Indo-Pacific security

Zero-sum resource game

One country’s gain is directly connected to the other country’s loss

IP strategically vital

2/3 of global growth & 60% of world GDP

Maritime chokepoint

• Trade routes could be ruined by conflict

• Taiwan or Peninsula would effect EU economies

• Hit supply chains

• Europe depend on resilience of east Asian supply chains

One theater

security is all interconnected

Tributary system

The regional institutional configuration founded on China’s superior position with respect to its neighbours (…). China’s superior position within Asia was the norm throughout history, and had direct influence on the expectations and diplomatic behaviour of regional actors, moulding the region’s unique institutional arrangement”

South China Sea

• important strategic area

• Beijing constructing military installations on islands

• Central coastal spot

• Friction with Philippines

Taiwan

• seperated from China 1949

• Under-one China policy-- the PRC claims Taiwan as its legitimate territory, demanding reunification with mainland by peaceful means

• Latest years, Beijing increasing pressure on them

North Korea

• Nuclear and missile program as a constant source of tension in the Korean Peninsula and beyond

• China is NK’s ally since 1961 and is by far the most important partner for Pyongyang

Asia-pacific to Indo-pacific

• Until early 2000, used AP to describe asian landmass

• The term served to capture the increasing intra-regional trade exchanges between East Asian and Pacific countries and, notably, to capture the growing integration of China into the global economy

• Starting from around 2007 a new term,  the “Indo-Pacific”, started to be used by different countries to describe the Asian geo-strategic space

  • Identification of the Indian and the Pacific maritime areas a single and integrated geopolitical space.

  • In opposition to the old concept of “Asia-Pacific”, the new concept brings Africa in and especially identifies India as a key player in regional dynamics.

  • China is wary of the concept, considering it as a sort of strategic “encirclement” from the West

Japan and Asean

• japan as first country to adopt concept of IP

• Open and comprehensive concept, not exclusive to anybody

• Underpinned by concrete initiatives, such as CPTPP and Quality Infrastructure Investment Initiative

ASEAN outlook on the IP

Viewing the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions as a closely interconnected space with ASEAN at the centre, IP as region of cooperation instead of rivalry, IP as region of development and prosperity for all, importance of the maritime domain and regional architecture.

US involvement in IP: Obama

• bilateral security alliances, engaging with regional multilateral institutions, broad military presence and advancing democracy and human rights

US involvement in IP: Trump

• Respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations, peaceful resolutions of disputes, free fair and reciprocal trade, adherence to international rules and norms.

• Continuing Obama but more emphasis on countering China

US involvement in IP: Biden

• Advance free and open IP, build connections, drive regional prosperity, bolster security, regional resilience to transnational threats.

• Also increased emphasis on China

Economic motivations to compete for IP

• fastest growing region on earth representing two-thirds of global economic growth, home of more than half of the world’s population, representing 60% of global GDP and 50% of global maritime transport.

• Because of its economic importance, what happens in the Indo-Pacific matters for many states at a global level

Geostrategic motivations to compete for IP

• home region of China, the world’s major rising power, hosting many other rising powers (India, Indonesia, Vietnam),

• important also to the United States, which possesses vast economic interests there, as well as a series of allies and military bases in the region

EU and the IP

• Main focus points:

  • Engagement with China is important to EU’s involvement in Asia…

  • But also other regional like-minded partners matter

  • Economic diplomacy: pursuit of FTAs with strategic partners

  • Try to make a greater and practical contribution to Asian security: partnerships with key players (Japan, Indonesia, Korea)

• Crucial for EU prosperity

• Free & open IP

• Focus on prosperity and security - cooperation and biggest trading partner

Security relations

High-level strategic dialogue

• exchange view on regional and international issues

• US factor. Because of the deeply-ingrained Transatlantic link, the EU is often perceived by China as having an ancillary role in relations to the US

Negotiation partner, economic competitor and systematic rival

Negotiating partner> WTO reforms (ex. on industrial subsidies)

Economic competitor> “Made in China 2025" aims at developing Chinese industrial leaders and made them global players in strategic high-tech sectors

Systemic rival> different understandings of fundamental values, different ideas of global order

3 future scenarios of EU security engagement in IP: 1

Business as usual

• EU actors could choose not to amend their posture and maintain the current level of security commitment towards the Indo-Pacific

• , this eventuality is unlikely in light of Trump Administration’s clear willingness to scale back military aid to Kyiv and reduce US contributions to European security.

• European players necessarily need to fill these gaps, leaving much less bandwidth to deploy significant resources in other theatres

3 future scenarios of EU security engagement in IP: 2

Retreat

• EU actors could choose to exclusively focus on the Eastern Neighbourhood and de-facto let their Indo-Pacific security engagements lapse

• division of labour’ between the US and EU powers, whereby the former takes care of Indo-Pacific security, and the latter focuses on Europe and nearby areas

• Not very likely

3 future scenarios of EU security engagement in IP: 3

Flexible adaption

• EU players amending their Indo-Pacific strategic approach in light of the new geo-strategic reality they have to cope with

• European actors becoming a sort of ‘smart security enablers’, operating more in a coordinated fashion and in niche domains where they can bring a unique added value to reinforce the resilience of Indo-Pacific partners

• Show the flag missions

Messy middle scenario

Europe still engaged, pivot is still there

Effort are fragmented and inconsistent

Limit ability shape indo-pacific stage

Lack of unity is strategically costly

Transitions strategy

• Interventions must have transition strategies, not just “exit strategies.”

• Effective operations blend military action with political reconciliation, institution-building, and economic reconstruction.

• Interventions can save lives but must plan for postconflict governance.