study guide wosc test 2

How are theories of foreign policy different from theories of international politics?

Theories of international politics explain patterns between states (anarchy, balance of power, institutions) while foreign policy theories explain how individual states make choices (domestic politics, leaders, bureaucracies). Foreign policy is micro-level: decision processes, interest groups, public opinion; international politics is macro-level: systemic forces and inter-state interactions. Both are complementary—systemic constraints shape choices, and domestic politics filter how states respond.

Explain the difference between the simple and dyadic versions of democratic peace theory.

The simple claim says democracies are overall more peaceful (weaker empirical support); the dyadic claim says democracies rarely or never fight each other (strong empirical support). So dyadic peace is about pairwise relations (democracy vs. democracy), while simple peace compares regime types across all wars. The dyadic finding is the core empirical regularity scholars try to explain.

Summarize the structural, normative, and institutional arguments for the democratic peace. Which is most compelling?

Structural: democratic checks and separated powers make leaders slow to go to war; Normative: democracies view each other as legitimate and resolve disputes peacefully; Institutional: electoral accountability and political cost of losing constrain leaders. Many scholars find the institutional explanation most compelling because it directly links decision costs and incentives to behavior, but combined explanations are strongest.

Evaluate the democratic peace theory. What are the most compelling arguments for and against it?

For: robust dyadic evidence that democracies rarely fight each other; plausible causal mechanisms (audience costs, shared norms, transparency). Against: selection/definition problems (which states count as democracies), exceptions in transitional democracies, democracies fight non-democracies often, and alternative explanations (alliances, common threats). Overall: the dyadic pattern is strong, but causation is multi-factorial and context dependent.

What are the most important findings about the impact of public opinion on foreign policy?

Public opinion matters but is often constrained and shaped by elites and media; leaders can mobilize or ignore it depending on institutional checks and political incentives. Public opinion influences long-term priorities (trade, alliances) and can limit costly wars via casualty sensitivity, but it rarely dictates precise tactics in crises. Socialization, framing, and timing (rally effects) modulate its impact.

Evaluate the relationship among the executive, the media, and public opinion in determining foreign policy. What impact have social media had?

Executives try to shape public opinion through media; media filters and frames events, and public opinion feeds back into political constraints—creating a triangular dynamic. Social media increases direct leader-to-public channels and rapid opinion shifts, lowers gatekeeping, and accelerates misinformation and polarization, making policy messaging harder and volatility greater. Net effect: faster, less predictable public response and a more contested info environment for policymakers.

How does the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy making differ from the organizational process model [or the rational actor model]?

Bureaucratic politics emphasizes competition among agencies where choices reflect bargaining and relative agency power; organizational process emphasizes routines and SOPs constraining choices; rational actor treats the state as a unitary actor maximizing objectives. Thus, outcomes can reflect politics (who wins), procedures (what routines allow), or calculated choice (best expected utility).

What is prospect theory, and what are its implications for explaining foreign policy?

Prospect theory (from behavioral economics) says decision-makers evaluate gains/losses relative to a reference point and are risk-averse over gains but risk-acceptant over losses. Implication: leaders facing potential losses (domestic or territorial) are likelier to take risky actions (gamble for resurrection), explaining escalation in crises. Example: frightened leaders might gamble on war rather than accept status quo losses.

What is bounded rationality, and what are its implications for explaining foreign policy?

Bounded rationality holds that cognitive limits and limited information mean actors satisfice—choose acceptable rather than optimal options—using heuristics and shortcuts. Implication: decisions reflect simplified models, routines, or political bargaining rather than perfect optimization; this explains errors, incrementalism, and reliance on SOPs. It also opens space for misperception and institutional effects.

How can misperception play a role in foreign policy making? Identify/discuss a relevant case.

Misperception—biased interpretations of others’ intentions or capabilities—can lead to unnecessary escalation, deterrence failures, or missed bargains. Case: Cuban Missile Crisis (U.S. initially misread Soviet motives; uncertainty about Soviet resolve), or Iraq 2003 (US misperception of WMD and regime threat) — both show intelligence and cognitive biases shaping catastrophic decisions. Correcting misperception requires better information, transparency, and institutional checks.

How are international organizations changing the practice of international politics? Do they represent a fundamental force, or simply a minor detail?

