CW Decisionmaking

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50 Terms

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SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY (SEUT)

  • Calculate the expected utility (value) of each option (outcome) x probability it will actually happen (likelihood)

    • Add each possible option/outcome into equation and calculate which has highest probability

  • Example: Value of getting better grades x probability that staying home will improve grades = choosing option that has highest expected utility for you

    • Should I buy lottery tickets?

      • Cost of a ticket is low utility

      • Winning millions is high utility but also high uncertainty

  • SEUT seems rational but people don't always make decisions that way

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Kahneman and Tversky

  • Presented people with gambles

  • Published in economics and psychology papers

    • Changed the way we assumed economics and rationality worked

  • Started behavioral economics

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Loss aversion

  • we feel approx. 2x stronger about losses than gains

    • Losses have greater weight than potential gains in making decisions

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Prospect theory

  •  describes how people value gains and losses

    • Function is concave for gains

      • Reflects diminishing marginal value and risk aversion

    • Function is convex for losses: reflects risk seeking

    • Loss aversion: implies losses have greater weight than potential gains in making decisions

      • Reflected in steeper curve for losses

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Tversky and Kahneman (1981) risk aversive vs risk seeking

  • Imagine US is prepping for an outbreak of a disease expected to kill 600 people

    • 2 alt programs to combat disease have been proposed

      • Program A: 200 saved

      • Program B: 33% chance that all 600 saved, 67% chance no one will be saved

    • Most people choose: A - risk aversive

  • Same experiment, new programs

    • Program A: 400 saved

    • Program B: 67% that 600 die, 33% no one dies

    • Most people chose: B - risk seeking

  • Same question framed different ways

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why do people not maximize utility in decisionmaking

  • We feel more strongly about losses > gains

  • We opt for certainty and certain gains

  • We prefer to take risks with losses

  • The way a situation is framed can influence choices

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Framing effects and preference reversals

  • When 2 options are identical, people make difference decisions depending on how outcomes are framed

  • People tend to be risk aversive when the outcome is framed as gain, and risk seeking when the outcome is framed as a loss

  • Kahneman and Tversky (1984): violates the principle of invariance

    • Peoples choices should depend on the situation, not on the way its framed/described

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Prospect theory

  • gains and losses are calculated from a reference point

    • We think about changes at points on the curve rather than absolute values

  • Predicts many aspects of human decision making

    • Such as why we often don't maximize utility

  • Theory is primarily descriptive

    • Explains what decisions people make

    • Not why

  • Doesn't explain ind differences in preference for risk

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Endowment effect Kahneman et al (1990)

  • Given a mug, how much do you sell it back to the giver for

    • Randomly assigned participants as buyers or sellers

      • Sellers demand more than buyers are prepared to give

      • Ex. Housing market

        • House prices fall, may fall more, homeowners reluctant to put their homes on the market

        • Homes stay on the market because there's a discrepancy between what people offer/accept

  • Endowment effect and prospect theory

    • Gains/losses calculated using a reference point

    • People care about change from this reference point rather than absolute values

    • Sometimes reference point shifts (ex. We obtain something) and leads to different decisions

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Disjunction effect and Sure thing principle

  • Sure thing principle

    • If we prefer X to Y in any state of the world then we should prefer X to Y when the state of the world is uncertain

    • Disjunction effect shows that sometimes people violate this principle

  • Disjunction effect

    • People look for reasons or arguments to support their decisions

    • People may make the same decision but for a different reason

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Reason based choice

  • Reason based choice suggests that we will be more likely to choose an opt when we have a compelling reason for that selection

  • Search for alts should occur when a compelling reason for choice is not available

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Heuristics

  • - a short cut rule of thumb for making judgements

  • Often produce the 'right' answer but sometimes lead to biases

    • A systematic error in judgement relative to some normative standard

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Intuition vs. logic

  • System 1 uses heuristics

    • Quickly produces intuitive answer

  • System 2 requires time and working memory to slowly work out a logical answer

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conjunction fallacy

  • Most people think that its more likely that Linda is a 'feminist' bank teller than a bank teller because she is more similar to that category

    • The probability is smaller though

  • People judge whehter someone/something belongs to a category by judging the similarity of that to a stereotypical member of that category

    • Linda is more representative of a feminist bank teller than a bank teller

      • So judged to be more likely

      • Unordered lottery number sequence more typical of a winning lottery ticket

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Availability heuristic:

