PHIL MIDTERM

What is an nonmoral fact?

A statement that is true for everyone.

What is an example of an nonmoral fact? (a)

a. 2+2=4.

What is an example of an nonmoral fact? (b)

b. Salt dissolves in water.

What is an example of an nonmoral fact? (c)

c. Trees have leaves

What are facts?

Objective truths that are true regardless of belief or perception.

Are facts subjective?

No, facts are objective and independent of personal beliefs.

Can someone's belief or perception change a fact?

No, facts remain true regardless of individual beliefs or perceptions.

What is an example of a fact?

The distance between the moon and Earth being more than one mile.

Can facts change over time?

No, facts are constant and do not change with time.

Ex: think about the period in time in which everyone alive thought that Earth was flat or didn’t even have the concept of Earth. At that time, Was it a fact that Earth was a sphere?

Yes at that time it was still a fact that Earth was a sphere

What are beliefs?

Representations of how things really are.

Can beliefs be true or false?

Yes, beliefs can be either true or false.

What is an example of a false belief?

Believing Joe Biden is the king of England.

What is the Correspondence Theory of Truth?

A belief is true if it matches how things really are.

What makes a belief true according to the Correspondence Theory of Truth?

If it matches the facts.

What makes a belief false according to the Correspondence Theory of Truth?

If it does not match how things really are.

Believing that earth has one moon according to correspondence theory

(i) your belief is true because in reality, Earth has one moon, and it is a fact that Earth has one moon.

Believing that earth has two moon according to correspondence theory

your belief is false because in reality, Earth does not have two moons, and

it is not a fact that Earth has two moons.

belief #1 is true if and only if possible fact # 1 is a fact.

the correspondence theory of truth

correspondence theory of truth

belief #1 is true if and only if possible fact # 1 is a fact.

Belief: Maria is morally obligated to return her overdue library book.

Possible Fact:

Maria is morally obligated to return her overdue library book.

Belief: It was wrong, morally speaking, for Yusuke to kidnap Javier.

Possible Fact:

It was wrong, morally speaking, for Yusuke to kidnap Javier.

Belief: It was wrong, morally speaking, for Bob to stab Joe.

Possible Fact:

It was wrong for Bob to stab Joe.

Belief: Your roommate ought, morally speaking, to let you out of the bathroom

Possible fact:

Your roommate ought, morally speaking, to let you out of the bathroom.

If it is not a fact that it was wrong for Bob to stab Joe,

then, on the correspondence theory of truth, the belief that it was wrong for Bob to stab Joe is false,

If it is not a fact that it was wrong for Bob to stab Joe, then, on the correspondence theory of truth, the belief that it was wrong for Bob to stab Joe is false...

since it does not fit with the facts; it is not a fact that it was wrong for Bob to stab Joe.

Ontological moral skepticism (OMS):

There are no moral facts.

Epistemological moral skepticism (EMS):

There might or might not be moral facts, but even if there are, we can’t know

(i) whether there are such facts or

(ii) what these facts are (if there are any such facts).

What is EMS?

Epistemological moral skepticism - a view about what we can know.

What is OMS?

Ontological moral skepticism - a view about what exists.

What is ontology?

Study of what exists

What is epistemology?

Study of knowledge

What is the difference between OMS and EMS?

OMS deals with facts that exist, EMS deals with facts we can know

Give an example of a fact we can know but not know what it is.

High temperature at North Pole on July 3rd, 1438

What is the fact in the example?

that there was a High temperature at North Pole on July 3rd, 1438 (OMS)

What can we not know in this case

What the High temperature at North Pole on July 3rd, 1438 was (EMS)

It very much seems that there is a fact about how many rabbits were born in the year 1583. That is, presumably, some rabbits were born in 1583. Call the number of rabbits born in that year “N.” It very much seems that it’s a fact that N rabbits were born in 1583. But, while we are presumably justified in believing that there is a fact of the matter, there is no way we can know what this fact is, i.e., we cannot know what number N is, i.e., we cannot know how many rabbits were born in 1583. (OMS)

OMS: It very much seems that it’s a fact that N rabbits were born in 1583.

