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20 Terms

1
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Patron-Client Model

  • Informal, decentralized activities based on kinship, family & informal networks.

  • Dependant on favours, respect (backed by violence) & services provided

  • Social networks are crucial here, not occupying a corporate role.

  • Relationships constantly in flux & fluid.

  • Enables OC to change people easily, replace those jailed.

    • Example of hydra effect

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Hydra Effect

  • OC members are easily replaceable

    • Arrests of OC members will not dampen the market.

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Corporate Model

  • Favourite of law enforcement

  • OC is highly organized into hierarchies

    • Ex: bosses, underbosses, capos, cells

  • Have defined roles: enforcer, corrupter, negotiator, boss, sit downs

  • Positions are based on skill

  • This model is largely rejected by most researchers (but not law enforcements), they are much more fluid than a corporation.

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Enterprise Model - Mark Haller

  • Focuses on the big picture & what’s most important.

    • Deters from focusing on individual gangsters.

  • Focus on the markets & the sub economy

  • Economic profit is the main goal, same as a legitimate enterprise.

  • Arrests don’t effect the presence of illegal services.

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Neo-Marxist Model

  • Largely suppressed in North America

  • Assumptions: OC embedded in state formations

  • OC tends to favour elites

  • In times of instability, OC used by elites to maintain privileged positions

  • Illicit goods & services in state structures (criminalized) OC pursues capital accumulation & relationships with elites

  • Lots of evidence to support this

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Role of Ethnicity!!

  • Not all OC criminals are Italians - in fact, majority aren’t & Italian formations are fading out.

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You cannot have a continuing criminal formation without?

  • Support from the state/infrastructure

  • A market/demand to fill

    • Focus of Mark Haller’s “Illegal Enterprise”

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Corruption - Beare

  • Bribery kept law enforcement looking the other way.

    • Ex: once OC gained control of the construction industry by providing protection & using intimidation & threats of violence.

  • Political figures accepted bribes/payments in exchange for permitting them to engage in illegitimate business.

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Organizational Strain Theory

  • OC fulfilled function of giving underprivileged immigrant population access to economic & social status that was unattainable by legal means.

    • Proposed by Robert K. Merton

  • Stated OC helps disadvantaged immigrants achieve social & economic status they can’t attain legally.

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Transnational Crime

  • Execution of crime involves more than one country

    • Ex: Piracy (not a new phenomenon)

    • Ex: White collar crimes & state crimes

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Infrastructure

  • You cannot have a continuing criminal conspiracy without help from the state

  • Essentially means support

    • Ex: Dominican drug traffickers paying off the Dominican police to ship drugs to the US

    • Ex: Piracy

    • Ex: providing food, shelter, accommodations, resources, etc.

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Piracy

  • Large scale violence

    • Violence has dramatically risen

  • Ships are bigger, faster, & safer

  • Violent daily attacks on vessels

  • Any ship on coast could be victimized - including cruise ships

  • Still present in Somalia due to infrastructure

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Privateers

  • Authorized private vessels to act in a military (auxiliary) fashion on behalf of the states.

  • Pirates were not to:

    • Attack ships of the country issuing the letter

    • Plunder villages or towns

    • Open the captured cargo until they returned to port

    • Must share some of the plunder with Royalty (because they protected you)

  • In return pirates were protected by nations, which provided:

    • Safe harbours

    • Supplies

    • Auctioned seized vessels, crew members & ship fixings.

      • Infrastructure argument (why they lasted 400 years)

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The Financial Transactions & Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)

  • Canada's financial intelligence unit and anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing supervisor.

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Classical Features of Organized Crime

  • Violence

  • Profitable opportunities

  • Code of secrecy (as a pirate)

  • Access to black markets to sell wares

    • Prominent merchants & traders

    • Seized ships auctioned off

  • Protection from political elites

    • Accommodation argument

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Loansharking (HALLER)

  • Makes loans at illegal rates of interest and uses violence or the threat of violence to ensure payments are made.

  • Violence not commonly used b/c they wanted to keep customers.

    • Ex: Harry Riccobene & Frank Sindone

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Gambling (HALLER)

  • Syndicates arose in many cities during the decades following the Civil War.

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Differential Social Organization Theory

  • Sutherland coined this phrase

    • Chicago school origins

  • Designed to explain crime category variations as a whole oppose to individual

  • Crime rate variations

    • Age groups, locations

  • Focuses on illicit nature of stolen securities

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Rational Choice Theory

  • Individuals make decisions based on their association of costs and benefits associated with their actions.

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Hybrid Model

  • Focuses on the dynamics and interdependencies of the marketplace

  • Applies behavioural theories of businesses to criminal networks

  • Grey areas between licit and illicit behaviour

  • There are more similarities between legal and illegal businesses then there are differences 

  • OC is largely symbiotic rather than parasitic 

  • Market exchange of many goods and services between licit and illicit markets