  •  the likelihood of events is judged based on the ease with which instances come to mind

    • youre going on holiday to the beach

      • More likely to kill you:

        • Coconut falling

        • Shark attack

        • Shark attack is less likely but representations are more available in memory (media) thus the brain takes that a s cue for it to be believed to be more relevant

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Gambler's fallacy:

  • the belief that after a streak of events (ex heads) the opposite becomes more likely (ex tails)

  • Representativeness in gambling

    • We expect a non random sequence to be as close to an alteration rate of 0% as possible

  • Realistically, a random sequence is most likely to have an alt rate of 50%

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making judgements

  • We find formal probability hard

  • We tend to use heuristics like representativeness, availability, and anchors

  • We are also very good at recognizing patterns and using them to make predictions

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Chapman and Johnson (2002) anchoring

  • Anchoring effect: Exposure to irrelevant numerical anchors influences judgments and estimations.

  • Anchoring involves starting from an initial value (anchor) and adjusting to reach a final estimate, but adjustments are often insufficient.

  • "Anchoring" can refer to:

    • Presenting a salient but uninformative number to subjects (anchoring procedure).

    • Experimental results where the uninformative number influences judgments.

    • The psychological process by which the uninformative number affects judgments.

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Function of reasoning

  • Allows us to apply our knowledge to new situations

  • Enables us to think hypothetically make plans for the future, consider the consequences of our actions

  • Enables us to evaluate past events and possibilities - think counterfactually

  • Enables us to understand the meaning of what others say

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Inductive reasoning

  • Reasoning from specific cases to general rule

  • Find a pattern in some cases and use it to make a prediction

    • Ex. All the swans I see are white -> all swans are white

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Abductive reasoning

  • Generating an explanation

    • Ex. Theres glass on the floor -> someone dropped a glass

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Deductive reasoning

  • Occurs when the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises

    • If the premises are true the conclusion must be true

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Propositional reasoning

  • A proposition is a statement that can be true or false

  • Involves drawing inferences based on the relation between propositions

    • Ex. Relations such as if and or

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mental models theory (johnson-laird (1983), J-L and Byrne (1991))

  • People construct models to represent the premises

  • Due to working memory limitations, they often represent only a single model initially

  • Evidence: the difficulty of drawing an inference is related to:

    • Whether an inference can be drawn from the initial models

    • The number of models required

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Cheater detection (Cosmides (1989))

  • We have evolved an evolutionary mechanism that sensitizes people to look for cheaters

    • General rule: if one takes a benefit then one must pay the cost

    • Cosmides argues that this evolutionary mechanism explains the facilitation observed on deontic selection tasks

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What is counterfactual thinking (CFT)

  • The imagination of alternatives to reality

  • Simulate a sequence of causal events

  • Expressed in the form of a conditional

    • Ex. "if the west hadnt supported ukraine, it couldn’t have fought russia"

      • "what if" "if only"

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Individual differences in CFT generation Bacon walsh and martin (2013)

  • people spontaneously generate more counterfactual when their mood is low

    • Cause or effect?

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CFT and blame

  • People attribute more blame when preceding actions are unusual and hence it is easy to imagine and alternative outcome

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luck

 the chance happening of fortunate or adverse events

  • People use luck (good/bad) to mean narrowly

  • Avoiding a (neg/pos) outcome

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CFT and the future

  • Prep for a task induces upward counterfactual thinking

    • After performing a task, inds who believe they will have to repeat it generate more upward counterfactuals

  • CFT thinking can influence future behavior

    • Generating upward CFT between two anagram tasks leads to improved performance in the second set

  • They help people learn from mistakes, formulate effective plans, and mitigate the certainty of hindsight bias.

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Deficits in CFT Knight and Grabowecky (1995)

  • Difficulty imagining counterfactual alternatives to reality may underlie many of the problems experienced by individuals with brain lesions in the dorsolateral PFC

    • Inflexible behavior

    • Suppressed emotions

    • Excessively bound by environmental cues

    • Uncreative

    • Have difficulty making plans

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problem

  • Start state - current situation

  • Goal state - desired situation

  • Problem - not clear how to get from start to goal state (subjective)

  • Well-defined problem

    • Initial state, goal state, and possible moves are well-defined (ex. Chess)

  • Ill-defined problem

    • Start state, end state, and/or possible strategies may be unknown (most everyday problems ex. Exams)

