the war of independence

after the election…

there was to be an appeal for irish self-determination at the Peace Conference, but many within sinn fein acknowledged that british delegation didn’t bode well for irish independence claims.

between the election results and the peace conference, a vacuum opened, allowing the volunteers, the most active part of the separatist movement, to seize the initiative.

the rise of the volunteers

mirroring the rise of sinn fein, the volunteers enjoyed a boost with the release of frongoch internees in december 1918, as the pace of reorganisation was accelerated.

active in the 1917 by election campaigns, providing inspiration and initiative in their local areas for many sinn fein clubs.

ashe’s death galvanised them

the volunteer convention the following month indicated the movement’s intentions and the elevation of de valera to the presidency helped to fuse the political and military wings of the separatist movement.

though the majority favoured a joint approach in the quest for irish freedom, a small minority were unhappy with the movement’s political links.

the volunteers and the irb

largely controlled the volunteer movement

at the volunteer convention in 1917 a number of irb personell were appointed to important new positions in the volunteers.

michael collins became director of organisation. he had played a role in maintaining the irb network while in frongoch and was soon to be the president of the irb’s supreme council.

de valera and brugha, the president and chief of staff of the volunteers refused to rejoin the irb after the rising. de valera never wanted to swear allegience to a faceless group on the irb executive, and membership to a secret society countered his religious beliefs.

brugha blamed the irb’s obsession with secrecy for the countermanding orders which doomed the rising from the outset. despite these actions, real power lay with the irb men. this division sowed the seeds of future strife.

ghq formed

to co-ordinate the activities of various units on a national scale.

in march 1918 richard mulcahy was in charge of this, and oversaw the increase in volunteer membership bc of the conscription crisis.

it also gave the volunteers a new sense of urgency as a force to resist conscription was needed, increasing volunteer activity in summer 1918. certain districts were proclaimed ‘special military areas’ under the defence of the realm act. soon, parts of tipperary, cork, and clare were ungovernable.

they became more numerous, confident and defiant, leading the opposition to british rule. military rule and authorities only increased the local people’s sense of alienation. this activity carried the volunteers through to the general election in december.

11/20 members of the volunteer executive won seats in the election.

soloheadbeg ambush

during the meeting of the first dail on 21st january 1919, members of south tipperary brigade (later IRA) ambushed a convoy of RIC at soloheadbeg to capture the gelignite being escorted to a local quarry and to intensify ric hostilities.

led by dan breen, sean treacy and seamus robinson, they acted independently of ghq which had forbidden arms raids.

led to deaths of two police constables, james mcdonnell and patrick o’connell. condemned by church and ghq reprimanded.

opening engagement of war of independence

reaction to soloheadbeg

ghq worried about reactions

both constables were catholics popular in the district and aroused widespread local indignation, with the catholic church particularly vocal.

the volunteers involved disappeared and the 1000 pound reward was never claimed.

the govt proclaimed the south riding of tipperary a special military area but the coercion of the entire local population was the wrong way to deal with a small number of volunteer extremists.

the beginning of the war

‘state of war’ between england and ireland

an t’oglach said ‘use all legitimate methods of warfare against the soldiers and policemen of the english usurper’

de valera escaped from lincoln jail on 3 feb 1919 and when the remaining ‘german plot’ prisoners were released in march 1919, the president of the dail was able to return to ireland without danger of arrest.

he presided at a meeting of dail eireann on 10 april 1919 at which the assembly confirmed a policy of boycotting against the ric

phase 1: jan 1919-march 1920

mainly isolated incidents between ira and ric. from the beginning the british govt refused to recognise the irish republic or to admit a state of war existed. it was described as ‘disorder’ and the ira a ‘murder gang’ of terrorists and assassins.

therefore, the police, rather than 50,000 garrison, delt with the conflict. british soldiers came in later. lloyd george described it as a ‘policeman’s job’.

guerilla tactics

switch made due to the conflict in 1919.

defensive tactics and pitched battle formation used during the easter rising proved a military embarrassment and would’ve been foolish to return to against a superior military force.

in 1919 the crown forces numbered 38,000 troops in addition to 10,000 ric men across the country.

the intelligence war

ira director of intelligence, michael collins built up an effective spy network which included ned broy, a member of g division - an intelligence-gathering unit of plain-clothes dublim metropolitan police (dmp) detectives. collins’ intelligence sources also included policemen, clerks, typists, waiters, journalists, etc.

