AOS 2 Unit 4 Ancient Hictory Quotes, Quotes on Peloponnesian War , AOS 1 Unit 4 Quotes

'the country had been deserted by it's native inhabitants (...) those who tilled the soil (...) were barbarian slaves'

Giaus Gracchus on Tiberius's outlook

Gwynn - 'Octavius was deposed (...) an action without precedent in a system based on precedent'

Gwynn on Gracchi Overeach

'Tiberius's tribunate marked the advent of violence upon (...) the political scene (...) the begining of the disentegration of the Senate's power'

Howatson on Gracchi

'Marius was the first commander to throw his hat into the political ring (...) as the hero of the populares

Humble on Marius

'The (...) economic pressures (...) the Gracchi had been unable to resolve led to the emergence of private armies'

Gwynn on the Consquences of Marius reforms

'The legions (...) became 'client(s) (...) of (...) powerful commanders'

Goldsworthy on Private armies

'Sulla's march on Rome was the natural consquence of (...) noble ambition and the Marian reforms

'The Senate's collective authority (...) had no power over a warlord with his private army

Gwynn on First March on Rome

'Sulla now began to make the blood flow, and filled the city with deaths'

Plutarch on Sulla's proscriptions

'an enigma. Ambitious and ruthless (...) yet dedicated his final years to the restoration of Republican values'

Gwynn on Sulla

'True freedom had died with Marius and Sulla

Seager on Cato's attitude

'Pompey was (...) what Sulla sought to prevent, a man who challenged the established order and ignored the traditional path of Republican politics'

Gwynn on Pompey

'The irony was Pompey (...) was no less an autocrat than Caesar'

Beard on Pompey

'Caesar would accept no superior, Pompey would accept no equal'

Lucan on Civil War

'(Pompey) wanted not to rule as a (...) dictator, but to be the man whom the senate and people turned (to)'

Seager on Pompey Autocracy

crudely ambiguous: failed pretender for sole dominion of (Rome) (...) or a matyr in the cause of liberty'

Seager on Pompey's Legacy

'his life outlasted his power

Cicero on Pompey

'not a war fought over (...) rival visions for Rome's future. It was a struggle for power

Gwynn on Roman Civil War

'Julius Caesar (...) (tried) to rule as an imperial wolf in republican sheeps clothing. His efforts fooled no one'

Humble on Caesar's autocracy

'the conquest (...) confirmed (...) Caesar's ambition (...) He now had the gloria, the wealth, and the veteran army needed to challenge Pompey

Gwynn on Caesar and the Gallic Wars

'opposition to (...) one man having (...) supreme power is (...) the essence of Roman citizenship'

Holland on Roman hesistance to monarchy

'a political program in the radical tradition of the Gracchi (...) with ambitions (...) to one-man rule'

Beard on Caesar's platform

'the Republic was already dead (...) Caesar's murder merely left a power vaccum'

Gwynn on the ramifications of Caesar's death

'end(ed) (...) the crisis through a military dictatorship (...) disguised (...) as the restoration of (...) Republican political order'

Sternberg on Augustus

'the republican aristocracy had been shattered by (..) civil war and was ready (...) to settle for dignity without power'

Seager on the acceptance of autocracy

'The Republic was a victim of it's own success

Gwynn on Rome's fall

'the size of the empire (...) and its administration (...) made the Republican constitution unable to function'

Sternberg on Roman expansion as cause of decline

'As the empire expanded, it became harder for the lower orders to gain access to (...) rewards'

'As the empire expanded (...) competition within the oligarchy became more intense'

Crawford on Roman expansion as cause of decline

'a man intent on flouting the laws of the Republic

Goldsworthy Caesar

'the whole career of Pompeii was violent and illicit'

Ronald SYme on Pompeii Subversion of Democracy

'certainly was the lesser of two evils'

Goldsworthy on Pompey

'it may have wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go'

Perciles quote on imperialism

'if either were to win a meaningful victory, it had to be on the others element (...) the Spartans learned how to do it, the Athenians never really did

Kagan on Strategy

what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta'

Thucydides on the cause of the war

'I am more afraid of our own mistakes then of our enemies designs'