It very much seems that there is a fact about how many rabbits were born in the year 1583. That is, presumably, some rabbits were born in 1583. Call the number of rabbits born in that year “N.” It very much seems that it’s a fact that N rabbits were born in 1583. But, while we are presumably justified in believing that there is a fact of the matter, there is no way we can know what this fact is, i.e., we cannot know what number N is, i.e., we cannot know how many rabbits were born in 1583. (EMS)

EMS: there is no way we can know what

this fact is, i.e., we cannot know what number N is, i.e., we cannot know how many rabbits were born in 1583.

It very much seems that there is a fact about how many rabbits were born in the year 1583. That is, presumably, some rabbits were born in 1583. Call the number of rabbits born in that year “N.” It very much seems that it’s a fact that N rabbits were born in 1583. But, while we are presumably justified in believing that there is a fact of the matter, there is no way we can know what this fact is, i.e., we cannot know what number N is, i.e., we cannot know how many rabbits were born in 1583.

It would be incorrect to claim that there’s no fact about how many rabbits were born in 1583.

a certain number of rabbits were born in 1583, and the fact of the matter is that that’s how many rabbits were born in 1583 (we just dont know the factual amount)

What is a moral fact?

A fact about what is morally right or wrong.

Can a person claim and believe that a fact exists without knowing what it is?

Yes, they can believe there is a fact without knowing the specifics.

Can a person claim and believe that moral facts without knowing what they are?

Yes, they can believe in moral facts without knowing the specifics.

Can a person claim and believe they are terrible at figuring out moral facts?

Yes, they can believe they are bad at determining moral facts compared to others.

You can believe that there are moral facts but...

still be extremely modest about the quality of your own judgments about what the moral facts are.

What is ontological moral skepticism?

Denial of existence of moral facts.

problem 1 of ontological moral skepticism?

If we think things through, the idea that there aren’t any moral facts is jarring.

problem 2 of ontological moral skepticism?

There aren’t any knock-down arguments for ontological moral skepticism.

Steps of Moral practice

(a) think about

(b) believe

(c) tell a person

(d) regulate our own behavior

Step 1 of moral practice

(a) think about whether something that we want to do is morally impermissible (or morally “wrong” or “forbidden” or “prohibited”) or whether, morally speaking, we ought to (or “are obligated to” or “must” or “should” or “have to”) do something that we don’t want to do,

step 2 of moral practice

(b) believe that it was (or would be) wrong for another person to do something or that, morally speaking, another person ought to do something,

step 3 of moral practice

(c) tell a person that, morally speaking, they shouldn’t do (or shouldn’t have done) something or that, morally speaking, they ought to do (or ought to have done) something

step 4 of moral practice

(d) regulate our own behavior, e.g., by doing something because we believe we ought to do it, and despite wanting not to do it, or refraining from doing something because we believe we ought not to do it, and even though we

If (i) there aren’t any moral facts, and (ii) the correspondence theory of truth is correct,

then (i-a) every belief or claim that something is morally impermissible/wrong is false, (i-b) every belief or claim that something is morally obligatory/required/etc. is false,

and (ii) our moral practice doesn’t seem to make any sense—it’s like talking about Santa Claus or witches as if they were real.

morally impermissible

Morally wrong, morally unacceptable

morally permissible

Tolerable; We can allow it; We usually have more than one option; Either option is considered to have permission

Example of problem OMS view

A: Killing a person to steal his car is wrong.

B: False! There’s no such thing as an act’s being morally wrong! Do you believe in Santa Claus?

suppose you're trying to figure out if something is morally permissible or morally impermissible (OMS):

Is it wrong to torture people who might be terrorists in order to try to stop terrorist attacks?

