full set

Act Consequentialism

The normative ethical theory that says that an act is morally right just because it produces the best actual or expected results.

act consequentialism problems

appears to ride roughshod over certain absolutely crucial aspects of so-called "commonsense morality"

commonsense morality

morality that virtually all of us implicitly accept

options and constraints in act consequentialism

says we are always required to perform available action that produces most overall net good

always morally right (never wrong) to perform an action if it produces more overall net good than any available alternative)

act consequentialism upshot

act consequentialism is true and we should conclude that commonsense morality is mistaken and should be rejected (kagan)

we should embrace some other version of consequentialism rule consequentialism

we should embrace some other non-consequentialist normative ethical theory

applied ethics

the application of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases, particularly those in a profession such as medicine or law

how to argue

• premises, conclusion(s) → between is reasons to believe • if dont like conclusion → pick a premises, premises don't support conclusion

elizabeth ashford

critically examines demandingness of tom scanlon's contractualism

Utilitarianism

idea that the goal of society should be to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people

ashford argument

contractualist obligations to help others in need (especially in emergencies or extreme poverty) are just as demanding as utilitarian ones.

contractualism

The ethical theory according to which morally right behavior and obligation should be determined by a hypothetical contract in which parties agree to accept certain standards as reasonable.

scanlon's contractualism's demandingness

Utilitarianism is often criticized for being excessively demanding. Scanlon's contractualism is seen as an appealing alternative because it retains impartiality while avoiding utilitarianism's extreme demands.

What We Owe to Each Other

most developed version of contractualist moral theory

ashford and emergency situations

Emergency situations, where basic interests are at stake and agents can help, impose extreme moral demands.

Ashford suggests that impartial moral theories, including contractualism, cannot plausibly defend less demanding obligations in such contexts.

duties to save the greater number

-commonsense morality

- moral requirement to being some benefit (or avoid harm) to greater number of individuals

design and options

consistent (dont have to save if you're gonna die, maybe only applies if you're gonna save someone)

dsgn and constraints

consistent (cant cut off someones arm to save greater number)

dsgn and requirements to do best thing

doesn't always permit (or require) saving gn (donating life's savings would be better than saving the 5 people)

dsgn and act consequentialism

doesnt enatil were required to save gn (if had to cut off arm) but it can accommodate existence of such duties (interpersonal aggregation)

interpersonal aggregation

can add up people's reasons

scanlon's contractualism and dsgn

cant accommodate dsgn (individualist restriction)

- everyone in rescue case has equally strong reason to reject principles that would permit others to act in ways that will mean they die (like dsgn)

individualist restriction

cant engage in interpersonal aggregation

sc's reasoning for dsgn

in order for us to have a duty to do something X, it must be the case that there is some principle requiring us to do X that can't be reasonably rejected (the individual's reasons are as strong as the 5)

scanlon's response to dsgn

larger group has reasons smaller doesn't have, so its not balanced

- failing to save member of larger group fails to give positive weight to their life and treats them unfairly/disrespectfully

objections to scanlons response (dsgn)

1. lottery instead and whoever wins you save (weighted - save group you picked, but what is you pick individual over group)

2. scanlon's response is inconsistent with indivisualist restriction (larger group has to be added, weighted scale example)

3. scanlon's response permits some objectionable kinds of aggregation individualist restriction was meant to rule out (medicine example)

why is scanlon's response to dsgn not obviously inconsistent with individualist restriction

the reason the larger group has to object to principles that would treat them as if they didn't make a difference is personable and only appeals to own interests and not others

promissory obligation

obligation to keep promises, more specific feature of commonsense morality

promissory obligation and sc

puts it to work rather than cpnsidering objections/challenges

promissory obligation features

1. constraint against promise breaking (have to keep promise even if breaking it would be better)

2. not a sui generis (of its own kind) obligation - no deeper explanation, just wrong to break promise (scanlon disagrees)

3. essentially second-personal obligation (incur moral obligation to promisee we cant break)

4. obligation with special stringency (promise can only be dissolved by promisee releasing promises obligation)

5. can be overridden (to save life, scanlon agrees, overridden doesn't mean dissolved)

practice view

obligation to keep promises is an obligation not to undermine or free-ride (benefits with no work) on a valuable social practice (promising)

scanlon's objections to practice view

1. fails to capture second-personal character of promissory obligation (duty to promisee)

