Does Parliament hold the government to account?

What Is the structure of the essay?

P1 - Select committees - effective

P2 - PMQs and MQs - effective

P3 - Legislative Scrutiny - not effective

P1 - Select Committees hold the government to account effectively as they scrutinise the policy, administration, and expenditure of government departments in detail

• A key argument that parliament is effective in holding the government to account is through the work of departmental select committees.

  • Select committees scrutinise the policy, administration, and expenditure of government departments in detail.

• Unlike PMQs, their questioning is calm, evidence-based, and professional, and political answers are not accepted.

  • Scrutiny is therefore a lot less partisan which increases their effectiveness as it makes it harder for the government to evade questions.

  • Committees gather both written and oral evidence from ministers, civil servants, experts and stakeholders, producing detailed reports with recommendations.

  • Crucially, the government must respond formally in approximately 8 weeks and can have direct impact on policy.

• In November 2025, the Treasury Select Committee summoned senior HMRC officials as part of an inquiry into the wrongful removal of child benefit from 3656 parents during governments anti-fraud crackdown.

  • The Committee demanded answers to 114 questions from officials, summoned HMRC Permanent Secretary John Paul-Marks, and requested documentation on how HMRC determined emigration status.

  • As a result, HMRC changed its process, showing how select committees exposing flaws in government can actuate change.

P1 - Select committees do not hold the government to account effectively as their powers are limited as their findings and recommendations are not binding.

• Alternatively, it can be argued that select committees do not hold the government to account effectively as their powers are limited

  • Select committees findings are not binding

• The government is only required to respond within around 60 days, not to implement changes.

  • Whilst the government accepts about 40% of SC recommendations, these are usually minor changes that align with their direct.

  • Due to this, their actual influence cab be seen as limited. This is further evidenced by their summoning power not being absolute - government ministers have denied showing up in the past.

• In October 2025, the Transport Select Committee published its report ‘Buses Connecting Communities’, calling for significant action to reverse the decline in bus services.

  • The Government rejected the majority of the Committees recommendations, including free travel for under 22’s and introduction of minimum service levels.

  • This demonstrates that despite thorough evidence-gathering and increased independence, Select Committees cannot compel policy change as their recommendations are not legally binding.

P2 - Ministerial Question Time and PMQs hold the government to account as ministers and the prime minister face sustained questioning every week

• Every week, government ministers are questioned in Parliament about the work of their departments. The most prominent example is PMQs which takes place every Wednesday at 12pm in the House of Commons and lasts for 30 minutes.

• Ministers are forced to respond publicly to current political controversies and policy concerns raised by MPs.

  • The Leader of the Opposition (6 questions) and the leader of the 3rd largest party (2 questions) have the opportunity to get the government to respond directly to their questions.

  • This strengthens Parliaments ability to hold the government to account effectively as it enables opposition leaders to challenge inconsistencies, and expose perceived government failures.

• On October 15th 2025, during PMQs, Opposition Leader, Kemi Badenoch, used all 6 of her questions to challenge the governments handling of the collapsed China spy case. She pressed the PM on his understanding of the legal issues involved, and the role of National Security Adviser Jonathon Powell.

  • In response, Keir Starmer pledged to publish the full witness statements that had led to the trials collapse and insisted no ministers were involved.

P2 - PMQs in particular provides little effective scrutiny and is more focused on partisan political point scoring than proper, detailed scrutiny of the government.

• As the questions are only 30 minutes, it encourages short, sharp exchanges rather than detailed political examination.

  • This effectively nullifies its effectiveness as it is boisterous and more parliamentary theatre than meaningful cross-bench debate.

  • ‘Scrutiny’ often focuses on government embarrassments in the week prior as opposed to serious policy issues.

  • Ministers frequently give political or evasive answers designed to generate media soundbites rather than genuinely engage with substance of questions.

• On the 12th of November 2025 during PMQs, Reform UK leader, Nigel Farage, asked Keir Starmer whether he would allow Reform-led councils to speed up the closure of migrant hotels.

  • Rather than directly answering the question, Starmer shifted focus to whether Farage condemned comments from a Reform councillor who had referred to children as ‘evil’ and criticised Farage as part-time.

  • This shows how PMQs are often not a meaningful form of scrutiny, as PMs often simply answer a question different to the one that was asked, resorting to witty one-liners.

P3 - Parliament is effective at holding the government to account through legislative scrutiny, in particular due to the checking power of the House of Lords that it has because of its lack of government majority.

• The House of Lords Act 1999 removed all but 92 hereditary peers, meaning the House of Lords no longer has an in-built Conservative majority.

• As a result, no single party now holds a majority in the House of Lords.

  • This makes the House of Lords more effective at holding the government to account and voting down legislation, because the government cannot rely on party discipline and a built-in majority to push legislation through.

  • Although the Lords recognises the primacy of the Commons, it can delay legislation and propose amendments to influence policy.

• In December 2025, the Starmer government suffered 8 defeats on the Employment Rights Act in the House of Lords. Two amendments were ultimately accepted after the Lords insisted on changes.

  • The Lords rejected proposal for day-one protection from unfair dismissal and instead voted for a six-month qualifying period, which the government conceded to as a compromise.

  • The chamber also insisted on amendments allowing words to opt out of guaranteed hours provisions in order to remain on zero-hour contracts.

• This shows that the House of Lords dallying power and lack of government majority can make it highly effective particularly in legislation

P3 - House of Lords scrutiny power on the government is limited by its lack of legislative powers, even if one party no longer has a majority

• The Parliament Acts prevent the Lords from voting down any financial bills and mean that the HOL can only delay for up to a year, after which the HOC can force through legislation.

• Even when the HOL votes against legislation/ attempts to significantly amend it, it often backs down when the HOC disagrees against these amendments, recognising its democratic illegitimacy.

  • The lack of democratic legitimacy therefore constrains its ability to hold the government to account.

• The Parliament Act has been used 7 times in total, including for equalising the age of consent to 16 for homosexuals and heterosexuals, with the Sexual Offences Act 2000.

• The HOL proposed several amendments to the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024. Despite this being a major piece of legislation, the Lords was able to do so as it wasn’t in the Conservative Party’s 2019 manifesto,

  • Amendment 9 mandated that Rwanda could not be deemed as a safe country until the Independent Monitoring Committee certified it.

• The House of Commons rejected all major amendments during ‘ping-pong’ insisting on the original wording of the bill.

• The bill received Royal Assent on 25 April 2024. The final Act largely reflected the governments own proposals, with little concessions and Lords backing down on amendment 9.

  • This shows how the Lord’s often concedes in parliamentary ping-pong on key pieces of legislation in the face of a determined government.

  • The Lords willingness to defer to the government limits its effectiveness at holding the government to account.

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