Theories

who argued for defensive realism

kenneth n waltz

what does waltz see the interational structure as

a state of anarchy

how does waltz describe “the state of nature among states”

a state of war

why is international politics a state of anarchhy for structural realists

because there is no overarching power

what sort of system are states operating in, according to structural realists

a self help system

what keeps all states in this self-help system accoridng to waltz

the constant possibility of war

what determines the behaviour of states according to structural realists

this state of anarchy and their desire to survive

what is limited according to defensive realists in this system

cooperation and interdependence

what is there among states according to structural realists

a balance of power

who argued for offensive realism

john j mearsheimer

what does offensive realism argue each great power is seeking to do

become a hegemon and use force to shift balance of power in their favour

does maersheimer think this is caused by the structure of the international system or the particular characteristics of great individual powerss

structure of the international system

what two assumptions, made by states about the international system, make offensive realism the only remedy possible

inherent threat and no international protection

what is it that for Maersheimer forces states to want to gain power and why

the international system, survival mandates it

as well as seekig their own power, what else are great powers trying to do in offensive realism

thwart rivals gaining power at its expense

what three features of the international system make states offensive realists (different from human nature realism, attributes the quality to the system)

lack of central authority, states always have some level of military capability, states can never be sure about each other’s intentions

what 3 general patterns of behaviour does the state of anarchy lead states into, according to offensive realists

fear, self-help and power maximisation

whats the security dilemma (O.R.)

the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decreases the security of other states, thus threatening them

who first spoke about the security dilemma

jervis

accoridng to Maersheimer, what balance of power produces the least fear for all states in the international system

bipolarity

name of the liberalist theorist

robert o keohane

what realist assumption does Keohane challenge

that rational, self-interested states will inevitably lead to a state of anarchy and conflict

what does keohane call upon to show that cooperation can be pursued even by rational, narrowly self-interested governments

rational choice analysis

what evidence does Keohane give to support his claim

prisoner’s dilemma game

in single-play prisoner’s dilemma game, are there ramiifcations for betraying one’s partner

no

when does cooperation actually start to benefit players, reflecting cooperation in the international system

in multi-play prisoner’s dilemma game with the same actors

what does keohane use the prisoner’s dilemma game to support

the claim that international institutions can change state behaviours to overcome structural incentives of anarchy

in a voluntaristic rational choice analysis, eahc actor is assumed to have calculated what about international institutions (L.)

that it will be at least as well off as a member than outside it

who was Keohane influenced by when considering how ideology, particularly shared ideology, translates to consensus on what success looks like

gramsci

why are international agreements without institutions much harder to enforce (L)

problem of transaction cost and lack of international enforcement

what are international institutions vital in overcoming (L)

the deficiencies in the self-help system

three sources of difficulty in deals made without international regimes

asymmetry of information, moral hazard and irresponsibility

what are two beneficial features of international regimes for cooperation and deals (L)

low transaction costs and strong access to information

why does Keohane think egoistic governments might comply with international regimes

becuase other governments monitor their behaviour

what are all these advantages of international regimes dependent on though (Keohane)

how much actor’s preferences sufficiently converge

what theory supports Keohane’s idea that international trade benefits people without being atthe expense of others

theory of non zero sum games

what is membership of international institutions fuelled by, according to keohane

common interest and an understanding of long term benefit

what do both realists and liberals take as the starting point of their theories

the rational, self-interested state

instead of rationality as the basis and explanation of behaviour, what does constructivism propose

identities as the basis of interests, which then drive action

instead of action being exogenously given, how do constructivists see it

endogenously driven

does wendt believe sef-help and power poltics follow causally or logically from anarchy

no

what feature of states, according to wendt, defines their relatios to other states and interests - therefore deciding their action

intersubjective identities

example of how intersubjective identities mean the same feature has different meanings for different states (Wendt)

US weapons arsenal means different things for Canada than Cuba

what concept, used by wendt, shows that no particular system follows from anarchy

structure of identity and interest

how does Wendt an dconstrucivtists understand institutions

as fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actor’s ideas about how the world works

what two forms can institutions take accoridg to wednt

cooperative or conflictual

which two constructivist theorists draw attention to the ways in which human interaction, including state action, is fundamentally shaped by ideational factors, intersubjective beliefs and identities

finnemore and sikkink

how is identity understood by constructivists

as an intersubjective belief, rooted in an actor’s self-understanding but also whether their identity is recognized by other actors

what do finnemore and sikkink think shape the international system by determining what expected and apprpriate behaviours are

norms

a change in norms causes what change in internaional structures (C.)

a change in what is rational

whats the word for the social category of states e.g. democratic state, islamic state, capitalist state (C.)

type identities

what kind of identities are the product of dyadic relationships among countries e.g. seeing certain states as friends or rivals (C.)

role identities

what do norms influence, rather tha oppose, accrding to finnemore and sikkink

rationality

according to constructivists, what is the main vehicle for system transformation

idea shifts and norm shifts

what do norm promoters at the international level need (C)

organizational platform to promote their norms

what have helped norm entrepeneurs spread their norms (C)

international institutions and organisations