AQA A Level Philosophy - Issues Facing Dualism

Define interactionism (3)

The theory that there are two entities, mind and body, each of which can have an effect on the other. There is a causal interaction between the two entities - in other words, mind influences matter and vice versa.

Outline the conceptual interaction problem (5)

1) How is it a mental substance, which is not in space and has no physical force, can affect a physical substance, which is in space and moved by physical forces?

2) Problem posed by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia:

3) p1. The movement of a physical object is only initiated by some physical force, exerted at some point in space.

4) p2. If dualism is true, then the mind is not in space and cannot exert physical force.

5) p3. therefore, the mind should not be able to move the body.

6) p4. The mind can cause the body to move.

7) p5. Therefore, dualism is false.

Outline the conceptual interaction problem and Descartes response (12)

How is it a mental substance, which is not in space and has no physical force, can affect a physical substance, which is in space and moved by physical forces? This is a problem posed by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia: 1. The movement of a physical object is only initiated by some physical force, exerted at some point in space. 2. If dualism is true, then the mind is not in space and cannot exert physical force. c1. therefore, the mind should not be able to move the body. 3. The mind can cause the body to move. 4. Therefore, dualism is false.

In reply, Descartes says we might explain something falling in terms of its weight. But weight doesn't 'push' the object whose weight it is. Weight is the result of the force of gravity on the mass of an object, and gravity is a force of attraction that operates without needing contact between the 2 physical objects.

Elizabeth responds : How can an immaterial thing that doesn't exist in space or have mass or extension, interact (via contact) with a physical thing (i.e. the body)

Descartes gives a second reply: 1. Mental events can cause physical events because of the union between mind and body. (However, the 'basic notion' of their relationship is not something Descartes explains). 2. It is a mistake to think the mind acts on the body the same way physical things act on each other. We have a tendency to conceive of all events in terms of causation. It might be that mental events cause physical events in a different type of way. So we may need to get rid of this causal view, there is nothing that contradicts the idea an object can exert force on another from a distance (earth and moon)

Outline the empirical interaction problem (5)

1) Causal closure: Science says all physical occurrences are explained by other physical occurrences and there is nothing else needed to explain this.

2) For example, modern neuroscience has shown in countless experiments that changes in the brain result in changes on the body, or that changes in the brain cause people to exhibit different behaviour or report different subjective states.

3) No non - physical explanation is required.

4) Conservation of energy: Physicists hold that the total energy in a close system must remain constant, and that the universe is just such a system. This is known as the law of the conservation of energy. The total amount of energy that can be exchanged between physical things remains the same. No new energy can be added to the universe. The energy keeps changing in its form, but the amount remains constant.

5) For the non-physical mind to interact with the body would then require energy to be added to the universe. Physicists hold that this is impossible.

Outline the property dualist response to interactionism and the issues facing it (5)

1) Substance dualism faces challenging conceptual issues in trying to explain how a mental substance not in space causes physical effects in space. Property dualism doesn't face this issue because mental properties are part of physical objects.

2) The claim is simply that these mental properties make a difference to how the world changes. For instance having a painful experience makes a difference to what I do next.

3) Hitting my thumb with a hammer makes me jump up and down, stopping me from hammering. My bodily movements (physical properties) are caused by my being in pain (mental properties).

4) We can object that we can give no account of how mental properties would cause physical effects. But, Chalmers notes, this is an objection to any fundamental causal relationship.

5) For instance, we have no account of how gravity works (if we did, then that would simply show that gravity isn't a fundamental force, but something else would be, and the question repeats itself).

6) Property dualism claims that mental properties are fundamental in the same sense as fundamental physical properties.

Define epiphenomenalism. (3)

The mind has no casual powers whatsoever. It causes no physical events or mental events. All mental events are caused by physical events E.G. in the brain. The mind is a by-product of physical processes in the brain.

Outline epiphenomenalism (5)

1) The mind has no casual powers whatsoever. It causes no physical events or mental events. All mental events are caused by physical events E.G. in the brain. The mind is a by-product of physical processes in the brain.

2) How ED explains the relationship between mind and brain: It accepts findings which show how drugs, illness or injury that affect the brain also effect the mind.

