Week 11 - Mens Rea

Why in People v. Thomas did the court rule that the reckless mental state is compatible with attempt?

Issue(s):

• Is attempted reckless manslaughter a cognizable crime in Colorado, or does the “reckless” mental state conflict with the intent required for attempt?

Facts (include arguments):

• Thomas, armed with a pistol, went to an apartment after being told a man upstairs raped his ex‑girlfriend.

• He lied and said he was a police officer, got the suspect to come downstairs, had the victim identify him, and told her to call police.

• The suspect tried to flee; Thomas chased, fired three shots (claiming two were warning shots and one accidental), and hit the man twice.

• Thomas was charged with attempted first‑degree murder, first‑degree assault, and lesser included offenses, including attempted reckless manslaughter.

• The jury convicted him of first‑degree assault and attempted reckless manslaughter.

• On appeal, Thomas argued that attempted reckless manslaughter cannot exist because recklessness (conscious disregard of risk) is incompatible with the intent required for attempt.

Procedural posture:

• Convicted at trial in Adams County District Court.

• Court of Appeals reversed the attempted reckless manslaughter conviction but affirmed first‑degree assault.

• Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether attempted reckless manslaughter is a valid crime.

Judgment:

• The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on that issue and restored Thomas’s conviction for attempted reckless manslaughter.

Applicable Rules and Precedent:

• Colorado attempt statute (§ 18‑2‑101(1)):

  • Attempt requires acting with the culpability required for the underlying offense plus a substantial step strongly corroborative of the firm purpose to complete the offense.

• Reckless manslaughter (§ 18‑3‑104):

  • A person commits it by recklessly causing death; “recklessly” = consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will occur.

• People v. Frysig: Attempt requires intent to engage in & complete the underlying offense, not necessarily intent to cause the specific result (death).

• People v. Castro: Attempted extreme indifference murder is allowed; intent relates to conduct creating grave risk, not to intentionally causing death.

• People v. Krovarz: Attempt liability rests on future dangerousness; it does not require specific intent to cause the result; knowing or reckless culpability can suffice when the actor is highly dangerous.

Holding:

• Attempted reckless manslaughter is a cognizable crime in Colorado.

• The actor must:

  1. Have reckless culpability (conscious disregard of a substantial, unjustifiable risk of death), and

  2. Take a substantial step strongly corroborating the firm purpose to engage in the risk‑creating conduct, even if they do not intend death itself.

Reasoning:

• Recklessness is not incompatible with attempt: attempt requires intent to do the risky conduct, not intent that death actually occur.

• Under Castro, the mental state for extreme indifference murder (and by analogy reckless manslaughter) is “general intent” to engage in dangerous conduct, not specific intent to kill.

• Under Krovarz, the key is potential future danger: a person who consciously disregards a huge risk of death is almost as dangerous as someone who intends death, so attempt liability is justified.

• Thomas’s conduct (chasing while armed, firing shots at a fleeing person) was a substantial step strongly showing his firm purpose to engage in life‑endangering conduct.

Rule of Law:

• A person can be guilty of attempted reckless manslaughter when they:

  • Act recklessly (consciously disregard a substantial, unjustifiable risk of death), and

  • Take a substantial step strongly corroborating their firm purpose to engage in the risk‑producing conduct, even without intending death.

Key takeaway:

• Attempt does not require intent to cause the result (death); it requires intent to do the dangerous conduct that the underlying crime criminalizes.

• Colorado therefore allows conviction for attempted reckless manslaughter when someone’s reckless, life‑endangering actions go far enough to be a substantial step, even if no one dies.

Concurrence point:

• Justice Dubofsky concurred specially, noting that Krovarz’s analysis might not safely extend to all reckless conduct (e.g., dangerous driving with no other traffic), where harm is speculative if no one else is around.

• However, on these facts, Thomas’s conduct was so close to intending harm that conviction for attempted reckless manslaughter was proper.

How did THACKER V. COMMONWEALTH define the tradition view of attempt?

• To be guilty of attempted murder, you must have the specific intent to kill the person.

• Reckless conduct that could kill, or general hostility, is not enough for attempt, even if it would be murder if someone died.

What happened in THACKER V. COMMONWEALTH?

