fishing for better incentives

fisheries code of conduct compliance

no countries pass, most of them fail

predicted that large piscivorous fish will be gone before 2048 or earlier

correlations with transparency international corruption index, world bank governance index, UN human development index, and yale environmental performance index

considerations when managing fisheries

depends on characteristics of fish → biology, status of stocks, history of extraction, gear type, commercial vs subsistence, and other recreations or non-extractive values

many failures, some successes

management types

harvest quotas, seasonal closures, ex-vessel tax, regulated entry, marine reserves, individual transferable quotas, regulated efficiency, effort tax

individual transferable quotas (ITQ)

regulator sells a total allowable catch (TAC) based in science

distributes these quotas, typically at auction or for sale at fixed price (bidding occurs until the cost equals the price - economic rent) so incentive to not overharvest as rent goes down

quota rights can be traded, rights based management

some systems buy the right to harvest in perpetuity, as % of TAC

(work similar to marketable pollution permits, so could also do it limited entry themed - restricts access or entry)

efficiency of ITQs

need only to enforce effort based limits rather than catch limits with measuring or weighing

so for example a certificate of operation is all that you would perhaps need and just ID vessels

when catch based it is a whole other problem

slows decline of fisheries and in some cases actually stops it

ITQ example alaskan halibut

management works with US and BC

prior to management plan, the season only lasted a few days until TAC and it was such bad quality, collapsing

adopted ITQ in 1995, only active fishers can buy quotas, new entrants can sublet

season is now 8 months may - nov, profits are steady and fish are better quality

1976 magnuson act and law of the the sea

before act, coastal nations did not have rights to marine resources in high seas - constant conflict

granted rights to coastal nations to marine resources 200 miles from shore

ITQs and participation outside this range needed

ITQs problems

allocation of quotas, reputable?, high-grading incentive (throw back the fish you dont want = overharvest), enforcement and administrative costs, most quotas held by large firms, “privatizing the ocean”?, how to set TAC in the first place?

don’t always prevent overfishing, success may not be universal (depends on governance and diversity), social issues and impacts of reduced local investment/involvement

no one size fits all approach possible

the cobra effect

when an attempted solution to a problem actually makes the problem worse, unintended consequences

how do you ensure that what you want actually happens?

cobra effect example

british were concerned about cobras in dehli so they offered a bounty for every dead cobra

so then people began breeding cobras, city officials stopped the program, the breeders released their cobras and as a result the situation worsened

cobra effect rat example

vietnam under french rule, france built traditional infrastructure - sewers

but these were rat highways resulting in a massive increase in number of rats

so bounty program for each rat tail, but then they noticed rats without tails → people had rat farms and would raise them cut off tails and release them so they could keep procreating

cobra effect traffic example

in colombia license plates were rationed, 1-4 not on friday, 5-8 not on monday

but a black market developed for fake plates, or people started buying more than one car to compensate

total driving went up!

cobra effect UN example

global carbon reduction program, the worse the GHGs the greater the credit recieved

companies started producing more GHG producing products because it meant they got more credits and thus worsened the problem

endangered species act in US example

before a species is listed, there is a review process

land is listed as critical habitat

so during this period there is an opportunity to exploit the resource without repercussion, landowners offset the act by developing before the species is listed

monthly construction permits increased !