.

• A treat rolls down into a box with two doors:

  • Near door

  • Far door

• A board could be placed between the two doors.

  • When the board is present → treat should stop at the near door

  • When the board is absent → treat should reach the far door

• Dogs were shown:

  • The empty box

  • The wall

  • Then turned around so the experimenter could hide a second treat (so they couldn’t simply sniff it out)

• Then a treat was rolled down the ramp.

Findings:

• Mixed trials: Dogs chose correctly ~80%

• No-wall trials: Dogs chose far door ~70%

• Wall trials: Dogs chose near door ~80%

• Shows dogs can use solidity—something toddlers and monkeys fail at.

Wild dogs would not be expected to perform the same.

Honeybee Dance / Whale Song / Ape Vocalization (Communication vs. Language)

Purpose:
To illustrate the difference between communication and true language.

Procedure (your notes describe only the concepts):

• Honeybees use a dance.

• Whales use songs.

• Apes use vocal signals.

Findings:

• These are forms of communication.

• They are not generative or novel.

Only humans have true language.

Pepperberg — Alex the African Grey Parrot

Purpose:
To demonstrate advanced cognitive abilities in a parrot, beyond simple labeling.

Procedure:
From your notes:

• Alex learned over 100 words.

• He could name shapes, colors, materials.

• He performed a marshmallow-style delay-of-gratification test.

• He waited for rewards and used strategies similar to children.

Findings:

• Alex could go beyond simple labels.

He demonstrated self-control and flexible use of language-like abilities.

Kaminski et al. — Rico the Super Dog

Purpose:
To show advanced word learning and comprehension in a dog.

Procedure:

• Rico knew 200 object names.

• When told “go get [object],” he retrieved it.

• He could fast map:

  • When hearing a new word, he used elimination to identify the correct new object among familiar ones.

• He remembered the objects up to four weeks later.

Findings:

• Dogs can use fast mapping—a process similar to human language learning.

• Rico’s performance challenged assumptions that only humans can learn this way.

Aronov et al. — Baby Birds Babbling

Purpose:
To show how birds develop songs and how their vocal development resembles human babbling.

Procedure:
Your notes describe only the findings:

• Birds learn songs through babbling.

• As they grow, their sounds begin to form the correct pattern/order for their species’ song.

Findings:

• Birds begin with babble-like sounds.

Over time, they refine their vocalizations into structured songs.

Gruber et al. — Tool Use & Cultural Transmission in Chimps

Purpose:
To test whether different chimp groups use different tools and whether this reflects cultural transmission.

Procedure:

• Researchers drilled a hole filled with honey.

• Two conditions:

  • Non-obligatory hole: shallow, chimps could reach honey easily

  • Obligatory hole: deep, honeycomb blocked the top, requiring tools

• Two chimp groups observed:

  • One group exclusively used leaves

  • One group exclusively used sticks

• Groups were the same species but lived in different social contexts.

Findings:

• Tool use differed by group.

• Behaviors were passed down socially.

• Shows chimps transmit culture

Miller et al. — Self-Control in Dogs

Purpose:
To test whether dogs have a self-control resource that can be depleted and replenished.

Procedure:
Two conditions:

1. Self-control condition: Dog in open crate but told to stay

2. Control condition: Dog locked in crate (no choice to exert self-control)

Afterward:

• Dogs given an impossible puzzle toy with a treat inside

• Time spent trying was measured

Findings (Part 1):

• Self-control condition: ~50 seconds

• Control condition: >2 minutes

• Exerting self-control drains energy.

Part 2 Procedure:

• Dogs given either glucose water or placebo

Part 2 Findings:

• Glucose restored energy; dogs tried longer

• Placebo + self-control condition = lowest persistence

Shows dogs have a limited self-control resource.

 Horner et al. — Overimitation (Social Cognition)

Purpose:
To test whether chimps and children copy irrelevant actions.

Procedure:

• Experimenter demonstrated steps needed to get a treat from a puzzle box.

• Some steps were unnecessary.

Findings:

• Chimps: did only necessary actions → showing causal understanding

• Children: copied every step, including unnecessary ones

  • They perceived social meaning in all steps.

Sampaio et al. — Social Cognition in Octopuses

Purpose:
To examine social coordination and accountability in octopuses.

Procedure:

• Octopuses hunted cooperatively with fish.

• Each individual in the group had a role.

• Octopus acted as “enforcer.”

Findings:

• Octopuses punished (punched) fish partners who didn’t perform their roles.

• Demonstrated social correction and accountability-like behavior across species.
  

Hare et al. — Domesticated Foxes

Purpose:
To test how domestication affects social cognition in foxes.

Procedure:

• Silver foxes bred in captivity, selected based on reaction to a human reaching into their cage (aggressive vs. shy).

• Baby foxes and baby dogs compared in a task:

  • “Find food if a person gazes and points.”

• Also compared domesticated vs. wild foxes.

Findings:

• Baby foxes and puppies both succeeded (15/18).

• Domesticated foxes performed better than wild foxes (15/18 vs. 11/18).

• Suggests domestication increases social understanding.

• Parallels dog evolution.

• Note from your notes: cats cannot do this.