• Thacker and two friends got drunk, came to a tent where a family was camping, family had a lit lamp, Thacker said, “I’m going to shoot that Goddamned light out, fired three shots, none hit, Thacker testified he did not know the family, had no ill will, only intended to shoot out the light, and would not have shot if he’d been sober.

Why did Virginia Supreme Court reverse THACKER V. COMMONWEALTH?

• Shooting at the light (even through the bed) does not prove he intended to murder Mrs. Ratrie.

• The evidence was not enough to show he had the specific intent to kill her.

• Therefore, attempted murder could not stand.

How does the MPC compare with the Thacker result?

Model Penal Code (MPC) agrees with the Thacker outcome (no attempted murder without intent to kill) but rejects the old common law rule that specific intent is required for every element of the crime being attempted.

Under MPC, when is a person guilty of attempt?

if, acting with the culpability required for the crime, they:

• Purposely engage in conduct that would be the crime if the circumstances were as they believe them to be, or

• When the crime requires causing a result, they do (or fail to do) anything with the purpose of causing that result, or believing it will cause that result without further conduct, or

• Purposely do (or fail to do) anything that, as they believe the circumstances to be, is a substantial step toward completing the crime.

In simple terms, what does the MPC require?

• Purpose (intent) for:

  • The conduct element, and

  • The result element (if the crime is about causing a result, like death).

• But for circumstance elements (like “the victim is under 18,” “the building is occupied,” etc.), the mental state is the same as for the completed crime (it can be knowing, reckless, etc., depending on what the underlying offense requires).

What is the MPC standalone crime for situations like in Thomas and Thacker, where someone acts recklessly and endangers life but doesn’t have intent to kill?

Recklessly Endangering Another Person:

• It’s a misdemeanor to recklessly engage in conduct that places (or may place) another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

• Recklessness and danger are presumed if someone knowingly points a firearm at or toward another person, even if they thought the gun wasn’t loaded.

What is JC Smith’s rationale for requiring specific intent in attempt crimes?

• The very idea of an attempt means trying or endeavoring to accomplish something uncertain or difficult.

• All ordinary uses of “attempt” imply a desired or intended consequence.

• Recklessness and negligence are incompatible with desire or intention.

• Therefore, for crimes that can be committed recklessly or negligently, it is logically impossible to have an “attempt” version, because you cannot “try” to do something you’re only reckless or negligent about.

Why does Holmes believe intent is required?

• In attempt cases, intent plays a special role that it doesn’t always play in completed crimes.

• Some acts are normally harmless on their own (e.g., lighting a match near a haystack), but become criminal attempts only because:

  • The actor intends to do more acts that will make the result harmful (like setting the haystack on fire).

• For most substantive crimes, we punish because the act is likely to cause harm under normal circumstances.

• But for attempts, the act by itself may not be likely to cause harm; it becomes dangerous only if it will be followed by other intentional acts.

• Since no further acts actually happened (the person was interrupted), the only way to show that those further acts would have happened is to show that the actor intended them.

• So the intent doesn’t just show the actor was wicked; it shows that the act was likely to be followed by harmful consequences.

• The intent makes an otherwise innocent act dangerous by creating a probability that more harmful acts will follow

Under Traditional strict specific-intent view, mistakes about age or time

can defeat attempt charges, even if they don’t defeat the completed crime

Under Thomas/MPC/common-sense view, if the completed crime has strict liability for a circumstance like age or time…

then attempt does too; mistakes about those circumstances should not be a defense.

What is JC smiths position about circumstance elements?

aligns with MPC/common-sense/Thomas, attempt mens rea for circumstances should match the completed offense, because the defendant state of mind is already blameworthy enough.

Should the law of attempt require higher mental state/specific intent than the completed crime when the defendant already did the dangerous conduct but the result didn’t happen (like in Thomas, where no one died)?

• In cases like Thomas, where the defendant has already done the full dangerous conduct and only the result is missing, there is no good policy reason to require specific intent for attempt.

• little risk of convicting an innocent person; the danger and blameworthiness are clear (“protect the innocent” rationale doesn’t justify)

• defendant is just as dangerous and blameworthy as if the result had occurred, so the mental state requirement for attempt should match that of the completed offense.