Perciles quote on the fickleness of Athens desmos and decision

'gave Corinth her first cause for war against Athens

Thucydides on Corinthian anger

'the Athenians might have avoided war (...) if only they could have been persuaded to lift the embargo

Plutarch on Megarian Decrees

'Athens has deprived some states of their freedom (...) she herself has for a long time been preparing fir the eventuality of war'

Corinthian reasoning for war at Peloponnesian Summit (according to Thucydides)

'cast your votes for the honour of Sparta and for war'

Ephor Sthenelaidas

'Do not force the rest of us in despair to join a different alliance'

J.H Finley regards this as the primary reason for war - Spartna fear of losing her alliance/hegemony

Corinthian threat at Peloponnesian Summit (according to Thucydides)

'behaved like a helmsman of a ship, who, when a storm bears down (...) relies on his own skill and take no notice (...) of the (...) terrified passengers

Plutarch on Pericles stategy

'it devoured (...) their manpower and their strength'

Thucydides on the Plagues effects

Aristotle - 'Cleon (...) corrupted the people by his wild impulses'

Aristotle on Cleon

Thucydides - 'remarkable among the Athenians for the violence of his charecter'

Thucydides on Cleon

Kagan - 'The outcome shook the Greek world'

Kagan on Pylos and Sphacteria

J.B. Bury - 'a Spartan by mistake'

J.B.Bury on Brasidas

'regard Sicily not as a prize which would end this war (...) but a springboard (...) to make themselves masters (...) of the whole Mediterranean

Thucydides on Sicilian Expedition motivations

''It is hardly possible to use the word 'peace' (...) in which neither side gave back or recieved what they had been promised'

Thucydides on the Peace of Nicias

-'The strong do what they have the power to do (...) the weak accept the what they have to accept'

Thucydides on Athenian logic in Melian Dialogue

"departure of Alcibiades left the venture in the hands of a leader who did not believe in its goals"

Kagan on Sicilian Campaign

'Nicias found himself as helpless against the demogogy of Alcibiades as he had been against that of Cleon'

Thucydides of Nicias dealing with demagogues

'the least scroplous (...) of human beings'

Plutarch on Alcibiades

'the key figure was not Alcibiades but Thrasybulus (...) Alcibiades (...) confidenve and ambitions went far beyond his abilities

Lazenby on Alcibiades

Thucydides - 'that the cause of Athens could never be lost as long as Alcibiades was alive'

Thucydides on Alcibiades

'Nicias had done better in his military command than anybody else of his time'

Thucydides on Nicias

'this hero of conscientious indecision'

J.b. Bury on Nicias

'their losses were (...) total; army, navy everything was destroyed

Thucydides on Athenian Casulaties (Sicilian Campaign)

'Sicily drew blood, and the hemorrhaging attracted a whole host of new enemies'

Hanson on the Sicilian Campaign

Aristotle- 'The revolution was provoked by the Sicilian Campaign

Aristotle on the Revolution

'Without Persia's vast sums of capital (...) Sparta could have never prosecuted the Ionian War, which eventually forced Athens to capitulate

Kagan on Persia and the Ionian War

'in (...) an hour he put an end to a war, which for its length (...) eclipsed anything that had gone before'

Plutarch on Lysander

'It was he who led them, rather then they who led him'

Thucydides on Periclean Democracy

'the close friendship (...) between Lysander and Cyrus (...) did much to make the alliance effective

Lysander Friendship with Cyrus according to Thucydides

'Scared generals into being to cautious or reckless (...) their decisions based on (...) what the voters (...) would approve

Hanson on Generals

After his death (...) Athens was to be polluted by the rank growth of corruption

Thucydides on the rise of demagagoues after Pericles

'warmest advocate of the expedition was (...) Alcibiades (...) exceedingly ambitious (...) personally to gain in wealth and reputation

Thucydides Alcibiades in the Sicilian Expedition

'the social structure was an ordered pyramid (...) the ability of outsanding men outside the hereditary elite to advance themselves was one of Rome's great strengths'

Gwynn on the Republic senatorial elite

(the nature of Roman political power)

' the Conflict of the Orders ha(d) (...) replaced a governing class defined by birth with one defined by wealth'

Beard on the Conflict of the Orders

(the nature of Roman political power)

'Rome was able to conquer the Meditterranean world because the governing class was united in its aims with (...) the Roman people

