Parliament (better version)

Is the Hol as effective body as the commons in fulfilling its functions?

1. Legislative function

2. Scrutiny

3. Representation

1) Yes - legislative function

The House of Lords can be considered more effective than the House of Commons in certain functions due to its weaker party discipline, which allows greater independence among its members (AO1: knowledge of structure and function). Unlike MPs, peers are less constrained by party loyalty and are therefore often more willing to scrutinise and challenge government policies, enhancing the Lords’ role in revising legislation (AO2: analysis). For example, in 2020, the Lords forced the government to make a U-turn on the Internal Market Bill to protect the powers of the devolved parliaments, demonstrating its capacity to hold the government to account (AO3: evaluation). Similarly, in 2012, the Lords inflicted three defeats on the government’s welfare reform proposals, opposing benefit cuts and the means-testing of payments for disabled people, which illustrates the chamber’s willingness to amend controversial legislation (AO1/AO2). These cases show that the expertise and independence of peers enable the House of Lords to perform its revising and scrutinising functions effectively, sometimes even more so than the Commons, which is often bound by party whips (AO3). While the Commons retains democratic legitimacy and ultimate law-making power, the Lords’ ability to act as a check on government power highlights its continued relevance in the UK parliamentary system (AO3).

1) No - legislative function

Despite its strengths in scrutiny and independence, the House of Lords has significant legal limitations that restrict its effectiveness compared to the House of Commons (AO1: knowledge of powers). Under the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the Lords can only delay legislation for up to a year rather than block it permanently, meaning it lacks the ultimate authority to prevent government policy from becoming law (AO2: analysis). For instance, although the Lords attempted to amend or reject the EU Withdrawal Bill in 2018 and the Article 50 Bill in 2017, all defeats were ultimately overturned by the Commons, highlighting the Lords’ inability to exercise binding power over legislation (AO3: evaluation). This demonstrates that, despite its revising role and ability to challenge government proposals, the Lords cannot match the Commons in terms of direct accountability or legislative supremacy, as the elected chamber retains the final decision-making power (AO3). Therefore, while the Lords contributes to scrutiny, its legal constraints limit its overall effectiveness relative to the democratic authority of the Commons (AO2/AO3).

2) Yes - scrutiny

The absence of a government majority in the House of Lords enhances its ability to scrutinise government actions and hold the executive to account (AO1: knowledge of structure and composition). Without a dominant party controlling proceedings, peers can engage in more balanced and independent debate, often challenging or amending government proposals, which contrasts with the Commons, where party whips tend to enforce strict voting discipline (AO2: analysis). The Lords also benefits from longer sittings and more time for detailed discussion, enabling careful consideration of complex legislation (AO1). For example, during the passage of the Immigration Bill in 2020, the Lords proposed multiple amendments to protect the rights of asylum seekers and child refugees, resulting in significant revisions to the legislation, demonstrating its capacity to improve government policy through scrutiny (AO2/AO3: evaluation). Similarly, in debates over the Rwanda Asylum Bill, the Lords made amendments aimed at safeguarding human rights and monitoring the deportation process, showing that independent peers can influence policy even when the government has a majority in the Commons (AO3). Therefore, the lack of a government majority and extended time for debate allow the Lords to perform its revising and scrutinising functions effectively, sometimes complementing or even surpassing the Commons in detailed legislative oversight (AO3).

2) No - scrutiny

Despite its strengths in revising legislation, the House of Lords has structural limitations that reduce its capacity to hold the executive to account compared with the House of Commons (AO1: knowledge of parliamentary functions). Unlike the Commons, the Lords has no direct mechanism to challenge the Prime Minister or government ministers, and it cannot replicate the high-profile scrutiny provided by Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs), where MPs publicly question the PM on policy and decisions (AO2: analysis). Additionally, the Lords lacks departmental select committees, which in the Commons provide detailed, ongoing scrutiny of government departments and policies, allowing for sustained investigation and accountability (AO1). For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Commons committees such as the Health and Social Care Committee were pivotal in examining ministers and civil servants over the government’s pandemic response, producing reports and holding inquiries that influenced policy, a level of scrutiny the Lords could not achieve (AO3: evaluation). Therefore, while the Lords contributes to legislative revision and can delay or amend bills, its structural constraints limit its ability to directly hold the government to account, making it less effective than the Commons in this regard (AO3).