collins established a ghq with officers at 3 crow street, 200 yards from dublim caste. its personnel monitored birtish agents and spies, kept records on enemy personnel and monitored their telephone, telegraph and postal communications.

collins’ assistant joe o’reilly called twice a day to collect reports and deliver instructions.

the squad

collins began eliminating the most prominent officers. in summer 1919 he established a special unit of full time gunmen from dick mckee’s dublin brigade, ira. the squad established a secret headquarters in a premises disguised as moreland’s in upper abbey street.

on 30 july 1919 squad members assassinated their first g man - detective seargent patrick smyth followed in 11 september by detective seargent daniel hoey.

on the same day, the dail was declared a dangerous assembly and afterwards collins went on the run, the dail govt departments forced underground. ]

the british govt suppressed sinn fein and irish volunteers. the year ended with the squad’s failed attempt on the life of lord french at ashtown railway station.

bg reaction security policy

conducted in a haphazard fashion, viewing attacks as the work of criminal gangs. the british drifted into a security policy with no clear military or political objectives

this is because:

the 1918 general election allowed lloyd george to continue as head of a coalition govt but it was now a conservative dominated government, including bonar law, curzon and long.

the differences between the liberals and conservatives contributed to the drift in irish policy

they were also preoccupied with other affairs. lloyd george and bonar law were frequently attending the paris peace conference. there was a wave of industrial unrest after ww1 with strikes in the coalmines and riots in the streets. there were rumblings in india (amritsar massacre april 1919) and egypt (egyptian reveloution 1919) which demanded government time and pushed ireland down the list of priorities.

first dail

coincidentally, the dail had its first meeting in the mansion house on 21 january on the same day as the soloheadbeg shootings.

two hours, spoken in irish, only 27 elected sinn fein members were present. 34 members, including devalera and griffith imprisoned while the other 8 were unavailable.

a short provisional constitution was adopted establishing an executive consisting of a Prime Minister chosen by the dail and four other ministers (Finance, Defence, Home affairs, Foreign affairs) selected by the PM

This was followed by a reading of the declaration of independence which linked the irish republic ratified by the people at the 1918 general election to the one proclaimed by the 1916 insurrectionists and demanded international recognition of a new irish state.

more idealistic was the unanimous approval given to the democratic programme, a fairly radical statement of intent on social and economic policy which claimed was pearse’s thinking. it was radical as it says ‘all rights to private property must be subordinated to the public right’ but was vague on how it could be put into practice.

the appeal to the peace conference

the other piece of business conducted by the dail in the opening session was the selection of a sinn fein team consisting of de valera, griffith and plunkett to take ireland’s claim to the paris peace conference.

devalera and griffith were in jail so it was left to sean t o’kelly, the dail’s speaker to act as the irish envoy in paris. arriving on 10 feb, o’kelly wrote to the conference leaders informing them he represented the ‘provisional government of the irish repubic’ but his letters were ignored.

president wilson considered it to be an internal british problem. it was clear well before the peace treaty was signed that ireland’s claim for self-determination would not be considered in paris.

this appeal was the clearest element of sinn fein policy during 1918 election campaign and this failure was a political setback which forced leadership to adopt a more militant stance.

devalera goes to america

to mobilise irish-american opinion to support independence.

left in june 1919 and returned in dec 1920 which meant separatist movement had to make do without their leader, allowing volunteers to dominate.

he was present at mansion house for the second session of dail eireann on 1-4 april and was elected priomh aire but then soon became known as ‘president of the irish republic’ for american audiences and propaganda purposes.

the dail cabinet

first presidential task was to appoint a new cabinet and he raised the number of ministers from 4-8

devalera chose collins (finance) brugha (defence) griffith (home affairs) plunkett (foreign affairs) cosgrave (local govt) markievics (labour) and macneill (industries)

this second session was attended by 52 members, a figure boosted by the british decision in march to release all prisoners held in english jails and the escape of others from mountjoy.

in the second session he warned the democratic programme that the priority was to overthrow british rule in ireland. he addressed growing public unrest and called for the irc to be ‘ostracised socially by the people’

british reaction to the dail

only in sept 1919 (set up in jan) did the authorities take the decision to suppress the dail.