Why are you thinking about that? There’s no such thing as right or wrong!

According to OMS, If there aren’t any moral facts...

then it’s not a fact that it was wrong for your roommate to lock

you in the bathroom.

If there aren’t any moral facts, then it’s not a fact that it was wrong for your roommate to lock you in the bathroom. According to the correspondence theory of truth...

your belief that it was wrong for them to lock you in the bathroom is false,

our moral practice doesn’t seem to make any sense...

If there aren’t any moral facts, then it’s very unclear what (if anything) you’re believing when you believe that it was wrong for your roommate to lock you in the bathroom.If there aren’t any moral facts, and the correspondence theory of truth is correct,

What is the problem here?

the problem is that it’s very hard to understand what

your belief is, at least in a way in which your overall set of beliefs makes sense.

If there aren’t any moral facts, and the correspondence theory of truth is correct....

it’s very hard to understand what your belief is

Situation in which OMS makes it hard to understand what your belief is...

(i) you believe that your car is parked in Lot 3,

(ii) you believe that the correspondence theory of truth is correct, and

(iii-a) you believe that there aren’t any facts about where material objects are,

(iii-b) you (accordingly) believe that there’s no fact about where your car is, and

(iii-c) you (accordingly) believe that it’s not a fact that your car is in Lot 3.

(i) you believe that your car is parked in Lot 3,

(ii) you believe that the correspondence theory of truth is correct, and

(iii-a) you believe that there aren’t any facts about where material objects are,

(iii-b) you (accordingly) believe that there’s no fact about where your car is, and

(iii-c) you (accordingly) believe that it’s not a fact that your car is in Lot 3.

If your other beliefs are true...

then your first belief is false

(i) you believe that your car is parked in Lot 3,

(ii) you believe that the correspondence theory of truth is correct, and

(iii-a) you believe that there aren’t any facts about where material objects are,

(iii-b) you (accordingly) believe that there’s no fact about where your car is, and

(iii-c) you (accordingly) believe that it’s not a fact that your car is in Lot 3.

if your second belief is true,

then the correspondence theory of truth is correct.

(i) you believe that your car is parked in Lot 3,

(ii) you believe that the correspondence theory of truth is correct, and

(iii-a) you believe that there aren’t any facts about where material objects are,

(iii-b) you (accordingly) believe that there’s no fact about where your car is, and

(iii-c) you (accordingly) believe that it’s not a fact that your car is in Lot 3.

if your last belief is true,

then it’s not a fact that your car is in Lot 3

Suppose you recognize that and continue to hold all of your beliefs

you could just knowingly be holding contradictory beliefs

suppose you don’t mean to be holding contradictory beliefs.

the problem is that it’s hard to figure out what your first belief could be, given that it’s supposed to be compatible with your other beliefs

What is the distinction between a type and its tokens?

an ontological one between a general sort of thing and its particular concrete instances

'Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.'?

How many different words can be counted in one sense?

Three. (Types)

'Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.'?

How many different words can be counted in another sense?

Ten. (tokens)

What are types generally said to be?

Abstract and unique.

What are tokens?

concrete particulars, composed of ink, pixels of light (or the suitably circumscribed lack thereof) on a computer screen, electronic strings of dots and dashes, smoke signals, hand signals, sound waves, etc.

What are propositions?

Sharable objects of attitudes, bearers of truth and falsity.

What does the stipulation about propositions rule out?

Thought- and utterance-tokens, concrete events or facts.

Example: Suppose that a bunch of people are meeting on Zoom.

Ted: Where is the Eiffel Tower?

Brian: The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.

Ted: What? I couldn’t hear you.

In the chat thread:

Carol: “The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.”

Frank: “The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.”

Thalia: “The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.”

Adrian: “Eiffel turninn er í París í Frakklandi.”

