The prisoner's Dilemma

According to R. Keohane, Political institurtions provided:

• Continuity

• Reciprocity

• Transparency

• Conflict resolution mechanism

Neo-Liberal institutionalism

Emphasies the role of international systems

What book did Joseph Nye write

Power and Interdependence: world politics in Transition 

A global society

Can emerge from a dense network of economic relationship among democratic governments and interact within a heavily institutionalized international system.

Less econimic integration - more poverty

Less interdependent

Liberal peace includes two varients

1. Democratic peace

2. Capitalist peace - too busy making money to fight

Tragedy in the International politics from liberal views:

• Even peace-loving countries are forced to militarize because of the anarchic structure of the international system

• Now, they have to prepare for wars.

Prisoners deilemna

• Liberal tragedy arises from strategic interaction

• Is a model of cooperation (or lack there of)

  • Between individuals

  • Between Governments

Actors in the elements of a game

Two actors

Choices in the elements of a game

Two Choices:

1. Cooperation

2. Deflection

Outcomes in the elements of a game

2 actors+2choices = 4 outcomes

Preferences in the elements of a game

How do the actors rank all of their possible outcomes

Strategies in the elements of a game

How will each actor play the game given the chouces, outcomes, and preferences

Solution in in the elements of a game

Combining the strategies of the two players gives us the solution to the game.

The actors in the India-Pakistan Nuclear Game

• India

• Pakistan

The choices in the India-Pakistan Nuclear Game

Two options

• Build Nuclear Weapons

• Don’t build nuclear weapons 

Possible outcomes in the India-Pakistan Nuclear Game

1. Arms Race

2. Stable Military Balance

3. Pakistan Advantage

4. India Advantage

Arms race in the India-Pakistan Nuclear Game

Both Build Nuclear Weapons

Stable Military Balance in the India-Pakistan Nuclear Game

Neither Builds Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan advantage in the India-Pakistan Nuclear Game

Pakistan Builds, India doesn’t

India Advantage in the India-Pakistan Nuclear Game

India build, Pakistan doesn’t

India
Don’t Build	Build
Stable Balance	India Advantage
Pakistan Advantage	Arms Race

Pakistan

Don’t build

build

India advantage > Stable Balance>arms race>Pakistan advantage

Pakistan Advantage>Stable Balance>arms race>India Advantage

		Don’t Build	Build
Pakistan	Don’t Build	Stable  Balance (3, 3)	India Advantage (1, 4)
	Build	Pakistan Advantage (4, 1)	Arms Race (2,2)

Higher the number, higher the payouts

Preference orders:

• India:

  • Stable balance>arms race>p.advantage

• Pakistan:

  • Stable balance>Arms race> I. advantage

Nash Equilibrium

An outcomes in which no players has an incentive to change its strategy unilaterally

Pareto optimality

An outcomes in which no one can be better off, without making somebody worse off

Tragedy on international politis with broader importance of the PD game

• Both can be better off, but unable to realize joint gains arises from inability to make binding commitments

Inability to realize joint gains with broader importance of the PD game

Arises from inability to make Binding Commitments

The absence of enforcement mechanism with broader importance of the PD game

Anarchy is the source of tradgedy

Iterated play when escaping the dilemma

Repeated play of the fame withouht a known end point