concept and nature of god

3 divine attributes; relationship to time; arguments for the incoherence of god

what is theism

conceives of God as personal - caring, responsible, constantly active within his creation

what is deism

conceives of the deity as a creator that designs the universe and sets in in motion but plays no further part in it

what does it mean for god to exist temporally

• god as everlasting

• existing within time (temporal) and throughout the whole of time through beginning to end

• like us - moves through time from past, present, towards future

• unlike us - his longevity is everlasting

what does it mean for god to be atemporal

• eternal existence

• exists outside of time, timeless

• no beginning or end because the ideas of beginning and end only exist within time - god is outside of time so cannot stop/start existing

2 issues for god as temporal/everlasting

1. if god is essentially everlasting then he must exist in time. implies that time is a necessary condition of his existence. but this threatens God’s perfection, as it implies his dependence on something other than him: time

2. given god’s necessary existence, his everlastingness implies that there was never a time when there was no time. but god cannot have created time since it is a necessary condition of his existence - threatening his omnipotence by suggesting that there is a major part of the universe (time) which he could not create

what are the two types of simultaneity (for atemporal/eternal existence)

T simultaneity: for temporal beings such as humans - humans can only experience things happening simultaneously in the present monent

e-simultaneity: applies to atemporal beings such as god. god could experience multiple things happening simultaneously at all times (past, present, future) from the perspective of an eternal present. eg. could have the experience of you on your 8th bday whilst simultaneously having the experience of you on your 18th

problems with the simultaneous thing

• can we really conceive of this kind of experiencing? - often driven to metaphorical terms

• ‘simultanous’ means at the same time, but e simultaneity suggests god is atemporal and exists outside of time

another issue for god as atemporal

• acting necessarily takes time - so being temporal is a necessary condition of being an agent ie. i could not write this sentence without it taking time

• this suggests an atemporal god could not be an agent (ie. could not act in any way)

• but the god is theism is essentially an agent- therefore the theistic god cannot be atemporal/eternal

• also creating is a kind of action so takes time. it is a process - eg. if someone creates x, there is necessarily a time before x exists, during x’s creation, and a time after x has been created. this suggests that being temporal is a necessary condition of being a creator, suggesting an atemporal god could not be a creator, let alone the creator of the universe

• but god is essentially the creator of the universe

• therefore the theistic god cannot be atemporal/eternal

explain omniscience

• divine attribute of perfect knowledge

• ‘knowing everything that it is possible to know’

• focus is on propositional knowledge

• not just a matter of what god knows, but how he knows - Aquinas argues that he knows ‘directly’ rather than through inference or understanding a system of representation + knows particulars (as this is superior to knowledge mediated by concepts) - ie. he knows about each tree rather than having general knowledge of trees

explain omnipotence

• divine attribute of perfect power/the most power possible

• two conceptions of this;

  • god can do everything, including what is logically impossible (but this is inconceivable, suggesting we cannot conceive of god)

  • god can do everything excluding what is logically impossible but including all that is logically possible (but not that this threatens his omnipotence since it implies that there is something over which god has no control). aquinas supports this as he argues that what is logically impossible is a contradiction in terms so not meaningful, it is not anything at all. thus the limits on logical possibility are not limits on Gods power

omnibenevolence

• divine attribute of supreme goodness

• can be understood in a moral sense - God is perfectly good means that god’s will is always in accordance with moral values

• DCT (divine command theory): omnibenevolence means that morality is dependent upon god’s will, so god is the ultimate moral authority and the author of moral law

• DIT (divine independence theory): god’s omnibenevolence consists in his acting according to, communicating, and in some way enforcing a moral law which is good independently of his will

what is a paradox

• when two or more things must be true, but they are mutually inconsistent, meaning it is logically impossible for them all to be true

explain the paradox of the stone

• can god create a stone that he can’t lift?

• it is logically possible for beings to make objects which they cannot lift, therefore is the answer is ‘no’ then there would be at least one logically possible thing that god cannot do, suggesting that god is not omnipotent

• is the answer is ‘yes’ then it suggests there is something that god cannot do (lift the stone) therefore there would be at least one logically possible thing that god cannot do, once again threatening his omnipotence)

• either way it seems there is something god cannot do, therefore neither he nor any other being can be omnipotent

• even further, the concept of omnipotence itself is incoherent, because it is logically contradictory to suggest that a being could have the powers to create a stone it cant lift AND the power to lift that stone

unsuccessful response to paradox of the stone - response then evaluation

response:

• paradox fails because it presupposes the possibility of something logically impossible

• the claim that X can make something too heavy for X to lift is not normally logically impossible - humans do it all the time