they banned all dail meetings declaring it to be a dangerous association, making it more difficult to build an effective, alternative governing body but also increased the irish sense of oppression, making a political settlement less likely.

the dail and the volunteers

in theory the volunteers were under cathal brugha, the minister of defence but there was considerable local autonomy with many commanders resentful of political interference.

in august 1919, to clarify the relationship between the dail and the volunteeers he insisted every volunteer swears an oath of alliegence to the dail. with some opposition and delay, the oath in reality didn’t achieve brugha’s objective of forcing volunteers to accept dail authority.

during 1919 brugha did not play an active role in the conflict and collins came out as a more dominant personality in the revolutionary struggle. His role as Dail cabinet minister and a member of volunteer ghq helped defuse tension between political and military factions.

collins v brugha

brugha, his nominal superior, became intensely jealous of collins and the move to control the volunteers was partially to limit his influence. he was also furious at how he used the irb to consolidate his power base and wanted to reduce the brotherhood’s influence within the volunteers.

while devalera shared this dislike of the irb and supported brugha’s plan, they failed to break the irb’s stranglehold on the volunteers.

brugha was further hampered by ricchard mulhacy, his assistant to whom he delegated much of the responsibility for overseeing the work of the volunteers. mulcahy and collins believed that as the irb and volunteers shared the same aims and methods, the brotherhood could only advance the cause.

as chief of staff, mulcahy acknowledged that the volunteer gho had little control over volunteer units and was happy to leave the development of military strategy to those local commandeers actually engaged in the conflict.

phase 2: march 1920 - dec 1920 - year of terror

from 1 january 1920 when IRA general headquarters ghq officially approved offensive action against crown forces saw the intensity of activities increase all over the country. unlike 1919 ira activity, with arms seizures and attacks on individual policemen, the new year marked the commencement of an all out assault on the ric.

at easter 1920 the ghq ordered a major mobilisation by irish volunteers for a concerted nationwide assault that saw the destruction of over 300 buildings, including vacated police barracks, courthouses and taxation offices on the night of 3-4 april. by the end of the year 533 police barracks were destroyed of which 23 were in used when attacked.

the beginning of reprisals

all through 1919 police discipline had held firm but from january 1920 ric men began to retaliate in a manner that terrorised the local population.

the first was in thuries hours after an ric constable had been gunned down. the police took to the streets, firing shots and smashing windows.

the assassination of tomas maccurtain

when police and troops rampaged cork following the assistanation of an ric distrrict inspector, their actions were loudly condemned by tomas maccurtain, the lord mayor and commandant of the cork brigade of the ira.

shortly afterwards, early 20 march 1920, two men burst into his house and shot him point blank range in his bedroom. the local population knew it was ric officers.

maccurtain’s funeral drew a huge crowd and was turned into another successful propaganda exercise by the ira.

ric demoralised force

during the winter of 1919-20 the ric abandoned many outlying barracks under increasing pressure from volunteer units.

at the beginning of 1920 the volunteers systemically destroyed vacated barracks to ensure they weren’t reoccupied. during the first 6 months of 1920 over 400 barracks were destroyed.

the ric became a demoralised force and it was clearly understrength. new recruits were attracted in the second half of 1919 for enhanced pay and conditions but not enough to balance the high number of resignations.

british counter offensive - black and tans and auxiliaries

to reinforce the demoralised ric, in december 1919 the british government initiated a recruitment campaign in britain aimed at young ex-servicemen wit military skills and experience.

due to a shortage of the dark bottle-green ric uniform, the new ric recruits worse a mix of police and military clothing - military trousers and tunic and a policeman’s cap and belt. within a few months they were nicknamed ‘black and tans’.

they arrived in ireland in march 1920 most numerous in the south where fighting was fiercest and police casualties and resignations highest. they were associated with unofficial reprisals.

they were supplemented in july by the new auxiliary division of the ric. the elite corps of ex-british army officers were paid twice as much as cadets and auxiliary companies were heavily armed with light machine guns and repeating shotguns, service rifles and revolvers.

a policeman’s job

the tans were mostly ex-soldiers, unsuited for police work.

at their peak there were 7000 in ireland and as their strength increased, growing number of new recruits came from ulster. a more elite force was also recruited in england during summer 1920.

authorities doubted the ric’s ability to keep going but they were reluctant to send in troops, preferring to limit themselves to police.