3) Yes - representation

The House of Lords, despite being unelected, can be effective in representing public interests through the expertise and experience of its members (AO1: knowledge of composition and function). Many peers bring specialist knowledge in fields such as science, education, law, and the armed forces, enabling informed and technically detailed contributions to policy debates that MPs in the Commons may lack (AO2: analysis). The Lords also provides a platform for vulnerable or underrepresented groups; for example, Baroness Altmann has consistently advocated for pensioners’ rights, while peers such as Lord Patel have contributed expert scrutiny on health policy, influencing amendments to legislation affecting public welfare (AO1/AO2). Although the Lords does not reflect electoral choice and therefore lacks full democratic legitimacy, its appointment system allows it to correct representational imbalances that the Commons may overlook, such as expertise-driven perspectives or minority voices (AO3: evaluation). Consequently, while it cannot replace the democratic accountability of the Commons, the Lords can enhance the inclusivity and quality of parliamentary debate, ensuring that diverse societal interests are considered in the legislative process (AO3).

3) No - representation

Although the House of Lords can provide expertise and represent underrepresented groups, its unelected nature significantly limits its ability to perform a truly representative role compared with the House of Commons (AO1: knowledge of composition and democratic legitimacy). The continued presence of hereditary peers (currently in 2026 there is 88-89 still), who inherit their seats through male primogeniture, exemplifies the outdated and undemocratic elements of the chamber, while demographic representation remains skewed—only around 14% of peers are women, and it was not until 2014 that Baroness D’Souza became the first female Lord Speaker (AO2: analysis). These factors highlight that, despite some inclusion of minority voices through life peerages, the Lords cannot fully reflect the electorate’s diversity or preferences, unlike the Commons, where MPs are directly accountable to voters (AO2/AO3). Consequently, while the Lords may offer expertise and policy knowledge, its lack of electoral legitimacy and poor demographic representation prevent it from rivaling the Commons in performing a representative function (AO3: evaluation).

Evaluate the extent to which Parliament may be considered an ineffective institution.

1) legistation

2) scrutiny

3) representation

1) legislation

Ineffective - power of the PM and whip system means it is rare that the government loses in a vote on legislation.

Parliament can be considered ineffective to some extent due to the concentration of power in the executive and the dominance of party discipline (AO1: knowledge of parliamentary structure and conventions). The Prime Minister and cabinet typically control the legislative agenda, and the whip system ensures that MPs vote along party lines, making it rare for the government to lose votes in the Commons, particularly when it holds a large majority (AO2: analysis). For example, during Boris Johnson’s 2019–2022 government, the Conservative majority meant that attempts by opposition parties to amend or block legislation, such as proposals to limit Brexit-related powers or challenge COVID-19 emergency laws, were largely unsuccessful, demonstrating Parliament’s limited ability to resist executive decisions (AO3: evaluation). This dominance of the executive over the legislature suggests that, while Parliament theoretically provides scrutiny and oversight, in practice its power is constrained by party control and the electoral mandate of the government, reducing its effectiveness as a check on government action (AO3).

1) counterpoint- legislation

Effective - they can prevent government legislation where there is genuine opposition even when the government has a significant majority.

Despite the dominance of the executive and the whip system, Parliament can still be effective in scrutinising and even blocking government legislation when there is genuine opposition (AO1: knowledge of parliamentary powers and procedures). Instances of backbench rebellions and cross-party alliances can override party discipline, demonstrating that MPs are not entirely powerless. For example, in 2020, the House of Lords forced the government to amend the Internal Market Bill to protect the powers of devolved administrations, despite the government’s Commons majority, illustrating Parliament’s capacity to influence legislation through persistence and negotiation (AO2: analysis). Similarly, in 2012, the Lords defeated the government three times over welfare reform proposals, particularly concerning cuts affecting disabled people, showing that sustained scrutiny can compel the executive to reconsider or modify its plans (AO3: evaluation). These cases indicate that, while party discipline often strengthens the government’s position, Parliament retains mechanisms, such as committee work, peer scrutiny, and strategic amendments, that allow it to exercise effective oversight and limit executive overreach (AO3).

2) scrutiny

Ineffective - PMQs is often a media event where limited genuine scrutiny happens and the HoLs is unelected so lacks

democratic legitimacy.