• but it becomes self-contradictory (and therefore logically impossible) when X is an ominpotent being

• ‘a stone an omnipotent being can’t lift’ is not a possible thing, as a self contradiction it describes nothing

• so ‘the power to create a stone an omnipotent being cannot life’ is not a possible power

• if god lacks it, god still doesn’t lack any possible power

evaluation:

• begs the question

• assumes that we can coherently talk od an omnipotent being ie. that in the phrase ‘a stone that an omnipotent being can’t lift’ we can make sense of the term ‘omnipotent being’

• but if the concept of an omnipotent being is indeed self contradictory, then this isn’t true

• we can’t legitimately use the concept of omnipotence in an argument unless we know it is a coherent concpet

• this reply is trying to show the concept is not self contradictory, but to conclude with this the premises assume the concept is not self-contradictory - begs the question as truth of the conclusion is assumed

• so reply fails

swinburne’s response to paradox of stone and why it fails

swinburne:

• an omnipotent being must be able to make a stone which he couldn’t life, but in doing so he would sacrifice his omnipotence

• to sacrifice his omnipotence, must also be within the power of an omnipotent being

response:

• given god’s omnipotence is essential to his nature, for him to cease being omnipotent would be for him to cease being god - therefore swinburne’s proposal implies that the only way to save god’s existence from the Paradox of the Stone is in effect to bring God’s existence to an end!

outline the euthyphro dilemma (1)

• concerns omnibenevolence

• is morality something independent of God or is it moral because God wills it to be?

• the answer is either DIT or DCT (explain)

• there are reasons to think that neither answer is satisfactory, creating a dilemma

problems with dit and dct (2)

DCT: if correct, then god can change wrong into right by an act of will eg. if he commanded us to murder babies, then it would be morally right of us to murder babies, but this violates our sense of morality

DIT: if correct, we place a constraint upon God; he would no longer be omnipotent because he cannot turn wrong into right - morality is not something God has power over

if neither answer is satisfactory, but logically god’s omnibenevolence must be either DCT or DIT, then we may question the coherence of our conception of God’s omnibenevolence

Plato’s version of Euthyphro (2)

• PLato considered ‘what is piety?’ - is piety doing whatever the gods want or do the gods want it because it is pious (closely reflects our thing but more focused on defining piety than our conception of God in relation to morality)

• Euthyphro responds that the gods love what is pious becuase it is pious. but this makes piety indepnedent of the gods’ love - the nature of piety is not dependent upon whether or not the gods love it. that some action is dear to the gods doesn;t make it an act of piety

• plato: an action qualifies as pious merely because the god’s love it 0 it is their love for an action that qualifies it as pious

criticism of DCT - ‘God is good’

• if good is whatever god wills, then ‘god is good’ is a tautology, and says nothing substantial about God - whatever he wills is good by definition

• ‘god is good’ means no more than ‘god wills whatever god wills’

• reply: ‘god is good’ means ‘god is good to us’ - ie. loves us and wants what’s best for us. and what is best for us can be understood in a way that is not dependent upon what god wills

• but then there is some standard of what if what is good independent of what god wills - again threatening his omnibenevolence

criticism of DCT - morality is arbitrary

• there is no moral reason guiding god’s will because god invents morality- but if god has no reason to what he does there is no rational structure to morality

• so it would be right to murder babies if god willed it?

• but this seems completely antithetical to our view of morality

• reply that god does not command things arbitrarily (look at his quality of love - so structured on the basis of this)

• but problem persists- god wills what he does because he loves, but why does god love what he does? this too is arbitrary?

how do different philosophers conceive of God in general

• Augustine: to think of God is to ‘attempt to conceive something which nothing more excellent or sublime exists’

• descartes - supremely perfect

• anselm - greatest conceivable being

• malcolm - unlimited being

outline the problem of omniscience and free will

• an omniscient being must be able to know what we will do in the future (part of what it is for god to be omniscient)

• so god exists atemporally

• but if god knows what we are going to do in the future, then how can we be free?

• define doing an action freely: be able to do it or refrain from doing it

• but if god knows what we are going to do then it must be true that we will do it

• if it is true that i will do that action, nothing can prevent it being true that i will do the action in the future

• therefore god knows what i will do before it - and i cannot refrain from doing the action in the future

• therefore my actions are not free

solution to free will- everlasting

• if we conceive of god as everlasting not eternal then we could argue it is impossible for him to know the future because of free will

• not a restriction if omniscience is knowing all that it is possible to know - gd still knows everything it is possible to know at any given time

• but is this a satisfactory answer? - view of omniscience and relationship between god and time (everlasting problems)