both the black and tans and auxiliaries participated fully in reprisals which had tacit support of the authorities.

civilians were shot and property damaged and as the ira responded with even more terror, the conflict reached new levels of violence.

the first major act of indiscipline involving the b+t was in limerick in late april 1920 when they terrorised the city following a drinking spree, firing shots in the air and assaulting citizens.

british counter offensive

as the ric required greater support, military presence increased. troops took over large local buildings and workhouses, for example and by summer 1920 the ira and british army were engaged in a bloody geurrilla war.

newly appointed chief secretary, sir hamar greenwood and the commander in chief of the british forces in ireland, general sir nevil macready both realised that british authority was becoming ineffective.

on 9 august 1920 the govt introduced the restoration of order in ireland act which gave dublin castle the power to govern by regulation. mass arrests, internment, deportations, courts martial, curfews and executions were implemented as the military situation deteriorated.

ira tactics - flying columns

this act forced more and more ira men to go on the run to avoid arrest. these fugitives banded together for safety and became the nucleus of ira active service units.

flying columns were composed of young, full time armed volunteers available for joint operations with local ira units. once the first columns in limerick were formed, ira ghq recognised the military potential of their hit and run tactics and in august encouraged the organisation of additional columns across the country.

led by men such as tom barry, liam lynch and ernie omalley, ira flying coluns and local units were engaged in highly effective guerilla warfare.

ira organisation

despite a lack of weapons, the ira built a sophisticated guerrilla army based on a parish-by-parish organisation. a village or town comprised a company, a number of companies a battalion and battalions formed a brigade.

by the truce of 1921, there were 65 brigades and 297 battalions of the ira in ireland with a strength of 115,550 volunteers. late in the war of independence and during the truce period, brigades were organised into divisions.

macswiney and kevin barry

the separatist cause won even more sympathy in international quarters following the death of terence mac swiney. he replaced tomas maccurtain as mayor of cork, both as lord mayor and commandant of the cork brigade of ira.

he was arrested in august following a raid of the cork ira staff meeting. he was sentenced to two years servitude and dispatched to briston jail in london.

he hunger striked against his sentence. his 74 day strike got attention from the public and his steady decline drew comment from british and internation press. when he died on 28 oct he was another republican martyr and his funeral was a day of public grief.

the day after, kevin barry, an 18yo medical student was hanged in mountjoy for his part in the dublin ambush in which 8 soldiers were killed. this affected opinion as labour took up the issue in parliament and certain sections of the press attacked the government’s policy on repression.

november 1920: a turning point in the war/ bloody sunday

november 1920 saw violence in new heights and proved a militant turning point in the irish war of independence.

michael collins found out a group of secret service officers, ‘cairo gang’ were sent to dublin to eliminate the ira intelligence network. with ghq approval dick mckee and peader clancy were put in the charge of eliminating the british agents. despite their arrests, the planned mission would continue on sunday 21 november 1920. just after 9 oclock , separate ira assassination teams struck various locations in dublin and executed 11 suspected british agents.

that afternoon, crowned forces opened fire on the crowd during a football match between dublin and tipperary in croke park killing 14 civillians and injuring 64. that night mckee clancy and an innocent man called conor cline were shot dead in dublin castle.

significance of bloody sunday

some within the republican movement considered the length of the conflict and possible communication channels with the enemy. the short term backlash of bloody sunday was less important than how neither side could afford a repeat of events.

historian hopkins suggests collins was prepared to accept a truce in december 1920 but this didnt happen for another 7 months because lloyd george allowed himself to be convinced by hawks who had his ear.

a beginning had been made prior to bloody sunday and that willingness to work for a truce was reinforced by the events of november 1920.

the kilmichael ambush

occurred halfway between dunmanway and macroom on sunday 30 november 1920. at a place called kilmichael, the flying column of the west cork brigade commanded by 23yo tom barry ambushed and killed 17 of the 18 auxiliaries under ric district inspector francis crake.

tom barry maintained that the auxiliaries pretended to surrender at one point during the engagement before resuming the fight. this deception he said cost the lives of 2 of his own men who broke cover and the treachery prompted him to take no prisoners. barrys critics suggest he concocted the false surrender to justify a premeditated massacre. whatever happened admist the fog of war, reprisals quickly followed.

