Introduction to International Politics Midterm

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Last updated 5:28 PM on 12/1/25
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74 Terms

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Realism

A theory of international relations that is based on the key idea of anarchy and power. There is no overarching power (anarchy) and States prioritize self-help and increase their power relative to the other states. As one state increases its power, others may respond in kind, leading to a constant struggle for power and security.

EXAMPLE: Cold war arms race is security dilemma 

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Neorealism

Branch of realism that focus on the distribution of power. Neorealists look at the structure of the international system as an explanatory factor. Bipolarity is the safest distribution of power in the international system.

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Liberalism

Liberalism is an international relations theory based off the belief that humans are inherently good. Believes in the principles of collective action where states unify together to solve a collective problem. Institutional change = less violence. Democracy is favored due to its lack of excessive government interference and Free trade is necessary to cause interdependence of the states which will cause less war.

EXAMPLE: League of nations represents an alliance where there is collective action

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Neo-Liberalism

Based on the question “if realists are right and anarchy leads to conflict why do we see so much cooperation?” They believe that collective interdependence is the reasoning for this and that states don’t only care about security but also value common interests

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Constructivism

Views international politics through a focus of norms and identities

How do state identities and cultures impact their interests and interactions with the rest of the world

EXAMPLE Sunni (Saudi arabia) and Shia (Iran) have two different belief systems and could be the reasoning behind their actions during Syria’s conflict. Iran backed the government while Saudi Arabia backed the resistance groups.

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Marxism

IR theory that focuses on the evolution of capitalism on economic class. One theory under Marxism is overproduction and underconsumption (the rich produce a product that the poor can not afford and the rich don’t buy due to saving so corporations expand abroad to distribute goods)

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Feminist

more of a critique on IR theories and consider the fact that most of these theories are focused on a man’s point of view and leave out a key part of the story that involves women. call for more women intervention in international politics. 

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What is the origin of Sovereignty

Peace of Westphalia - established ideas of individual states and respecting boarders and non-interference

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Principles of Sovereignty

Supreme Authority

  • the government in a state has full authority over that state and the laws made there

Territorial Integrity

  • states have to respect other boarders and not try to forcefully expand

non-interference

  • Countries should not interfere with other countries domestic affairs

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why is sovereignty hard in practice

in situations we are faced with human rights violations some states may step in to end the situation occurring which is technically interfering with sovereignty.  

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Jus Ad Bellum 

  • Legitimate authority 

    • do you have authority in this conflict / a position in this conflict 

  • Just cause 

    • is there a rightful reason for entering war 

  • Right Intention 

    • is there a good intention behind war - striving for something good 

  • Probability of success 

    • do you have a high chance of winning 

  • Last resort 

    • have all other methods failed 

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Jus In Bello

  • Distinction 

    • separate civilians from militants 

  • Proportionality 

    • no excessive force 

  • military necessity 

    • are your actions necessary 

  • No use of evil weapons or methods 

  • Fair Treatment 

    •  fair treatment towards prisoners of war and others involved 

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Forms of Power

Hard Power - militaristic and economic power. More physical methods of power that are measurable. 

Soft power - ability to get others to do what you want including promoting cultural values and institutions 

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Dimensions of Power

  • scope**

    • the extent of power exercised in certain areas - one state could be more powerful in economics than another 

  • Domain**

    • the number or importance of the things they have control over 

  • weight** 

    • probability that one states actions will be affected by another states 

  • Means** 

    • ways to exercise influence

      • economic means (augmenting or reducing goods being provided to other countries)  

      • military means (actual or threatened military force)

      • diplomatic means (negotiation and representation)

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Faces of power

  • decision making **

    • ability to make decisions that affect others 

  • non-decision making **

    • ability to suppress certain issues and controlling agenda 

  • ideological power**

    • ability to shape the preferences and beliefs of others 

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Security Dilemma (definition and causes)

Security dilemma is the dilemma of when one state builds their security, other states feel insecure. The uncertainty of why state 1 was building their security (they could have plans for war) causes state 2 to begin building their security in fear of what state 1 will do. 

caused by anarchy. There is no overarching government or system, so the states are left to fend for themselves. Because states are driven by their own national interests namely security one state may build arms or alliances in goal of achieving their own security. Because of anarchy however, neighboring states see this and build arms as well since states have to rely on themselves for security. 

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what is relative power as it relates to security dilemma

states are motivated by relative gains rather than absolute gains and strive only to be more powerful relative to other states. One states loss is considered a gain in power for another state - this is relative power. The state didn’t gain power however the other state loss power so relative to them the first state has more power.

in security dilemma states are striving to gain that relative power. One state increasing their security is considered a loss in power for the other state which causes the dilemma

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power balancing strategies

internal balancing: balancing internal power through building military to stand against a more powerful state 

External balancing: forming alliances externally to offset the power of more powerful states 

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Security dilemmas roll in deterrence

each country is trying to deter conflict from the other side - if state B is stronger than state A then state A is deterred from fighting state B, each is trying to outdo the other

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Rationalist Explanations for War

Actors have divergent interests and interact to gain these interests. These interactions are strategic. War happens when there is an unsuccessful bargaining and crisis bargaining

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The rationalist puzzle + war inefficiency

war is costly for all those involved so war is seen as an inefficient way of achieving goals, if there is an alternative, states will choose that. Why do states go to war even if it is costly on both sides? 

