Martime Warfare Final

Sun Tzu

Art of war, Avoid long protracted war, 4 main objectives: subdue without fighting, disrupt alliances, attack his enemy, lay siege to fortified cities.

Karl Von Clausewitz

On War, force a confrontation and have a clear objective, the side that will be victorious in war will navigate the fog of war best.

Mahan

large powerful armadas that fight in one decisive battle, sea power

Sir Julian Stafford Corbett

Control of maritime communication is key, you can disperse your forces as long as they are in communication

Center of Gravity

Most important thing enemy has, if it were taking out enemy would fall

Critical Vulnerability

offshoot of center of gravity, there are many critical vulnerabilities that is taken out would take down center of gravity.

Levels of War: Strategic

Multinational strategic objectives, ex) planning at the pentagon

Levels of War: Operation

Links that tactical employment of forces to national and military strategy

Levels of War: Tactical

Planning and executing battles

Role of CNO

most senior naval officer, responsible to SECNAV for manning, training, and equipping Navy, member of JCOS

Role of SECNAV

Authoirty over both Navy and Marine Corp, civilian who conducts all affairs of the Department of the Navy, responsible for building and repairing ships

Role of CMC

most senior marine, responsible to SECNAV for utilization of resources and operating efficiency of the USMC forces, member of JCOS

Operational Chain of Command

in charge of operations, “warheads on foreheads”, president, SECWAR, JCOS, commbatant cmdrs, components cmdrs,

Administrative Chain of Command

in charge of admin, "manning, training, and equipping”, president, SECWAR, SECNAV, CNO

Nuclear Triad

Bombers, Boomers, and ICMBs

Strategic Bombers

46 nuclear capable B-52s and 20 B-2A aircraft, most flexible leg of the nuclear triad

Boomers

Ohio class SSBNs, most surviveable leg of nuclear triad, undetectable platforms

ICBMs

LGM-30G, up to 400 Minuteman III missiles, most responsive leg of nuclear triad, continuous alert since 1959

3 ways we deter

Denial, resilience, cost imposition

Denial

deter aggression where enemies could rapidly seize territory, high value assets and capabilities

Cost Imposition

impose costs in excess to the aggressor

Resilience

withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption, ex) cyber resilience

Geographic combatant commands

made to simplify orders to areas

functional combatant commands

operatre worldwide across geographical boundaries

USAFRICOM

Stuttgart, Germany

USCENTCOM

Tampa, Florida

USEUCOM

Stuttgart, Germany

USINDOPACOM

Honolulu, Hawaii

USNORTHCOM

Colorado Springs, Colorado

USSOUTHCOM

Miami, Florida

USSPACECOM

Huntsville, Alabama

2nd fleet

HQ Norfolk, VA, North Atlantic AOR

3rd fleet

HQ - San Diego, CA, East Pacific AOR

4th Fleet

HQ Mayport, FL, South Atlantic AOR

5th Fleet

HQ Manama, Bahrain, middle east AOR

6th Fleet

HQ Naples, Italy, Mediterranean AOR

7th fleet

HQ Yokosuka, Japan, West Pacific AOR

10th fleet

HQ Fort Meade, MD, fleet cyber command

Strait of Hormuz

only way to Middle East, controls oil flow

Bab el Mandab Strait

controls oil flow, and Houthis keep causing violence in strait which is effecting global shipping

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea

UNCLOS Territorial Sea

0-12nm, complete sovereignty, innocent passage only

UNCLOS Contiguous Zone

0-24 nm, coastal state can enforce laws and regulations,

UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

24-200 nm, national has sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting natural resources

UNCLOS High Seas

>200nm, resources of high seas are common ground

FONOPs

Freedom of Navigation Operations, can include innocent passages, we conduct FONOPs to dispute territorial claims especially with China

Innocent Passage

passages that are not ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security’ of the coastal state, ships may not exercise or practice weapons of any kind, launch or recover aircraft, or engage in propoganda or intelligence collection, submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag

Transit Passage

continuous and expeditious transit through a strait between one EEZ/high seas to another, do not threaten nations around the strait, submarines may remain submerged