What are the Tokens/Types

four sentence tokens, and two sentence types

three tokens of one sentence type (the one in English) and one token of a different sentence type (the one in Icelandic).

each of the four sentence tokens means the same thing

they all express the same proposition.

Identify the proposition in the situations

Ted: Where is the Eiffel Tower?

Brian: The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.

Ted: What? I couldn’t hear you.

In the chat thread:

Carol: “The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.”

Frank: “The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.”

Thalia: “The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.”

Adrian: “Eiffel turninn er í París í Frakklandi.”

a certain thing (the thing that, in English, is called “The Eiffel Tower”) is in a certain place (the place that, in English, is called “Paris, France”).

The sentence token “The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.”

has a certain length,

the sentence type “The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, France.”

is, intuitively, an abstract entity that does not have a length (or location or weight) and

The proposition that

is true; and is, intuitively, an abstract entity that does not have a length (or location or weight).

For any given proposition, P, we might

(i) believe that P is true,

(ii) believe that P is false, or

(iii) be unsure of whether P is true or false.

consider the following proposition

(i) There are at least five fish in the Atlantic Ocean.

Presumably you believe that (i) is true,

consider the following proposition

(ii) Earth and Saturn have collided ten times in the last year.

Presumably you believe that (ii) is false

consider the following proposition

(iii) The number of rabbits born in 1583 is an odd number

Presumably you are unsure whether (iii) is true or false.

If we are unsure about the truth of P, then we might, for purposes of figuring out whether P is true,

(i) consider existing arguments for or against P, and/or

(ii) construct arguments for or against P, perhaps by modifying some existing argument.

Arguments are

ways of arranging and evaluating propositions

making and considering arguments about something can help us figure out

(i) what’s true, or, in any event,

(ii) what we have good (or, more strongly, sufficient) reason to believe.

for example, in considering whether there are any moral facts, we might construct

(i) arguments for the idea that there are moral facts and (ii) arguments against the idea that there are moral facts.

When trying to figure out if there are moral facts

we’re trying to figure out whether we have good (or, more strongly, sufficient) reason to believe that there are moral facts or, conversely, that there are not moral facts

even after considering and constructing a bunch of arguments about moral facts,

the most reasonable attitude might be to remain (very) uncertain about whether there are moral facts.

the “simple empiricist” argument for ontological moral skepticism

1. If a candidate fact, Z, cannot be empirically verified, then Z is not a fact.

2. No candidate moral facts can be empirically verified.

Conclusion: There aren’t any moral facts.

something can be “empirically verified” if and only if

it can be verified by observation, where “observation” can include experimentation and using scientific instruments.

A “candidate fact” is...

something that might or might not be a fact

The problem with the simple empiricist argument for OMS is the first premise:

It seems, on reflection, that there are some things that

(i) are facts but

(ii) cannot be empirically verified.

if there are some facts that cannot be empirically verified

then the first premise of the simple empiricist argument is false.

What is a good example of the problem for the first premise of the simple empiricist argument.

Math (counting numbers)

for every number, N, there’s an infinite number of bigger numbers

There is no empirical verification for this statement (so according to "simple empiricist” argument OMS it would be false)

it might seem obvious that, for every number, N, there’s an infinite number of

bigger numbers. But it’s one thing for something to seem obvious and another thing to

empirically verify it.

it’s a fact that for every number, there is an infinite number of bigger numbers, but...

that fact cannot be empirically verified.

If there’s something that’s

(i) a fact but

(ii) not empirically verifiable...

then the first premise of the simple empiricist argument for ontological moral skepticism is false.

Suppose that (i) The Correspondence Theory of Truth is correct, (ii) Jim believes that it was

morally impermissible for Ted to steal his chickens, and (iii) Jim’s belief is true. Claim: Holding

those three things fixed, it must be the case that ____________ .

(a) there are moral facts

(b) Jim knows all of the moral facts

(c) most people who have a belief about the matter agree with Jim

(d) (a) and (c

there are moral facts