a fortnight after, auxiliaries poured into cork city on the night of 11 december. they set fire to buildings on patrick street. a sector of the city centre which included city hall had been destroyed. after a military enquiry the auxiliaries were expelled from cork city.

cork commemoration jersey

o’neills cork caa 1920 commemoration jersey showcases the portraits and signatures of heroes tomas maccurtain and torence macswiney both of whom died in 1920 while serving as lord mayor of cork. also depicted is the burning of cork and the monument commemorating the kilmichael ambush on the back

martial law dec 1920

bloody sunday and the kilmichael ambush highlighted that this was a war and more was needed to deal with the ira.

on 22 november widespread arrest and internment of ‘all known officers’. within a week of bloody sunday 500+ arrests were made.

as the better government for ireland bill entered its final stage in december the govt needed to restore law and order to to faciliate elections for newly created parliaments of northern and southern ireland. mounting national and international criticisms of an irish policy which allowed undisciplined ric reprisals increased. despite some misgivings the majority voted in dec 1920 for martial law in more lawless regions.

on 10 dec the lord lieutenant from dublin castle proclaimed cork, tipperary, limerick and kerry under martial law and appointed general macready commander of british forces as military governor general. two days later he approved a two week weapons amnesty that anyone in proclaimed areas wearing stolen crown uniform or having arms would be executed. a separate proclamation sanctioned official reprisals against civilians. on 29 december 7 houses were destroyed in middleton in response to an ambush earlier that day, the first of 150+ properties destroyed in unofficial reprisals in the 1st 5 months of 1921.

the order to surrender arms by 27 dec was ineffective and by end of month the govt decided to extend martial law (pressure on irq). clare, kilkenny, waterford, wexford were proclaimed on 4th jan 1921 and a state of ‘armed insurrection’ was declared to exist. any person taking part in or aiding was executed or military trial

the dail counter staff

the dail succeeded in building an effective counter state, significant by the harrowing police and military sinn fein and the ira demonstrated they could be efficient administrators.

in june 1920 mulcahy ordered the ira to become a police force and it won immediate public approval. in addition, they regulated hours of public houses and illicit whiskey distilling. they also stewarded race meetings and gaelic football matches.

a system of dail courts were set up. the authority of the courts gained wide acceptance because they were fair emphasised by the willingness of unionist landlords to have cases heard by the dail courts. judges were often drawn from local solicitors of the catholic clergy but ensured justice was even.

sinn fein propaganda

the dail established the irish bulletin making the first appearance on 11 november 1919 the irish bulletin was issued several times each week and circulated despite obstacles.

it documented british aggression acts and reprisals added propaganda. it appeared in numerous british newspapers including the times.

in november 1920 they circulated in house of commons and helped turn public opinion against the coalition govts’s irish policy.

by feb 1821 erskine childers had assumed overall control of sinn fein publicity and the irish bulletin emphasised claims that the its was a murder gang. thereafter articles decsribed the ira as the army of the irish republic which was engaged in a legitimate war.

phase 3: jan 1921- july 1921

final war phase, in early 1921 increased british military presence and their military tactics as well as continuing arms shortages undermined the capacity of the ira to perform operations. ghq advised a larger number of smaller operations required fewer weapons and posing less risk. more ambushes and executions on both sides.

escalation as up to dec 1920 casualties included 177 policemen, 84 soldiers and civillian dead which included ira personnel numbered 42. from 1 jan 1921 until truce in july a further 228 policemen, 96 soldiers and 154 civilians were killed.

ira mounted more ambushes and british deployed more troops in rural areas where flying columns were operating. large numbers of weapons were uncovered in planned searches and flying columns came under pressure. this closer contact escalated the conflict. dublin also experienced more violence.

phase 3: jan 1921- july 1921

6 months from jan 1 1921 and end of war on july 11th were the bloodiest. 1500 people died in political violence north and south in 1921, most in south.

ira continued its offenses especially outside cork. continued its offensives especially outside Cork where much of the fighting had been concentrated. the ira carried out successful ambushes at Glenwood, Co Clare; Clonfin, Co Longford; Dromkeen, Co Limerick; Millstreet, Co Cork; Carrowkennnedy and Tourmakeady in Co Mayo, and Headford in Co Kerry. These engagements saw heavy casualties inflicted on the British forces. there were significant reverses for the IRA at Clonmult and Upton in Co Cork, Drumcondra in Dublin and Selton Hill in Co Leitrim. Tom Barry’s fabled flying column narrowly escaped encirclement at Crossbarry and fought its way out.