TACSIT definition

probability an adversary knows where we are

TACSIT 0

Unknown

TACSIT 1

Located and can be targeted

TACSIT 2

Forces location known, disposition unknown (can’t fire on us/don’t have detailed info), most common

TACSIT 3

Forces not located

OTC Call Sign

A

CWC call sign & location

B, carrier

AMDC Call Sign & location

W, cruiser

ASWC Call Sign & location

X, carrier

IWC Call Sign & location

Q, carrier

STWC call sign & location

P, CAG on carrier

SUWC Call Sign

S, carrier

SCC Call Sign & location

Z, DESRON CO on carrier

Principles of CWC

relies on delegation, collaborative planning, decentralized execution, command by negation

Aircraft in a carrier airwing

4 strike fighters squadrons (F18s, F35s), 1 airborne early warning squadron (E2s), 1 electronic attack squadron (EA18s), 1 fleet logistic support squadron (C2s), 1 helicopter sea combat squadron (MH60S), 1 helicopter maritime squadron (MH60R)

Primary mission set for F18s

strike, maritime employment, offensive counter air, air defense

Primary Mission set for F35s

strike, maritime employment, offensive counter air, suppression of enemy air defense, air defense

primary missions of EA18s

suppression of enemy air defense, electronic warfare

E2D primary mission set

command & control, strike, maritime employment, offensive counter air, air defense, suppression of enemy air defense, combat search and rescue

CMV-22s primary mission set

carrier onboard delivery, transportation of goods and people

Capabilities shared by all US subs

unlimited endurance, only American asset with heavywieght torpedos, stealth, advanced SONAR

Limitations shared by all US subs

no ability to reload armaments at sea, limited ADCAP loadout, low variety loadouts, limited comms without sacrifing stealth, no AAW capabilities, poor maneuverability on surface

Primary mission area CVN Nimitz

strike, ASW, Command and Control

CVN Ford primary mission area

strike, ASW, Command and Control

DDG Aleigh Burke Flight I and II primary mission sets

SUW, IAMB, BMD, ASW, strike

CG Ticonderoga Primary mission set

SUW, IAMD, and strike

Differences between Ford and Nimitz

Nimitz are older, Ford has less crew and better quality of life, Ford has more room for flight operations, Ford can launch a larger number and variety of aircraft, Ford has increased electrical generation, Ford has newer radar system (SPY), Ford has electromagnetic aircraft launch system

Active Seeker Pros

missile has organic radar transmitter and receiver, fire and forget, very accurate, difficult to jam, can fire at EMCON

Active Seeker Cons

less control over missile, can be tricked, indiscriminate targeting

passive seeker pros (missle listens for and targets emissions)

fire and forget, can fire at EMCON, chaff is ineffective

cons passive seeker

can be defeated by effective emcon, can be lured by false emissions

semi-active seeker

missile is aided by a targeting device that tells the missile where to go

semi-active pros

high accuracy, difficult to trick, does not emit a signal

semi-active cons

requires an inorganic asset to idetify the target, the targetor cannot be at EMCON, coordination between assets

electro-optical

missile uses imagery or a built in camera to be guided to the target

electro-optical pros

mitigates collateral damage, emcon ineffective, does not emit signal

electro-optical disadvantages

affected by weather and visibility

TLAM Nav systems

GPS, Inertial navigation system (accelerometer), Terrain contour map (altimeter and 3D maps), digital scene matching area correlator (matches live pictures with stored scenes to guide missile)

peration prosperity guardian

US launched multi-nation maritime security initiative in response to25 Houthi attacks, forces operate under Combined Maritime forces and leadership of Task Force 153 (CTF 153)

Surface and Aviation kill chain

find, fix, track, target, engage, assess (F2T2EA)

Tactical Data Links

secure wireless communication links used by US armed forces and NATO nations, example is Link 16 which mainly applies to air defense and missile defense command and control

MDA - missile defense agency

responsible for developing layered defense against ballistic missiles, track, target, and engage missiles

Defense in Depth

how a CSG detects and destroys enemy aircraft/missiles, E2 - early warning, F18s - attempt to intercept w DCA capabilities, CG/DDGs - use air defense radar and assets to defend against potential/actual missle launches