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theories of problem solving

  • Behaviorist approach

    • Trial and error learning

      • Unsystematic behavior

      • Requires no knowledge

      • Slow

      • Doesn’t work for all problems

      • Risky

    • Thorndike's (1898) cat experiment

  • Gestalt approach

    • Problem solving requires insight

      • "aha" moment

    • Gestalt approach evaluation:

      • Recognizes the role of insight

      • Mechanisms underlying insight are not specified

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insight and prob solving

  • Neurosci and insight

    • Activation in right anterior superior temporal gyrus

      • FMRI: insight relative to non-insight solutions

      • EEG: prior to insight

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representational change theory

  • Representational change theory (Ohlsson 1992)

    • Aims to explain the processes underlying insight

      • Construct a problem representation

      • Retrieve operators (moves/actions) from memory by spreading activation from the problem representation

      • Impasses occur when the problem representation does not cue the right operators

      • Impasses are broken by restructuring the problem representation

      • Once an impasse is broken a full or partial insight may occur

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Allen Newell and Herb Simon (1972) info processing

  • Computational modeling approach - general problem solver

    • Most problems don't require insight, focus instead on well defined knowledge lean problems

  • General problem solver

    • Problem space: all possible states of a problem (all chess positons)

      • Initial state: starting position

      • Goal state: final position (ex. Checkmate)

      • Operators: allows moves or actions (ex. Chess moves)

      • Problem solving is a search through the problem space

    • We don’t have the WM capacity to think of all possible moves

      • Use general purpose heuristics instead

      • Objective measure of optimal performance and can test whether people make moves that are consistent with the heuristics

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Analogical problem solving

  •  how do we learn from past problems

    • Negative transfer

      • functional fixedness the perceived inability of someone to use an object for something other than its original intended purpose

    • Positive transfer

      • Near transfer to a similar context

      • Far transfer to a different context

  • Retrieving analogies is hard unless the problems share similar surface features

  • In real life, this may be even more difficult because the time and context might be more distant than in lab studies

  • Individual differences are not well understood

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Judgment vs. Decision-Making:

  • Judgment vs. Decision-Making:

    • Decision-making involves choosing a course of action, while judgment focuses on estimating the probability of events.

    • Judgments are evaluated based on accuracy, while decisions are assessed based on consequences.

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Support theory

proposes that subjective probability increases with more explicit and detailed event descriptions.

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Tetlock's social functionalist approach

suggests biases in decision-making stem from the need to justify decisions to others.

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Dijksterhuis's unconscious thought theory

proposes the superiority of unconscious over conscious thinking, but this is debated in research.

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Incubation

aids problem solving by allowing irrelevant information or ineffective strategies to fade.

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Individuals with high fluid intelligence

  • excel in analogical reasoning, with the left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex playing a crucial role.

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Chess-Playing Expertise:

  • Expert chess players possess more cognitive ability and extensive knowledge, allowing rapid identification of good moves.

  • Chess expertise relies on template-based knowledge, emphasizing fast search processes over complex strategies.

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Medical Expertise:

  • Medical experts rely on fast, automatic processes for diagnosis, with analytic processes enhancing performance, especially for experts.

  • Diagnostic errors in medical expertise can stem from failures in detection, recognition, or judgment.

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Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking

  • Counterfactual thoughts are reflections on alternative outcomes of past events.

  • The functional theory suggests that counterfactual thinking serves the purpose of behavior regulation and performance improvement.

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Counterfactual thoughts can influence behavior through two pathways (Byrne 2002)

  • Content-specific pathway: Directly affects behavioral intentions based on specific informational effects.

  • Content-neutral pathway: Indirectly influences behavior through affect, mind-sets, or motivation.

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emotions and CFT (Byrne 2002)

  • Counterfactual thinking amplifies emotions such as guilt, regret, and relief by comparing actual outcomes with alternative possibilities.

  • It influences social judgments regarding accountability, responsibility, and blame.

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Evans' hypothetical thinking theory

based on dual processes, proposes that people typically consider only one hypothesis at a time, prioritize the most relevant hypothesis, and accept candidate explanations as long as they are satisfactory. This suggests a nuanced approach to how people engage in hypothesis testing.


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confirmation bias,

where people tend to seek evidence that confirms their hypotheses rather than testing them rigorously. Later, this idea was modified to suggest a bias towards positive test strategies.