Trump

Robin, Reactionary Mind, 2017

Broad Argument

• This is trying to say Trump is largely a continuation of conservatism, and though there are some changes, largely Trump continues and unites many of the 20thC Conservative tendencies.

• The real difference is Trump’s willingness to expose the inherent problems of Capitalism, though the failure of a strong left to challenge him indicates that this is the death of conservatism as a coherent movement through its victory.

• Trump’s ‘oscillating’ is a tendency of the right more broadly, rather than him specifically, coming from more established conservatives like Bagehot, though this is not part of his ideology but instead from his own ‘ambles’ from one place to the next.

  • Further, racism a long-standing hold of American conservatism and on the right - e.g. the Tea Party.

• The important part is welding 2 visions of Conservatism together - the ‘warrior’ and the ‘businessman’. Since the Cold War, and the supremacy of neoliberalism, these archetypes have collapsed into each other especially in the figure of Trump. The other important part is making a majority off of minority opinions, e.g. making more mainstream the racial dogwhistles.

• The collapse of a real left-wing alternative thanks to the right’s supremacy has removed the need for a real ideological challenge. E.g. Southern Schools are now more segregated than ever.

  • Trump’s character has therefore become more important - e.g. the role of a wealthy person decrying the wealthy.

• Trump’s vision of the economy fits into a conservative positioning around power as something to be continually tested and demonstrated - the economy is a form of pseudo jousing and to be won in. This is breaking the mould of the elite - Trump has removed the pseudo-importance of the economy and recognised its emptiness. It was instead something to be used to demonstrate power - e.g. using a ‘faux-aristocratic ethos of jewellry’ etc.

• Further, instead of moving toward patriotric visions of the state for those who were not focused on the economy (e.g. instead of being a ‘warrior’ instead of a ‘businessman’), he views the state as an extension of the economy - e.g. his anti-Iraq position was not on the morality or the importance of the US but on the economic failing of getting oil. This is not entirely suprising given, per Brown, the neoliberal establishment has turned the state largely into the economy.

• Though, the failure of Trump to acheive what he wanted (note the problem with writing in 2017) has been a strong party infrasture, and a limited left to position himself against. This is the failure their own successes. There is no longer anything to motivate the base, and so they are being forced to turn to less democratic means, e.g. the Bench. The only option is his mercurial personality and unrationalised rage. But this rage ‘threatens to make him and his movement marginal’.

Gerstle, 2017, Chapter 7. Go back through with AI when have a chance after. coursework.

Broad Argument

• The political upheavals of 2016 were direct responses to the upheaval of the Great Recession which created various forms of distress across broad sections of society. Trump uniquely capitalised on this through combining ethnonationalist Tea Party sentiment with a rejection of Free Market ideology. 2016 was not the genius of Trump, but instead a broad collapse of establishment credibility.

• On White Crisis

  • Continual decline of traditionally white manufacturing jobs given the stock market brought people into anger. Murray (neoliberal) argued the problem was from social issues - Gerstle is saying that this was true in that it was a time of record self harm among poor whites, but that it was not from a social crisis, but instead an economic crisis

• On Black Suffering

  • Great Recession hit minorities harder (e.g. 2010-13, difference in white vs black wealth went from 8 to 13x). Black peopel more likely to be civil servants who were let go at a higher rate than private sector, and hit significantly by neoliberal groups like Tea Party in the aftermath of the crisis. People therefore turn to the drug economy, which exacerbates suffering in the context of strong anti-drug laws from the 80s onwards.

• On the ‘Precariat’

  • This is a group defined by Gerstle as those living paycheck to paycheque, especially those working daily wages - e.g. the gig economy. Neoliberalism had theorised this of the economy as the virtue of self-power and productivity, even if it was bad labour. Issue, no insurance against risk - even though the ACA helped to some degree (check this).

  • This group particularly important given the membership of the elite in it.

• Tea Party erupted as a result of anger against this movement - and funded by the Koch borthers along with other groups, protests against Obamacare combined economic arguments with racial ones (note, there is a connection here that the money is being spent on racial minorities rather than ‘deserving’ Americans'). 2009 75k people march in a protest alleging Obama was a Kenyan.

  • This was a protest agaisnt cosmopolitanism itself. Note the tension here with the neoliberal backers. Therefore it was not a huge protest against both free markets and free movement.

• Trump capitalised on this sentiment well - was a 2010 Tea Party activist, and combined his desire for relevency with similar views as many tea party activists.

  • This was e.g. his objection to not being involved in the new york liberal elite, and so then becoming more focused on hiring ‘scrappy Italians’ etc.

• Rally culture injected more importance and action within the state, against the boring nature of the Democratic establishment.

• He also was ‘bored’ by the idea of markets and deliberately ran against the meritorcratic ideal of the Republican party.

• Occupy Wall Street also popularised on this under the slogan ‘we are the 99%’ which attracted various people - e.g. Graeber academic. Limited by anarchist movements, though representative of the golden age of the American left e.g. Chomsky.

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