2. 3 satisfactory alternatives (principle M, D, L)

principle M

obligation not to manipulate others by making insincere promises

problems with principle M

explains whats wrong with making decietful promises, not breaking them

principle D

obligation to be cautious about inducting beliefs about what we're gonna do

problem with principle D

explains why its wrong to make irresponsible promises even if they're sincere (promise to help friend move house even if not confident you can)

principle L

if youve said you'd do something and believe the promisee'll suffer if you don't do it, you have to take reasonable steps to prevent that loss

problem with principle L

lacks special stringency of obligation involved (can satisfy L by giving warnings, compensation, but wont fulfil promissory obligation)

scanlon's assurance view

obligation to keep promises is incurred in virtue of giving promises assurance that we shall perform/not perform certain acts

principle F

principle F (scanlon)

if

1. A voluntarily and intentionally makes B expect A'll do X

2. A knows B wants to be assured

3. A acts to provide assurance and believes has done so

4. B knows A's intentions (per 3)

5. A intends for B to know this and knows B knows

6. B knows A has this knowledge and intent

therefore, (unless special justification), A must do X unless B consents to X not being done

principle F expectation

belief about future conduct that asuree cares about that assure creates voluntarily and intentionally where all this is a matter of mutual knowledge, you create an obligation to do that thing

principle F justification

we should be obligated to do X after having created an assurance we would because of the virtue of assurance

virtue of assurance

given reasons promisees have for wanting assurance, promises have reasons to want to provide it - value of assurance being fulfilled

virtue of assurance problem

at most, this justifies a principle permitting/requiring individuals to make promises

principle F objections

1. assurance without primissory obligation (can assure someone without promising them - job example)

2. promissory obligation without assurance (promise something but everyone knows it wont be done - bad dad, soccer example)

alternative views to principle F

reliance view, authority view, trust view (promise something, we offer them to trust us, they accept (creating assurance))

epistemology

the theory of knowledge, (what knowledge is, the grounds of knowledge) especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope. Epistemology is the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion.

metaphysics

a branch of philosophy that investigates the ultimate nature of reality

-inc existence, time, space, identity, free will, causation and abstract objects

heuristics

Mental shortcuts or "rules of thumb" that often lead to a solution (but not always) like check extreme cases, checking for counterexamples

scepticism

the disbelief in any claims of ultimate knowledge

scepticism origins

goes back to greeks (piero)

peronian scepticism - advocates suspending judgement (rejects possibilities of knowing anything)

cartesian scapticism

justify belief theres an external mind, suspension of all beliefs

Solipcism

Reality is in the mind, the belief that the only someone can be sure of is hiself or herself, true knowledge of anything else cannot be proven and doesn't exist

Descartes

(1596-1650) French philosopher, sought to establish knowledge on firm foundations, known for cartesian revolution, took rationalist approach

Cartesian Revolution

a shift from metaphysics (what there is) to epistemology (what we know)

Rationalist Approach

assumes that the truth can best be discovered by reasoned contemplation

descartes method

radical doubt - dismantle all beliefs only on indubitable truths ("clear and distinct ideas"

Descartes First Meditation

everything can be called into doubt

rollercoaster of doubt

3 main stages of sceptical argument

1. argument from illusion

2. argument from dreaming

3. evil genius argument

argument from illusion

1. senses sometimes decieve us (optical illusions/errors)

2. we should never fully trust a mechanism that even once leads up to error

therefore, we should never fully trust out sences

problems with argument from illusion

1. should we distrust all sensory info - we only recognise these errors by trusting other senses

2. even descartes says you can trust a mechanism that can lead to error (except sleeping)

3. the argument may be self-undermining or too strong

argument from dreaming

1. I cant trust my senses when I'm dreaming

2. I have no way of telling whether I'm dreaming or not

therefore, I cant trust my senses

problems with argument from dreaming

1. if youre awake you have to know you're awake, so you know you're not dreaming

2. things dream represent are real - can think you're awake when dreaming

3. still stronger than argument from illusion, cause any experience could be dreampt

evil genius argument (god's evil)

1. for all I konw the evil genius exists

2. if the evil genius exists, anything I believe is false

therefore, idk anything

responses to descartes first meditions

1. descartes acknowledges force of sceptical arguments but them as method, not end

2. scepticism is a tool to find indubitable truth not permant stance

3. "rollercoaster structure" - each sceptical worry is followed by possible escape then deeper worry

conscious awareness

can percieve things without being consciously aware of them (song in head from environmental stimulus)

Radical Doubt

need to doubt everything initially, can't trust sensory perception

descartes' method of doubt

doubt everything that can be doubted, treat everything uncertain as false until find something indubitable, suspend not outright reject beliefs

limits of scepticism

1. descartes relies on logic and argumentation - exempt from sceptical attack, complete scepticism is self-undermining

2. descartes focus on indubitability rather than truth (sometimes more accessible, indubitability is psychological state)

cogito ergo sum

I think therefore I am - if he's being deceived, he must exist to be deceived (but only true when he thinks it - I exist as long as I am thinking)