3) It fits with the theory of evolution; as the brain has developed in complexity the mind has arisen with this complexity.

4) Implications are:

Physical properties explain all physical behaviour (neurons firing makes my arm move).

5) Mental properties therefore don't cause physical behaviour.

Mental properties 'sit above' the brain but do not cause physical behaviour.

Outline epiphenomenalism (TH Huxley) (12)

The mind has no casual powers whatsoever. It causes no physical events or mental events. All mental events are caused by physical events E.G. in the brain. The mind is a by-product of physical processes in the brain.

How ED explains the relationship between mind and brain:It accepts findings which show how drugs, illness or injury that affect the brain also effect the mind. It fits with the theory of evolution; as the brain has developed in complexity the mind has arisen with this complexity.

TH Huxley is a supporter of evolution theory:

· 'On the hypothesis that animals are automata

· Animal behaviour can be explained purely in physical terms

· The actions of animals are determined by their instincts, not their minds

Reflex actions in humans show that the nervous system and brain act automatically without the mind being involved.

Huxley refers to a brain damaged soldier who would sing or load a rifle while unconscious. The soldier on 'auto -pilot' suggests that complex behaviour does not require consciousness as their cause.

Therefore consciousness is not involved in the causal process

Some implications of this are: humans are no different from animals; mental states are caused by the brain; but mental states don't cause anything; and the belief that our actions are determined by our beliefs, desires and decisions (volitions) is false.

The train analogy:

Huxley compares the body and brain to a steam train and engine and conscious experiences to the whistle. The steam that drives the whistle is caused by the engine. The movement of the train is caused by the engine.

It is a mistake to think the whistle drives the train forward as well - like the mind it is a 'collateral product'.

The physical activity of the brain causes the body to behave. It also causes our beliefs, desires and decisions (volitions). But these have no effect on our behaviour. Volitions and actions are closely correlated. (I have an urge to pick up my cup of tea and my arm moves). But volitions don't cause actions - actions are unconscious and automatic.

Terry Fodor claimed that if epiphenomenalism was true then 'practically everything I believe about anything is false and it's the end of the world

Outline the challenged posed by introspective self-knowledge (5)

(Introspection means the examination of your own mental processes - looking in on your mind.)

1) The criticism is that epiphenomenalism goes against what is revealed to us by introspection. It threatens our knowledge of our own minds. Our introspection makes us aware of how our mental states cause other mental states.

2) For example, if I am fascinated by stamps then I understand that this is why I desire to collect them.

3) However, epiphenomenalism claims that my desire to collect them is not caused by my fascination but rather it is caused by a process in my brain. My fascination had nothing to do with it.

4) Therefore, I don't know my own mind as I'm wrong about the cause of my stamp collecting.

5) According to epiphenomenalism, it would be quite possible for me to have no fascination with stamps yet still desire to collect them (as they claim mental states don't cause other mental states).

6) This seems an absurd claim and therefore we should reject epiphenomenalism.

Outline the challenge posed by phenomenology of our mental life (5)

1) We experience causal connections between our mental states, and between our mental states and our behaviour. It is part of my experience that whether I feel pain makes a difference both to what I think and to what I do.

2) What I think: if I hit my thumb with a hammer then the feeling of this mental state of pain causes me to have other mental states, such as surprise, distress, anger, etc. The feeling of the horribleness of pain will also make me want to be eager to avoid it again.

3) What I do : if I hit my thumb with a hammer then the feeling of this mental state of pain causes my physical physical behaviour, such as scream, jump up and down, etc.

4) These causal connections are part of our everyday experience. We experience 'what it is like' (qualia) to have a thought which leads to another thought, or to have a thought which leads to an action. In other words, it is part of the 'phenomenology (qualia) of our mental life'.

5) Epiphenomenalism has to argue that my experience is completely misleading in this respect, because it claims there are no causal connections between my pain and other mental states or my physical behaviour.

6) Therefore, the weight of experience and common sense would seem to suggest that the claim of epiphenomenalism is wrong and even absurd.

Outline the challenge posed by evolution/ natural selection (5)

1) Suppose Darwin's theory of natural selection is true. According to the theory millions of genetic alterations randomly take place. Most disappear without a trace. But some accidentally help a creature to survive and reproduce slowly spread.