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Explanations for why there are unsuccessful bargains that cause war

War from incomplete information **

  • incentives to lie and misrepresent information about strength and resolve cause some states to have incorrect or insufficient information about the opposing state causing them to not know how much they can demand or how much they need to give in a bargain to prevent war 

War from Commitment Issues** 

  • the issue of how credible a state is to not use violence or maintain their end of the bargain / agreement 

War from the issue of indivisibility**

  • some things that are fought over cannot be split without ruining the value of the item so there is not much bargaining that can prevent war

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The Bargaining Model 

the bargaining model is a product of the bargains that states in a conflict enter in attempt to negotiate. 

The model demonstrates the status quo aka what exists now. The bargaining model depicts a grey area that is considered “cost” due to war for both sides. Any agreement that exists within the grey area considered the cost of war is the range for bargaining. The states want anything more than what they can get in war so to prevent war the states must bargain in this range. 

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when does the bargaining range close? when does it change in general?

bargaining range changes when the cost of war changes. If war becomes costlier for a state, then the range changes. As cost increases for a state the bargaining range increases and vice versa. The bargaining range closes completely when both A and B see a zero cost for war or the value of war becomes extremely high. War from inseparable goods causes bargaining range to close. 

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coordination

both actors benefit from working together and have no incentive to deflect. They just need to mutually decide to act in a way that benefits their interests

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collaboration

working together to help both parties but they each have an incentive to deflect

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coercion

actors attempt to use their power to force a bargain

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Prisoners Dilemma **

demonstrates cooperation

two prisoners are kept separated and given a choice to cooperate or deflect 

if prisoner both cooperate, they got 1 year 

if prisoner 1 deflects and 2 cooperates then 1 goes free and 2 serves 3 years (and vice versa) 

if they both deflect, they each serve 10 years 

both prisoners have limited information and have to trust the other prisoner to cooperate reflecting IRL international politics 

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Chicken**

two cars are driving towards each other and the first to swerve is the chicken and the one who didn’t is the winner

High costs to both if one doesn’t swerve

how can I make my threats and statements more credible? increasing the stakes - remove the steering wheel so you have no choice but to continue forward forcing the other car to swerve

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Credibility

how likely a state is to believe a threat is going to be carried out

refers to the belief not the actual intentions (if someone believes I will do something then I have credibility regardless of if I will do it or not) 

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Why is credibility hard to achieve 

following through with threats is costly (threatening war but the costs of war are so high that would not make sense for them to threaten war) 

Conflicting interests at the heart of the bargaining interaction

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Ways to achieve Credibility

Brinksmanship **

  • A Strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war with the hope that the other will lose its nerve first and make concessions

  • Signaling resolve through approaching the brink of war through provocative actions

  • Each side raises the stakes of war hoping the other caves

Tying Hands **

  • Making threats that would make backing down difficult

    • in front of the public to cause audience costs

Paying for power**

  • costly steps to increase capabilities

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Costly Signaling

refers to a communication strategy where the sender demonstrates a cost making their signal more credible 

  • what is some cost that a resolved state would be fine paying but an unresolved state would not? A costly signal uses these costs to show their resolve 

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Cheap Talk

No set cost or binding commitment - less credible

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Types of Costly Signaling

Sinking Costs

  • Incur costs that are financially costly if they did not follow through with the agreement 

    • Audience costs

Tying hands

  • An agreement made in a way that it is hard for the state to back out - stakes too high to back out 

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Costly signaling role in conflict and bargaining 

State A will not believe a threat from state B without some cost tied to it. Creates credibility in threats being made. 

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Democratic Peace

There are few clear cases of war between mature democratic states

  • they are not overall less war prone than other kinds of states they just don’t fight other democratic states

  • Since leaders don’t directly pay the costs of the war - taxes, loss - so democracies make sure these costs are felt through political accountability

    • voting and removing support from a person in a position of power jeopardizing their position of power

    • This causes high cost for the leaders and therefore less war since the leaders of these states value war significantly less

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Institutional explanation for democratic peace 

The belief that the institutions built in democracies are the cause of the democratic peace - the voting systems and elections cause the leaders in democratic countries to have to respond to the people out of fear of being removed from power causing higher costs 

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Normative explanations for Democratic Peace

norms - focuses on how in Democratic societies we have norms and morals that are against war so leaders will not enter an unpopular war since our society is against war

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Democratic Mechanisms and Critiques 

some say that democratic peace isn’t caused by democracy itself rather it is correlated. Democracy doesn’t cause the oeace itself but peace can be correlated to democracy

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Two level game

A two level game is a framework that examines how international negotiations occur on two levels - domestic and international

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Two Level game connection to domestic political institutions and constraints

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Two level game’s role in bargaining

A bargain must be within the range for both international bargaining range and domestic bargaining range

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Formation and purpose of alliances 

Alliances are formed to help their members cooperate militarily in the event of war that specify standards of behavior 

The formation of alliances can be for the preservation of the balance of power, bandwagoning where states join with the more powerful side in a dispute, and they may join together to counter threats 

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Challenges with alliances

Challenge of Credibility 

  • How can I get another country to believe my threats? 