IOs embed rules, reduce transaction costs, and provide monitoring/verification—shaping state behavior beyond narrow power calculus. They are more than minor details: they institutionalize cooperation and create reputational costs, but their autonomy is limited by great-power preferences. So IOs are significant instruments that can alter incentives but not fully override material power.

How are transnational advocacy networks changing the practice of international politics? Fundamental force or minor detail?

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) spread norms, mobilize publics, and pressure governments/IOs, often by shaming or naming-and-framing issues (human rights, environment). They have shifted agenda-setting and moral authority in many areas, representing a growing force especially on norms and non-state issues, though they rely on state receptivity for enforcement. Thus TANs are increasingly consequential for norm diffusion and issue salience.

Evaluate the significance of the United Nations in world politics. Best arguments for its importance and unimportance?

For importance: UN offers legitimacy, forum for diplomacy, peacekeeping, and norm building (human rights, decolonization). Against: UN is constrained by great-power politics (Security Council veto) and limited enforcement capacity, making it ineffective in crises (Rwanda, Syria). Conclusion: UN is valuable for diplomacy and normative work but limited as a coercive actor.

What explanation of war is most compelling? Why? What are the policy implications?

No single cause fits all, but a multi-level explanation (systemic incentives + state-level motives + individual misperceptions) is most compelling because it captures necessary and sufficient conditions across cases. Policy implication: prevention must combine structural measures (alliances, IOs), domestic resilience (democracy, institutions), and leader-level checks (better intelligence, deliberation). Single-track policies (only sanctions or only institutions) are insufficient.

Single explanation that applies to WWI, WWII, and Vietnam — which and why?

A combined explanation of misperceived threats amid power politics plus domestic political incentives works: structural pressures create security dilemmas, while nationalism, alliances, and political incentives escalate conflicts. Each war had both external systemic pressures (competition, revisionism) and internal drivers (nationalism, political calculations) that converted tensions into war. Policy lesson: address both external balances and internal drivers.

If we want to explain and prevent war, should we focus more on underlying or proximate causes?

Both matter—underlying causes (power shifts, economic structures, long-term grievances) create the conditions for war, while proximate causes (crises, miscalculations, assassinations) trigger it; prevention requires addressing underlying vulnerabilities and proximate triggers simultaneously. Focusing exclusively on one misses opportunities for structural reform or crisis management.

In what way might war be a rational policy, even if it is very costly? Provide a case.

War can be rational if expected political gains (territory, regime survival, deterrent credibility) exceed costs or if leaders face existential threats; for example, a threatened state might fight to avoid subjugation or to deter future aggression. Case: Israel 1967—perceived strategic encirclement led to preventive war judged rational by leaders despite costs.

What are the major obstacles to developing a convincing scientific explanation of war?

Low number of large wars (small-N problem), complex multi-causality, measurement/selection bias, and normative/political interference limit experimental control and generalizability. Additionally, data quality and varying historical contexts complicate causal inference. These obstacles demand mixed methods, careful case selection, and theoretical pluralism.

How is civil war different from international war?

Civil war is internal conflict involving government and organized rebel groups, often with ethnic/identity dimensions, and involves non-state combatants and population control issues; international war is between sovereign states with interstate legal implications. Civil wars often have longer durations, higher civilian casualties, and external interventions or spillovers complicating resolution.

How do civil war and contentious politics influence international politics?

Civil wars can create refugee flows, regional instability, cross-border insurgency, and opportunities for foreign intervention or proxy warfare, altering regional balances. Contentious politics (mass protests, insurgency) can invite external support or sanctions and influence international norms (e.g., responsibility to protect). They reshape alliances, economic ties, and humanitarian priorities.

How does arms control [or peacekeeping] ameliorate the security dilemma? What are its limitations?

Arms control reduces uncertainty via transparency, limits, and verification which lower fear of offensive build-ups; peacekeeping separates combatants and signals commitment to restraint. Limitations: verification loopholes, cheating incentives, and enforcement requires political will; peacekeeping fails when parties don’t consent or major powers disagree.

How does peacekeeping differ from peace enforcement?

Peacekeeping generally requires consent, aims to monitor ceasefires and separate forces with limited use of force; peace enforcement uses coercive military force (often without full consent) to compel actors to stop fighting. Peace enforcement is riskier and politically contentious but sometimes necessary when consent is absent.

What is the relationship between negotiation and coercion?