2) That creature and its descendants reproduce more than others without those traits, so more and more creatures end up with them.

3) The features enable the creature to reproduce more, so its descendants also have that feature and they reproduce more and so on.

4) So according to the theory of evolution, the traits that evolve over time are the ones that contribute to the survival and reproduction of the creature.

5) We can assume that mental properties evolved. But how, if they make no difference to what creatures do and so, whether they survive and reproduce?

6) Epiphenomenalist dualism conflicts with our best account of the origin of consciousness.

Outline the epistemological problem of other minds (5)

1.) I know I have a mind through introspection.

2.) My introspection reveals to me my thoughts, sensations, etc.

3.) I cannot have this kind of privileged access to the minds of others. They are private and inaccessible.

4.) My belief that other people have minds is limited to what I can empirically observe about another person.

5.) Strictly speaking I cannot know if other people have minds; I just belief that they are minded.

6.) It is a problem for philosophy in general but is a particular challenge for substance dualism which claims the mind has no empirical presence at all.

7.) Therefore, this leads to the possibility of solipsism: only my mind exists.

If minds and bodies are entirely independent, then how can I infer from seeing a body that there is a mind 'attached'? Other 'people' could all lack consciousness, but be programmed to behave as they do, with no minds. If it is possible there are no other minds, then it is possible my mind is the only one that exists. This is solipsism.

Outline the conceptual problem of other minds (5)

1) The problem of whether other minds are similar to mine.

2) Wittgenstein's Beetle in a box: We all have a box into which only we can look - they are all labelled 'beetle', we may assume that everyone's beetle is the same but it is very possible that we all have something different in our boxes. We can never compare our boxes so we can never be sure. When I talk about my beetle no one can truly understand what I mean as it is a wholly private object. There might even be nothing in the box.

3) Our use of the words 'pain' or 'happy' could be different as like the beetle our experience is wholly private, what one person means to be pain could be completely different to another.

4) I cannot be sure if other people conceive of happiness, pain, etc. in the same way I do.

5) If dualists are correct that our mental states are private, we can never know if they are being applied correctly to each other. Ryle suggests that 'absolute solitude...is the inevitable destiny of the soul'.

Outline the response to the problem of other minds : the argument from analogy (5)

The argument from analogy argues we can use the behaviour of other people to infer that they have minds too. First presented by John Stuart Mill:

1. I have a mind.

2. I know from experience that my mental states cause my behaviour.

3. Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave similarly to me in similar situations.

4. Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same types of cause as my behaviour, namely mental states.

5. Therefore, other people have minds.

Mill is arguing that we learn that there is a law-like connection between occurrences in our bodies and minds. When is stand on a pin I feel pain in my mind which is followed by my shouting and efforts to remove the pain. When I observe someone behaving in a similar way, in accordance with a similar occurrence, I infer they have conscious experiences similar to mine.

This inference is based on an analogy so it draws from similarities between my case and others (similar bodies, similar behaviours) and then infers that others are also similar in certain unobservable ways.

Outline the response to the problem of other minds that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis (5)

1) In trying to solve the problem of other minds, we can admit that propositional knowledge of other minds as a justified, true belief is unobtainable. This does not mean that we should stop believing in the existence of other minds though.

2) The argument from analogy is only supposed to make belief in other minds justified. We can think of it as an abductive argument - an inference to the best explanation. We can argue that a mind is the best explanation (best hypothesis) for the cause of other people's behaviour, language, etc.

3) Anita Avramides claims this was what Descartes was trying to argue. Descartes said that language and adaptable behaviour distinguish us from animals and shows that we have minds.

- Language and behaviour are observable

- We can infer that other people have minds based upon these observations.

- No analogy is needed

4) This is further backed up by Occam's razor - do not add any unnecessary complications to an argument.

- It is unnecessary to assume everyone else is a philosophical zombie, we have no reason to think or claim this other than hyperbolic doubt.

- It is unnecessary to claim that the mind doesn't cause behaviour as stated by epiphenomenalist dualism, when the weight of experience suggests otherwise.

5) Therefore the inference that others have minds is the simplest (and therefore the best).