their most ambitious action in 1921, the burning of the customs house in dublin on May 25th, was accomplished though with the deaths of five IRA men and the capture of 80 others. The year was also characterised by an escalation in the number of civilians shot as spies by the ira.

the army of the irish republic

in march 1921, in response to the continued british insistence that the ira was an undisciplined ‘murder gang’, the dail clarified that the ira had been fighting on its behalf and assumed responsibility for the actions of the volunteers up to that point.

the second dail.

the govt of ireland act came into force the day before eamon de valera’s return to dublin on xmas eve 1920. it meant lloyd george’s 1916 two home rule govts would be set out. one in dublin for 26 counties and one in belfast for 6 north-eastern counties where unionists formed an electoral majority. provisions for a unification of ireland would only happen if the unionists wanted it. however, the dail and ira were still determined to continue fighting for an all-ireland republic completely independent from britain.

under the act, an election was held in the 26 counties on 19 may 1921 to return members to the parliament of southern ireland. the dail rejected the government of ireland act but decided to use election arrangements to return members for the second dail. unopposed in 124 of the 128 new constituencies, sinn fein swept the board.

6 days later an election was held in the 6 counties for the parliament of northern ireland. unionists won 40 out of 52 seats while sinn fein candidates won 6 seats. sinn feiners elected in both elections now formed the 2nd dail which maintained itself as a parliament of an all ireland republic.

burning of custom house

conscious of escalation, de valera returned in dec 1920 and called for a more conventional military campaign for an advantage in the propaganda war. the result was the attack on customs house 25 may 1921.

a symbolic target, carried out by dublin ira party of over 100, overseen by OC of dublin brigade, oscar trainor. it proved impossible to escape without british forces arriving. 5 ira men died and dozens were amongst the 100+ suspects arrested by crown forces. both the asu and dublin’s 2nd battalion were seriously weakened and surviving activists amalgamated into the dublin guard.

serious blow to ira morale and collins was furious that devalera used his influence to persuade dublin officers.

the aim to bring international attention succeeded, making ireland seem ungovernable. they quickly adapted tactics and continued the war to call their bluff and within next weeks negociations began.

military pressures on the british - all out or get out!!

therefore, the escalation meant the govt had to clarify their position on ireland and public opinion clearly turned against bg policy.

bonar law’s retirement in march 1921 allowed lloyd george to be more flexible in his thinking and ending hostilities.

martial law had already been proclaimed in counties Cork, Kerry, Limerick and Tipperary on 10 December 1920, - two days before auxiliaries set fire part to Cork city centre. martial law was proclaimed in four more counties – Clare, Waterford, Kilkenny and Wexford – on 29 and 30 December. A system of official reprisals was also introduced in the south-western counties of Cork, Kerry, Limerick and Tipperary in december 1920. during the first five months of 1921 these official reprisals were carried out at the rate of 1 per day. In response IRA commanders had ordered their units to engage ion counter reprisals.

on 24th may 1921, the cabinet took the decision to apply martial law throughout 26 counties, although a number of ministers were clearly unhappy at this coercive approach.

pressures on the british: military pressures

additional troops dispatched, extended martial law from 14 july.

june 1922 macready told the british cabinet that rebels could be crushed with 20 more battalions, martial law and executions. it had to be ‘all out or get out’

he earlier revealed he didn’t think coercion was likely to work and insisted the troops shouldn’t be expected to endure another irish winter, so concluded that oct 1921 would be the deadline to achieve a military victory. although the ira were only able to mount largely small scale attacks in 1921 to lower british morale.

although martial law across 26 counties was agreed, there was an obvious lack of conviction and enthusiasm. neither the british govt nor public had the stomach for such a campaign.

public opinion

yet the crucial factor determining the british policy in summer 1921 was the clear shift in public opinion in ireland against the british government’s reliance on coercion. violence and bg criticism was growing.

writers and intellectuals loudly condemned reprisals. labour established its own commission which travelled to ireland to investigate the situation and its report published on 29 dec was extremely critical.

the press denounced the govt’s failure in ireland part from the right wing. morning post which called for an all out assault on the ira.

the times commenting on british public opinion to govt policy in ireland during the war of independence.