The Wax Example (Descartes)

descartes is a thinking thing, not body - like how wax can change sensory properties but is still recognised as wax (essence is grasped by mind not senses)

foundation of certainty

clear (vivid and evident) and distinct (differentiated from other ideas) ideas

- idea of triangle is clear if grasp shape and distinct if don't confuse other figures

cosmological arguments

Arguments that try to show that from the fact that the universe exists, God exists (first cause)

classic forms of cosmological arguments

aristotle, aquinas - everything in motion is moved by something else, there must be a first unmoved mover (god)

objections to cosmological argument

1. some infinite regresses aren't problematic (negative integers, infinite space)

2. argument doesn't establish god's traditional attributes (omnis)

3. why must first cause be god and not something else (big bang)

modern forms of cosmological arguments

kalam - whatever begins to exist has a cause, universe began to exist, therefore universe has to cause (claimed god)

necessary beings

Beings which, if they exist, cannot not exist; beings which are not dependent on any other for their existence (god)

contingent beings

Beings that depend upon something else for their existence. They have the property that they need not be, or could have been different (me)

descartes cosmological argument (simple terms)

god is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, powerful and benevolent, there must be as much perfection in the cause as the effect (perfect can't come from not perfect)

descartes cosmological argument

1. i. have a clear and distinct idea of perfect, infinite being (god)

2. this idea must have been caused by something just as great

3. I am not perfect or infinite, so I couldn't have created it

4. therefore, the idea must have been caused by a truly perfect and infinite being

therefore, god exists

descartes anticipates objections to his cosmological argument

1. why couldn't descartes have created idea of god - descartes isn't perfect or infinite

2. could idea of god come from removing descartes limitations - idea of god is positively infinite, not just absence of limits

3. could idea come from combining all perfections found in various beings - gods perfections are unified inseparable not a sum

other critiques of descartes' cosmological argument

1. idea of perfection and infinity is vague

2. idea of god may be too vague

3. does perfection come in degrees or is it a maximal property

ontological arguments

Arguments that reason from the concept of God to the existence of God (exists by definition) - god is greater than what can be conceived, real things are better than imagined, so the greater thing is real

critiques of ontological arguments

parody arguments - similar reasoning could "prove" existence of perfect island, cat, pizza = argument proves too much

parody

shows argument is flawed by constructing parallel argument with obvious fake conclusion (proves too much)

reductio ad absurdum

assume opposite of claim, show it leads to contradiction, repute of claim

causal principle

cause of something must contain at least as much perfection as the effect

causal principle counterexamples

1. evolution - over time, effects (organisms) can be more perfect than cause

2. randomness - sometimes chance leads to more perfect outcomes than causes

universal claims

Claims about entire classes of things (all Fs are Gs)

universal claims problem

strong and easily refuted by 1 counterexample

god and deception (descartes)

descartes claims god cant devieve because deception implies imperfection

counterexamples - magician (good deception), white lies (kind deception)

cartesian circle

The idea that what is perceived is clearly true on the basis that God, an infinitely perfect being and not a deceiver, does not allow mistaken perceptions - god proves gods existence (circular reasoning)

descartes ontological argument

1. all that i clearly and distinctly understand to belong to something really does belong to it

2. I clearly and distinctly understand that existence belong to god's nature

therefore, god exists

critiques of descartes ontological argument

1. premise assumes gods existence (circular)

2. concept of 'existence' as a perfection is questions

Teleological Argument

explains phenomena by purpose they sevre rather than cause

Argument from Design (teleological argument)

1. the world is complex, orderly, and appears purposeful

2. similar to man-made objects, which are products of intelligent design

therefore, by analogy the world must have an intelligent designer (god)

Watch analogy (Paley)

the world is like a watch - complex, orderly, pleasing = therefore, it has a designer

Objections to the Argument from Design

1. analogy objections (universe isnt enough like human artifacts for analogy to hold)

2. evolutionary objections (darwin explains complexity and apparently design without invoking a designer)

3. multiplicity objections (could be many designers)

4. who-designed-the-designer (god, as complex, would also need one, infinity regress)

5. problem of poor design (natural flaws, suffering suggest imperfect designer)

argument for the argument from design

fine tuning argument - physicals constraints and initial conditions of the universe are perfect for life

Problem of Evil

How it is possible for there to be evil in a world created by an all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing being.

problem of evil formulation

1. god is supposed to be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent

2. if god existed, he woulda created the best of all possible worlds

3. our world isn't the best of all possible worlds (due to evil and suffering)

therefore, god doesn't exist