  • done by making sure allies are more likely to fight on each other’s behalf, and alliances must do something to make sure adversaries believe they will go to war on each others behalf

Free riding 

  • when smaller states don’t contribute to the defense spending of the alliance as much as they would have to contribute without the alliance 

Misaligned Interests

  • interests don’t align for the individual states within the alliance leading to tensions 

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Alliances Conditions for Success 

Success relies on these 4 factors: 

  • the strength of the interest that brought them together 

  • the ability of the alliance to alter its members preferences so that in the event of war, war is preferable to abandonment 

  • the effectiveness of the alliance in convincing that the members of the alliance prefer war to abandoning members of the alliance 

  • the ability if the members to limit the risk of entrapment 

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Principle Agent Problem

conflicts of interest that arise when one party delegates decision making authority to another party - agent expected to act on the principles behalf

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Principle Agent connection with alliances

Demonstrates the dynamics of alliances since it explains how principles delegate tasks to agents

principles may have their own goals and interests causing agency problems effecting the accountability and effectiveness of alliances since principles may struggle to control an agent with different interests

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Critical Theory Perspectives

Feminism - take into consideration the role and situation of women and how gender impacts international relations and the actions that occur in international politics

Psychology: consider the role of emotions and experiences in decision making 

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Unitary theory and Criticism of it

A state operated as a single unit with a single set of beliefs and systems 

criticism: what about the role of bureaucracy, interest groups and the general public’s interference with international politics? 

what about leaders and their biases? 

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Terrorism Definition

violent

noncombatant

nonstate actors

political aim

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The difference between Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism

Terrorists are less organized, have less public support, weaker, less violence, and targeting civilians

Guerrilla targets military / government

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Similarities, gray area and classification challenges with Guerrilla War vs Terrorism

what defines political?

how do we define what is and isn’t a noncombatant? Is an unarmed member of the military a noncombatant?

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Civil war and Terrorism 

Civil war also involves using violence for political aims 

Terrorism is used as a method of credibility by the weaker rebel group within a civil war 

Terrorism tends to be less about the level of violence but about the target 

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Terrorism as a tool

terrorism represents a strategic instrument that any in a party can use

for weaker parties terrorism is a way to establish credibility and credible threats

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Terrorism as a syndrome

terrorism as a psychological meaningful entity with identifiable characteristics on individual and group levels

terrorists are characterized by specific traits that distinguish them from non-terrorists

Terrorism has a root cause and terrorism should be seen as a monolithic entity

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Terrorism attrition 

one side has a goal of wearing down the opponent’s military capabilities 

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Provocation

meant to persuade a sympathetic population that the targets of the terrorist attacks are evil and untrustworthy

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Spoiling

spoils the intended peace by preying on the lack of trust on both sides.

An attack from outside or within the groups attempting peace to spoil the intended peace

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outbidding

Competing with other terrorist groups - increases degree of violence

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Reasons Why Countries Trade

To realize the benefits of Specialization where one country focuses on the production of one item that they specialize in and trade for other products with other countries 

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Comparative advantage

The ability of a country or firm to produce a particular good or service such that its resources are more efficiently than it can produce other goods or services. The comparative aspect comes from internal comparison. Can this country produce item A or B more efficiently? If item A is produced more efficiently than it has a comparative advantage 

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Absolute Advantage

The ability of a country or firm to produce more of a particular product or service than other countries or firms. Comparison is across countries not within.

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Heckscher Ohlin Trade Theory 

The theory that a country will export goods that make intensive use of the factors of production in which it is well endowed 

A labor rich country will export goods that make use of the labor they have available 

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Why are there trade barriers

many countries have trade barriers in order to protect domestic producers from imports

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Protectionism

The use of certain measures to restrict imports

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Tariffs

Taxes on imports - historically the most common form of trade barrier

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Quantitative restriction / quota

A common form of trade barrier that limits the quantity of a foreign good that can be sold domestically 

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Examples of other Nontariff barriers to trade

regulations targeted at foreign goods or requirements that governments purchase from domestic producers

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Winners and Losers in International Trade

Three groups “loose” due to protections in internation trade - Consumers of imported goods, exporters, citizens in general

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Stolper-Samuelson Approach

The theorem that trade protection benefits the scarce factor of production. In a labor scarce country labor benefits from protection and loses from trade liberalization

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Ricardo-Viner model 

A model of trade relations that emphasizes the sector in which factors of production are employed rather than the nature of the factor itself. 

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Ad Bellum

Legit Authority, just cause, Right Intention, prob success, last resort 

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In Bello

Distinction, Proportionality, Military necessary, no evil weapons, fair treatment