Potter on Roman political unity

(Why rome became powerful) and (the nature of Roman political power)

The republic was a (...) conservative, yet adaptable form of government that provided the platform for Rome rise

Gwynn on Roman Political System

(Why rome became powerful) and (the nature of Roman political power)

'women in these stories are (...) judged less as individuals than by how their actions reflected upon their husbands

Gwynn on Roman women

'the violence of 146 (...) marked the achme of Roman military power

Beard on 146

'The secret of Roman sucess lay not just in its military might, but (...) more in (its) (...) refusal to back down'

Gywnn on Roman convinction

(Why rome became powerful)

'uncoventional (...) but entirely in line with their own reponses to Pyrrhus and their First Punic War disasters, was to refuse talks

Hoyos on Roman determination

(Why rome became powerful)

'this system of alliances became an effective mechanism for converting Rome's defeated enemies into (...) its growing military machine'

Beard on Latin Alliance

(Why rome became powerful)

'the alliance system (...) gave Rome the ability to mobolize the manpower (...) with unprecedented efficiency'

Potter on Roman alliance system

(Why rome became powerful)

Gywnn - ' The absorption of foreign gods (...) established bonds between the Romans and their conquered foes'

Cicero - ' The fate of those men demonstrates that our empire was extended by commanders who obeyed the dictates of religion'

referencing Giaus Flaminius and Publius Claudies Pulcher

Gwynn on Religion as a strength of Rome vs Cicero

(Why rome became powerful)

'The disaster had an undoubted psychological impact (...) does not appear to have undermined Roman power

Gwynn on the Gallic Sack

'One man restored the state to us by delaying'

Ennius on Fabius Maximus

-'The expansion of Roman power through Italy was dramatic'

Beard on Roman rise throughout Italy

'There was a thirst for glory, desire for conquest (...) at all levels of Roman society

Beard on Roman Gloria

'Cynoscephale confirmed a changing of the gaurd. The flexible formation developed by Scipio proved superior to the rigid Macedonian phalanx

Gwynn on Cynoscephale

'Nothing underscores better (...) Rome's enormous reserves of citizens and allied manpower

Beard on Roman Conviction to fight after Cannae

'the battle of Cannae is (...) a perfect example of (...) the inherent agressiveness of the Romans approach to war'

Potter on Cannae

The Romans did not want simply to conquer the Greeks. They wanted the Greeks to accept them

Gywnn on Roman Hellenism

'Hannibal was a brilliant solidier (...) who had the final prize in his grasp, but (...) failed to take it'

Beard on Hannibal

The Romans had the advantage of not depending on a single charismatic leader

Beard on Roman leadership

'They were just as committed to militarism as the Romans (...) This was a world where violence was endemic

Beard on Militarism

-'the most distinctive political unit in the Greek world'

-'Man by nature is a political creature'

Kagan and Aristotle on the Poleis

sparked by 'a condition of crises'

Finley on Colonialism

'nearly all tyrannt started as popular leaders

Aristotle on Tryanny

'he declared outlawry of all (...) superfolous art'

Plutarch on Lycurgus

Cicero - 'mixed constitution

Plutarch - qualifying the fiery genius of the royal office' - on gerousia

Aristotle - 'childish

Cicero, Plutrach, Aristotle on Spartan Constitution

'Women were expected to be neither seen nor heard

Hughes on Women in Ancient Greece

'the most remarkable group of women in all of Greece;

Cartledge on Women in Sparta

'Lycurgus may have been a myth (...) but it was for the laws he had (...) given that the Spartans (...) at Thermopylae gave their lives so willingly'

Cartledge on Lycurgus

'loyalty was to (...) the state rather then family or friends'

Cartledge on Sparta

'the helots are the most single important fact about Sparta'

Cartledge on Helots

Rhetra -the Rhetra's solution was remarkably sucessful: Sparta avoided the (...) upheaveals (...) of other Greek cities

Agriculture - Messina was the prize aquisition (...) this agricultural wealth constituted the basis of Spartan society

Kennel on the Rhetra and Agriculture

'Draco's laws were written in ink but blood'

Solon on Draco's laws

'All the common people were weighed down with the debts they owned to a few rich men'

Plutarch on Athens pre-Solon