Negotiation and coercion are complementary strategies—coercion (threats, force) changes a rival’s cost–benefit calculus and shapes bargaining; negotiation exploits that leverage to reach agreement. Effective coercion increases bargaining leverage but risks escalation if credibility is lacking; negotiation without credible leverage may produce weak deals.

What are the dangers of a policy of coercion?

Dangers include escalation to war, credibility loss if threats are not backed by action, entrenching adversaries, and alienating third parties; coercion can also produce rally-around-the-flag effects for opponents. Coercive policies may succeed short-term but create long-term resentments and blowback.

What was the US strategy for the use of force in Vietnam, and why did it fail?

US strategy emphasized incremental escalation, attrition, and body-count metrics to raise costs on the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, expecting domestic pressure to force concession. It failed because it misread political will and objectives of opponents, underestimated insurgency resilience and overestimated the efficacy of military coercion; domestic public opinion and credibility eroded, making victory politically unattainable.

How has the gap in military capabilities between powerful and weak actors influenced the strategic choices of weak actors?

Weak actors shift to asymmetric strategies—terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla tactics, cyber attacks, and strategic avoidance of conventional battles—to impose costs and negate the material advantage of strong actors. They aim to raise political costs of intervention and exploit political vulnerabilities of powerful states. This dynamic makes conventional superiority less decisive in many conflicts.

What political weaknesses have accompanied the development of high-tech weaponry?

High-tech weaponry increases complexity, cost, and dependence on supply chains, creating vulnerability to sanctions or tech-denial; it can degrade transparency (cyber, AI), create escalation ambiguity, and provoke public scrutiny over ethical use. Politically, it can centralize power and shift resource priorities away from domestic needs.

How is terrorism fundamentally similar to and distinct from the conventional use of force?

Similarity: both use violence to achieve political ends and aim to coerce or influence audiences. Distinct: terrorism targets civilians to generate political impact, often lacks territorial control, is driven by non-state actors, and uses low-cost strategies that exploit political vulnerabilities. Countermeasures must address political grievances and legitimacy as well as security.

What are the major explanations for terrorism and which is most convincing?

Explanations include ideological/religious motivations, political grievances (oppression, occupation), strategic choice by weaker actors to raise costs, and social/psychological recruitment mechanisms. The most convincing is a strategic grievance explanation: terrorism often emerges where political exclusion, occupation, or repression make violence a perceived instrument for change, though ideology and organizational factors shape tactics.

How are weapons of mass destruction fundamentally similar to and distinctive from conventional weapons?

Similar: both are instruments for coercion and deterrence. Distinct: WMDs have massively disproportionate destructive capacity, cause deterrence stability (for nuclear states) but high humanitarian risk, and raise unique proliferation, command-and-control, and accidental-use concerns. Policy implications: WMDs necessitate special norms, verification, and arms-control regimes.

How does the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction affect state strategies to maintain security?

Proliferation drives states to revise deterrence strategies, pursue countermeasures (missile defense, preemption), seek alliances or their own WMDs, and invest in intelligence and non-proliferation diplomacy. It also increases crisis instability, especially with new or less secure arsenals, and reshapes regional balances and intervention calculus.

How does spread of transnational terrorism affect state strategies to maintain security?

States adopt homeland security measures, intelligence-sharing, counterterrorism cooperation, targeted strikes, and sometimes restrictive domestic policies; they balance civil liberties and effectiveness. Transnational terrorism pushes states toward multilateral intelligence networks, border controls, and counter-radicalization programs, and can lead to interventionist policies with significant political costs.

Is the spread of nuclear weapons likely to increase or decrease stability? Why?

It can increase stability in some cases (mutual nuclear deterrence reduces likelihood of major power war—MAD) but decrease stability in others (more actors raise risk of accidental use, crisis instability, and proliferation incentives). Net effect depends on command-and-control robustness, rationality of actors, and regional dynamics; thus proliferation is a mixed risk rather than a clear good or bad.

In what ways is “asymmetric conflict” asymmetric?

Asymmetry appears in capabilities (state vs. insurgent), tactics (conventional vs. guerrilla/terror), objectives (territorial control vs. political signaling), and legitimacy/audiences (insurgents fight for hearts and minds). Asymmetric conflict therefore requires different strategies—population-centric counterinsurgency, intelligence, and political solutions rather than purely conventional force.