Parliament can be considered ineffective in holding the government to account because some of its scrutiny mechanisms are limited in practice (AO1: knowledge of parliamentary scrutiny). For example, Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs), while intended as a key tool for MPs to question the Prime Minister, often functions as a highly choreographed media event, with short, pre-prepared questions and the Prime Minister using soundbites to avoid detailed scrutiny, limiting the depth of accountability (AO2: analysis). Similarly, the House of Lords, despite its revising role, is unelected and therefore lacks democratic legitimacy, which constrains its authority to challenge government legislation effectively; the Lords can only delay most bills rather than block them outright under the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 (AO1). For instance, the Lords’ attempts to amend the EU Withdrawal Bill in 2017 were ultimately overturned by the Commons, demonstrating that even when peers scrutinise legislation rigorously, their impact is legally limited (AO3: evaluation). This suggests that, although Parliament provides formal mechanisms for scrutiny, the combination of media-focused questioning in the Commons and the unelected nature of the Lords can reduce the institution’s overall effectiveness in holding the executive to account (AO3).

2) Counterpoint- scrutiny

Effective -- they can effectively scrutinise the government through committees and questions to ministers in both houses.

Despite criticisms of limited scrutiny, Parliament can be highly effective in holding the government to account through its committees and questioning procedures in both Houses (AO1: knowledge of parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms). Select committees in the House of Commons and subject-specific committees in the House of Lords investigate government policy in detail, gather evidence from experts and ministers, and produce reports that can influence legislation and administration (AO2: analysis). For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commons’ Health and Social Care Committee conducted extensive inquiries into the government’s response, questioning ministers, civil servants, and NHS officials, and published reports that prompted changes to policy on testing, PPE distribution, and public health guidance. Similarly, the Lords’ Economic Affairs Committee scrutinised the financial implications of pandemic support schemes and raised concerns that shaped debate in both Houses (AO2/AO3: evaluation). These mechanisms demonstrate that, while some parliamentary events like PMQs may be performative, the formal committee structures enable Parliament to conduct detailed, expert-led scrutiny of the executive, enhancing its effectiveness in holding the government accountable (AO3).

3) representation

Ineffective- lack of proportion of the FPTP system means that people will not have voted for their MP and may not feel they are represented in parliament.

Parliament can be seen as ineffective in representing the electorate due to the distortions of the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system (AO1: knowledge of parliamentary elections and representation). FPTP often produces a Commons where MPs are elected with less than a majority of votes in their constituencies, meaning that many voters are effectively unrepresented or feel their vote does not count (AO2: analysis). For instance, in the 2024 general election, the Labour Party won 412 seats with only 33.7 % of the national vote, giving them a majority disproportionate to their vote share, while Reform UK received 14.3 % of the vote but secured only 5 seats, highlighting how a significant portion of the electorate can fail to gain representation (AO2/AO3). These results illustrate that, despite Parliament’s theoretical role in representing the electorate, its composition may not reflect the actual distribution of public support, undermining its legitimacy and effectiveness in fulfilling a truly representative function (AO3).

3) counterpoint- representation

Effective - FPTP electoral system means that MPs effectively represent their constituents.

Despite criticisms of the First‑Past‑the‑Post electoral system, it can be argued that FPTP enhances Parliament’s effectiveness by enabling MPs to represent the specific views of their constituents rather than simply obeying a party line (AO1: knowledge of electoral system and representation). Under FPTP, each MP has a clear geographical constituency and is accountable to local voters, which can encourage them to vote according to local opinion, especially on conscience issues where party whips exercise less control (AO2: analysis). A notable example is the Assisted Dying Bill, where MPs were given a free vote in the House of Commons, allowing them to decide based on their own judgement and constituent views rather than party instructions; the bill passed by 314 to 291 votes, reflecting this individual autonomy in representation. Several MPs cited their constituents’ views and local campaigning as key factors in their decision like Dave Robertson, MP for Lichfield, and voting patterns varied within parties in ways that appeared to correspond with local attitudes on the issue (AO3: evaluation). This suggests that, while FPTP may distort national proportionality, it can strengthen the link between MPs and their constituents on moral or local matters, thereby enhancing Parliament’s responsiveness and effectiveness in representing disparate local preferences (AO3).